R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME EIGHT

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

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VOLUME EIGHT

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DISPUTATION XLVIII

ON ACTION

1. Aristotle taught very little about the six ultimate genera of accidents, whether in the Dialectic or in the Metaphysics. He was content merely to enumerate them. Indeed, in Metaphysics V, chapter 7, he lists them in such a way that he omits habit and posture; and the Commentator, on that passage, says: "He passed over the predicaments of posture and habit, either for the sake of brevity or because they are hidden." From Aristotle's Physics, however, much can be gathered about the other four: he treats action and passion in Book III, and time and place in Book IV. Our task here is to treat these more broadly and abstractly, as metaphysical inquiry demands. Although writers usually discuss these predicaments in general, asking whether they are something absolute, relative, or mixed, and whether they are things or modes distinct from other realities, these matters will be better explained in the treatment of each individual predicament. For I do not think there is any real notion common to all and only these predicaments on the basis of which such general questions could be treated. Moreover, it is very confused and laborious to dispute, in a general way, about things that are distinct precisely as distinct, merely because of the extrinsic denomination by which these genera are called the six ultimate predicaments.

Section I

Why We Speak of Action Before the Others. Action Is One Genus of Being.

2. Accordingly, concerning action—which Aristotle always numbers first among these—we have already said much above when treating the efficient cause. Since action is the causality of the efficient cause, as we said there, it was necessary to say whatever was necessary for understanding the causality of that cause. We must therefore take over from what was said there that action is something included in the realm of things, contained within the latitude of being, and by its nature distinct from the thing that comes to be through it. Since these points were sufficiently proved there, there is no need to repeat them here, although it will often be necessary to emphasize them again. From those points we also presuppose as certain that action is something distinct from the other predicaments, except passion (of which, and of the distinction between the two, we shall speak in the following disputation), and except when (quando), concerning which there is a difficulty common to all the predicaments about how it is distinguished from them, which we reserve for its proper place; and also except relation, which will be treated below, since it requires some explanation. As for the remaining predicaments, the matter is clear: compared with substance, quantity, quality, and where (ubi), action stands to them as to its terms; and therefore, once the distinction of action from its term is proved, the distinction from those predicaments is also proved. With habit and posture it has no likeness at all, much less identity. If those be considered insofar as they can in some way be brought about through action, there will be the same distinction between action and them as there is between action and other terms. These points being presupposed, it remains for us to explain more distinctly the common essence of action and its causes and principles, and then to hand down its divisions, explaining each member as far as falls within the bounds of metaphysics.

SECTION I
WHETHER ACTION ESSENTIALLY IMPLIES A REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTING

1. The reason for doubting is that action seems essentially to express a relation to an agent, without which it can neither be understood nor distinguished from passion. On the other hand, if relation constitutes a special predicamental genus, it cannot be included in the essence of another predicament.

The Division of Relation Into One Arising Extrinsically & One Arising Intrinsically is Examined

2. At this point we must expressly treat Scotus's opinion, which distinguishes relation into one that arises extrinsically and one that arises intrinsically, a discussion to which we referred above. He calls those relations "arising intrinsically" which necessarily spring up once the foundation and the term are posited; for this reason he calls them "arising intrinsically," because, so to speak, they germinate from within when the foundation and the term are posited. These relations he says can be proper relations which constitute the predicament of relation (ad aliquid). By contrast, he calls "arising extrinsically" those respects that do not necessarily follow upon the positing of some foundation and term, as in the case of action, which is our present topic. For when fire and wood are posited, the respect of action does not at once arise intrinsically, because the two might not be applied to one another, or some obstacle might intervene to impede the action. Indeed, even when all requisites are posited and all impediments removed, action may still fail to follow, as is clear in a free agent; and even in a natural agent that could happen by absolute power, if God's

concurrence alone be set aside. This cannot happen with relations that arise intrinsically, and so they are rightly called respects arising extrinsically, both to distinguish them from the former and because, if they do not sprout from the foundation inwardly, they must come from without. Scotus says that these respects neither belong to the predicament of relation nor constitute any single predicament, but several; he gives no reason for this, offering only the authority of those who distinguished the ten predicaments. A reason can be given, however: the former relations, just as they agree in the mode of resulting from foundation and term, likewise have a certain common and univocal notion of relation, and they have no other function than to relate; therefore they constitute the special predicament of relation. But the latter respects, since they come from without, are conferred in various ways and for various offices; for that reason they have a mode entirely different from the former relations, and among them there are also several genera that are primarily diverse.

3. Scotus treats this view expressly in Sentences IV, dist. 13, q. 1, § Ad cuius autem, and he alludes to it at dist. 6, q. 10, and in III, dist. 11, q. 1. According to it, action is a certain respect arising extrinsically. The ground for this is that action signifies a real respect to the agent, as the initial reason for doubting shows; and yet it does not signify a predicamental relation, as the opposing reason shows. Therefore it signifies a respect of another sort, best described by the phrase "arising extrinsically," as explained above. Nor is it sufficient to say that action expresses only a respect secundum dici (in the order of saying), for action and passion are not distinguished only secundum dici or in the order of signifying, but in the very formal notion signified; and they are distinguished only by a respect. Therefore that respect is not merely secundum dici, for, as has been said, to be a respect secundum dici is not to be a respect, but to be signified after the manner of a respect. Hence it is a respect in the order of being. This is confirmed, for it belongs to the intrinsic notion of action to be an emanation and causality of the agent; thus essentially it is something mediating

between agent and effect, depending on both and establishing, as it were, a certain opposition between them. But this belongs only to the notion of a respect in the order of being. Therefore…

How Scotus's Position is Opposed by Others

4. The Thomists first attack this general distinction of relations into those arising intrinsically and those arising extrinsically, as can be seen in Hervaeus, Quodlibeta VII, q. 14; Soncinas, on Metaphysics V, q. 39; and Soto, on the Categories, chapter on relation, and on Physics V, q. 2, a. 2. The chief reason for their attack is that if these respects "arising extrinsically" are true respects in the order of being, as Scotus seems to suppose, then they univocally agree in the essential notion of a respect to another. A mere difference in the mode of origin or production or resulting—though it indicates some essential diversity—does not prevent, but rather presupposes, a certain common and essential agreement that must be univocal, since there is no basis here for an analogy. Therefore all these relations would be of the same genus and consequently of the same predicament. No reason can be given why those differences, however essential, are not true specific differences, since they are not themselves relations; otherwise one could also say that mutual and non-mutual relation, and the like, differ in predicament.

5. A difficulty immediately arises in this attack, since by similar reasoning it would be proved that transcendental relations are not true respects in the order of being, or that they do not belong to the predicament of relation—whereas above we showed that these transcendental respects cannot be denied to be real and in the order of being. Indeed, if Scotus had understood by "relations arising extrinsically" nothing but transcendental respects, we would not contend greatly with him over that name, even though it should rightly be avoided, as I shall say forthwith. For as to the thing itself, we cannot deny transcendental respects both in other realities—as was

seen in the preceding disputation and throughout metaphysics—and also in action, as I shall now show. Nor does the attack just cited have force against this, because the very concept of a transcendental respect is transcendental and ranges over all beings, especially created beings; and this is even more indubitable regarding incomplete and imperfect beings. Much more, then, the more abstract concept—namely, respect in general, insofar as it abstracts from the transcendental and the predicamental—cannot be generic, but (so to speak) super-transcendental. These, therefore, are separated as primarily diverse, as is clear from what was said in the chapter on the predicament of relation.

Why Bl. Scotus's Opinion Should be Rejected

6. If, however, Scotus understands by relation arising intrinsically or extrinsically something other than transcendental and predicamental respect, we cannot agree with him; and then the argument set out carries no small weight. For since a relation "arising extrinsically" would not be a transcendental respect, it would posit a determinate mode of relations; why then would it not posit a special genus of real relation, common univocally and as a determinate nature contained under a more universal genus? Moreover, there is no reason why Scotus should limit these relations, which he calls "arising extrinsically," to the six ultimate predicaments alone. For union, according to his view, is a relation arising extrinsically; and yet it does not belong to any of the six predicaments, but is reduced to the predicament of the form that is united, as was shown above. If perhaps he were to say that all these predicaments express or include this respect, whereas not every respect "arising extrinsically" belongs to the six ultimate predicaments, he ought first to have given a reason for this. Thereafter he could more easily have said that these predicaments include transcendental respects, primarily diverse from predicamental ones.

7. I inquire further about the very appellation: why call this respect "arising extrinsically"? The reason given above and the example of action do not seem sufficient. For the relation of proximity between Peter and Paul is considered predicamental; and yet it does not follow immediately upon Peter and Paul existing in reality. In them there is only a sort of remote foundation, and something further must be added which is the proximate reason for founding and, as it were, eliciting the relation. This very thing is found between what acts and what suffers: no respect arises between them unless there be some change and some new mode in one or other of them; and this change is not itself the relation but some mode of a thing, even if it includes a transcendental respect or a predicamental respect follows upon it. But just as in other matters, once the necessary motion or change is posited, the relation arises at once, so also here, once the action is posited; and nothing further is required except that the action itself occur. This is not enough for the respect to be called "arising extrinsically," since nearly all predicamental relations exhibit this: for example, not only action, but even a power cannot be referred to its object, nor knowledge to the knowable, unless it first exists in reality; and when it exists, it does not exist without a transcendental respect.

8. I explain this finally as follows. Either Scotus is speaking of the relation of the agent to the patient or effect, or of the respect of the action itself to the principle of acting. If the first, then it is false that such a respect is included in action, for rather it results from action; and it is also false to call it "arising extrinsically," for once the foundation with its proximate ground of founding and the term are present, that relation necessarily arises, as is clear from what has been said about the predicament of relation. If, however, he is speaking of the respect of the action itself, to what, I ask, does it "arise extrinsically"? To the action itself? But then it is intrinsic and essential to it. To the subject in which the action inheres, whatever that may be? In that way many predicamental relations could be called "arising extrinsically," because with respect to the subject to which they are

attributed, they come extrinsically or accidentally. Thus the relation of knowledge to the knowable could be said to arise extrinsically with respect to the subject to which knowledge accrues—especially if it is infused from without. For, when the power and the object are posited, such a relation is not in it; but once knowledge exists, that relation necessarily accrues. If finally it be said that there is a difference here in that by the action by which knowledge is produced no relation is produced, but it results afterward, whereas in action as such nothing is added but a respect, since action is produced per se as action is produced per se—and that in general this belongs to a relation "arising extrinsically," namely, that it alone is produced per se—if this be said, it is common to transcendental relations, though not necessary to all, as was said above. Likewise it cannot be true of all six ultimate predicaments, as will be clear from their treatment. And especially in the case of action this is gratuitously asserted; for just as knowledge is not a mere respect, but a quality that includes a transcendental respect to its object, so action is not a mere respect, but a certain mode that intrinsically and essentially includes a respect. And if from knowledge, as including a transcendental respect, there then results another predicamental relation, the same can be said of action. Therefore there is no special reason why such a respect should truly be called "arising extrinsically."

A Second Position, Denying That Action Includes a Relation, is Rejected

9. There is, then, a second position which says that action does not essentially include any respect to the agent other than an extrinsic denomination taken from the very form or effect produced. Thus Hervaeus holds, and in Quodlibet I, q. 9; and Iavellus, on Metaphysics V, q. 23. They say that the action of heating, for example, is nothing other than the heat produced by the fire, by which the fire is denominated "agent," a denomination that does not consist in a

respect but in a kind of extrinsic informing, and to that a respect can then follow. The basis of this position is that this suffices to constitute the agent as actually acting; therefore it also suffices for the notion of action; therefore whatever else is feigned is superfluous and can scarcely be understood; therefore it must not be admitted.

10. But this position is either false or does not adequately explain the proper respect of action. If it understands that action in reality names no thing or real mode distinct by nature from the form that is made, but is the very form itself as extrinsically denominating the efficient cause, it has already been sufficiently refuted above, when we showed that action must be something intermediate between agent and effect, and distinct by nature from both. On that view there is no such intermediate, since the effect itself is said to denominate extrinsically the efficient cause and as such is called "action," just as the surface of a containing thing extrinsically denominates the thing contained and is called "place." Nor can this position give an account of why the form made should extrinsically denominate the cause that made it. The mere existence of the two things—that which is made and that which is said to make—does not suffice for that denomination; for those two things might both exist in reality in such a way that neither would have made the other, but each would have been made by God or some other cause. In that case such a denomination would not be taken from the existence of those two things; therefore something else must intervene in the things themselves, because that denomination arises from the things themselves. If, as is necessary, it be said that only this intervenes, that one proceeds from the other, I ask what this "proceeding" is. It is something existing in the things themselves, and it cannot fail to be distinct by nature from the thing which is the efficient cause and the thing which is the effect, since those two things could exist without the procession of one from the other. Therefore the denomination is not taken from the thing that is the effect as such, but from this proceeding or producing, whatever it be.

11. This is confirmed and made clearer as follows. Just as an absolute procession is necessary for the generic denomination of "agent," so a determinate mode of procession is necessary for a determinate denomination, even if otherwise the same thing were made by the same thing. Hence it is a sign that the denomination is not taken from the mere coexistence of these things but from the procession that mediates between them. The assumption is made clear by an example: if Peter causes Paul in a natural way, he is truly called Paul's begetter and father; but if, by divine power—for example, by an act of will—he had produced him, although he would have been his effector, he would not be his begetter nor father. Therefore action cannot be the thing made as such denominating, but must be something else that intervenes between it and the efficient thing; for when the same thing is made, the making and the denomination taken from it are different.

12. But if that position, by "form made," does not understand the thing itself which is the terminus of the making taken materially, but some mode existing in the very thing made and extrinsically denominating the agent—which mode too can be numbered among the agent's effects, since it proceeds immediately and per se from the agent, although it proceeds not so much as an effect as as a way to the effect—if, I say, the position speaks in this sense, it does indeed say something true, as is clear from what was said above and will be more fully explained in Section 3 when we treat the subject of action. Nevertheless, it does not sufficiently explain the matter, and besides it confuses the question about the subject of action, which is not relevant here. Moreover, it without cause denies that action expresses a respect to the agent, both because that very denomination is taken from no other source than such a respect—why does the heating that occurs in this piece of wood denominate this fire as acting and not another, except because it has a respect to this one and not another?—and also because this very fact of emanating from this source intrinsically expresses a respect that cannot be conceived otherwise.

But it has been shown that what denominates the cause as actually acting, as such, is not the thing itself that is made as existing absolutely, but some intermediate reality, which can be nothing other than the emanation itself. Therefore a respect to the agent is necessarily included in it.

A Third Position

13. The third position is that action expresses something absolute together with a respect. This is taken from the Commentator on Physics III, com. 9, and from St. Thomas there; and Capreolus follows it, Sentences II, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1 and 3; as does Soncinas, on Metaphysics V, q. 38. Yet this position is displeasing in two respects. First, its authors think that the relation which action expresses is the relation that results in the agent toward the patient or effect; but this is impossible, because action, in its whole notion, is by nature prior to that relation. For once the effect is produced, that relation arises by an order of nature; but the effect comes to be through action. Therefore action, as action, cannot be constituted intrinsically by that relation. This is confirmed: even if no real predicamental relation resulted in the agent—as happens in God creating—nevertheless the full notion of real action would remain, because He would be a true efficient cause [and the effect would truly proceed from Him; thus the efficient cause], as such, is prior by nature to and independent of that relation. Therefore such a relation resulting in the cause is not intrinsic and essential to action. Second, the position is displeasing because it takes the respect included in action to be a predicamental relation—whereas one reality of one predicament cannot be constituted essentially by another, otherwise the predicaments would not be unmixed and action would not be a per se unity but an aggregate of several. They say, however, that action does not per se and first, so to speak, signify in the direct mode both an absolute and a respect—for in that case it would not be one thing—but that it directly and per se

signifies something absolute, for example the motion that occurs in the patient, while it only connotes the relation that results in the agent. Yet the arguments already made show that this cannot be true, both because action as action is presupposed to that relation, and also because here we are inquiring into the intrinsic constituent of action. But a reality of one predicament cannot be constituted by a mere connotation of something belonging to another predicament; for what is connoted is extrinsic, and connotation is not something of the thing, but a denomination taken from our mode of conceiving or denominating. If, however, by the word "connotation" one understands some real habitude of the motion itself to the relation that results in the agent, then that relation will not be merely connoted, but will be included per se, first and directly, in action; and it will not be a habitude to the relation that, as it were, accidentally results, but to the very principle of causing, which action regards per se.

First Assertion Toward Resolving the Question

14. The Commentator's position must therefore be understood otherwise if it is to be true: namely, that in reality action is a certain real and absolute mode, yet one that intrinsically and essentially includes a respect to the acting principle from which it flows, and that precisely under this respect it has the notion of action. To make this view more exact, it must be explained and proved part by part.

15. Action Is the Dependence by Which an Effect Depends on an Efficient Cause. I say, then, first: in reality action is nothing other than that special dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause. This assertion was sufficiently proved in disputing about the causality of the efficient cause. From what has been said here against the other positions it is easily recommended; for action is not the thing that does the making, nor the thing made, the terminus of

efficient causality, nor both taken together, nor is the denomination derived from their coexistence; it is something else intermediate between them. But nothing else can be conceived than the dependence of one upon the other. Therefore… The minor is proved thus. Without this dependence it is impossible to understand in one of these things the notion of an effect and in the other the notion of an efficient cause. Once this dependence is posited and any other reality or real mode is set aside, the thing that depends is necessarily something produced, and that from which it depends is actually acting. Therefore action can be nothing other than this dependence. This is confirmed: every effect depends on its cause through the causality of that cause; therefore the effect of an efficient cause depends on it through the causality of the efficient cause. But the causality of this cause is nothing other than action, as was shown above. Therefore… I added that this must be understood of the special dependence of the effect on the efficient cause, for in every genus of cause there is its own mode of dependence; and yet dependence on a form is not action but union. Therefore the special dependence which is on an extrinsic cause really influencing being, which we call the efficient cause, is, in the thing itself, the action of the agent.

16. You will say: dependence arises from action; the effect depends because it is being made; therefore action cannot be the dependence itself but something prior to it. I reply by denying that dependence arises from action; rather it is action itself. Hence that causal statement is not to be reduced to an efficient cause but rather to a formal cause: that is, when one says that a thing depends because it is being made, the sense is not that dependence flows from action, but that by action itself the notion of agent is constituted. Next, I admit that by these two words, dependence and action, and by the precise concepts corresponding to them, the mode that is dependence is not signified under the same aspect, as I shall explain immediately; and this suffices for that causal locution, which often does not indicate a

true cause, but a reason—so that a distinction by inadequate concepts will suffice, just as we say that God is willing because He is understanding. Therefore, in the conclusion I did not say that action is formally dependence, lest it be understood of formal consideration as precisely conceived; rather I said that in reality action is not other than dependence, which is most certain to me from the reasons already given.

Second Assertion

17. Action Regards the Agent Essentially. I say, secondly: action as action intrinsically and essentially expresses a transcendental respect to the agent, that is, to the principle of acting. The initial reason for doubting at the beginning sufficiently proves this conclusion. The reason urged on the opposite side does not tell against it, for it concerns only predicamental relations as such. All that was said against the other opinions likewise proves the same. Moreover, since action as action expresses an egress or procession from the agent, it cannot be conceived without a respect to the agent; therefore it is a sign that it intrinsically expresses a respect to the agent. Furthermore, action as action denominates the agent as actually acting by a real denomination that arises from the things themselves, and not on account of any real union to the agent, as we shall show below—for otherwise that denomination would be intrinsic rather than extrinsic. Therefore it is at least on account of the real habitude of the action to the agent. Finally, we shall show below that action has a real and essential dependence on the acting principle—not by another dependence distinct from itself, otherwise one would proceed to infinity, as has often been said—therefore by itself intrinsically. But such an intrinsic dependence cannot consist without a real habitude of the action to the agent; therefore this transcendental respect is included in the essential notion of action as such.

Third Assertion

18. By the Respect Imbibed in Action, the Agent Is Not Referred. I say, thirdly: by this respect of action to the agent, taken precisely, the agent itself is not thereby referred to another; rather the action itself regards the agent from which it proceeds. This conclusion has been partly proved by the arguments made against Capreolus and others cited under the third position. It can also be briefly commended thus. The agent itself is rather the term of this respect, for the action regards it insofar as it includes such a respect. To explain further, note that there are two ways in which the agent as agent can be understood to be referred to another, namely to its term or effect: first, by a transcendental respect, insofar as it is an efficient cause in act; second, by the predicamental relation that results therefrom. Regarding this latter relation, the stated conclusion is evident, and the arguments made prove it especially. As to the transcendental respect, it must further be observed that such a respect can be conceived as the agent's respect to its own action; for this truly and really proceeds from it and can in some way be reckoned among its effects. Nevertheless, in truth there is no new transcendental respect in the agent to its own action beyond that (if any there be) which is essentially imbibed in the very power of acting; for between that power and its action no other thing or real mode intervenes in whose intrinsic notion such a respect would be included. Therefore there is no new transcendental respect in the agent to its action; rather the action is referred to it, and from it the agent is denominated as being in act.

19. In another way, the agent as agent can be understood to be referred transcendently to its effect; for one cannot understand an agent unless it acts, as we shall say at greater length in the next section. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, it is better to say that the agent is denominated as though referred transcendently to the term than to say

that it is referred to it; for nothing is referred unless by a respect which it has in itself. The agent as agent does not have that respect in itself, but is denominated from the action which has that respect. It must further be considered in this matter that action does not regard the agent without a respect to the term, as will be shown in the next section; nevertheless, by a precisive abstraction we can separate one respect from another, as we have just now separated them in this very explanation. Therefore I said advisedly in the assertion that by this respect, taken precisely, which action has to the agent, it does not refer the latter, but, as it were, informs or denominates it—although action, according to the whole it includes, can be said to refer and, as it were, to order the agent to the effect, even though, as I said, this is rather to denominate it as related than to refer it. This is especially true of transient action, as we shall explain in Section 3, from which it will be clearer what sort of respect action has to the agent.

Fourth Assertion

20. Action Is the Ultimate Act of an Active Power. Lastly, from what has been said it is gathered that action, as action, can rightly be called the ultimate act of an active power and its exercise—provided it be not understood as an intrinsic and informing act, but absolutely as an act flowing from the power, whether it informs it or not. In the way in which an active power is called a power (although it is rather a kind of act), the action that flows from it can be called its act —not as of a subject, but as of the principle by which it acts; for this is the essential respect of action as such. Hence from the very respect which I said action has to its principle, it follows that it is compared to it as an act proceeding from it. And because action is what proceeds most immediately from an active power, it is rightly called its exercise; and in the same sense it is called, as it were, an extrinsic actualization of it. Likewise, action is the very causality of the efficient cause by which it is constituted as actually causing; but causality constitutes the

cause in act. Therefore, under this aspect it can be called its act, at least extrinsically. Nor does what we said above stand in the way—that in reality action is nothing other than the dependence of the effect on the cause—for that dependence itself essentially regards its principle, and by reason of this respect it is called the exercise and a certain extrinsic actuality of the active power.

SECTION II

WHETHER ACTION, AS ACTION, ESSENTIALLY HAS REFERENCE TO SOME TERMINUS, EVEN IF IT IS IMMANENT, AND THEREFORE WHETHER IT TOO IS PLACED IN THIS PREDICAMENT

1. In this section the essence of action must be explained further, and at the same time its first and principal division into immanent and transient action must be touched upon. Here I call "transient action" that which has an effect outside the agent, whether the action itself is also outside the agent or not—for this must be examined later. By contrast I call "immanent action" that which has no effect outside the agent; and it is beyond controversy that such action is in the agent itself.

First Position Concerning the Term of Action

2. Many hold that it belongs to the notion of action, properly speaking as a distinct genus of accident, that it tends toward some term which it therefore regards transcendently; yet they deny that this belongs to the notion of every action, that is, of every active causality which is the actuality or exercise of an active power. This opinion is held by many Thomists, especially Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 26. The foundation is that in the predicament of action there are transient

actions, which must have some term or effect toward which they tend, for in this consists the reason why they are called "transient." Immanent actions, however, are not placed in the genus of action, but are certain qualities, as the same author proves at length on Metaphysics IX, q. 21. Therefore it is not necessary that such an action should have a term distinct from itself. And since there is no controversy regarding the first part, the second is proved first from Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 9, text 16, where he establishes this difference between transient and immanent action: that by the former something is made, but not by the latter. This is to say that an immanent action is not a proper action belonging to the genus of action.

3. Soncinas argues a second time: every action in the genus of action is successive; for every action is motion, as is said in Physics III, text 19, and as is clear from the De Anima; this was also touched upon above when we treated the intensification of qualities. Therefore such an action is not a true action belonging to the genus of action. If you press further that from this it follows that illumination is not a true action, Soncinas grants the consequence, whence he would all the more say the same about substantial generation.

4. Third, every action of itself entails a passion, as is also clear from Physics III; but immanent actions do not entail passions in that about which they are occupied. Vision does not change the visible object about which it is occupied. Hence such an action cannot regard a term that is made through it, because an action never has such a term except insofar as it changes that with which it is concerned so as to regard such a term; but by immanent action the proper matter of the action, which is its object, is not changed. Therefore by such an action nothing is made. This is confirmed: an active power is a principle of changing another as another; therefore the proper action is that by which another is changed. But by an immanent act another is not changed, as has been shown. Fourth, an immanent action is a perfection of the agent, since beatitude sometimes consists in such an

action; but no proper predicamental action is a perfection of the agent —for fire, by heating, is not perfected by its action. Therefore…

A Second Position, Placing Immanent Actions in the Predicament of Action Even If They Lack a Term

5. The second position denies that it belongs to the intrinsic essence of action, as such, to have a term that is made through it, to which it expresses a respect; that is, it denies that this belongs to the essence of action insofar as it is a certain highest and distinct genus. Under that genus, they say, some actions have a term and some do not. Those that have a term are transient actions—in which this position agrees with the previous one. Those that do not have a term are immanent actions—concerning which this position differs greatly from the preceding one. It holds that these immanent actions are most properly actions of the genus and predicament of action; yet they are pure actions that produce no intrinsic term of their own, strictly speaking, but immediately and per se attain their objects. Many disciples of St. Thomas think thus regarding immanent actions. For although they attribute in a special way to intellection that it produces a "word" (verbum) as an intrinsic effect, nevertheless they do not attribute a similar or proportional effect to every immanent action; almost all deny this in the actions of the senses and of both appetites. Nor do they agree among themselves in attributing that effect to every intellection; some require that effect only because of the absence of the object in certain intellections. Finally, they do not seem to posit that word as a proper term of intellection as producing action, because they teach that the word and the intellection are realities wholly distinct—something repugnant to action and its proper intrinsic term, since action can only be a mode of that reality which is its term and not a reality really distinct from it, as was proved above when disputing about efficient causality. The view of these authors is therefore that immanent action as such produces nothing per se that is

its proper term, but is a pure action, although sometimes some effect results from it. Thus teach the Thomists just cited and other modern interpreters of St. Thomas, on I, q. 27, a. 1; and Iavellus, Metaphysics IX, q. 16, where he numbers no other effects of immanent actions except habits, to which actions are compared rather as principles of acting than as actions—whereby he sufficiently declares that those actions do not have properly so-called intrinsic terms.

6. The first and principal foundation of this position is the testimony of the Philosopher, Metaphysics IX, text 16, saying that there are some actions whose work is nothing other than the action itself. All understand these to be immanent actions, as is clear from the Commentator, St. Thomas, and others. Therefore it does not belong to the notion of action as such to have an intrinsic term toward which it tends as to its own proper end and perfection. Second, an induction can be made: bodily vision produces nothing in the object nor in the very one who sees, beyond the vision itself; there is no reason for feigning or multiplying anything else as produced by that action; the same holds for the acts of the other senses and for the act of loving and similar acts. Third, the following reason can be added: these actions are not instituted by nature to produce anything, nor that the agent by them communicate its being, but that by them the powers may unite themselves to their objects. Therefore it is without cause to attribute to these actions the production of something. Here one can apply the axiom: things are not to be multiplied without necessity.

A Third Position, Requiring a Term in Every Action

7. The third position is that it belongs to the notion of action as such that it have a term which it intrinsically regards; and that this is therefore common to every action that proceeds from a true efficient cause. This is the more common opinion of the theologians on I, dist. 27, especially Durandus and Gabriel, q. 2; it is taken also from Scotus, q. 3, and Quodlibet 8; from St. Bonaventure, Sentences I, dist. 3, a. 1,

q. 1, ad ult.; from Antonius Andreas, Metaphysics IX, q. 4; and others around the Aristotelian text cited. And I judge this position to be altogether true. Since, as I said, there is no controversy about transient action, the truth of this position must first be explained in the case of immanent action, and then it will be confirmed absolutely of action as such.

A Certain Distinction of Hervaeus Concerning Action Is Refuted

8. Before all else we must guard against an equivocation about immanent and transient action introduced by Hervaeus, Quodlibet II, q. 8, reported and refuted by Soncinas and Iavellus in the places cited. Hervaeus said that immanent operation is not an "effection," nor any causality of an efficient cause which could be an immanent action, because he thinks this repugnant to the definition of an active power—namely, that it is the principle of changing another as other. He says that immanent action or operation can be predicated only of the causality of form or matter, perhaps because these causes cause in such a way that they remain in the very effect. Two things are rightly rejected in this view. First, that he calls the causalities of matter and form "immanent actions," when in truth they are not actions; otherwise, if one may abuse terms in this way, we can hardly understand the authors and philosophers. When philosophers and theologians speak of immanent action, they never understand the causality of matter and form, but the acts of the vital powers, which are efficiently produced by the powers themselves. Second, he falsely denies that any proper "effection" is truly immanent, whereas all teach this concerning vital acts; nor is it repugnant that a power should act upon itself, whether it be a partial principle of acting or a total proximate one, or a virtual one—about which we disputed at length above. Here, then, by immanent action we understand the true and

proper efficiency of certain acts which remain in the very powers by which they are made and inform them.

The Dependence of Immanent Acts on Their Powers Is Explained

9. Second, I presuppose that these immanent acts both are true qualities and are efficiently produced by their powers. The former point is common doctrine, as was seen above when we treated the species of quality. The latter is most certain. For although there is controversy whether, by absolute power, these immanent and vital acts could constitute the soul's powers in second act if they were not efficiently produced by them, nevertheless it is at least certain that, by the nature of the thing, a human being cannot know or love by these acts unless he performs them by the very powers by which he knows or loves. And I think it is certain, even by absolute power, that free acts cannot be free unless they are efficiently produced by the free power of which they are the acts, as was touched upon above. Hence it follows that in these acts there is not only the qualities themselves, but also the effective dependence of those qualities on their powers and the effective causality of the powers upon them; for these powers truly produce these qualities; therefore they are their true efficient causes; therefore they have true efficient causality upon them; therefore they truly depend efficiently upon the powers as their proper effects. All these consequences are evident from that antecedent; indeed they add scarcely anything to it, beyond a fuller explanation of the same terms or correlatives.

10. Someone might, however, doubt whether the dependence of such a quality on its power is something distinct by nature from the quality itself. Indeed, if the authors of the first opinion could be understood to speak in some probable sense, no other seems to be available except this: that these qualities, of themselves and immediately, proceed from their powers without an action intervening

that is distinct by nature from them. Given this supposition, it is plausibly denied that proper actions, in the predicament of action, intervene in their production, because in their production no proper action mediates. For the same reason they are said to be pure qualities and not actions, unless only equivocally—or, as others speak, they are "grammatical" actions, because they are signified after the manner of actions tending toward an object as toward a term, although in that object they produce nothing. Or they can be said to be actions eminently, because they are truly produced not by a formal action but by something more eminent than action. Finally, according to this view the essential dependence of these acts on their powers is excellently preserved. For if they are such pure qualities that by themselves, most formally, they are such qualities and depend actively on their own powers, it is impossible for those qualities to exist in reality without such dependence. If they exist in reality without such dependence, that will be sufficient argument that the dependence is not essential, but something distinct by nature from the qualities themselves, as they are qualities.

11. Taken in this way, the view is not altogether improbable; yet from it one could not conclude that there is action without a term; rather one would have to conclude that there is a term without an action (if I may so speak)—for there is a quality truly produced and made without a mediating action. For my part, however, I cannot accept this view. First, because it posits something singular or new in these acts without sufficient foundation. The efficiency of these acts is not an improper efficiency, as by some mere resultance, but it is most proper and per se. For just as other active powers, when they properly act, display themselves in their actions, so these powers display themselves in their own acts. Nor do these powers produce these acts through prior immanent acts so that we might say that the former are, as it were, eminent actions of the latter, as many philosophers say of God's actions ad extra. Rather, these acts, speaking per se, flow from their powers without the intervention of other immanent acts which

would be distinct qualities; otherwise there would be a regress to infinity. Never is the proper efficiency of an active power found to reach an effect without a mediating action. To attribute this singularity to these acts is gratuitous, since in them there is nothing singular that would warrant the claim. That such acts continually depend on the influx of the power is no argument; for light likewise depends in that way on what illuminates, and much more all creatures depend on God —and nevertheless in these efficiencies a true action intervenes. The essential dependence alleged—such that these qualities could in no way be produced except in this manner—is asserted gratuitously and without foundation.

In Immanent Acts, Proper Predicamental Actions Intervene

12. For this reason, from the opposite principle I judge it far more probable that even in these qualities the dependence and the active outflow are distinguished, by nature, from the qualities themselves, and consequently that in the production of these acts there intervene true actions in the predicament of action, having proper and intrinsic terms produced by those actions, namely the acts themselves insofar as they are qualities informing their powers. I prove the several points. First, that these acts do not have the alleged essential and immutable dependence on their powers. No created thing having its own entity and its own being, really distinct from others, has such a dependence upon another creature that it cannot be produced by God alone without the aid or cooperation of a creature acting together with Him. This pertains to God's omnipotence and is founded upon the principle: whatever He can do with a secondary cause, He can do by Himself alone. The a priori reason is that since God alone is being itself by essence, eminently containing every participable being, He alone is a sufficient active principle of any being whatsoever. God can therefore produce these acts, insofar as they are

certain qualities, without the active concurrence of the powers—whether He produce them as informing the powers or not (for this belongs to another discussion). Therefore the dependence of these qualities upon the powers is not of the essence and entity of these qualities; therefore it is some mode distinct by nature from them. Hence it seems to me that Soncinas does not speak consistently when, on Metaphysics V, q. 20, ad 4, he expressly proves that it does not belong to the notion of an immanent act to be efficiently from the power in which it is, because God can, by Himself alone and without any other active principle concurring, cause intellection in the intellect—and straightway, at q. 21, he denies that immanent actions are true actions. For he cannot deny that these qualities, which he calls immanent acts, are de facto produced by their powers; therefore, if they are produced and this does not belong to their notion, there is something mediating between them and the powers by which they are produced—which can be nothing other than dependence and action.

13. Moreover, even if it were granted that these qualities depend essentially upon their powers, it still could not be proved—nor would it be true—that they depend by their very entities with the same immutable dependence. For the very same immanent act can be produced by its power in diverse ways—for example, with the concurrence of a habit or without it; or by means of this intelligible species or by another; and with this help of God or with another, especially in supernatural acts. According to these diverse modes of being produced, the action and dependence must needs vary, even if the quality itself does not vary. For in whatever way the agent varies, the action varies, even if the effect does not vary, as is clear from what was said about the efficient cause; we shall touch upon something of this in the next section. Now whenever, in the thing itself, dependence in the same quality can vary, this is a most certain sign that that dependence is in reality distinct from the quality and has the true and proper nature of action. Therefore even in those qualities a true action must be distinguished by nature, which is the causality of the efficient

power with respect to such a quality. Hence it is also clear that that action, as action, does not belong to the genus of quality, because it is a tendency toward a quality, distinct by nature from it, and is a true active causality constituting, in its own way, the efficient cause in second act with respect to the effect—whereas that formal effect does not belong to the genus of quality. Therefore it will be a proper action in the predicament of action; for it has a sufficient likeness to other actions, and there is no other predicament in which, as such, it should be placed.

14. Add that nothing prevents such an emanation from the agent from belonging to this predicament, for the fact that it is momentary, or that it always endures with the term, does not hinder, as is clear in illumination; indeed these do not diminish but rather perfect the notion of action. That such an action is immanent hinders even less, since it has a true term and is a true flow from the agent into the patient. Whether the agent and the patient are distinct or not is irrelevant to taking away the notion of predicamental action, as is clear in its own way in nutrition, locomotion, and the like, though not as perfectly. This view is also more consonant with Aristotle: Metaphysics IX, c. 6; Ethics VI, c. 4; and Magna Moralia I, last chapter, where he distinguishes action into immanent and transient, and everywhere he calls immanent acts "actions" or "operations," as is also clear from Ethics X, c. 3–6, in which places the ancient interpreters speak similarly. Likewise, in the Categories, in the chapter on Action, he places among the items of that predicament "being affected by pain and pleasure," which are immanent actions. Simplicius too, in the treatise On the Six Principles, says, following Archytas of Tarentum, that in the predicament of action are placed both the actions of inanimate things and of living things, and even of man himself; Albert the Great holds the same there. There is no doubt that immanent actions are included among the actions of animals and of man. Wherefore when some authors say that immanent acts are "actions" only in the mode of signifying, they either speak of immanent acts

insofar as they are certain qualities—for even as such they are usually signified after the manner of actions because of their tendency toward an object, so that the act of understanding is called "intellection," the act of willing "volition"—or else certain authors did not sufficiently consider the proper action that intervenes in the production of these qualities.

15. Finally, from all this it is clear that if immanent actions are taken as they truly are actions, they do not lack an intrinsic term toward which they tend as to their own proper end and perfection. This is proved from what has been said, because they tend toward the very acts themselves insofar as they are qualities, just as illumination tends toward light and heating toward heat.

Resolution of the Question. There Is No Action Without a Term

16. Lastly, from what has been said concerning immanent action, it is easy to see how one should answer the whole question and concerning action as such. I say that it belongs to the intrinsic and essential notion of action as such, and of every action, to have an intrinsic term toward which it tends, to be produced through it; and consequently the transcendental respect to such a term is included in the essential and complete concept of action. The first part is proved, first, by induction: every transient action has such a term, as is beyond controversy; and every immanent action also has it, as has been shown; and besides these there is no other kind of action. Therefore every action has such a term. Therefore it is a sign that this belongs to the notion of action as action. Second, there is an a priori reason: action as action, if it be true and proper, is nothing else than production or effection or the causality of an efficient cause; but it is impossible even in thought to conceive a true production without something being produced by it, or an actual causality without some

thing being caused. Therefore it is impossible to understand action without a term.

17. Third, if there were any actions without a term, they would be above all immanent ones; but these are not. For it has been shown that they are qualities which can have the proper notion of a term produced by a proper action—even if such action remains in the agent and is therefore called "immanent." Moreover, if an immanent act were a pure action, it would be immutable and invariable, and could be produced only by such and such an agent—something we have shown not to be true of the whole immanent act, even if it may be verified of action as such. Therefore, in the whole entity which is an immanent act, there is something that can be produced by various actions; therefore that has the notion of a term, even with respect to immanent action. Furthermore, there is nothing in these actions on account of which they should be thought to lack terms, as will be clear from the solutions to the arguments; and for the moment this is shown from the general and precise notion of immanent action. For either its notion is explained by the fact that it remains in the agent—and this does not exclude a term; for if the term itself also remains in the agent, the whole action will be immanent—or its notion is explained by the fact that it is a vital action, which requires an actual and permanent efficiency; and this too does not exclude a term, for the term may be such that by its nature it demands the actual and permanent efficiency or influx of its principle. Thus light likewise demands to be continually conserved by its agent, and nevertheless it is the term of a proper action; and the actions of the vegetative soul are also vital and require the actual influx of the principle, and nevertheless they have their proper terms. Or finally its notion is explained by the fact that immanent action is concerned with an extrinsic object which it does not change; and this does not exclude an internal term either, for the object is only the "matter about which," which does not pertain to the proper material cause; the "matter from which," which has the proper notion of cause with respect to such

action, is the very subject in which such action is received; and this it truly changes; and thus in it the action can have its proper and intrinsic term. There is therefore no reason to deny these actions their proper terms. Hence it belongs to the notion of action as such to have a term.

18. This can finally be illustrated as follows. Action as action does not signify a form that has its own entity, but a mode of some form or entity, namely the dependence of that form or entity upon the agent. But it belongs to the nature of a mode that it be a mode of something and that it cannot be found otherwise. Therefore, in the present case, dependence cannot be except the dependence of something that depends; and that we call the term of action or of dependence insofar as it is from the agent. You will say that dependence depends by itself, and therefore does not always need a term which depends through it. I answer that no mode, indeed not even a simple form, can be for the sake of itself alone or primarily—that is, as somehow participating its own quasi effect or denomination; but per se and directly its nature is to inform another or, as it were, to tend toward another; and if it somehow participates its denomination, this is quasi consequent or concomitant. Examples make the matter clear. Intellection and volition, because they are acts tending per se toward an object, cannot "stop," so to speak, in themselves—just as St. Thomas said (I–II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2) that it is impossible that the first lovable thing be love itself or the first visible thing be vision itself, because every vision is of some visible object. Hence, although one immanent act can be occupied with another as with an object, yet it cannot be occupied with itself; and although perhaps the same act of intellect and will reflects on itself in some way, it nevertheless cannot so rest in itself that it does not directly tend toward some object. Likewise quantity, although in some way it is quantitative by itself, cannot rest in itself, but is ordered to something other than itself to render that other quantitative, namely substance. Likewise one relation, if—as many hold—it is not referred to another

by a second relation, but by itself, cannot exist solely for the sake of being referred by itself to another, but must refer something else to its proper term. Thus, although dependence depends by itself and action is brought about by itself, there cannot be a dependence that rests solely in its own dependence, nor an action that rests solely in its own being an action; for the whole necessity of action and production is that by it something else be made.

19. From this the latter part of the assertion remains sufficiently proved—namely, that action essentially includes a transcendental ordering to its own term, because by its nature it is instituted for nothing other than to tend toward it and to establish it in reality. This can also be proved from the general notion of a mode. Every mode expresses a transcendental habitude to that of which it is the mode; but action is nothing other than a certain mode of the very term, establishing it as dependent on its cause. Therefore it intrinsically includes the aforesaid habitude to it. You will ask what sort of habitude this is—whether it is after the manner of an accident to its subject, or after the manner of a cause to its effect. I answer: neither, if we speak strictly. Not indeed after the manner of an accident; for an accident presupposes the subject to exist and is caused by it, at least materially; whereas action neither presupposes the term nor is caused by it, properly speaking—especially not materially. Nor is it the habitude of a cause—least of all an efficient cause—for action is not properly an efficient cause, but is the causality of the efficient cause. Hence, reductively, action can be reduced to that genus of cause, by reason of which action, too, is said to be by nature prior to its term, and the causal locution "because the thing is being produced, it is" is verified. Properly, however, that habitude is the way to the term, or the habitude of causality to the effect—just as, proportion being kept, union regards the united or the composite that results from union.

What Aristotle Held in This Matter

20. To the arguments for the first opinion we reply as follows. As to the first, drawn from Aristotle's testimony, Aristotle's view is not that by these immanent actions nothing at all is made, but either that nothing is made outside the very agent, or (which I think more likely) that nothing is made which remains after the action is over; and in this way he says that such an action consists in the very use. Thus, in Ethics I, c. 1, he says that in some arts the operations are the ends and not something made by them, as in the art of playing the lyre. This must necessarily be understood of a term that is made and remains after the action, as we explained above when treating the final cause. Thus, by immanent actions, nothing is said to be left as made because nothing is made by them that remains when they cease.

What Differences Exist in This Respect Between Immanent & Transient Actions

21. You will say: then there is no difference in this respect between immanent and transient actions; for even among transient actions there are some to which no thing made corresponds that remains when they cease, as is clear from the example proposed of playing the lyre or singing; and conversely, by certain immanent acts something permanent is produced after the act, such as a habit, which is sometimes produced by an act. I reply, beginning with the latter point, that there is no immanent action by which, properly and per se, something permanent is made after it. For a habit is not made by the action insofar as it is an action, but by the intrinsic term of the immanent action—that is, by that quality which is the second and ultimate act of the power. Hence a habit is not made by the immanent act taken in that way, as an action, but as a principle of acting, as was explained above; for that action by which the habit is immediately made and to which it is proximally terminated is identified with the habit itself and is its mode, just as in general every action is in its own proper term. The difference, therefore, consists in this: an immanent

action never has a term that remains after it, whereas a transient action regularly has such a term—even though sometimes and rarely it is otherwise. In this there is also a difference: when what is made by a transient action does not remain, this is only because of imperfection or imperfect participation, by reason of which it cannot remain unless it be actually conserved; thus sound—the term made by the action of playing or singing—does not remain because of its imperfection; likewise light, and similar things. By contrast, in immanent and vital acts this arises from a certain special nature that pertains to perfection: for they are the ultimate acts of life, and therefore they cannot remain without the actual influx of a vital principle.

Instantaneous Actions Belong to the Predicament of Action

22. To the second argument we reply that the assumption is altogether false. Under the genus of action are placed not only successive actions but also instantaneous ones. The argument made from illumination sufficiently proves this; and it is a wonder how Soncinas denies that illumination is placed under this genus, when he cannot deny that it is a true accidental action productive of its own proper term. For if it is not placed in this genus, in what predicament will it be? If perhaps Soncinas says that illumination is reduced to the predicament of quality where light is, why does he not say the same of heating? Or why should a successive action more properly constitute its own predicament than an instantaneous action? He can give no probable reason for this—especially since many think that from the fact that one action is successive and another occurs all at once they do not necessarily have an essential and specific distinction, if they do not have a greater difference otherwise. For just as heating "by eight degrees," because it occurs in a longer or shorter time, is not a specifically different action, nor is one action in reality a greater action than another—that is, one having more or less entity in the notion of

action—since they produce an equal term, albeit more slowly or more quickly, which is accidental; so, even if that whole heating occurred in an instant (as it could, if the patient had no resistance), it would not be an essentially different action, but would only be (so to speak) the swiftest action of that species to that term. We shall add something on this point in the next section. Whatever be said of this last point, there is no doubt that instantaneous action is a true action in the predicament of action.

Whether Every Action Is Motion

23. As to the argument on the contrary—that every action is motion—we reply by denying that proposition when taken metaphysically; for it fails at least in creative action, as was seen above and will be touched upon again here in Section 4. If, however, it be taken physically—that is, of physical action—it is true, with proportion, and speaking by identity rather than formally according to the mind's precise concepts. For successive action is successive motion, and instantaneous action is instantaneous change, which in a broad sense is also often called motion. And thus perhaps Aristotle spoke in Physics III, c. 3; although from that passage one should rather take it that every motion is action, than conversely that every action is motion.

Whether Every Action Entails a Passion

24. The same must be said of the proposition: action of itself entails passion. It is true of physical action, not of action taken absolutely. And although immanent action should rather be called metaphysical than physical, because by force of its genus it abstracts from matter in being, nevertheless, insofar as it agrees with physical action in that it is done from a subject, that principle holds true even of immanent action. It is ill argued to compare such an action to its

object, in which it entails no passion; for it belongs only to the notion of action that it entail a passion in the subject in which the action itself is, or—to speak more formally—in the subject in which its term is. In this way immanent action entails a passion in the very agent. There is also a bad confusion between "the matter about which" and "the matter from which." It is not necessary that an action entail a passion in the matter "about which" as in a subject, but in the matter "in which" or "from which," since that is the subject. As for the confirmation from the definition of active power: if the argument had any force, it would prove that the powers from which immanent acts flow are not active powers, because they do not change another. The definition must therefore be explained either of powers that act by transient and physical action, or, if it is to be understood universally of the power of changing a subject, the clause "another as other" is not to be understood according to a real distinction, but it suffices that it be according to the formal reason of agent power and patient power, as was said when treating the efficient cause.

25. The fourth argument is proposed because no distinction is made between immanent action insofar as it is action, and insofar as it is the quality made; or between speaking of action as action, and speaking of this or that action as such. Action, therefore, according to the common and precise notion of action, does not require that it be a perfection of the agent—which is all that the example of heating in fire proves. Yet it is not repugnant to the notion of action that some action, from its own proper and specific nature, be a perfection of the agent. Again, when it is said that beatitude consists in immanent action, if we speak properly, it must be understood to consist in the very immanent act insofar as it is a quality informing and ultimately perfecting the agent; for it consists in action as action only by presupposition and as in a way to such perfection.

The Arguments for the Second Position Are Addressed

26. The arguments of the second position have already been answered above, especially the first and second. To the third we say that it is said only metaphorically that powers are united to their objects by immanent actions. In the way in which they are united, that union is effected proximally by the qualities produced in the powers themselves through proper immanent actions. In general, a unitive action is never effected without the production of some term which either formally is the very mode of union, or completely and adequately is the composite resulting from the union—as has been treated more fully elsewhere.

SECTION III

WHICH REFERENCE, TO THE PRINCIPLE OR TO THE TERM, IS MORE ESSENTIAL TO ACTION, AND WHENCE IT TAKES ITS SPECIFICATION

1. Since it has been shown that action intrinsically and essentially includes a twofold reference, we must next consider how those two references can belong to one and the same simple reality that is one in itself. For they seem to differ in kind from one another, since they regard realities that are more than specifically diverse. Therefore either they cannot of themselves compose the essential notion of an action that is one, or else we must say that from one of them action receives the notion of genus and from the other the notion of difference, so that in this way they can compose a notion that is of itself one. But there is no reason why generic or specific difference should be attributed to one reference rather than to the other, because, in the general account of action, both references are included: one to the agent in general, and another to the term in general. Moreover, action in its species can vary not only when the term varies but also when the principle of acting varies.

2. Authors have for the most part passed over this question as such, yet they include it either under the general question about the specification of motion from its term, which we shall touch on in the next disputation, or under the question about the specification of immanent acts from their objects, which we hinted at above when treating of quality. Nevertheless it has a special difficulty because of the peculiar reference that action as action bears to the agent, and because of the various statements of the doctors, especially St. Thomas. We presuppose, from what has been said above and from the doctrine of St. Thomas (I–II, q. 54, a. 2), that entities or modes which in their very essence include a reference to something else receive their species from that reference—not that the term itself or the extrinsic thing is the proper differentia, since this ought to be intrinsic and most formally within the thing itself, but that, according to the diversity of the thing to which the relation is ordered, the relation itself is diversified and consequently the essence of the thing.

Various Opinions are Proposed

3. On this basis, there are several possible ways of speaking to the present difficulty. The first is that action takes its species, properly speaking, from the principle of acting and not from the term. This seems to be the view of St. Thomas (I–II, q. 1, a. 3), whose words are these: "Since motion is distinguished by action and passion, each of these derives its species from an act: action from the act which is the principle of acting, passion from the act which is the term of the motion." Hence heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than a motion toward heat; but definition manifests the specific nature. This view is also proved by reason, because action has so essential a relation to the efficient principle that, if this is varied, the action must be varied; therefore it must take its species from that principle. By contrast, action does not so depend upon the term that, if the latter is

essentially varied, the action must of necessity be essentially varied. For the creation of heaven and of earth is of the same species, even if the things created are specifically different. This is confirmed, first, because vital actions differ from non-vital actions by reason of the active principle, namely that they proceed from an intrinsic and vital principle. Again, vital actions differ among themselves by their objects, inasmuch as these are active principles of them, as St. Thomas said above; therefore in general actions are distinguished by their principle. A second confirmation: motion as motion, or passion or change taken generically, takes its species from the term; therefore action as action cannot take its species thence, for, since they belong to different predicaments, they cannot have the same principle of specification.

4. A second way of speaking is that action takes its species from the term and not from the principle of acting. This is taken from St. Thomas (De Potentia, q. 6, a. 8), where he says: "Properly, action, like motion, has its species from the term; from the principle, it has properly that it is natural." All the philosophers seem to say the same when they speak of the specification of motion from the term, for under motion they include both action and passion. It is also proved by reason, for if action did not take its specification from the term but from the principle of acting, then all actions proceeding from the same principle would be of the same species, even if they were directed to very different things, because they would have the same specificating principle. But the consequence is incredible; otherwise the heating and the illuminating performed by the sun would be actions of the same species, since they proceed from the same solar light; similarly, all acts of the will—especially those which are performed by the will alone as the proximate active principle—would be of the same species. A first confirmation: although action proceeds from the agent, it is essentially a communication of some being and under that aspect is a path to its term; but a path essentially regards the term and is diversified when the term is diversified; therefore action takes its species from the term. A second confirmation: since motion has two

terms, namely the term from which and the term to which, according to true philosophy motion does not receive its species from the term from which, but from the term to which. Now the principle of acting and the form produced seem to be related to action in a similar way: the agent is that from which the action proceeds, while the form is that to which it tends (and by "term" here we always understand the form produced). Therefore action does not take its species from the principle from which it proceeds, but from the term to which it tends.

5. A third opinion can be that both the principle and the term concur together to the specification of action, in such wise, however, that a variation of either, or of each, suffices for a difference of action. For if an action proceeds from the same agent to the same term, the action will be of the same species; but if the term is the same and the agent different, the action will be different; and conversely, if the agent is the same and the term distinct, the action will be distinct from each of the preceding. This opinion too can be taken from St. Thomas in the place cited in De Potentia, and more clearly in I, q. 77, a. 3, where he says: "From these two the action receives its species, namely from the principle or from the end, that is, the term." Here one should note the disjunctive "or," for it indicates that a difference in either of the two suffices for a difference of action. This opinion can be proved by reason, first from the principle of St. Thomas (I–II, q. 54, a. 2): "All things which are said according to an order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordered." Therefore what is said according to an order to many will be distinguished according to the distinction of those things. And because, as in morals good comes from an integral cause while evil comes from any defect, so unity requires the agreement of all principles, whereas diversity is sufficiently grounded in the diversity of any one of them, therefore in the present case, since action essentially regards both the principle and the term, from the agreement and unity of these it will take its unity, and from the difference of any one of them it will take its diversity. This is shown, second, by induction. In

the first place, the production of the same man effected by a generating man or by God creating is an action specifically different because of the difference of principles, even though the term is the same; and the same seems even more certain with respect to the generation and resurrection of the same man, and to the natural and miraculous production of the same power of sight. Conversely, it is far more certain that the actions of heating and of illuminating are specifically different by reason of their terms, even if they proceed from the same principle, as we said a little earlier. Hence, third, the reasons used for the first and second opinions confirm this third as well, since they prove that a difference in any of those references suffices for a difference of action; whence it clearly follows that both concur together to the specification of action.

6. Some add that even those two taken together are not sufficient for the unity of action, but that attention must be paid besides to the mode of action. For it can happen that the principle and the term are the same, and nonetheless the action is diverse by reason of its mode, as can be seen in certain examples set out above. The creation and the generation of the same thing, even if both actions are immediately performed by God, are actions specifically diverse not by reason of the term or the principle but by reason of the mode. Likewise the philosophers say that circular motion and rectilinear motion differ in species, even if they tend to the same term and proceed from the same principle; and the same is true of increase and diminution. This can be confirmed by a parallel: habits are often distinguished by the mode of tending, even if they otherwise agree in their objects; likewise two material paths, though they tend to the same term, are usually distinguished because they tend by different modes or through different spaces.

That Action Takes Its Specific Character
& Distinction from the Term

7. In this diversity of opinions, I judge that, first of all, for specific unity of action the unity of the term is required, and consequently that for terms specifically diverse the actions are always specifically diverse; and so the species of action is always taken in some way from the term. This is taken from Aristotle (Physics V, c. 4, text 31), for in this respect the same reasoning applies to motion and to action; and the other philosophers agree. Aegidius holds the same (In I, dist. 17, a. 2). The reason is that the term is related to action as a form and ultimate act, for the sake of which the action is primarily and per se performed; therefore it takes its primary notion from that. Again, in reality action is nothing other than the very form or thing that is produced, insofar as it proceeds from and depends upon the agent; therefore if the form produced is specifically diverse, the action also will be specifically diverse. Finally, actions derive their contrariety and repugnance from the terms toward which they tend; cooling and heating are contrary precisely because the terms to which they tend are contrary. In the same way they derive their common denomination from their terms, as heating is named from heat; this is a sign that they also take from the term their species and nature. Aristotle used the same argument in a similar case (Physics V, texts 4 and 48); and the arguments adduced for the second opinion sufficiently persuade to this assertion.

8. But one can ask here how great, or of what kind, the distinction or unity of terms is that suffices or is required for the distinction or unity of action. Some think that a specific distinction of terms in their natural and real being does not suffice, but that it is further required that they be distinguished in the formal ratio of terminating; and conversely, for the specific unity of action they do not think the specific unity of the term is required in its real being, but in the formal being of the term. For just as in the objects of habits one commonly distinguishes the material and the formal object, so that the unity or distinction of a habit is understood to be taken not from the material but from the formal object, so too they judge that in the

terms of actions a distinction must be made; and they call the material term the thing that is made according to its real being, while the formal term is that same thing according to the mode in which it is effected by the agent. This opinion can be taken from Albert (Physics VII, tract. III, c. 1). Nevertheless, the foregoing conclusion must be understood of terms produced by action according to their being. For unless it is so understood, nothing certain can be affirmed about the unity or distinction of actions from their terms. Whence shall that "formality" of the term be taken? If it is said to be taken from the mode of acting, inquiry will have to be made whether the mode of acting is one in genus or in ultimate species. The former cannot always be said, as is clear in the mode of acting by alteration, or by eduction from the potency of matter, and others. But if under that mode of acting there are various modes or various actions specifically distinct, their distinction can only be designated from the terms, and these terms will necessarily have to be taken according to the being of the thing, because in the mode whereby they are reached they do not differ. For this reason we said above that creative action is not of one species with respect to all things, but that, in proportion to the specific diversity of creatures, the actions of creating also differ in species; and we confirmed this by parity of reasoning from the specific diversity of generations or alterations tending to diverse terms.

9. This argument also confirms the present view. For that the generations of a horse, a lion, and so on, differ in species is the common opinion of the philosophers; and Aristotle openly says that heating and cooling differ in species (Physics V, c. 3). This seems self-evident, since those actions are by their nature contrary. Nearly the same reason applies to the eduction of specifically distinct substantial forms, which by their nature are mutually repugnant in the same matter. The same argument can further be made of all acts of the intellect or will, which agree in the mode whereby they are elicited by these powers and yet cannot on that account be reckoned of the same species, since they tend to diverse terms or objects. A final a priori

reason is that action, as action, is the production and communication of some being; but no more formal term of production can be assigned than the producible thing itself according to the specific being by which it is producible. Wherefore it is not correct to compare the terms of actions with the objects of habits or acts, because objects are not related to habits as producible by them, but as attainable (so to speak) through some medium or under some formal aspect; hence from a diversity of media or of formal aspects of attaining objects habits can be diversified. Action, however, regards its term as producible, that is, as able to receive being or such-and-such a being; and this is the most formal consideration, and therefore from its diversity action is always diversified.

Actions are Not Distinguished Apart from Their Terms

10. I say, second, that it is probable that an action is never different in species by reason of the principle of acting alone, if the term is the same and of the same account, although the opposite could also be defended. The former is proved by induction—and since this induction is negative, it must be made in those cases in which actions most seem to be specifically diverse while tending to the same term. For if, upon a careful consideration of such cases, this is not so, it will be a sufficient argument that it never occurs. The induction is thus made first in the generation and creation of the same man: those actions differ to the extent that creation includes the production of matter and form from nothing, whereas generation does not include but presupposes them and expresses only the union of form with matter. But if, in the production of a man by creation, we carefully distinguish the production of matter and of form and consider solely the action whereby they are united, that action, precisely taken, will not be found to be distinct from the action that occurs in generation. In a higher treatise, when speaking of the formal cause, we said that

the action by which, in elementary matter, the first form of fire or earth and so on was introduced was a true eduction, even if in the same instant the matter was created. Hence, although the creation of fire is absolutely a different action from generation, nevertheless, if one precisely abstracts the eduction that is included in that creation, this will not be an action specifically distinct from generation. For the same reason I said elsewhere (II, III, disp. 34, sect. 5), with many authors, that the resurrection of a man, if it is considered precisely with respect to the union of the soul with the body, without any other supernatural gift or miracle added, is of the same specific account as the substantial action by which the soul is first united to the body in generation. Therefore the same must be said of every similar action or of the restitution of a lost form. Likewise, if God were to annihilate some angel and then create the same angel again, although this might be called a kind of resurrection, that is, a repeated production of a thing which previously was and then ceased to be, nevertheless that action would be of the same kind as the first creation, because mere repetition or interruption of duration cannot suffice for a specific diversity of actions. The same, then, will be true of a unitive or educing action, if on the side of the term there is no greater diversity.

11. One can further compare the action of creating with the action of educing a form from the potency of matter, and it will be found specifically distinct even with respect to the same term. For if God were to create quantity without a subject, the action would be specifically different from that by which He educes quantity from matter. Yet, although this is true, it is not without some diversity in the terms; for by creation quantity itself is made, whereas by eduction not quantity but a quantum is made. This difference occurs in every similar action and is not a mere matter of speaking but has a foundation in the thing itself: by creation quantity is made precisely and abstractly, or with the mode of existing per se; by eduction, however, quantity is formally made as united, so that the action is also terminated to the mode of union, which is distinct in the nature of the

thing from the form itself. From this diversity in the term of the action there also arises a diversity in mode, since by creation the form is produced by the power of the efficient cause alone, whereas by eduction it is not produced unless the material cause concurs as concause. Thus creation of the same thing is never an action specifically different from another production of it, without some distinction on the side of the terms. From this a general argument can be made: if in those actions which most seem to be diverse of themselves either by their principles or by their modes the distinction is never saved without a distinction in terms, much less will this be found in other actions.

12. Other examples can be more easily resolved from here, such as heating effected by fire or by the sun, or again by fire with the concurrence of God or by God alone. In all these cases it can most readily be denied that the actions are specifically diverse because of that difference of principles alone; for although those principles are really or formally diverse, they do not act as they are diverse, but inasmuch as the one eminently contains the other, or both contain the same form. That this suffices for specific unity of action with respect to the same term can be made sufficiently plausible: a power that eminently contains another, just as it eminently contains that other's form, so also it contains its action. Therefore an eminent power can not only make the same species of form that the inferior power makes, but can also perform the same species of action; accordingly God can by Himself make the same species of heat that fire makes, and also the same species of heating. Therefore the heating which is caused by God alone and that which is caused by fire with God's concurrence do not differ in species on this ground. The same reasoning applies to all similar agents.

13. From this a general reason can also be formed. Different principles of the same term are either univocal causes, or equivocal, or one is univocal and the other equivocal. If they are univocal causes, they will be of the same account as the effect and consequently with

each other. If, however, one cause is univocal and the other equivocal, the action also will be of the same account, for the reason just touched on, since the equivocal cause acts as eminently containing the effect and the action of the univocal cause. And by the same reasoning, if both causes are equivocal, even if they are of different natures in themselves, if they produce an effect of the same account, they will also act by an action of the same account, because they act insofar as they eminently contain the same thing. Therefore, if the action tends to a term entirely similar, it cannot be essentially different on the part of the agents, because there cannot be any other diversity in the agents besides the one just stated. Unless perhaps someone were to add that sometimes an effect is produced by a univocal cause together with an equivocal cause, as by a second cause together with the first, and sometimes by an equivocal cause alone; or at least that sometimes an effect is produced by a principal cause by means of an instrument, and sometimes without one. But certainly, if the earlier varieties of agents do not suffice for a diversity of actions, neither will these suffice, for they are neither greater nor do they have a special rationale; rather, these are contained under those. For whether the equivocal cause operates alone or with the univocal, it is all one, since the equivocal cause always operates as eminently containing the effect. And an instrumental cause, especially if it is connatural, is not counted (so to speak) alongside the principal cause, but is assumed into the same action most connatural to itself and to the effect.

14. This induction is confirmed, for it seems per se incredible that the action of moving the heavens, for example, is specifically different because it is performed by angels of different species, or by God immediately, or by an angel. The same, then, must be said of other similar cases whenever the term is entirely of the same species. Finally one can add an a priori reason: the principle of acting, if it is univocal, is by its species determined to such-and-such an action tending to such-and-such a term; if it is equivocal, since as such it is universal and indifferent, a determinate species of action cannot be

taken from it. It is determined, therefore, by the term, because it does not act upon the term according to the whole power it has, but insofar as it eminently contains it; therefore the species of action must always be ultimately looked for from the term.

The Arguments for the First Opinion are Answered

15. This part, then, is the most probable and, speaking absolutely, seems true to me. From it the reasons alleged for the first opinion are easily solved. The text of St. Thomas there cited must be explained in light of his other statements, namely, that action takes its species from the principle of acting, not by stopping at that, but as referred to the term, or as determined by reason of the term to such-and-such a mode of action. This is why, although order to the principle and to the term belongs to the essence of action, the specific determination of action comes more from the term than from the principle, because the term, in general, is more determinate and it limits (so to speak) the action of the cause, unless the cause is otherwise itself determined. To the first reason it is answered by denying both parts assumed in it. For we have said that the creations of things specifically diverse are themselves specifically diverse, even if they proceed from the same agent; and conversely, actions to the same term are of the same account, even if they flow from diverse agents. To the first confirmation I grant that vital actions differ from non-vital actions by the principles of different accounts, yet not without an order to diverse terms. Hence, if sometimes exactly the same term can be produced by a vital and by a non-vital action, then the actions themselves will not be different in species in reality, but only by an extrinsic denomination, as free and non-free action often differ, or natural and violent motion. Thus the speech or eating of an angel in an assumed body is not vital, as the speech or eating of a man is; and yet,

if those external actions are considered in their real essence, they are not specifically diverse, but only denominatively.

16. I grant again that vital actions differ among themselves by their objects as by principles, yet not without an order to the term. Here one must bear in mind what we said above: in immanent vital acts we must distinguish the notion of action from its intrinsic term and from the quality produced, which is the proper form and ultimate act of the vital power; of this act, as such, it is pre-eminently true that it takes its species from the object toward which it immediately tends. Nevertheless, speaking of action as action, it too takes its species from its own intrinsic term, although it also takes it from the object either insofar as the object is in some way a principle of that action, or insofar as the very term of the action takes its species from the object. To the second confirmation it is answered that both passion and action regard the term in a mode suited to themselves, and therefore can take different species from it—especially since the distinction between action and passion is only of reason, by inadequate concepts, as we shall say more fully in the following disputation.

17. I added, nevertheless, in the conclusion that the opposite side can be defended, because if someone were to insist that the total actions of a univocal and an equivocal cause, tending to terms entirely similar—say, the heating by fire and by the sun—are specifically diverse in the notion of actions, that is, of dependencies, he could not easily be refuted by some manifest or evident demonstration. Still, for a philosophical matter, the reasons given seem sufficient. That opinion could have some plausibility only when a supernatural mode of acting is conjoined with the diversity of agents, as I shall now say.

How Action is Distinguished by Mode

18. I say, third, that it is more likely that actions are never specifically diverse by reason of the mode of acting alone, if the terms of the actions are altogether the same, or at least similar, provided the

modes of acting are connatural to the things or to the terms themselves. Why I add this last part I shall explain below. For the present the assertion is proved, first, by induction, which should be made in the way indicated in the proof of the preceding conclusion. It has already been shown with respect to creation and generation that those modes are general and not specific; and then that those actions differ not only in mode but also in term, and not only in the term from which but also in the term to which. The term from which, unless it flows back into a diversity of the term to which, does not specify or diversify action, as is gathered from St. Thomas (I, q. 25, a. 1; q. 45, a. 1), because action is not ordered to the term from which but to the term to which, and it departs rather from the other, as is also taught about motion in Physics V. Again, local motion in a straight line or in a circle to the same ultimate term would not be a different action unless the proximate terms to which those actions tend were different. I omit the question whether circular and rectilinear motion differ essentially even in the notion of motion, or only in an accidental way and as it were in figure, as a straight and a circular line—a question that belongs to physics. Another example that was adduced above, that of increase and diminution, is not to the point; for, in the way that increase and diminution are distinguished, they are distinguished not by the mode of tending but by their terms. Whether, however, they are distinguished in species insofar as they are actions, or only in the notion of change—insofar as one has the notion of privation and the other of acquisition, and because each is denominated from what happens in it—does not belong to the present disputation but to philosophy. Here it is enough to say in general that, in the notion of actions, there is no greater specific distinction than what the distinction of terms demands. Therefore, in natural actions, no example can be adduced in which, the term and the principle of acting remaining the same, actions are distinguished in species by mode.

19. The reason seems to be the same as was touched on above, namely that the term, according to its proper being, is as it were

the formal object of the action; therefore no mode can be found that changes (so to speak) the formality of that object so as to specify the action—especially if we speak of a mode of action connatural to such a term, for a connatural mode of production is proportioned to the thing or to that being which is communicated by the action, since it is its intrinsic mode, connatural to it. Hence, if the term is altogether the same, the action cannot be different by mode alone. Nor can it easily be explained in what such a mode consists; for if any modes can be imagined beyond those enumerated above, they are in reality accidental. For example, that one action is by way of resultant effect and another from an extrinsic agent—this does not change the notion of action if the term is of the same account. This is evident in the cooling of water when it returns of itself to its former coldness, and in the cooling of air by an extrinsic cause: those actions are not specifically diverse as to their real and physical essence, but only as to a certain denomination. Likewise, that an action is violent or connatural to the subject does not in itself vary the action if it does not vary the term, for those "modes," or rather denominations, are taken only from a certain relation and proportion, or disproportion, to nature—a relation which not only does not vary the action but rather requires the identity or similarity of it, so that it can be proportioned to one subject and violent or non-natural in another.

20. I add also that the mode of action—its being successive or instantaneous—does not vary the species of action, speaking per se, if the term is altogether the same; for even those two modes are very accidental, since they consist only in greater or lesser speed of the action, as we said above. Hence those modes are often varied by accidental conditions required for acting: the intensification of light occurs successively because the agent is successively applied more and more; the intensification of heat because the patient resists or does not resist; and the intensification of vision or of an immanent act by the free application of the agent.

21. Whether Actions Take a Different Species From the Natural or Miraculous Mode by Which the Same Term Is Brought About. I added in the last part of the assertion "provided the actions are connatural," because by God's absolute power it may perhaps be that the same thing is produced by actions specifically distinct, even if there is no diversity at all in their terms—if one action is natural and the other supernatural, or if both are supernatural. This can happen in two ways. First, if in some way the principle of acting is diversified, as when God operates through a creature as through an instrument beyond its natural power by its obediential potency. For concerning such a mode of acting it is sufficiently probable that it suffices to vary the species of the action, as I said elsewhere (I, III, disp. 31, sect. 6, in the solution to the sixth argument), where we said something about differences among actions that should be interpreted in light of the present doctrine. A second way of multiplying those actions could be by God's will and power alone, as if God should will by His own power alone to produce or conserve exactly the same thing by various actions specifically distinct, either simultaneously or successively. This mode can seem more difficult, because it seems repugnant to multiply things or modes where there is no principle of distinction. To this it is said that God can bring about actions that are distinct in themselves and not by reason of the terms or anything else; many affirm this of all actions and take it from Scotus (In I, dist. 13, q. un.). Although it is not so probable of all actions connatural to the things or to the terms themselves, yet of supernatural actions, which are not thus fitted to the things themselves, it does not seem improbable. Since no contradiction appears in this, it is not easy to deny, although the opposite is not without probability.

Proper Resolution of the Question

22. Finally, to answer the proposed question in form, it must be said that action, in a certain respect, depends equally essentially

and even individually upon both principle and term, whereas as to specification it depends more upon the term. The first part is made clear because in two respects there is equality. First, because it is just as impossible for action to exist without a reference to the agent as without a reference to the term, and conversely, as has been sufficiently proved in the preceding sections. Second (which regards individuation), because every action, as to the mode of its entity in the individual and in the particular, so depends upon this agent and upon this term that, if either is varied, it is impossible for the same action to remain. The reason on the part of the term is that, since action is in the term as its mode, it cannot remain if the term is changed or absent, because in general a mode cannot remain without the thing of which it is the mode. On the part of the agent, the reason is that action does not flow from the agent through another action, but through itself; hence this action depends wholly upon this agent by its own modal entity, and therefore the agent cannot be varied without there being a variation in the action itself, because there is nothing else in which the variation might per se and necessarily take place. For when it is said that the agent is varied, it need not be varied as to its absolute entity, but only as to this, that now it acts and afterward it does not act, even if the same effect remains in reality. That variety, then, cannot occur except by a variety in the action. Therefore, universally, whenever the agent is varied, the action too must be varied. Just as, when the formal effect is varied, the form must be varied; when the subject is taken away, the accident is taken away; and when the term is destroyed, the relation is destroyed; so, when the agent is varied as an agent, the action—which is its form as such, and to which it is related as to the subject of that denomination and as to the term of that relation—must be varied. Accordingly, with respect to these two there is equality between these references and so intrinsic a necessity that it implies a contradiction for action to occur otherwise. The other part of the conclusion is sufficiently evident from the foregoing: the term is as it were the ultimate extrinsic form of action, and by it the agent is

determined, as such, to produce an action of such a species—speaking per se and according to the natures of things, whatever may be the case with supernatural miracles.

First Reply to the Reason for Doubt

23. From this a ready answer is given to the argument for doubting proposed at the beginning. We deny that the references of action to the agent and to the term are two according to reality; they are only two according to our inadequate concepts. Nor does it matter that the agent and the term are very different things, because they are not regarded by that reference except with mutual subordination, and thus, as it were, as one. For action does not proceed from the agent except in order to tend to the term; where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one. This is frequent in such references: a habit regards a power not by resting in it, but by passing on (so to speak) to its object; and, in general, relation refers the subject to a term.

The Arguments of the Other Opinions are Answered

24. The arguments of the first opinion, insofar as they could be opposed to our view, have already been solved. The arguments of the second directly confirm our opinion, and therefore there is no need to reply to them. Yet the comparison made there between the term from which and the principle of action is not altogether on a par; for action does not properly depend on the term from which, nor does it express a positive transcendental reference to it, since that is only a privation or a contrary term. Action, however, depends positively and essentially upon the agent through itself, and therefore it expresses toward it a proper and positive transcendental reference, no less than toward the term.

25. As to the arguments set out under the third opinion, they have been partly answered in proving our own. For the examples adduced there about a diversity of actions from a diversity of principles are not true, unless that diversity of principles flows back into a diversity of terms, speaking according to the nature of the thing and setting miracles aside. As to the reason given there, one must say that whenever one being has a reference to two with mutual subordination, the specification must be taken from that which is as it were ultimate in that ordering, and, by that title—speaking per se—the species is varied because of it, and not because of the other, unless by means of that or by reason of that the reference to the ultimate term is also varied.

26. Finally, the other arguments hinted at in the fourth way of speaking have been dealt with in the course of proving the third assertion. The examples brought there from the distinction of habits or of material paths rather confirm what we have said. For the mode of proceeding in a science or of operating by a habit does not distinguish habits unless, in the object itself, it varies either the medium for assenting or the motive for operating—a variation which is in the object itself and, as it were, in the formal term of the habit. Material paths tending to the same remote terminus are distinct because, if they are taken as absolute things, they are spaces distinct by their quantities; but if they are taken relatively, as ordered to the term, the distinction lies in their proximate and intrinsic termini, just as we said above of motion to the same term along a straight or a circular line.

SECTIO IV

WHETHER ACTION AS ACTION ESSENTIALLY IMPLIES A REFERENCE TO A SUBJECT OF INHERENCE, AND WHAT THAT IS

Section IV

1. In this section the division of action into immanent and transient must be further explained, and another subdivision of transient action will be indicated, and at the same time that common doubt will be resolved, whether a transient action is in the agent or not.

On the Subject of Transient Action. First Opinion

2. First, then, it must be inquired whether action as action necessarily regards the agent itself as the subject in which it inheres. For all those authors who affirm that transient action is in the agent rest on this principle: action, as action, must inhere in some subject, which cannot be anything other than the agent insofar as it is actually acting. This opinion is held among the disciples of St. Thomas by Cajetan (I, q. 25); the Hispanus on I, dist. 27, q. 1, notable 3; Flandrinus (V Metaph., q. 22, a. 2). Scotus holds it (In IV, dist. 13, q. 1), as does Antonius Andreas (on De Sex Principiis, ch. "De Actione"), and commonly the Scotists; likewise Paul of Venice (Summa naturalium, ch. 18) and Avicenna (II Sufficientiae, ch. 5). Yet they differ greatly as to the thing itself: the Scotists understand by "action" only the relation of the agent to the effect or the patient. For they think that, before that relation which results in the agent after the effect has been produced, nothing intervenes between agent and effect —distinct by the nature of the thing from the form which is the principle of acting and from that which is the term of the action— which could properly be called a predicamental action. But we do not speak of action in this sense, nor do we think that relation can properly be called action. Rather we suppose the contrary foundation: namely, that between the effect and the efficient cause there is an intervening action, distinct by the nature of the thing from them, which is prior by nature to that relation and is its foundation, condition, or reason for being founded.

3. Cajetan and those who follow him, then, understand in this latter sense that action expresses an intrinsic reference to some subject in which it inheres, and that this subject must be the agent itself. If you object that the action of God cannot in this way inhere in God, they reply that the action of God is in God, not, however, by proper inherence, but by His identity and simplicity, because that action is not in the genus of action, nor an accident, but is God's very substance. Here, however, we are speaking of predicamental action, which is an accident. The chief foundation of this opinion seems to be this: since action is an accident, it must of necessity be in some subject in which it inheres; since it is the form and act of the agent (Physics III, c. 2), it cannot have any more proper subject of inherence. Furthermore, the subject of a form is that which by it is actualized and reduced from potency to act. St. Thomas seems to have touched this reason in these words (Contra Gentiles II, c. 9): "An action which is not the substance of the agent is in it as an accident in a subject, and therefore it is counted among the nine predicaments." And De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7: "Action, as action, is considered as from the agent; insofar as it is an accident, it is considered as in the subject which is the agent."

4. A second argument: if action is not in the agent as in its subject, it will be in no subject; but this is repugnant, because it is against the notion of an accident. Therefore. The major is proved thus. If action were in some subject besides the agent, it would denominate that subject, for every form denominates the subject in which it is. But it cannot denominate it: what denomination would it give? Not that of "agent," because it gives that denomination only to the agent; not any other, because action as action cannot denominate otherwise, nor can one easily imagine such a denomination. Moreover, if it were in another subject, it would most of all be in the patient; but not so, because in the patient there is passion. Since action and passion express opposite references and predicamental forms that are diverse, they cannot be in the same subject. Whence St. Thomas (In II Sent.,

dist. 40, q. 2, a. 4) proves from this that action and passion are different accidents, because action is in the agent and passion in the patient.

5. Third, created action is a perfection of the agent. Therefore it is in it, because a form perfects only the subject in which it is. The antecedent can be proved, first, from the Philosopher (De Caelo II, c. 3): "Each thing exists for the sake of its operation; but each thing is for the sake of its perfection; therefore every operation is a perfection of the operator." Next from St. Thomas (De Potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 1), where he says that the action which is between agent and patient is properly a perfection of the agent; and so he says in the reply to the seventh objection there, and in Contra Gentiles III, c. 19; and this is taken from the Commentator (In Metaph. XII, com. 36).

Second Opinion

6. A second opinion also affirms that it belongs to the nature of created action as such to have some subject of inherence, because of the common notion of accident; however, this subject is not always the agent. One must distinguish: immanent actions are in the agent itself, but transient actions are in the patient. As to the former parts this opinion agrees with the preceding; it must be proved only as to the latter. This seems to be expressly Aristotle's view (Physics III, c. 3), where he says that the same motion is action and passion, and that it is the act of the agent and of the patient, of the former as that from which, of the latter as that in which. Clearly, then, he thinks that action is in the patient. The same is clear from Metaphysics IX, c. 9, where he says that action is in the thing made, as building is in the thing built; and from De Anima II, c. 2 (texts 24–25): "The action of agents seems to be in that which suffers and is being disposed." And in III, c. 2 (text 139), he expressly says that action and passion are in that which suffers, and from this he infers that it is not necessary that what moves be moved; and text 140: "Action," he says, "and passion are not in the

agent, but in that which suffers." There can be no doubt, then, about Aristotle's opinion in this part, as all the Greek interpreters, the Commentator, and the Latin expositors note in the places cited. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that this was also the view of St. Thomas; he never departs from Aristotle in matters purely philosophical and not contrary to faith. The same can be gathered from his Commentaries on those places; and expressly in Contra Gentiles II, c. 1, he establishes this difference between immanent and transient actions, as Ferrariensis there and below (c. 9) notes and gathers other places. Capreolus (In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3; In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3), Hervaeus (Quodl. IV, sect. 4), Soncinas (V Metaph., q. 37), Iavellus (IX, q. 15), and this is the received opinion among more recent authors, both in Physics III and in Metaphysics V and IX.

7. This opinion is customarily confirmed by many reasons, but for me there are two principal ones. First, action cannot be a reality really distinct from the formal term which is made by it, but is its mode; therefore where the term of the action is, there the action itself must be, because the mode necessarily accompanies the thing of which it is the mode. But the term of a transient action is in the patient, by the admission of all, and this is self-evident: the heat produced by fire heating wood is in the wood; therefore the action itself is in the same. The first antecedent (for the rest is manifest) has been often urged and proved above when we were treating of the efficient cause, and especially when treating of active creation. Also in this disputation, sect. 1, we showed that action is nothing other than the dependence of the effect on the efficient cause; but dependence cannot be a reality distinct from the thing which depends, but only its mode. Therefore. Again, once the principle of acting and its effect and the dependence of the effect upon its principle are posited, with any other entity removed by the intellect, both the effect in act and the efficient cause in act are sufficiently understood. Therefore it is impertinent to feign some other thing really distinct from the effect and prior by nature to it which is the action of it. For action is posited

solely for the causality of the agent and the dependence of the effect; but these are perfectly well understood without positing that entity; it is therefore a gratuitous fiction, which will be further confirmed by the next reason.

8. The second reason is that not only the effect, but the action itself, flows actively from the agent, not through another action but through itself, as has been explained above. But in the agent of a transient action, from the fact that it acts, no thing or real mode flows actively from it in order to remain in it; therefore the action of such an agent flows from it in such a way as to be received in the patient. The minor is proved, first, by Aristotle's reason that the agent, precisely insofar as it acts, is not moved. I say "precisely insofar as it acts," because beforehand it can be moved, as when it is newly applied to act; or concomitantly or consequently, if in acting it suffers something in return. Yet, precisely and per se, from the fact that it is an agent, it is not moved, because to be changed is accidental to an agent as an agent. Second, because no term of a transient action remains in the agent, as all admit; this is the greatest difference between immanent and transient action. Therefore no action can flow from such an agent which remains in it. The consequence is clear both from the previous reason and from what was said in sect. II: one cannot understand some thing that is so pure an action that by it nothing is understood to be made intrinsically; but a thing made in an extrinsic subject cannot be an intrinsic term of an action remaining in another subject. Third, it is per se incredible that, in order for the sun to illuminate the air, there must first of necessity flow from the sun's light some other thing or mode which remains in the sun itself and affects it otherwise. Why is such an entity feigned? What indication is there of it? In which power of the sun would such an act be received? For just as the sun's action, illumination, flows from the sun's light, so, if it flowed from it into it, it would have to be received proximately in the light itself of the sun; for, just as the sun illuminates insofar as it is luminous, and therefore illumination proceeds formally from light, so the sun is constituted

actually illuminating insofar as it is luminous. Therefore, if illumination, by remaining in the illuminator, constitutes it actually illuminating, it will remain proximately and immediately in its light, constituting it in second act, as vision remains in sight. Hence light, heat, and similar active powers would not only be active but also passive powers—an unheard-of and incredible thing.

9. Finally, it was proved above that the dependence of creatures on God flows immediately from God's own power and not from some other action which one would have to feign in God; and from that dependence, as it flows from God, God is sufficiently denominated "actually acting." Therefore, similarly, the dependence of light upon the sun's light can be perfectly well understood as immediately flowing from the sun's illuminative power, which is light, without the flow of some other thing from the same light which would remain in it and, as it were, mediate between the light and the dependence of the illumination upon the light. For if we suppose that God were to impede that flow remaining in the light, nothing would prevent the light from remaining dependent on the light; God could have done this; therefore the sign is that that other flow is impertinent. Hence, when no other reason remains, such an unintelligible and unnecessary multiplication of things is to be avoided.

The Second Opinion is Preferred to The First & Explained

10. This latter opinion, therefore, insofar as it denies that transient action posits in the agent something prior to the effect, is most true. Nevertheless, as to the way of assigning a subject to action as action, and as to the difference on this point between immanent and transient action, it needs some further explanation.

11. I say, first, that there is some real action which has no subject of inherence. This is proved from what was said above about the action of creating. For we showed that creation is truly a transient

action and has no subject, because it belongs to the very notion of creation that it not be made from a presupposed subject. Theologians think the same of the action of transubstantiation, as is taken from St. Thomas (III, q. 75, a. 8). For according to his opinion, since the action of transubstantiation proceeds actively from the words of consecration, one must necessarily say that it is a transient and not an immanent action. That action agrees with creation in this: it does not presuppose a subject in which it can be received, because there is no common subject of the term from which and the term to which. Therefore there is some action which has no subject of inherence, although such an action is found not only in some supernatural action or proper to God; for created agents by natural power alone can act only upon a presupposed subject.

12. Whence it follows also that such a mode of action can be found within the latitude of transient actions, but not within that of immanent actions. For immanent actions, if they are proper to God, are not accidental actions, nor indeed actions properly and strictly taken. For if we consider metaphysically only God's immanent acts, which are understanding and loving, not only are they not accidents, but they are God's very substance; indeed, in them no real origin is understood, so that they could be called actions. If, however, we consider the acts theologically, insofar as by them two divine Persons proceed ad intra, still they cannot properly be called actions, either because action as action includes that it itself really flows from the acting principle—whereas in those processions the Persons proceed, but the actions do not—or else because action as action includes dependence, for action expresses an order to the thing acted or made; but in those processions of Persons there is no dependence, as was said above (disp. XII on causes). Therefore, among immanent acts there is no proper action which is not an action of a created agent, and hence there is none which is not from a subject and in a subject, since a created agent can effect nothing except upon a presupposed subject and by an action received in it.

13. I say, second, that it does not belong to the notion of action as such to have a proper subject of inherence; this belongs to it by reason of its formal term. The first part is proved from the preceding conclusion; for what belongs to the essential notion of the superior as such necessarily belongs to all its inferiors; conversely, what does not belong to some inferior cannot be of the formal and essential notion of the superior. But there is some action which has no subject of inherence, as was said in the first assertion; therefore to have a subject or a relation to it cannot belong to the formal notion of action as such. Hence we gather that it belongs to the notion of action as such only to be a certain mode adhering to the term and flowing per se and immediately from the efficient cause. For that reference to the term is not as to a subject, as we said above, nor is that intimate conjunction a proper inherence or informing, but a peculiar mode of constituting the very term in reality, dependent upon and flowing from its principle. From this we further gather the latter part of the conclusion: since action is fitted to its term and takes its rationale from it, if action as action does not per se require a subject, a determinate action can require it only from the peculiar account which it has from its term; therefore, according to the exigency of the term, action requires a subject, and not otherwise. Indeed, although that reality or mode which is action may of itself sometimes require a subject by reason of its term, nevertheless, under the precise concept of action, an order to a subject is not explained, but only to a principle and to a term, as will be made clearer in the solutions of the arguments and still more in the next disputation when we explain the distinction between action and passion.

14. Action and Term Require the Same Subject. I say, third, that every action which is in a subject is in that subject in which its term is; and this is what formally belongs to every action, whether immanent or transient, which proceeds from a subject. This is proved by induction: an immanent action inheres in that power in which its intrinsic term is; thus the action of understanding remains in the

intellect, because in the same the mental word remains, and so in other cases. For we are speaking of the terms produced by such actions, not of the objects, which are also sometimes said to be the terms of immanent acts because they terminate their references. It is never found that the term of an immanent action is outside the power in which the action itself remains; for although sometimes an immanent act has an effect outside its own power, yet to that it is not related as action but as principle of acting, as the will of God is related to effects ad extra, and the will of man brings about in its own way the motion of the arm. The same is found in transient actions, as is evident of itself. Hence, if sometimes the term of a transient action remains in some way in the agent itself, then in the same way the action itself remains there, as when water returns to its former coldness: because the cold remains in it, the action of cooling remains in it. The reason is easily taken from the preceding conclusion: action does not require a subject except by reason of its term; therefore it cannot require any other subject than the one the term calls for. Likewise, the creation of matter or of an angel has no subject because matter or the angel, which is the term of that action, has no subject. Therefore, universally, the subject of action is according to the exigency of the term. Finally, it has been shown that action is identified with its term as its mode; therefore, in whatever subject the term is, there also will be the action.

15. Action as Action Inheres in No Subject. I say, fourth, that no action as action, conceived precisely under that aspect by which it is distinguished from passion, has a subject of inherence, but only of denomination; hence an action which is in a subject inheres there only through the mediation of passion. The proof is that action as action differs from passion only by a formal aspect conceived by the mind, as we shall say more fully in the next disputation. But action and passion differ only in this: passion expresses motion or change as affecting the patient and inhering in it; therefore action as action abstracts from this relationship; it does not, then, formally include "to be in," but "to be from" the agent. For this reason it is a very analogical accident, as we

noted above when dividing the accidents. This is confirmed: action of this kind is said to induce passion, as it were actively; therefore, according to its precise formal notion, it does not affect the patient, but induces a passion which affects it, and thus it is in it through the mediation of passion. Accordingly, in this respect there is no formal difference between immanent and transient action; for if we speak formally, neither is in the agent as it is an agent, but each is in the patient as it is a patient and by means of passion. The difference is that, in an immanent action, agent and patient coincide in one and the same subject; and therefore, while the action is in the patient, it is also in the agent. In a transient action, however, the agent is distinct from the patient; therefore, because the action is in the patient, it cannot remain in the agent.

The Arguments of the Other Opinions are Solved

16. To the arguments for the first opinion we reply: action as such is called an accident analogically, and therefore it need not express a proper relation of inhering in something, but of flowing from something. When it is said to be the act of an agent, this likewise must be understood not of an inhering act but of an emanating act, and, as far as it goes, of an extrinsically denominating act.

17. To the second argument it has already been shown that there is no inconvenience if some transient action is in no subject but only in its term. Further, of every action as action we have said that, per se and formally, it has no proper subject of inherence. Hence it comes about that, although by the mediation of passion it inheres in some subject, it does not denominate that subject qua action, but qua passion. Thus even an immanent action, insofar as it denominates a man as "acting" or "operating," is not formally conceived as inhering in him, but as being from him. Nor is it necessary that every reality which is in something by inherence denominate it according to every aspect

that can be considered in that reality, as is clear in the case of place and of other extrinsic forms. To the other part of that argument I grant that every action which is in a subject is in the patient; nor does it matter that in the same subject there is also passion, because action and passion do not express opposite forms, but diverse relations to things in a certain way relatively opposed, namely agent and patient, or at least to powers of diverse accounts, namely active and passive. Nevertheless, with respect to the same form or entity, they are not opposed but follow upon one another, as "to give" and "to receive," that is, to emanate from one and to be received in another, or to emanate from one in one respect and to be received in another.

18. Whether Action Is a Perfection of the Agent. Whether St. Thomas Placed Transient Action in the Agent. To the third argument we deny that action is properly a perfection of the agent in the sense in which a perfection is an intrinsically perfecting form. It is commonly said that the action of a created agent is its extrinsic perfection, insofar as its perfection is in some way extended to other things—a feature which, in beings having a limited perfection, is reckoned to pertain to a kind of extrinsic perfection. But in reality the agent as agent manifests its perfection rather than is perfected, unless from its action it reaps some advantage, either by receiving the term of action into itself—as in those things which act by an immanent action—or by conserving itself through its action or protecting itself against contraries. As to the testimonies of St. Thomas adduced in those arguments, I admit that some are difficult. The Thomists commonly understand that, whenever St. Thomas indicates that a transient action is in the agent, he is speaking either of action under the aspect of the resulting relation, or of transient action as to efficacy only, as are, in his opinion, the acts of the divine will and even of the angelic will; or else that, when he says that action is in the agent, he is not speaking of proper inherence, but broadly, inasmuch as any extrinsic form can be said to be "in" that which it denominates. These explanations—or one of them—must be accepted and accommodated according to the

convenience of each passage. There is no need to linger further over these matters, since St. Thomas's opinion is sufficiently clear from other places.

SECTION V
WHAT, FINALLY, IS THE NATURE OF ACTION, AND WHAT ARE ITS CAUSES OR PROPERTIES

Description of Action

1. From what has been treated thus far concerning action, almost everything we proposed to say about it has now been elucidated. First, it is clear what its common notion or essence is, which Gilbert of Poitiers, in his book On the Six Principles, defines thus: "Action is the form by which, in virtue of the matter subject, we are denominated as acting." This description seems proportioned to that by which Aristotle defined quality, saying that quality is that "by which we are said to be such." But that definition appears as obscure as the thing defined. For this is precisely what we seek: what, in things, is that form or quasi-form by which we are denominated as acting. Therefore above we explained that it is a certain mode or dependence, distinct by the nature of the thing from the term produced. Taking this mode under the name of "form," we may rightly say that action is the form by which the active principle is first reduced to act, or the form which flows first and of itself, and by which that which is properly made by the agent issues forth and depends. All these clauses follow sufficiently from the disputations thus far.

On the Causes of Action

2. From this it is also known what the causes or essential principles of action are. Its efficient cause is that principle from which

it flows. Here the question immediately insinuates itself, what that principle is, so that we may explain the axiom: "Actions belong to supposita." But this matter too has been clarified above when we spoke of the suppositum. The intrinsic and immediate final cause of action is its term; its mediate or ultimate end can be either the agent itself or any other end to which its term is referred. As for a material cause, sometimes there is none with respect to a given action, as was said of the action of creation. When, however, a material cause does intervene, it is the patient itself which, although it immediately receives that thing which is the action, nevertheless, according to a distinction of reason, does not receive it except through the mediation of passion. And since action is a simple form, it has no other proper formal cause, nor other essential principles, besides the principle from which it flows and the term toward which it tends, inasmuch as it essentially regards these, as has been explained. This is enough concerning the causes of action.

Properties of Action

3. Whether Action Is Always Conjoined to Motion. How Action Induces Passion. There is scarcely anything to be said of properties that belong to action as such, because there are hardly any that belong to it per se and are not contained in its essential notion. Gilbert, however, intimates three or four. First, he says, it is proper to action "to be in motion," that is, always to be conjoined to motion. For this to be true, "motion" must be taken broadly, including under it any change, even a perfective one. This can be understood in two ways. First, that action is always joined to change; and in this sense it is always true, if it is understood of positive change, because such change cannot occur except from some mover and consequently from an agent through some action. If it is understood of corruptive change, it is not always necessary that it occur through a positive action—for example, if it is a pure cessation; then, proportionally, there will

intervene the lack or suspension of some action. A second sense is that, conversely, action always has change conjoined with it; and thus it coincides with the second property posited by the same author, namely, that action induces passion in the subject matter. This is true in actions that are exercised about some subject; creation, strictly speaking, does not induce passion, as was seen above. When it is said that action "induces" passion, that inducing must not be understood through proper efficiency or causality; for since action and passion are not distinct in reality, as we shall see, there cannot be proper causality between them. Nor is it to be understood merely as an inference of consequence; in that way passion would equally "infer" action. It must be understood, rather, as an a priori entailment, in the way one property is said to be the reason of another; for this a virtual distinction or a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing suffices.

4. That Action Admits of More and Less. A third property, which Aristotle also posited in the Categories, is that action can have a contrary. This is sufficiently clear of itself; it belongs to action by reason of its term; hence it does not always belong to it, but only when its term has a contrary. In this respect, the same account applies to action as to motion, about whose contrariety the natural philosophers discuss at length. Finally, both Aristotle and Gilbert add the property that action admits of more and less. This can be attributed to action in two ways. In one way, by reason of the term only; thus illumination "to the degree of eight" is a greater and more intense action than illumination "to the degree of four," even if each occurs in an instant. In this sense the proportional account of this property in action is the same as in the formal term of the action; on this we spoke above when treating of qualities. In another way, the property can be understood by reason of time; in this way one can say that the more intense action is that which is accomplished more quickly, even if another, in a longer time, has an equal effect. In this way the property can belong only to successive action, and it coincides with the speed of motion, which is a

topic proper to philosophy. It is true that "speed" is less properly called an "intensification" of action; it is rather a lesser extension of the action's own parts according to duration or succession.

SECTIO VI
HOW MANY GENERA AND SPECIES OF ACTION THERE ARE, AND HOW THEY ARE PLACED UNDER ONE GENUS

1. This question too has been treated for the most part above. Yet, in order to make clear how the category of action is to be constituted, what its highest genus is, and consequently which actions are directly placed under it, the principal divisions of action that have been set out piecemeal above must be briefly gathered together.

First Division of Action Into Substantial & Accidental

2. First, then, action can be divided into substantial and accidental. I call that action "substantial" which is terminated to a substance; "accidental," that which is terminated to an accident. About this division there can be no doubt that it is rightly given and sufficient; for in things nothing can come to be except a substance or an accident, as is clear from what was said above about the divisions of being. Each of these can come to be per se and by a proper action, as is clear from what we said about the efficient cause and is known well enough in itself. Therefore action is rightly and sufficiently divided into those two members.

Whether the Division Is Univocal or Rather Analogical

3. A doubt arises, however—and this is the chief reason why I propose this section—whether action is divided univocally into those members or only analogically. From what has been said above about causes one seems clearly forced to conclude that this division is analogical. For we said that "cause," especially the efficient cause, is said analogically of the cause of substances and of the cause of accidents. Therefore the causality of these causes is analogical; but the causality of these causes is nothing other than action. Therefore action too is said analogically of the actions of these causes. This is confirmed, first, because "generation," by the common judgment of the philosophers, is said analogically of accidental and of substantial generation. The consequence is clear, because the same proportional account holds whether we speak of action under the common notion of action or under a particular notion. The antecedent is taken from Aristotle (On Generation and Corruption I), who for this reason calls the generation of substance simply "generation," whereas the "generation" of accidents he calls "alteration" or "action," and so on. Finally, the reason which is taken from the same source (c. 3) and from St. Thomas (ibid.; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 9; a. 3; De Veritate q. 21, a. 5) applies to action as such: generation is a road to being; but the being of substance is being simply, whereas the being of an accident is being in a qualified sense. In the same way, action is, on the side of the agent, in its own manner a road to being, for it is the active communication of being itself. Therefore, if the being communicated through it is analogical, the action too is analogical. For the whole account of action is chiefly taken from the term, as we showed above; and the formal term of action is the thing produced insofar as it is brought into its being. Therefore, if there is analogy in the very being of the terms, there will also be analogy in the actions, in the notion of actions.

4. On the other hand, if what is divided in this division is not univocal, one cannot assign a single highest genus for the category of action; or at least one will have to say that the action which is the

highest genus of this fifth category is only that which is accidental. But if this is said, it further follows that two categories of action must be constituted. For why, if accidental actions constitute their own category, should not substantial actions constitute another? First, those are found to be primarily diverse among themselves; next, in substantial actions there are specific differences with generic agreements up to a certain highest level. Finally, the distinction between substantial actions and their terms is as great as that between accidental actions and their terms. Therefore there is no reason why accidental action should constitute a single genus of a category and not substantial action.

It is Concluded to be Analogical

5. In this doubt I judge it probable that the division is analogical; for the reasons given first, which are taken from the thing itself, are very strong and do not seem to admit of a fitting reply. The reasons given afterward are drawn only from authority, from the received division of the categories; these can be met by giving plausible reasons why accidental actions are directly placed in one category, whereas substantial actions are referred back to the category of substance. For, first, creation was little known to the ancient philosophers; hence it is not surprising that they gave it no place among the categories. Next, we said above that creation is not an accident but a certain substantial mode; therefore it was not necessary to place it among the categories of accidents, but it should be reduced to the category of substance. Substantial generation, moreover, is by many not reckoned a proper action but a certain terminus of a preceding alteration, since it results from it. I, for my part, do not think this view true, but rather that generation is a true and proper action, as I said above when treating of the efficient cause; and this is the more common opinion of the philosophers, which Aristotle expressly proves against the ancient philosophers in the books On Generation.

Nevertheless, because this action is always conjoined with alteration, it is reckoned as one with it; and therefore there is no need on its account to constitute a distinct category. A better reason is this: substantial generation, since it is a road to substance, does not have the proper notion of an accident, but is intrinsically a substantial mode; therefore it is fittingly referred back to the category of substance.

6. This view, then, is very probable. If someone does not like it, he can say that action can be considered in two ways: first, as it is a road to the term to which it gives being, and under this aspect the reasons adduced go through and conclude that it is something analogical; second, precisely as it is the act of the agent, in its own way bringing that from potency to act, and under this aspect it is something univocal, which can also be proportionally applied to passion. Yet a difficulty always remains in this reply, that action as action cannot be abstracted from the notion of road and causality, that is, the giving of some being; likewise, that it is the act of an agent in no other way than because it flows from the agent to communicate some being. One can say that none of these is considered in action as it is placed in the category, but only that it is, as it were, a form of the agent denominating it as such; and as such it has logical univocity, although according to its complete real account it has a metaphysical analogy.

Second Division of Substantial Action

7. Second, substantial action can be subdivided into that which is done without a subject and that which is done from a subject. This division is clear enough from what has been said: the former is creation, the latter generation. These can be further subdivided into production and conservation, a division which we discussed at length above and showed to be not real but of reason. Again, those members can be divided into various species according to the variety of terms, as we also said above. One can also ask whether this division is

univocal or analogical. It can seem analogical for two reasons. First, because God, under the aspect of first efficient cause, is the primary cause with respect to all others, so that "efficient cause" is said analogically of them and God is the primary analogate; therefore, since creation is as it were God's first action as efficient cause, on which all others essentially depend, in some way "action" seems to be said analogically of it and of the other actions, and creation to be the first analogate. Second, because creation gives being simply; by generation, however, being is not given simply as such, but such-and-such being and, so to speak, only on one side, namely by applying a form to matter.

8. Yet, although these reasons are plausible, there does not seem to be here a sufficient basis for analogy. For through generation a substance truly and properly comes to be, which is "a being simply," and is predicated univocally of all created things. Thus, although in mode creation is always the more excellent action, nevertheless the thing made by generation is often more perfect than that made by creation. Again, that every generation presupposes some creation, at least of matter, does not suffice to constitute analogy, because that presupposition is only material, just as form presupposes matter, and for that reason is not analogically "substance" with respect to it. Moreover, every act of generating is necessarily an act of God, although not of God alone, and therefore from the peculiar relation which creation has to God it need not follow that the notion of action belongs to it first and analogically. Hence, although the notion of efficient cause, as to the power of acting, is said analogically and primarily of God, nevertheless, as to actual action, analogy need not intervene, because God is also denominated "actually acting" by a created action, and sometimes by the very same action by which the creature is said to act, as was seen above.

Third Division Into Transient & Immanent Action

9. Third, accidental action is subdivided into immanent and transient; we have said enough about this division. Nor does it matter that the differentia "transient" seems to fit substantial actions also, for we cannot find more proper differences, and differences must be taken as they fit the genus which they divide. Other differences, too, can be common to these members, and according to them these divisions could be ordered otherwise. For accidental action is also "from a presupposed subject," and there can also be some action "without a subject," as in creation or the conservation of an accident outside a subject. Likewise, in accidental actions there is production and conservation. Action could also be divided first into spiritual and material, and then these members into others. Nonetheless, the proposed order seems more suitable, both because of the greater difference between substantial and accidental actions and especially if only the latter constitute a single category. Accidental action, then, is rightly divided into immanent and transient. Immanent is properly called only that action which formally remains in the same proximate power from which it is elicited, and which by its kind is such that it can never occur in another subject; and in this sense only the actions of knowing and loving are immanent. In these there are many genera and species of actions which it is not necessary to set out further here; that belongs to the sciences of the soul and of the angels.

Certain Vital & Connatural Actions are Broadly Called Immanent

10. Sometimes, however, the name "immanent action" is extended to any action which remains in the operating suppositum; and in this sense all vital motions—nutrition and growth, and even the local motion of animals—can be called immanent; likewise the natural motion of earth tending downward, or of water returning to its former coldness. But all these are immanent actions improperly so called, because although they are in the same suppositum, they are not

in the same part, or not in the same power or faculty of acting. Those natural motions are particularly excluded, because in some way they are attributed to an extrinsic agent, as in generating; and for the same reason the natural emanation, for example of powers from the soul—although in its way it is an action, as we saw above, and remains in the same soul—nevertheless, because it is properly attributed to an extrinsic agent, is not properly an immanent action. Thus it comes about that proper immanent action is found only in vital actions, although the converse does not hold, for not every vital action is immanent in the strict sense.

Whether There is Some Action Formally Immanent & Virtually Transient

11. Some are accustomed to subdivide transient action into what is formally transient and what is transient only as to efficacy; indeed, those who think every action is in the agent hold that no action is called transient except on account of efficacy. I, however, judge that no action, as action, is transient "as to efficacy" only, because action as action is efficacious only by reason of its intrinsic term. Hence, if there is an action which remains in the agent, it remains there because its terminating principle remains there; therefore, as action, it cannot be transient "as to efficacy." If sometimes through an immanent act something outside is produced, it is not produced through that act under the notion of action, but as a principle of acting, as was said above about the divine knowledge and will; and the same holds for the created will insofar as it is operative ad extra. Accordingly, an immanent action then, as it is an action, does not of itself operate ad extra, but operates ad extra through its intrinsic term. Thus, if we call the return of water to its former coldness an immanent action, although from it there follows that water, once made cold, cools some external thing, that action of "reduction" is not properly called transient as to efficacy, because it halts in its own term;

another action follows from the power of the term of the prior action, as from the principle of a new action. In this way it must be understood whenever an immanent act is the principle of some effect outside the agent; indeed, if sometimes it leaves some other effect in the agent itself, it brings that about in the same way. Every transient action, therefore, if it is properly and in the notion of action transient, is called transient because it is formally transient, that is, it proceeds from the agent and is received in the patient. This, in turn, can be divided into many species and modes of transient actions, the treatment and study of which properly belong to natural philosophy; for such action especially concerns sensible matter, and consequently, with respect to these species, the account of action and of motion is nearly the same.

Other Divisions of Actions

12. Other divisions of actions are also found in the authors, which, for our present purpose, are sufficiently known from what has been said above: for example, that action is distinguished into vital and non-vital, which we touched upon in Section III. Likewise, that it could be distinguished into action that proceeds by proper efficiency, or by natural resultant effect—of which we spoke when treating the efficient cause. Finally, we gave above the division into instantaneous and successive action, about which we shall say more in the next disputation. Let this, then, suffice to have been said about action.

DISPUTATION XLIX

ON PASSION

The term "passion" has various meanings. In the usage of philosophers and theologians, the name "passion" is equivocal, as is clear from Aristotle (Metaphysics V, ch. 21), from St. Thomas (I–II, q. 22, a. 1), and from other places and authors generally. For the affections of the soul are commonly called "passions," and certain qualities of the third species are also called "passions," as is evident from the chapter on Quality and from Physics III, ch. 3. Moreover, one is especially said to "suffer" when one undergoes something contrary to one's nature, or when one loses something. More broadly, however, "passion" is said of every reception of a form, whatever that form may be. In the present disputation it is taken in this latter way; thus it corresponds to action—though not to every action, but to that which is performed upon a presupposed subject. Since action and passion, taken in this way, have a great mutual connection and agree in many respects, many of the points earlier said about action—mutatis mutandis—can be applied to passion. Therefore we shall treat this disputation more briefly, by first explaining the agreement and the difference between action and passion, and then by setting out the proper nature of passion and its species.

SECTION I
WHETHER PASSION DIFFERS IN REALITY FROM ACTION

1. A certain opinion is rejected. Some have thought that action and passion are really distinct things; this must be the position of those who hold that action is nothing other than a relation of the agent to the patient, while passion is a relation of the patient to the agent. This was the view of Scotus (IV Sent., dist. 13, q. 1; Quodl. 11), followed by Anthony of Andrés (on De Sex Principiis, q. 9). This opinion, however, has already been rejected above with respect to action; and for the same or an even stronger reason it must be rejected for passion. For by passion as such the patient is not referred to the agent; rather, the very thing suffered is affected by passion with an order to some terminus. Passion is the reception of a form. And although every passion proceeds from some agent, it proceeds from it only as from an extrinsic cause; hence passion not only does not formally state a relation to the agent, but it does not include, in its formal and precise concept, any transcendental respect to the agent—otherwise it would include in its ratio what belongs to the ratio of action. If, then, there is any relation of the patient to the agent, it results from passion and is founded upon it; for the patient is referred to the agent because it suffers from it. Therefore action and passion cannot be distinguished in that way. I omit other points previously said about relations that supervene extrinsically, which can also be applied here.

Another Opinion is Refuted

2. Others have said that action and passion are sometimes really distinct, and sometimes not; namely, when an action is in the

agent and induces a passion in the patient, they are really distinct; but when an action together with the passion itself is transferred into the patient, or both remain in the agent itself—which at the same time would also be a patient—then they are not really distinct. Yet since above we rejected the first member of this partition and showed that there is no action, properly so called, which induces a passion in another subject other than the one in which it is itself, we hold as certain that this partition is unnecessary, and that on that basis—namely, from a distinction of subjects—action and passion are never really distinct. In order that the comparison be formal and proper, it must be made between passion and the very action that induces it. For if they are compared disparately (so to speak), they can often be really distinct; thus, passive generation is really distinct from creation, and generally the action of creating can be said to be really distinct from passion—either negatively, because it has no passion intrinsically conjoined with it, or positively with respect to other passions which it does not induce. But such a comparison is extrinsic and accidental. Therefore passion must be compared with the action that brings about that passion, and, proportionally, each passion with the action that corresponds to it.

Action & Passion are Not Really Distinct

3. With the sense of this comparison thus explained, the common and true opinion is that action and passion are not really distinct in a proper and strict sense. This is Aristotle's view in Physics III, ch. 3, where he says that action and passion in reality are the same act or motion and differ only according to diverse respects. The same is taught by the authors cited above [who hold that action is in the patient]. And it is proved as follows. Either action and passion are really distinguished as two things, or as two real modes really distinct. The first cannot be said; for, as seen above, action is not a "thing" properly taken, but a mode of a thing; therefore passion too cannot be

a thing possessing its own entity from itself, but is a mode of a thing. It is of the same mode and order as action, and, according to its own formal character, it imports a lesser perfection. Likewise, motion is not a thing properly speaking, but a mode of a thing; therefore passion is not a thing either, for they are of the same nature—or rather the same, as I shall say below. The second is also false: real modes, as stated above in Disputation VII, do not of themselves have a real distinction, but only according to the things of which they are modes; but passion and the action that induces it are modes of the same thing, namely of the same motion or of the same terminus; therefore they cannot be real modes that are really distinct. The minor is proved both from Aristotle's teaching and the common doctrine cited above, and from the thing itself: for passion is nothing other than the "coming-to-be" of the form or of the formal terminus of the action insofar as it is received in a subject and immediately reduces that subject from potency to act. But the "coming-to-be" of the terminus or form is nothing but a certain mode of that terminus; therefore passion is a mode of the terminus of the action. And above it was also shown that action is nothing other than a certain mode of the same terminus, namely its dependence on the agent. Therefore action and passion are modes of the same thing; consequently they cannot be really distinct from each other. This is confirmed: action is not really distinct from its terminus, as was said above; we shall immediately show the same for passion with respect to its terminus; therefore neither can be really distinct from the other. Finally, it is confirmed by the common maxim that a distinction should not be introduced without necessity; here there is no necessity, as will be seen even more strongly from what follows.

Various Opinions About a Modal Distinction Between Action & Passion

4. One may further doubt whether at least a modal distinction—actual and founded in the nature of the thing—should

be admitted between action and passion; for it often happens that modes of the same thing, thus distinct from the thing, are among themselves distinct in the same way. Many think that such a distinction must be admitted between action and passion. Others speak uncertainly, calling it a formal distinction. This view can be grounded either on the predicamental distinction between action and passion, or on the distinction between active and passive power. For since action is the act of an active power and passion the act of a passive power, and since such powers are in some way distinct in reality, it seems necessary that action and passion also be in some way distinct in the thing and by nature.

5. Hervaeus (Quodl. VII, q. 14) says that action and passion differ because the agent belongs to the ratio of action and the patient to the ratio of passion, extrinsically (he says) and by addition, as a cause belongs to the ratio of its effect. Yet it is scarcely clear what he means, unless he intends what others say—and what we too will say presently—namely, that action and passion differ according to diverse respects to agent or patient. But Hervaeus does not seem to intend this sense, for he expressly contends that relations to the agent and to the patient are not of the essence of action and passion. Thus he signifies that a motion existing in the patient is action insofar as, by an extrinsic denomination, it denominates the agent as actually acting; it is passion insofar as it denominates the subject as actually suffering—even without any relation to them. This is plainly unintelligible, unless at least a transcendental respect is involved.

6. Capreolus speaks more clearly (II Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 2): he says that action and passion differ by diverse relations; he wishes, however, that these relations pertain to action and passion not directly but obliquely. Hence he holds that in reality and intrinsically action and passion do not differ in any way, but are the very same change or motion; extrinsically they differ by the relations they connote. He says that in action this relation is the relation of the agent to the effect, which is in the agent itself; in the patient it is the relation

of the effect to the cause. But we have shown above that this view is false with respect to action; and the same proportionally holds for passion. First, the relation of the effect to the cause follows upon passion in the very terminus of the passion; therefore passion cannot be constituted in its formal ratio by that relation. Second, passion as such directly regards the patient, insofar as it is a form actuating it and denominating it as actually suffering; therefore the respect included by passion as such is not the patient's respect to another, but the respect of passion itself to the subject, insofar as it is in a proper and special way the act of that subject. Hence, if the patient itself be considered concretely, it does not formally signify "effect" as related to an agent, but only "subject" as affected by a passion tending to some terminus. Therefore that relation in no way belongs to the ratio of passion. Indeed, if a relation to the agent is to be attributed to either of the two, it is more fittingly ascribed to action than to passion, because relation to the cause is only a relation of origin from it. This relation primarily belongs to action, and, if it be taken not predicamental but transcendental, it enters intrinsically into the ratio of action, as I showed above.

7. Finally, it is scarcely intelligible how action and passion are distinguished by extrinsic relations connoted obliquely; for in the very way in which they are distinguished by them, they would also be constituted by them. Therefore either they are constituted by them as by forms from which the same motion is extrinsically denominated "action" and "passion"—and then these would be merely two denominations belonging to two species of relation, thus never leaving the category of relation—or they are constituted by respects to those relations; and thus action would be constituted by a respect to the agent's relation, and passion by a respect to the patient's relation—which is plainly false. For, first, the ground of such a respect does not entail a further respect to the relation that arises from it; and, second, passion (as I also said above about action) signifies not a respect to a relation, but a respect to the passive power.

Action & Passion are Distinguished Not by Nature But by a Distinction of Reasoned Reason

8. I judge, therefore, that action and passion are not in reality modes distinct by nature, but that the same dependence and emanation of the form from the agent—inasmuch as it intrinsically affects the subject—is called "passion," whereas insofar as it denominates the agent as actually acting, it is called "action." Thus these two are, at most, distinguished by a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae (a distinction of reasoned reason), i.e., a distinction founded in some way upon the things themselves, which is sometimes sufficient to distinguish categories, when there arise therefrom primary and diverse modes of denominating or predicating—which happens in the present case. This is the teaching of St. Thomas (In XI Metaph., lect. 9), where he expressly says that action and passion differ only by reason; and the same is taken from Contra Gentiles II, ch. 9, and from other places cited above. It is also taken from Aristotle in Physics III, where he says that the same motion is the act of the agent and of the patient, and that according to these diverse formalities it is called "action" and "passion."

9. The first part is proved by reason: action and passion are so united in reality within one motion or change that neither action can be separated from passion, nor passion from action—even by absolute power. This is a sign that they are not actually distinct by nature. The consequence follows from what we said above regarding distinctions of things or modes: where such inseparability intervenes, no sufficient indication remains of an actual, by-nature distinction. The antecedent is proved because it is repugnant that passion occur in a subject without proceeding from some agent (for there cannot be an effect without a cause). But in that very change, insofar as it proceeds from an agent, there is found the true ratio of action, as is clear from the preceding disputation and from what was said above when we treated

of God's transient action. Conversely, there cannot be an action "from a subject" (for of this kind of action we speak) without thereby inducing a passion. For if it occurs from a subject, the terminus of the action is received in that subject and comes to be in it; therefore there is passion and reception on the part of that subject. Hence action of that sort and passion are absolutely inseparable. There is no need to restrict this to transient or successive actions, as some would. Speaking of passion in the general sense given above—for every change and reception in fieri—and applying action to passion proportionally, the doctrine is general. In immanent action, just as there is action, so too there is a perfective passion; and in instantaneous action, there is an indivisible change and passion. Thus action and passion are always conjoined in the same change.

10. The second part of the conclusion follows of necessity, given what precedes and given the common doctrine and distinction of the categories. Some distinction must be admitted between action and passion; since it is neither real nor by nature, it must be one of reason. Again, it cannot be a voluntary distinction feigned without basis, because the distinction of the categories is in some way founded upon the things themselves. Therefore this distinction is founded in the things, not that it actually precedes in the things themselves, but that it is virtually there and is accomplished by the intellect's varying conception and definition. In this sense it is rightly called a "distinction of reasoned reason." If this be the same as what others call a "formal distinction," we do not contend about the term. Furthermore, the argument drawn above from the distinction between active and passive power also proves this: these often are distinct in reality; and even when they are conjoined in one thing, as in the powers of the soul, they are at least distinguished by a distinction of reasoned reason, as was seen above. Therefore the acts of these powers are in some way distinguished—at least by a distinction of reasoned reason. From the diversity of the powers themselves and from the diverse way in which they are reduced to act,

there is taken a sufficient foundation for the aforesaid distinction of reason between action and passion. Nor is there a greater distinction when active and passive power are really and also in subject distinct. For the act of the active power does not actuate that power as the subject in which it is, but as the source from which it proceeds; conversely, the act of the passive power actuates it as the subject in which it exists. One and the same act necessarily exercises both roles in reality, even if the powers are most distinct in reality; therefore in that case too there intervenes a distinction of reason because of diverse respects, and never a greater distinction. Thus the foundations of the other opinions have been answered.

SECTION II
HOW PASSION IS RELATED TO MOTION OR CHANGE, AND WHAT PASSION FINALLY IS

1. Although the treatment of motion, in a special way, belongs to natural philosophy—inasmuch as motion occurs physically or materially in bodily things—nevertheless a more abstract consideration of change falls under metaphysics, because it intervenes in all things (even those lacking matter) and in every action and passion of a creature. Therefore we too must say something about it. This is most suitably taken up here because, as we think, there is hardly any difference between motion and passion if they are compared proportionally.

A Common Opinion on the Distinction Between Passion & Motion

2. It is commonly said that motion can be considered in three ways. First, as it is "from another": thus it is called action. Second, as it is received "in something": thus it is passion. Third, as it is the form or

terminus in fieri, that is, the "coming-to-be" of the form, or a flow tending toward the perfection of the form: in this way it has the character of motion and is formally distinguished both from action and from passion. This is a rather common opinion in Physics III. It can be proved thus. Passion as passion constitutes a determinate category, whereas motion as motion constitutes no category; hence they must at least be distinguished formally. The major is assumed from the division of the categories. The minor is proved, first, from Aristotle in the Categories, where, after numbering passion among the categories, he treats of motion in the Postpraedicamenta. Second, from Aristotle in Physics II, text 4, where he says that motion is not apart from the things to which there is motion; therefore, just as there is no category common to all the things to which there is motion, so motion is not outside those categories to which its termini belong. Third, because passion, being one genus, is said univocally; motion, however, is not univocal but analogous, as all teach in expounding the places of Aristotle cited; hence motion does not pertain to the category of passion. Fourth, because motion signifies something incomplete and imperfect, since it signifies a terminus as partly acquired and partly to be acquired; therefore of itself it is not constituted in a category, but is reduced to the category of the perfect form to which it tends. Fifth, because motion has a different definition than passion. Aristotle defines motion as "the act of what is in potency, as such" (Physics III, text 6). Of action and passion he adds (text 22) that they are "affections of motion," and that passion is "the act of the passive." Things that differ in definition are at least distinct by a formal distinction.

3. Accordingly, action and passion are thought to be related to motion as two formally diverse modes to one, as it were, material subject which they affect. Aristotle plainly signifies this when he says: "Teaching is not strictly the same as learning, nor action the same as passion, but the motion in which these inhere; for the being of the one is in this, and the being of the other is toward that; they are different in

ratio." Hence those who suppose that action and passion are modes distinct by nature consequently think that they are distinguished in the same way from motion. Those who posit only a distinction of reason between action and passion posit a similar distinction between passion and motion. Yet both agree in contrasting action and passion as modes mutually diverse, and in contrasting them with motion as with a material reality modified by them.

Some Points in Which Motion & Passion Agree

4. In this opinion, however common it may be, one thing has always seemed difficult to me: I do not see where the difference between passion and motion is constituted, if they are compared proportionally and according to their complete formalities. By "proportionally" I mean that a successive passion be compared with successive motion, an instantaneous passion with instantaneous change, a perfective with a perfective change, a corruptive with a corruptive change, and so on. To lay open the difficulty, we must enumerate everything that can be found in passion and in motion. First, I assume that both motion and passion tend toward some terminus and intrinsically express a transcendental respect to that terminus. This is beyond doubt for motion, because motion is intrinsically a way and a flow, and a way intrinsically regards a terminus; hence Aristotle teaches that motions are distinguished by their termini. Concerning passion, the same can be proved by the same reasons by which we proved this of action. For every passion is a passive acquisition and reception in fieri; these cannot be understood without an order to the form that is coming to be or being acquired. Thus it is more certain that passions are specified and distinguished by their termini than actions are, as St. Thomas clearly teaches (I–II, q. 1, a. 3). In this, then, motion and passion agree.

5. Consequently, both are also in some way distinct from the terminus—not as a thing from a thing, but at least as a mode. Nearly

everyone teaches this in Physics III, where Aristotle (text 4) does not obscurely signify it, and St. Thomas, and again in Physics V, text 9, where Averroes, Alexander, Themistius, and others hold the same. The same reason applies to passion, as those authors think, because some distinction in the thing is necessary; a greater distinction is neither necessary nor intelligible. The first is clear, because a form can remain in a subject without such a motion or passion, as is obvious; therefore they are distinguished in some way by nature, according to the principle we often repeat. The second proposition is proved because there is no sign of a greater distinction, since, conversely, it cannot happen that such a motion or passion exist without such a terminus. Moreover, a greater distinction is not necessary: when some form comes to be in a subject, in it there is a dependence by which it simultaneously depends upon the subject and upon the principle from which it flows; this dependence is one and the same. It is distinct by nature only from the form upon which it depends, as is clear from what was said above about the eduction of a form from the potency of matter. But by virtue of this very dependence, insofar as it is received in the patient, the patient suffers and receives the form. Therefore passion is nothing other than this dependence, that is, this very passive "coming-to-be" as received in the patient and as affecting it. But this dependence is only a certain mode of the terminus itself. Therefore no other thing distinct from the terminus is necessary in order to understand the true ratio and role of passion.

6. Indeed, from this it also follows that such a distinct thing is not even possible. For then the patient would receive both the form—which is the terminus of the passion—and the dependence of that form (we suppose such a dependence as comes to be from the subject), and, in addition to these, it would receive some other thing really distinct. Thus in every passion there would necessarily be two receptions and two things received—which is absurd; and then one thing would not be the reception of the other. Likewise, if they were distinct things, God could conserve either without the other;

therefore the terminus could be received with its coming-to-be, without another really distinct thing; and thus the subject would suffer without a passion. Conversely, that "other thing," which is the passion, could be conserved without the other which is the terminus. You will say: by a similar argument it would be proved that form is not by nature distinct from passion, because a form cannot be received without passion. I reply by denying the consequence: although this form cannot be received without some passion (because it cannot exist without some mode of dependence and reception), nevertheless it can be conserved without the reception or passion by which at the beginning it was made or received. Even in its conservation, several dependences can vary; and that is a sufficient sign of a modal, but not a greater, distinction—as has often been said.

7. Third, motion and passion agree in this: each regards a subject, and one and the same subject, under the same passive capacity or potentiality. This is proved as follows. It is certain that passion contains an intrinsic relation to the patient; for every act that actuates, as such, implies a relation to the potency of which it is the act. But passion is the act of the patient as patient; therefore it implies an intrinsic relation to the patient—namely, a transcendental relation, as we said above regarding the relation of action to the agent. The same must be explained here proportionally; the reasons given there apply here even more strongly. As for motion: that it has a similar relation to the patient or mobile is proved from Aristotle's definition of motion as the act of a being in potency, as in potency—where he clearly defines motion through a relation to the subject. Moreover, passive creation—as we saw above from St. Thomas's doctrine—is not a true change precisely because it is not the act of a subject; therefore it belongs to the nature of change to express a relation to the subject which is changed by it. Further, what is properly said to be changed is that which is disposed differently than before, as Aristotle testifies; thus motion must signify a respect to some subject, which it formally makes to be otherwise than before. The terminus is not properly said

to be otherwise than before, since previously it was not; rather, that is properly said to be changed which first was under one terminus of motion and afterwards is under another. Finally, motion is essentially the act by which that which is actually moved is formally constituted as moved; therefore motion, as such, includes an intrinsic relation to such an effect and to the subject in which it has it.

8. An objection is commonly urged about local motion, which, it is said, is not in the subject that is said to be moved, but in the surrounding body; for motion is in the subject in which its terminus is; but place, the terminus of local motion, is not in the body that is moved or located, but in the surrounding. The reply is easy: the assumption must be denied. Local motion intrinsically inheres in the mobile; otherwise how would it truly and really change? As to the argument: the intrinsic terminus of motion is not the surrounding place, but the ubi intrinsically, which is really intrinsic in the located thing itself—as we shall show below; thus that argument rather proves the opposite. Therefore, in general, motion and passion also agree in this, that they express a relation to the subject which they intrinsically and formally affect.

9. That passion and motion, taken proportionally, regard the same subject and according to the same capacity and potentiality is proved both by induction and by expounding and applying Aristotle's definition of motion. For heating, as both passion and the motion of heating occur in water, actuates it according to the capacity it has for receiving heat, and insofar as, according to that capacity, it is presupposed to be in potency—that is, lacking heat—and is reduced from such potency to act. This is what Aristotle means when he says that motion is the act of what is in potency, as in potency. That clause is commonly explained in two ways. First, motion is an imperfect act which actuates the mobile in such a way as to leave it in potency according to which it is more and more actuated. In this way the definition applies only to successive motion, the ratio of which is that, while it is, it is partly acquired and partly something remains to be

acquired; hence, insofar as it already is in some part, it is the act of a being having the potency for it; insofar as something of it remains to be acquired, it leaves its subject in potency so that it can be further actuated. Because the subject is actuated through the motion in such a way that through the motion it always tends toward further perfection, therefore motion is said to be the act of what is in potency, as in potency. All of this equally belongs to passion, insofar as passion is successive (for we have already said they are to be compared proportionally). This passion too actuates the patient insofar as it has the potency for acquiring some form; and if it is successive, it actuates in such a way that it always leaves the subject in potency to further perfection and tends to that perfection. Therefore also in this it agrees with motion.

10. The second way to expound the definition concerning the last clause is this: motion is the act of what is in potency, as in potency, that is, insofar as it first passes from being in potency to being in act. A thing is in passive potency as long as it has an aptitude for the act and lacks it; it is reduced to act when it receives the act. This reduction begins with the very "coming-to-be" or passive acquisition of that form, which is the proper act of such a potency. Since motion consists in the actual acquisition of the terminus—as is the truer and more common opinion—the first act by which the subject begins to be actuated, insofar as it existed in potency, is motion itself. In this sense I do not dislike what Simplicius reports from Alexander (Physics II, com. 8): that motion is the first change of what is in potency as such —although he would have spoken better had he said "the first actuation," lest he seem to include the defined in the definition. According to this sense the definition applies not only to successive motion but also to instantaneous change. For every change is the act of a being that has the potency for it, and by it the subject is first reduced from potency to act; therefore every instantaneous change is the act of a being in potency, as in potency. All of this likewise belongs to passion, taken universally and proportionally. For the subject first

begins to be reduced from potency to act when it first begins to suffer; thus passion is the first actuation of passive potency, and is called "first" with respect to the form to which it is terminated, which also actuates, but no longer by way of becoming or passion, but in a settled and perfected being, according to its capacity. This is found in every passion—both successive and instantaneous, both perfective and destructive. Therefore, in whatever way motion is said to be the act of what is in potency as in potency, this applies also to passion; hence nothing remains by which a true difference between motion and passion can be assigned.

11. Reply to an objection. It may be said that it belongs to the ratio of motion or change that by it the subject is first reduced from potency to act, because what is changed is said to be otherwise disposed now than before; this, however, does not belong to the ratio of passion: for as long as a subject receives something, it is truly said to suffer, even if it does not newly receive it, but had previously received that very thing or something similar. Nevertheless, this difference, at most, concerns words; and the usage of the terms is not settled. The first point is clear: at the first instant or time when some subject begins to acquire a form, just as it is changed, so too it suffers, and it receives both denominations from the same acquisition or flow, insofar as it actuates the subject. If that reception lasts for some time through succession of parts, then just as it continually suffers, so too it is continually moved—and conversely. The proposed difference does not apply here; for in order that a thing be moved now, it is not necessary that it was not moved previously, but only that it is not being moved according to the same part of the motion. If that reception endures for some time by the persevering duration of the same acquisition—as happens in the illumination of the air—then, just as in reality there endures a real passion and reception, so too there endures the real change made at the first instant; and if afterwards it is not called "change," that is only because the name "change," like the name "production," connotes that immediately

beforehand it was not present. Perhaps "passion" does not connote this, just as "conservation" does not. Therefore, just as we said above that production and conservation do not differ in reality according to any positive ratio, so we must say of passion and motion.

A Resolution of the True Difference Between Passion & Motion

12. Passion Does Not Differ in Reality from Motion by Any Distinction. The arguments made in the latter place seem to establish in the thing what they intend. Yet, lest we seem to abandon the common manner of speaking without any explanation, the following assertions appear suitable to settle this controversy. First, it must be said that passion and motion are not actually distinct on the side of the thing—neither really, nor by nature, nor modally. Everything we have said clearly proves this. And this can be proved a fortiori from what was said in the preceding section concerning action and passion; for passion and motion are less distinct from one another than action and passion are; but action and passion are not actually distinct by nature. Therefore…

13. Second, it must be said that passion and motion, properly and completely taken, do not differ even by a distinction of reasoned reason, according to their positive formalities, but only in name. This conclusion too is sufficiently persuaded by the arguments made last. Hence Aristotle defines motion to be the act of the mobile as mobile (Physics III, text 15), and yet immediately (texts 22–23) defines passion to be the act of the patient as patient. But, on the side of the subject, "being mobile" or "changeable" and "being receptive" or "passible," if these are taken proportionally with reference to positive reception or change, are not two passive powers or capacities even distinct by reason, as is self-evident; therefore neither are the acts themselves distinct.

14. By What Distinction of Reason Passion and Motion Differ. Third, I say: if motion is taken with some precision or abstraction, or even with the connotation of some negation, then in some way it can be distinguished by reason from passion. Explanation: as I have often said, in the terminus or form that comes to be in a subject, only two things are present, distinct modally or by nature—namely, the form itself that is induced and its dependence upon the agent. The form cannot be called motion or passion (although some, following Averroes, Physics V, com. 9, speak that way, but not rightly), because the form is the terminus of motion, and if the form alone remains without any further flow, there is no motion; and the same holds for action and passion. Therefore the flow or dependence of the form is what receives all these denominations. The intellect can consider that flow precisely as it is a way to the terminus, abstracting precisely from its affecting a subject or from its dependence upon a principle. So conceived, that flow can be called "motion," and under this aspect, by reason, it is distinguished both from action and from passion, and is in some way included in both—either as something superior and transcending, or as a material and inadequate concept of either. Aristotle seems to take motion in this way (Physics III, text 25) when, under a distinction, he says that motion is the act of the active or the passive. Nevertheless, this acceptation of motion is quite improper; for motion and change, taken according to the common conception of the mind, essentially imply a relation to the subject that is changed. Also, according to this signification, there would be change in passive creation, because there too there is a flow or passive dependence of the terminus; yet, properly speaking, this is not admitted, as we saw above. Nonetheless, because the conception and precision of motion is not entirely fixed among philosophers, it can be said that motion, in that sense, is distinguished by reason from passion. In that signification motion is said analogically, and it much more properly pertains to passion than to action.

15. Another way to declare a distinction of reason between motion and passion is by connotation. For motion, as such, and insofar as it denominates the mobile as changing or moving, connotes the negation that this motion or change was immediately lacking in the subject beforehand—since to be changed is to be otherwise disposed than before. Passion as passion, however, does not seem to include this connotation in its concept, as was said above. One may add that change as such can abstract from whether it is effected by a positive reason or by the mere absence of a pre-existent form; for sometimes there is a purely privative change, as the loss of light in the air. Passion, strictly speaking, is said only of the positive acquisition of some form or positive mode. Yet these two last differences seem less usual, and, according to them, the comparison between passion and change is not proportional but concerns diverse things; therefore they do not seem proper. The first difference has a greater foundation in the precision that the intellect can make because of the diverse relation that the same dependence has to various termini; and thus authors who distinguish these seem to speak according to this difference, which is proved—at most—by the reasons made at the beginning. Insofar as those reasons might seem to proceed against our first or second assertion, we must briefly solve them.

Replies to the Arguments

16. To the first: motion, as it properly signifies the act of the mobile, belongs to the category of passion, either as a certain species of it if it is taken for physical or successive motion (as I shall say shortly in §4), or as a highest genus if it is taken in common for change as such. Motion, precisely taken as a way to the terminus, does not belong to a special predicamental accident—not only because it is something imperfect, as many think, but especially because it is not the form of any subject, nor is it considered as such under that precision, but only as a way to the terminus; hence it is reduced to the

category of its terminus, as we also said above when treating of passive creation.

17. Therefore Aristotle, in the first place cited from the Postpraedicamenta, perhaps spoke of motion under that consideration and precision—or as something in a certain way common to action and passion. There he treats only of the distinction of motion and of certain of its properties; all that he says can be common, with proportion, both to action and to passion. Indeed, he clearly speaks of motion as it abstracts from substantial and accidental change, and from positive and privative change; for among the species of motion he includes generation and corruption. In that sense motion is clearly something more general; thus it is distinguished by reason from passion, as a proper genus of a certain category. In the second place, however, he clearly speaks of motion precisely as a way to the terminus, and as such he says that it is reduced to the category of its terminus.

18. To the third, we reply: motion, in the generality in which Aristotle discusses it in the Postpraedicamenta, is indeed something analogous, as is evident from what has been said. Nevertheless, I think that passion too can be taken in that generality in which it is likewise something analogous. For, to omit the privative change—which in its way can also be called a passion, although more properly it is called "change"—if we speak of passions and of the changes we compare to them, passion, as common to substantial and accidental change, is perhaps also something analogous, for the same reason as action. Consequently, it is probable that the passion which occurs in matter through substantial generation does not pertain to passion insofar as it constitutes the special category of accident. Besides the arguments brought above about action, another, which seems probable, occurs here: predicaments of accidents are always distinguished by Aristotle in relation to first substance and to the various denominations they give to it, and according to which they can be predicated of it, as was said above. But substantial generation as passion neither inheres in any

first substance (but only in matter), nor does it bestow a denomination upon substance by way of affection or passion, but only by way of becoming; for substance is said to be generated not as a subject but as a terminus. Under that aspect this generation is reduced to the category of its terminus, as was said above. Matter itself is not properly said to be generated; although Scotus and Anthony of Andrés (In VII Metaph., qq. 8–10) say that matter is generated as a subject, that way of speaking is quite improper and unusual, as Soncinas and Javellus note in the same places. Therefore that passion is probably not counted among those that assume the nature of accidents; hence it should be reduced to the category of substance. Those who think that there is no proper accident in prime matter must hold this. Thus, under this general aspect, passion is something analogous. According to this opinion, passion—which is one of the highest genera of accidents—will be only that which is a positive, real, accidental passion.

19. If, however, motion or change is taken with the same restriction for the real and accidental act of the mobile as mobile, I do not see why it should not be equally univocal; for it also states a common notion found in many and equally contractible to the same inferiors. Finally, motion under that aspect does not, in my judgment, express a concept different from the concept of passion.

20. To the fourth: passion also expresses something imperfect; and, if it is successive, it expresses an acquisition partly made and partly to be made. In this respect the same holds for passion and for change, if they are taken with the due proportion. Motion, therefore, cannot on that account be excluded from constituting a category, because what is imperfect absolutely or in one genus can be perfect in another and, under that aspect, constitute a proper category. Not all the genera of the categories are perfect beings absolutely. Hence motion, under that consideration by which it is distinguished from passion, fails to constitute a special category not solely because of imperfection, but rather because of analogy or the other reasons

given above. To the fifth it has already been explained how the definition of motion also applies to passion if they are compared according to their complete and proportional real ratio. It has also been explained how motion can be prescinded from action and passion, and what these are understood to add to motion thus conceived: they do not add modes distinct by nature, but certain transcendental respects which are as it were "differences," or rather transcendental modes distinct by reason, completing with the ratio of flow or way the ratio of action or passion.

21. Conclusion of All That Has Been Said. From these considerations it remains sufficiently explained what passion is and in what way it constitutes a special genus; and, as Gilbert of Poitiers said, everything said of action can be applied likewise to passion, with only the relation inverted. Therefore it will not be necessary to repeat those points here.

SECTION III

WHETHER ACTUAL INHERENCE BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF PASSION, OR ONLY APTITUDINAL INHERENCE

1. Although this question seems common to all accidents, it has a special difficulty in the case of passion. Few have treated it; we ought not to omit it.

Reasons for Doubt

2. The reason for doubting is this: above it was said that it does not belong to the nature of an accident as such to inhere actually, but only with an aptitude; yet passion is a certain accident; therefore it will not belong to its nature to inhere actually, but only with an aptitude. It may be replied that passion is not such an accident as is a

form or a thing distinct from others, but is only a real mode; and we said above that modes essentially include not merely aptitudinal but actual inherence. This does not satisfy. A mode essentially includes actual conjunction only with that thing or form of which it is the mode, not with the subject in which that form inheres; for the mode is really distinct from the subject, and thus it could really be separated from it and conserved without it. Therefore the mode does not essentially include actual inherence in such a subject. An example clarifies this: figure is only a mode of quantity; hence, with respect to quantity, it essentially includes actual union, but not with respect to the substance in which the quantity inheres. Thus heating, as passion, is indeed a mode of heat; and from this it follows rightly that it essentially includes an actual conjunction with heat, such that it cannot exist without heat; but it does not thereby include essentially an actual inherence in the subject of heat with respect to which it is a passion. Therefore passion, as passion, will express only an aptitudinal conjunction with the subject.

3. On the contrary: action as action expresses a relation of actual dependence upon the agent, not merely an aptitudinal one; therefore passion as passion expresses an actual actuation of the patient, and not merely an aptitudinal one. The consequence is clear, because passion is compared to the patient in proportion as action is compared to the agent: just as action is an act "from which," so passion is an act "in which." But passion cannot actuate except by inhering. Therefore actual inherence, not merely aptitudinal inherence, belongs to its ratio.

The Name "Passion" Implies Actual Inherence

4. In this matter, if we consider the force of the terms "passion" and "patient," there is no doubt that they immediately indicate act, not merely aptitude. It is not called "passion" unless something is actually suffered; and to suffer signifies act, not mere

aptitude to suffer. Therefore passion, in strictness, signifies that form which actually constitutes the patient. Hence, if we suppose that God produces heat outside any subject and we call that production "heating," it is certain that such "heating" cannot properly be called passion: by it nothing suffers; a terminus does not suffer by being produced, but comes to be. Although this already seems evident from the signification of the word, we must not rest in this alone, but must probe the reality more deeply. We have often said that in a form that is made in and from a subject, besides the entity of the form, there is found a dependence, by which the form emanates from and depends upon the agent. This dependence, insofar as it is united to the patient and effects it, we call "passion." The question, therefore, is whether, just as in a form that is made in a subject two things distinct by nature are distinguished—namely the form and its union—so too in the dependence itself similar distinct elements can be distinguished—namely the dependence in itself, insofar as it tends to the form, and its union with the subject. For if these two are distinguished in the dependence, then, just as the form is separable from actual union with the subject, so too that dependence will be similarly separable; the same reasoning and proportion obtain; and from the very modal distinction this necessarily follows.

5. From this it further follows that—whatever be said of the word "passion"—that mode, or form, which is passion does not essentially express union with the subject, since it is distinct from union by nature and is separable from it; therefore it will essentially express only an aptitude, that is, that it is a form apt to constitute the subject as suffering, even if it does not so constitute it except when it is united—although perhaps the name "passion" is taken from the actual affection of the patient and not from the aptitudinal alone. In general, the name "accident" seems to be taken from actual inherence ("because it befalls"), and the name "form" because it "informs," although in the thing signified the essential ratio does not consist in act but in aptitude. That in the dependence of the form those two—

namely the substance of the dependence and its union to the subject —are to be distinguished by nature, as they are in the form, can be proved both by parity of reason and also because the dependence has its entire being ordered to the terminus and is really identified with it. If, therefore, in the terminus, substance and union are two things distinct by nature, then in the dependence too those two must be distinguished by nature.

Actual Inherence Belongs to The Essence of Passion

6. Nevertheless, I judge that passion as such essentially expresses actual union and conjunction with the terminus and with the subject of which it is the passion, such that the effecting of the form—or the dependence by which a subject suffers—is essentially such that it cannot exist unless it is united to the subject. To prove this assertion, I distinguish a twofold (indeed threefold) passion. One is purely unitive, of a pre-existent form—pre-existent either in time or by nature—with the subject. Another is both unitive and productive of the form. I omit another member, namely a productive action that is not unitive of the form, for that cannot have the ratio of passion, as I shall immediately say.

7. Of the first kind of passion, that is, purely unitive, it is evident that it cannot occur without actual union to the subject, and that it essentially includes such union, because formally nothing new is made by it except the union of the form to the subject. But that union cannot occur unless the subject itself actually receives and suffers it; for union cannot be without an actual termination to the things that are united. Therefore this passion essentially includes an actual affection of the subject which is united by it. An example of this kind of passion in natural things occurs only in the generation of a human being, because no other natural form pre-exists and is made by another action naturally prior to the composite except the rational

soul. In supernatural matters there is a similar example in the resurrection of a human being; and one can add that of the union of the humanity to the Word. Therefore the passion that occurs in matter when the rational soul is united to it clearly depends essentially upon the matter: if it does not occur in the matter, nothing occurs by it, because the union of the form to the matter will not occur. That union cannot occur to the matter unless the matter itself receives that unitive passion. If, however, the union does not occur, nothing happens—since the form is already supposed to exist, and only the union was the formal terminus of that change. The same reasoning applies to every similar example or union. Nor does the difficulty first mentioned apply here, because by this change not both the form and the union are made, but the union alone, as philosophy shows.

8. Furthermore, when a passion is such that by it the form is simultaneously produced and united to the subject—and the form is of such a kind that it is not a thing properly distinct from the subject, but only a modal entity—then it is likewise clear that such a passion essentially includes actual union to the subject. The principal example is the passion that occurs by local motion, by which there is produced only a certain mode in the subject that is moved, namely local presence (as will be set forth more fully below under the category of ubi). It is impossible to understand how such a passion could occur outside the subject; the same holds for any similar case. The reason is that in the terminus of this sort of passion union is not distinguished from the very form; actual union to the subject belongs to the very nature of such a modal form. Therefore passion is proportioned to its terminus. In this case too the reason for doubt proposed at the beginning ceases.

9. There remains, then, a third mode: namely, when the passion in the subject is such that by it both the form—truly distinct from the subject—and the form's union to the subject come to be. Of this passion too I say that it essentially and in its substance includes not merely an aptitudinal but an actual affection of the subject. The a

priori reason is that such a passion is essentially a passive eduction from the potency of matter; but such an eduction essentially includes actual union to matter. A posteriori it is clear: it is impossible that this passion be conserved as to its substance (so to speak) while separated from the subject and without union—wherein there is a great difference between that passion and the form itself. This is a sign that passion includes actual union in its essence. The assumption is made clear thus: if heat is produced outside a subject, then the dependence and outflow of that heat from its cause is not of the same essential ratio as the dependence by which heat is made from a subject; and, as I showed elsewhere, by the very fact that quantity is conserved while separated from substance, it is made or conserved by a dependence essentially distinct from that which it had when in the subject. The reason is that passive creation and eduction from the potency of a subject are essentially diverse dependences; but, by the very fact that the dependence is separated from the subject, it is no longer an eduction, but a creation or a conservation of the same ratio as creation. Therefore the dependence is essentially changed by the separation from the subject; therefore that dependence which has the ratio of passion insofar as it affects a subject essentially includes actual union to the subject.

10. An Objection Solved. Someone may say that, in a material form or accident separated from the subject, a twofold dependence can be conceived. One dependence, by its nature, essentially requires independence from the subject—such is creative dependence, to which it is repugnant to affect a subject and to have the ratio of passion. Another dependence can be conceived which by its nature requires dependence upon the subject, but not so essentially that it could not, by God's absolute power, be deprived of that dependence and be otherwise conserved, God supplying that dependence in another way. Then that dependence, even if it is actually separated from the subject, would not be creative dependence, because of itself it is born to depend upon a subject. Thus such a dependence of itself

would be a true passion aptitudinally, because of itself it is apt to affect a subject, even if, when posited as separated by God's power, it does not actually affect.

11. This answer does not satisfy. It is repugnant that an actual dependence which, by its nature, hangs in its being or becoming upon a subject be conserved actually separated from the subject. Here lies a great difference between dependence and the form that depends. The reason for this difference is that dependence does not depend through another dependence, but through itself; therefore it cannot be conserved without the influx of every cause upon which it per se and really depends or by which it is caused. Nor could that natural dependence which it has upon a material cause be supplied by another kind of action, because action is not an action upon an action. It is otherwise for the form that depends: it depends through a dependence distinct from itself, and the dependence it has upon the subject can be supplied by another kind of action. It follows that no action or dependence can terminate in a form that stands of itself and is separated from a subject without that action being creation or creative conservation. For if it is done without the material concurrence of a subject, then the form is produced without eduction from the potency of a subject; therefore it is creation, for there is no middle between these. Here there is no place for the distinction between actual or aptitudinal dependence upon a subject; by the very fact that the action is not actually "from a subject," it must be actually "from no subject," and in this the ratio of creation is consummated. Wherefore, although the same form might be made "from a subject," nevertheless that very action can never be "from a subject." And therefore neither can that dependence ever assume or have the ratio of passion, because it can never itself affect the subject. Hence, in the end, it is concluded that no dependence can have the ratio of passion unless it is actually made in and from a subject and consequently affects it; and conversely, no dependence actually separated from a subject is born to affect the subject itself and assume the ratio of

passion. Therefore, universally, passion in its essential ratio includes actual union to the subject and can never be preserved with aptitudinal union alone.

Replies to the Reasons for Doubt

12. To the initial reason for doubting, the reply is that passion, by its special ratio, requires this actual inherence—not because it is a mode precisely as a mode, but because it is such a mode by which a form is educed from the potency of a subject, or by which a form is passively made from a subject. This ratio essentially includes actual union to the subject. To the other difficulty the reply is that there is a dissimilar ratio between the form and the dependence with respect to including actual union to the subject, as has been said. And although perhaps in the dependence itself one may in some way distinguish the union from the tendency toward the form, nevertheless, with respect to the dependence or passion itself, those two are essentially conjoined so that one cannot remain without the other, for the reason given. See what I have said on this matter in Part III, vol. I, disputation VIII, section 1.

SECTION IV
WHETHER SUCCESSIVE AND INSTANTANEOUS PASSION BELONG TO THE GENUS OF PASSION, AND HOW THEY DIFFER UNDER IT

1. All the divisions that we gave concerning action have a place in passion, except the division between action "from a subject" and action "without a subject"; for in passion this division has no place, since passion intrinsically expresses an order to a subject. Therefore it is repugnant that a passion be given outside a subject, as is

sufficiently clear from what was said in the preceding section. Of the other divisions which, as I said, can be accommodated to passion, none requires a new exposition except the one proposed in the title of this section.

Resolution of the Question

2. First, it is certain that passion is correctly divided into instantaneous and successive. There is no doubt that these two genera of passions are found and that they sufficiently divide passion in its whole latitude. The first point is clear by induction: perfective passions such as understanding, willing, and illumination are, properly speaking, effected in an instant, as is taught by all in Metaphysics IX and by the theologians on I Sent., dist. 17 (see Major, q. 5). This is Aristotle's clear teaching and fairly evident in itself, as we touched upon above when treating of immanent acts. Among physical actions, substantial generation takes place in an instant. Other passions are successive, which is clear; I presuppose this from philosophy. The second point is clear: these two members include an immediate contradiction, by reason of which they adequately divide the divided. For in any passion or reception, either the whole form capable of being acquired is received all at once, or by degrees and in parts; there is no middle between these two. When a passion is produced in the former way, it is instantaneous, because it is whole at once and indivisible. When it occurs in the latter way, it is successive, because one part of it comes to be before another. Therefore the division is rightly and sufficiently given. Nor can it be doubted that each of these passions—especially if accidental—belongs to this genus, since each is the act of the patient as patient, that is, insofar as it tends to some terminus. That "tending" does not intrinsically state succession, but a passage from passive potency to act or to the acquisition of act; nor does succession of itself and intrinsically repugn to it. Therefore the

predicamental passion as such is indifferent to these two modes and embraces them under itself.

3. Instantaneous Passion Can Occur in Two Ways. Concerning the first member, something must be noted. An instantaneous passion can occur in two ways. First, so that it endures only for an instant: thus occurs substantial generation, insofar as it is a passion or transformation of matter from one form to another, when it occurs simultaneously in a definite and determinate portion of matter, and from a univocal cause upon which the effect does not depend for its conservation but only for its becoming. That action—and consequently also that passion—occurs in a single moment, because it is whole at once; and it lasts for only a single moment, as far as depends on itself, because it is not conserved by the agent. Hence the passion may be called an instantaneous "passing passion." The other kind is "permanent": although it occurs in an instant, it endures as long as the effect endures that proceeds from such a cause—because the effect depends upon it both in becoming and in being conserved. Such are illumination, intellection, and the like. There is a question about terminology: whether such a passion merits the name "passion" for the whole time it endures, or only for the first instant. The reality, however, is already sufficiently established, as was noted above.

4. This difference between these actions is accidental, because it is taken only from a greater or lesser perseverance in the same state; this difference is merely accidental and includes indeed a certain extrinsic denomination, as will be clearer below when we speak of durations. Each of these passions, therefore, is of itself apt to endure for any duration, if it be conserved by the agent; that it sometimes endures and sometimes does not, comes from the condition of the agent—namely, whether it is univocal or equivocal, or at least whether it acts naturally or freely. Such conditions do not per se essentially vary the passions resulting from actions. From this it follows that, although these actions and passions are of themselves apt to occur in an instant of our time (and for that reason are called "instantaneous"),

nonetheless it does not repugn to them to occur while coexisting with our time—either through the agent's liberty or because the application of the patient to the sphere of the agent's activity does not happen otherwise. This coexistence is not by coextension of parts (for that repugns to a passion supposed indivisible and whole at once), but by the coexistence of the entire indivisible change within some whole time, or in each part or intrinsic instant of it. Wherefore, although such a passion or change is said by coexistence to be "in time," nevertheless, according to its intrinsic duration, it always occurs in an instant—as will be shown more at length in the disputation on durations.

5. Two Modes of Successive Passion. Concerning the other member, it is to be considered that passion may occur gradually and by parts in two ways. First, by a continuous flow, such as we experience in local motion—most manifestly, for example, in the motion of the sun—from which it also follows that the passive illumination of the air from daybreak increases continuously up to the full day. Second, successive passion can be understood to occur discretely, or (as they say) by interrupted pauses—whether each of these in itself is instantaneous, or successive and continuous—e.g., if we imagine water to be slightly heated and then immediately to rest, and after a short time to be heated again, etc. This latter mode of succession is manifestly accidental, especially in physical passions, whatever one may think of the angelic, regarding which we judge the same, as we shall touch upon in the disputation on durations. The reason is that this discrete succession is nothing but the multiplication of multiple passions, one occurring after another without any union among them; hence such a succession will be accidental to them—as it is accidental to one man that another was generated previously or will be generated afterwards. Therefore, although with respect to the terminus or the subject each of those passions may be called "partial," since by it either the subject suffers only according to one part, or the terminus is acquired only according to a part, nevertheless with

respect to the other change it is not partial properly and actually, because they do not actually compose any change that is per se one, but only a number of certain changes, which in the genus of change is a unity per accidens—whatever be the case whether, in the genus of quantity or of number, it is or is rather conceived as something per se one. This discrete succession, being per accidens, does not affect the variation of the species or essential ratio of the passion. The prior succession seems more per se, because, given the continuity of the flow, there is some unity among the parts of such a change, and consequently some per se unity in the whole change; and therefore there is a somewhat greater difficulty concerning it.

Whether Instantaneous & Successive Passion Differ Essentially

6. An Opinion. Hence arises the doubt whether these two members essentially divide passion as passion; the same is usually treated concerning change in general and can also be treated concerning action. Some philosophers think that these two members are always essentially diverse. It can be proved by a parity of reasoning about motion—or rather from their identity, since we said that motion, according to its complete and proportional ratio, does not differ from passion. In motion, "to be successive" or "to be instantaneous" are differences that cause essential diversity; therefore, the same in passion. The minor is proved: a motion that is successive is essentially successive, and an instantaneous change is essentially instantaneous, because succession intrinsically repugns to the latter, and "to be whole at once" repugns to the former. This is confirmed because motion is essentially a kind of tendency; a tendency cannot be understood without flow and succession. A second confirmation: otherwise there would be no being essentially successive; for time, which is most of all successive, has succession only by reason of

motion; therefore, if any being is essentially successive, it is motion alone.

7. The Opposed Opinion. Others hold the contrary: namely, that these two kinds of passion differ only accidentally, unless a difference is taken from the termini or from elsewhere. The reason is that a successive passion differs from an instantaneous one only in that its parts are either simultaneous or one after another; but this is very accidental for varying the essence of passion. For as, in the form itself that comes to be, it is accidental that one part of it be made before another—and it would be no less accidental if, as one part succeeded, another were corrupted, as perhaps happens in nutrition or aggeneration—so, in the reception of such a form, which is the same as passion, it seems accidental that one part be made after another or all at once. This is confirmed by the argument suggested above: that a passion be done in a shorter or longer time is accidental to the action, if by it the same being is acquired; therefore it will also be accidental, etc.

8. The Author's Position. We must first beware of an equivocation. There is no doubt that for a passion "to be successive" or "to be instantaneous" are so diverse modes that, if compared formally, one may be said to differ essentially from the other—just as a point is essentially distinct from a line, an instant from time, or the relation of proximity or simultaneity from the relation of distance. Wherefore, if the comparison between successive and instantaneous passion is made in a formal or, so to speak, "composite" sense, there is no doubt that they can be said to differ in species, just as white, as white, differs in species from black. In the same way, "successive," as successive, can be said to differ in species from "instantaneous." If it be supposed that some name signifies successive passion precisely as such—say, the name motus (motion)—and the name mutatio signifies instantaneous passion precisely as such, then in that formal sense motion and change could be said to differ in species; and, at least in that sense, it would be true that succession belongs to the essence of motion formally taken,

as whiteness belongs to white as white. Nevertheless, this sense—however common it may seem—does not suffice to explain the matter at hand. Our principal inquiry is whether these two modes (to occur successively or in an instant) are accidental to the passions or actions to which they belong, or whether they are so intrinsic that they cause or indicate in them an essential diversity—not merely in the aforesaid formal or composite sense (which is of little moment), but simply between the passions themselves taken in themselves.

9. In this sense I think a distinction must be made. Whenever some passion occurs successively, some latitude is necessary in its terminus—either of intensity or of extension—by reason of which such succession can take place. Sometimes such succession can be entirely intrinsic to the change or passion, by virtue of and because of the repugnance that its parts have from the nature of its terminus. At other times, the succession is not so intrinsic from the nature of the terminus, but comes from the agent: either because the agent cannot at once overcome its contrary, or because it cannot equally diffuse that action into what is distant and what is near.

10. Resolution of the Doubt. I say, therefore, that a passion is not different in species from the mere fact that it is successive or instantaneous. If these conditions or two modes do not proceed from the intrinsic nature of the terminus considered in itself, they are accidental; therefore they do not vary the passion or change essentially. If, however, they proceed per se from the intrinsic nature of the terminus itself, then indeed the passions will be essentially diverse —not so much on account of succession or its absence, as on account of the diversity of the termini. Examples make all this clear. Illumination or intensive heating can occur successively and in an instant, as I suppose; with illumination the thing is manifest, even by experience. The same reasoning applies to heating: although, because of the resistance of the contrary, it more often occurs successively, nevertheless, if it happens in a patient that does not resist, it will be whole at once, since on the part of the quality itself it does not repugn

to occur all at once—just as it does not repugn to exist all at once; and the agent acts all at once as far as it can when there is no resistance. Hence it is clear that, for such a terminus, "to occur successively" is extrinsic and accidental; therefore it is accidental also to the change or passion itself to occur so. In this part, the arguments for the second opinion rightly convince. The same is true of succession according to the extension of the subject, which commonly occurs in alteration or aggeneration. On the part of the termini it would not repugn that the whole quality or form be introduced at once into all the parts of the subject or matter, since it remains at once in all; the succession arises only from a defect in the agent's power or in the application of the patient. Indeed, it does not repugn that the same numerically identical action or passion which was begun successively should endure and persist whole at once. Thus the sun successively illuminates this air—intensively, because the closer it approaches the same part, the more intensely it illuminates it; extensively, because the higher it rises, the further parts it reaches to illuminate. Nevertheless, by the same action by which it successively produced six degrees of light, it conserves them all together for some time or instant. Just as that succession is accidental to the light, so it is to the illumination; therefore it is of the same species whether it be done all at once or successively. The same holds, by parity of reasoning, for fire, insofar as it can have succession according to extension.

11. However, when the induction of a form is instantaneous and indivisible from the intrinsic nature and necessity of such a form, then such a passion, under that aspect, will be essentially different from a successive passion. Substantial generation is indivisible in intensity from the intrinsic ratio of its terminus; therefore, if it occurs in a determinate subject, it necessarily occurs whole at once and in an intrinsic instant; and therefore it essentially differs from every action or change that either has or can have succession in intensity. The same will be true of any change to a quality if it is also indivisible in intensity. The reason for this diversity does not arise from the mere

lack of succession, but from the fact that a form that is by its nature indivisible intensively is specifically different from a form that is by its nature intensible. Therefore the acquisitions of such forms are by their nature specifically diverse.

12. In a like manner one must philosophize if there is given some passion or change which, from the intrinsic nature of its terminus, necessarily requires succession; such a passion will be essentially different both from change necessarily indivisible by force of its terminus and from that change which is indifferent to succession and its absence, as far as depends on the terminus. Although mere succession does not indicate essential diversity, its intrinsic necessity sufficiently indicates it. Among pure changes tending to quality or substance, I do not find any that necessarily have such intrinsic succession. The same is true of the proper acquisition of quantity, for it is always accompanied by some alteration and aggeneration. Only in the local change of bodies does there seem to intervene a kind of successive passion of this sort; for the terminus of that motion has such extension and latitude that it involves at least a natural repugnance to be traversed or acquired in an instant. Although, if one attend closely, the repugnance that intervenes there arises not only from the terminus but also from the mobile itself, which neither according to itself as a whole nor according to any part of itself can at once occupy both a distant and a proximate place. Hence this repugnance ceases in some way for spiritual substances, as we shall touch upon in Disputation LI. From whatever side that intrinsic succession arises, it sufficiently indicates essential diversity between that kind of change or passion and all others that occur or can occur in an instant.

DISPUTATION L

ON THE CATEGORY WHEN, AND IN GENERAL ON THE DURATIONS OF THINGS

Wherever Aristotle discusses the genera of accidents, he says almost nothing about this genus. He merely interprets the signification of the word, taking "when" (quando) to be the same as "in time," or as time itself—a subject he treats expressly in Physics IV. Since, however, we are considering all these matters here under a higher and more abstract aspect, this disputation too must begin from a more universal principle. For we must treat in it of the durations of all things, since this is the predicate attributed to individual things; and we must see whether it is something substantial or accidental, and whether with respect to certain things it constitutes a special genus. In that way it will be clear what is signified by the name "when," and how it is a special genus.

SECTION I

WHETHER DURATION IN A THING IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE BEING (ESSE) OF THE ENDURING THING

Section I

1. That duration is something in things is self-evident, and therefore we shall not linger in proving it; this will also be made clear from what follows. Next, we presuppose that duration is not truly and properly attributed except to things that exist. For a thing is said to endure when it perseveres in its existence; hence duration is judged to be the same as permanence in being. Thus God is said to endure perpetually because He always exists; creatures, however, do not always endure, but are said to endure when they exist. Fictions or beings of reason are not truly and properly said to endure, because they do not exist; yet in the way in which they are feigned or apprehended as if they truly existed, they are also conceived as if they endured—and this is attributed to them insofar as the act of mind by which they are feigned or to which they are presented endures and exists. Therefore, universally, enduring is attributed only to a thing actually existing and precisely as it is existing. From this it can also be gathered that duration is something of the thing, since it belongs only to things that exist and to each according to the measure of its existence. Hence the difficulty arises how duration is compared with existence—namely, whether it is something distinct from the thing itself, or is entirely the same.

The First Opinion is Presented & Refuted

2. On this point the first way of speaking can be that duration and existence are really distinct in created things (for these are chiefly in view). I find this view stated explicitly by no author, although St. Bonaventure and others (whom I shall cite below), when treating of the duration of angels, seem to suggest it. Yet one can urge this opinion, especially according to the view that in created things existence is really distinct from essence. For if existence is really distinct from essence, then duration is also distinct. The consequence is proved thus: just as to exist is outside the essence of the creature, so too is to endure. Again, to endure does not belong to an existing thing

precisely as it is existing, as we said above; therefore, if existence is a thing distinct from essence, much more so is duration. Hence St. Thomas (ST I, q. 10, a. 2) says that in every created thing duration is distinguished from the thing, because in every created thing existence is distinguished from essence. Again, that existence and duration are mutually distinct is proved because in the thing itself the one is separable from the other, and conversely. Therefore, according to the principles set out above concerning distinctions, this is a sign of a real distinction. The antecedent is proved as follows. First, existence seems to be separated from duration in the first instant of a thing's production: in that instant the thing exists, yet it does not as yet endure. Conversely, duration seems to be separated from existence in the humanity of Christ, for example, in which there is no created existence (according to that opinion). Yet it does not seem possible to deny that there is in it created duration, since its duration is not eternal or infinite, but temporal and finite. And if the Word were to relinquish that humanity, the same duration would continue, and would be measured by the same measure of time; but then it would have created duration; therefore it had the same before.

3. This opinion does not seem probable to me. First, because below we shall show that duration and existence are not distinct in reality, much less really distinct. Next, this multiplication of entities that can hardly be understood in themselves is to be avoided unless it is efficaciously demonstrated. Also, its foundation presupposes a false principle—namely, that existence is really distinguished from created essence (on which we have spoken above)—and from that false principle it draws a bad conclusion. For even if existence were distinguished from essence, it would not follow that duration must be distinguished from existence; indeed, the authors who maintain that distinction do not distinguish these two. The example concerning the humanity of Christ rather confirms the true opinion that we have set forth elsewhere—namely, that that humanity does not lack its own created existence of its created nature—than that a created duration

can be found without a created existence, which in truth cannot in any way be understood. For that there is created duration in that humanity seems sufficiently proved by the line of reasoning given. Although those who defend the contrary opinion could say that, just as the humanity of Christ exists by an uncreated existence, so it also endures by an uncreated duration, and consequently by eternity itself, and yet does not endure eternally, because the union to that eternity was not from eternity but from time; nevertheless, for as long as that union remains, that humanity has eternal duration. This evasion has as much plausibility as that opinion can have; yet it does not satisfy, both because the question immediately arises concerning the union itself, which is created and has a temporal duration on the part of its beginning, and could also have an end by absolute power. The question, I say, arises: what is the duration of the union itself, and how is it not created and finite? And also because the argument given seems to show that, even if the union were dissolved, the same duration would remain in the humanity as regards the very entity of the nature. Therefore we more easily and more truly profess that there is in that humanity a created duration, yet not without a created existence.

A Second Opinion is Considered

4. The second opinion is that duration is distinguished from existence from the nature of the thing as a real mode of it. This opinion seems to be presupposed by St. Bonaventure and others who say that there can be extension and variation in duration even if there is none in existence itself; their position will be treated below. Certain Thomists say the same, on the first part of St. Thomas. The foundation of this opinion can be that in created duration as such some succession is necessarily included, whereas in created existence no succession is necessarily included. Therefore they are distinguished at least from the nature of the thing. The minor is certain with respect to permanent

things, and especially with respect to incorruptible things. The major is proved as follows. Every created duration admits of more and less, and not according to intensity (as is self-evident); therefore it is according to extension. Thus an angel has endured more today than yesterday. Now this extension, since it is not in permanent quantity, cannot be without some succession. Second, even in successive motion, time, which is the duration of motion, is distinguished from motion from the nature of the thing; therefore universally every duration is distinguished in the same way from the thing that endures. The consequence holds either by parity of reason or even a fortiori, because since both time and motion are successive and are nevertheless distinguished from the nature of the thing, and since every duration seems to include some succession, much more will duration be distinguished from the nature of the thing from any permanent thing. The antecedent is proved because motion can be slower or faster, but time not at all, as Aristotle testifies in Physics IV; for that motion is faster which in equal time traverses a greater distance. Hence in the motion of the heavens and in the motion of a clock the time of one hour is the same, although the motion and its speed are not equal. Third, it belongs to the very notion of created duration that there is some conservation; but conservation does not belong to the notion of created existence, for production suffices. Therefore duration and existence are distinguished, at least from the nature of the thing. For just as conservation adds to production a certain permanence, so too duration adds to existence permanence and continuation; but permanence and continuation are distinguished from the thing that remains, at least as its mode. Fourth, a real measure is distinguished from the nature of the thing measured; but duration is the measure of the enduring thing; therefore it is distinguished from the nature of the thing.

Resolution of the Question

5. Duration and existence are distinguished only by reason. We must say that duration and existence are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but only by reason. This opinion is held by Ockham (In II, q. 10) and Gabriel (In II, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1); the same is indicated by Scotus in the same place (q. 1), and by Capreolus (q. 2, a. 1, concl. 5–6; a. 2), especially in the solutions to the arguments against the second part of the sixth conclusion, to which Soncinas also adheres after the seventh conclusion. These authors speak chiefly of permanent duration, for they seem to think differently about time and motion, as we shall see later. For the present I understand the conclusion simply and without restriction. To explain it, I note first that the question here concerns real and true duration; for the imaginary duration that we conceive—even if things do not exist—as a kind of perpetual succession in which things can exist and endure more and less, is nothing real; thus it is neither properly the same as things nor distinguished from them, except as non-being is from being. Concerning this imaginary succession and what it is, I shall speak below. Next I note that we are not speaking of the extrinsic duration of one thing, which can be compared to another as its measure, as we shall see below. In that sense it is clear that an extrinsic duration can be either a thing or a mode distinguished from the nature of the thing from which it is measured; indeed, to be an apt measure from the nature of the thing requires such a distinction, which is sometimes real and sometimes modal, according to the nature and relation of the things compared as measure and measured, as will be clear from the course of the disputation. Therefore the question concerns intrinsic duration, by which a thing is properly said to endure; for by an extrinsic duration a thing does not endure, but its duration is recognized. Hence in every existing thing this intrinsic duration is necessary, because, all extrinsic duration being set aside, each thing is truly and properly said to endure even if it alone remains in its being. Thus God, by His eternity, endured even if nothing besides Himself existed; and if He had created only a single angel or

the heavens alone, that too would endure by its created duration. Therefore to endure is not an extrinsic denomination but an intrinsic one from the duration by which each thing intrinsically exists, and of this intrinsic duration we are now speaking.

6. The first part—namely, that duration is not something distinguished from the nature of the thing that endures, or from its existence (which is the same)—is proved by Ockham at the place cited. If duration is something distinct, it is either a substance or an accident. The former cannot be said universally of all things that endure, since accidents endure too; and if one were to say it specifically of substances, then one would already concede what the argument intends. For no one will say that one substance is the duration of another distinct substance. Therefore, if duration is a substance, it will be no other than the very substance that endures. The latter cannot be said either, because duration is neither quantity, nor quality, nor relation, and so on with the other categories of accidents. Yet this line of reasoning can be evaded in one of two ways: first, by saying that duration is a mode of existence; and just as existence does not constitute a special category, so duration is reduced to each category: the duration of a substance is a certain substantial mode, and so with other things. Or second, by saying that duration is an accident and constitutes a special category—namely, the very one we are considering, "when." This latter response is indeed probable, as we shall see; but from it there does not follow the necessity of a distinction from the nature of the thing, for less suffices to distinguish categories, as we have seen above.

7. Therefore I prove otherwise. By the force of existence alone, without any other thing or distinct superadded mode, a thing endures. Therefore duration is not distinguished from existence from the nature of the thing. The antecedent is proved as follows. A thing that exists is either conceived precisely in that first instant in which it intrinsically begins to exist, or it is conceived as remaining and persevering in being. In the first way of considering an existing thing,

the question is whether for that instant it should be said to endure. Although this might seem to concern a manner of speaking, let us now suppose, as more probable, that it does not then endure in the same way as it exists; for it intrinsically begins to exist, but extrinsically to endure—something I shall explain more fully below. In the second way of considering the thing, all admit without controversy that a thing cannot remain in being without enduring; indeed, they admit that duration is nothing other than permanence in being, because to endure is nothing else than to remain in being. Therefore a thing thus considered has endurance by the force of its very being-as-permanent; but the permanence of being is not any thing or real mode superadded to being; therefore neither is duration. The minor seems self-evident. For in order that being itself remain (I speak of permanent things), it is not necessary that anything be added to it; otherwise this would not be mere permanence but a kind of increase. Therefore for a thing to remain is nothing other than to retain that same existence. Consequently permanence adds no thing to existence.

8. This is confirmed and clarified by a similar case. Above, with St. Thomas, we said that action and conservation are not distinct in reality but only by reason, because conservation (speaking per se) is nothing other than the very same action persevering in its being. By the same proportion, within existence itself the permanence of that existence is not distinguished in reality from existence if that existence is truly permanent. Finally, I argue that existence is inseparable in reality from its duration, and conversely duration is inseparable from existence; and in each thing both are equally variable or invariable. Therefore they are not distinguished from the side of the thing. The consequence is clear from what was said above about distinctions in general. The major is clear, because it is impossible for a thing to endure except while it exists, as was shown above; and conversely, while an existing thing remains, it necessarily endures. That it is said to exist in the first instant and not properly to endure does not indicate a distinction greater than that of reason, as is clear from the example

adduced concerning production and conservation; more will be said below. Finally, a thing can no more exist without its own existence than endure without its own duration; therefore these two are mutually inseparable. The minor is likewise proved: if existence is altogether necessary, so is duration; if the former is incorruptible or corruptible, so is the latter; if one is permanent, so is the other; and if one is successive, so is the other. Therefore they are equally invariable or variable—a point that will be made clearer by answering the arguments.

9. The other part—namely, that duration and the thing that endures, or its existence, are at least distinguished by reason—is common, and is clear from the signification of the words themselves. "To exist" and "to endure" are not synonymous; therefore what they signify is distinguished at least by reason. The arguments given above in favor of the second opinion also prove this, especially the one that duration and existence are distinguished at least as conservation and production are distinguished (about which more below). Likewise, motion and time, in the view of all, are distinguished at least by reason, and yet time is nothing other than the duration of motion. Even more pressing is the consideration that in God Himself eternity is distinguished by reason from existence; therefore a fortiori they are distinguished in creatures, for no perfections can be more united in any participated being than in the First. The antecedent is clear because eternity is an attribute demonstrated of the divine existence through immutability; therefore these must be distinguished at least by reason.

10. The arguments for the second opinion will be treated at greater length in the following sections. For in the first it is assumed that every created duration involves succession, which is false, as will be said at length below. In the second, the question of the distinction of motion and time is touched upon; in the following section we shall explain it more fully and answer the argument proposed there. The third argument proves at most a distinction of reason, because there is

no greater distinction between conservation and production. In the fourth, the minor is false—namely, that duration is the measure of the enduring thing—as I shall show in the next section.

SECTION II
WHAT THE FORMAL NOTION OF DURATION IS, AND HOW ACCORDING TO IT DURATION IS DISTINGUISHED BY REASON FROM EXISTENCE

1. These two points are so connected that they seem to require a simultaneous explanation. Authors also differ in their views on them. I shall briefly discuss their opinions and then set out the matter.

Various Opinions

2. The first opinion is that of Ockham and Gabriel, mentioned above, who say that duration is distinguished from existence because "existence" signifies absolutely and simply that a thing is outside its causes, whereas "duration" expresses existence while connoting a succession with which the thing that is said to endure either coexists or can coexist; or, put otherwise, duration expresses existence insofar as it is apt to coexist with succession. Consequently, they say that a permanent thing in the first instant in which it exists is not said to endure, just as in that instant it is said not to be conserved but to be produced.

3. An Instant Is Truly A Duration. The Objection Is Answered. This opinion does not please many. For although it is true that the name "duration" is taken from permanence in being—which we do not conceive except under the mode of a certain extension and succession, or at least as coexistence with a real or imaginary

succession—nevertheless it is not on that account necessary that all this be included in the signification of the word. For although we conceive simple things after the manner of composite ones and so coin words to signify them, it does not follow that our manner of conceiving or the concomitance of another thing is included or connoted in the very signification of the word. Thus, even if the reality signified by the name "duration" is conceived by us after the mode of succession or in comparison with succession, it is not therefore necessary that our mode of conceiving or coexistence with succession be included in the signification of the word. Add that it does not seem necessary for duration to add to existence the fact that some real succession coexists with it or can coexist. For, as the familiar axiom has it, the source from which a name is taken is one thing, and what it is imposed to signify is another. Although, then, the name "duration" is drawn from successive duration, which is more familiar to us, it is not imposed to signify only successive duration, nor to signify a reality merely as coexisting. Furthermore, philosophically speaking, a thing is said to endure from the first instant and moment in which it is, if up to the last in which it is it is of such a sort that it intrinsically begins by the first and ends by the last instant of its being. Hence a thing is unqualifiedly judged prior in duration, even if it precedes another only by an instant—for example, the heavens are said to be prior in duration to their motion. Likewise, substantial generation is said to endure only for an instant, although it is not apt to coexist with any succession. Therefore duration as such does not signify or connote formal or virtual succession. Finally, the instant itself is some duration. You will say: just as a point is not a line nor quantity, but the principle of a line or quantity, so an instant will not be duration but the principle of duration. I reply: quantity formally includes extension or divisibility, whereas duration as such does not express extension or succession; therefore the case is not similar. A proper comparison would be between an instant and time: an instant is not time, but the principle of time; duration, however, is more universal than time and

abstracts both from successive permanence that is divisible and from permanence that is indivisible. Hence, although the instant is not time, it is nevertheless duration; for what endures by an instant endures somewhat. Therefore duration and existence are not correctly distinguished by the connotation of succession existing in itself or in another. Despite these objections, however, this opinion is probable, as I shall declare below.

4. Others explain the distinction between duration and existence differently, and their account must be weighed. They say that duration is distinguished from being because, formally, it adds to being a negation. For being as such says only that a thing has actual entity outside its causes; but to endure formally adds the negation that that being has not been destroyed but remains. Nor does it matter that this negation is virtually contained in that positive reality; for there is a difference between being contained virtually and being signified formally, and this suffices for a distinction of reason. In this way we distinguish being (ens) and the one (unum), although the negation of division which "one" formally expresses is virtually contained in being itself. This view contains clear truth on certain points. First, in that in any thing that endures, the existence can be understood together with that negation. For it is true even of God to say that He exists in such a way that He is not destroyed, since He cannot be destroyed. And of a thing that endures only for an instant we can also say that for that instant it exists or existed in such a way that for that same instant it was not destroyed—indeed, nor could it be destroyed—in that composite sense in which a thing is said necessarily to be when it is. Hence it is further true that every thing which exists under that negation endures; and to conceive a thing as enduring it suffices to conceive it as existing and not destroyed. For, as is clear from what has been said, duration adds nothing positive over and above existence. Therefore, if that negation is superadded by which we circumscribe permanence in being, it more than suffices to conceive a thing as enduring.

5. What is uncertain is this: that to conceive duration formally it is necessary formally to conceive that negation, and that it follows from this that the word "duration" formally signifies that negation. For "duration" seems a positive word, and the permanence in being that it signifies does not seem to consist in a negation, but in a positive continuity of being itself. Next, when we say that God has endured from eternity, we do not formally signify that from eternity He has not been destroyed. Moreover, it would follow that time formally consists in a negation—which is contrary to the common conception of all; and the consequence holds because time is a kind of duration. Finally, for a thing to be destroyed is to be deprived of being; therefore for a thing not to be destroyed is nothing other than not to be deprived of its being; therefore this negation adds nothing over and above being itself. If someone were to say that the endurance of a motion is formally nothing other than its not having ceased, by this negation he would say nothing but the motion itself; for a negation of cessation is nothing other than a negation of rest, and rest is nothing other than the privation of motion.

6. To these and similar points one can readily reply, according to the opinion stated, that in metaphysical and simple concepts, although they seem to signify positively, there is often no distinction except by an added or conceived negation. Although in reality the negation expresses nothing other than the positive reality, it differs in mode insofar as the positive is explained by a negation. Although sometimes that negation is the negation of another privation, nevertheless, formally as such, conceived by reason, it differs from the positive; and our mind, as it were by a certain reflection, uses that negation to declare the identity or existence of the same thing. All this can be seen from what was said concerning unity and simplicity. The word "simplicity" also seems positive, like "duration," and yet formally it expresses a negation, although by it a certain positive perfection is declared. The same, therefore, can very plausibly be said of duration. Capreolus touched on this when he said that duration is said to be

existence insofar as it does not pass swiftly away. By this he indicates that a thing in the first instant of its being does not properly have duration, or at least that being itself does not have the rationale of duration except as it is under that negation of not passing away suddenly. He therefore holds that duration formally expresses a negation. If this is true, the matter can be suitably explained by that negation of destruction or change in being itself. For permanence in being cannot add anything other than being itself; nor, when we say that God has endured from eternity, do we signify anything other than that God has always remained in His being, such that in it He could neither be destroyed nor diminished. What should be said concerning time on this opinion I shall explain below.

7. The remaining objections urged against this view prove only that by this negation nothing other than the positive being of the thing as actually existing is declared; yet this does not prevent it from being declared in a special way and by a distinct concept. Nor does this opinion say that duration consists in negation alone, but in being itself as conceived under such a negation; and in this way it probably explains the distinction of reason between existence and duration, at least in permanent things. What is to be affirmed definitively I shall state below.

A Third Opinion is Refuted

8. Others distinguish these by the notion of measure. They say that duration adds to being the rationale or relation of a measure, and in this way they say that the two are distinguished by reason. This opinion is also hinted at by Capreolus, and seems rather common among Thomists, as will be evident from what we shall say concerning individual durations. It can be understood in two ways: first, of active measure, that is, as measuring; second, of passive measure, that is, as measurable. In neither way does this opinion seem true. First, if duration as such is said to be an active measure, it is understood either

to be the measure of the very thing whose duration it is, or of another. Neither can be said; therefore, as such, duration does not express an active measure. The minor regarding the latter part seems clear: to be an extrinsic measure befalls one duration with respect to another, and in each it presupposes the rationale of duration; and it is a kind of denomination of duration itself in relation to reason. All these points will be confirmed a fortiori by the arguments that immediately follow. Therefore the minor is proved concerning the former part: quantity does not measure the substance in which it inheres, as Albert and Durandus rightly noted; rather it renders that substance measurable by another quantity. Therefore neither is duration the measure of the thing whose duration it is. Second, if duration is the measure of the thing whose duration it is, what does it measure in it? Perhaps it will be said that it measures its being. But against this: either it measures the perfection of its being—which it does not, both because the perfection of a thing does not consist in duration, nor is it formally increased or diminished by it, and because rather the perfection of duration is measured from the perfection of being itself—or else it measures some other quantity of it, which is plainly false; or finally it measures the duration of that thing. But this is as if one were to say that duration is the measure of itself, which cannot be said. For, as Scotus noted, a measure is always something extrinsic by which we know the quantity or perfection of a thing; hence Aristotle says that measure is that by which the "how much" is known. We do not know a thing's quantity by itself, but by another applied to it. Hence Aristotle says in the same place that the measure must be more known than the thing measured. Therefore, if it ever happens that the greatness of a quantity is known by itself, it is more truly said to be known without a measure than to be measured by itself or to be known by itself as by its own measure.

9. From this it is easy to prove the other part. Although every created duration renders the enduring thing measurable under that aspect, nevertheless its primary rationale cannot consist in this

"measurability," so to speak; therefore neither does the distinction between existence and duration primarily and per se consist in this notion of measure. The antecedent is clear because for a thing to be measurable is nothing other than to be knowable by another quantity or after the manner of quantity. For just as Aristotle said that measure is that by which the "how much" is known, so, passively, what is measurable is what is knowable after the mode of quantity by the application of another, better-known quantity. But to be knowable in this way cannot be the primary rationale of duration, nor indeed of any thing—both because to be knowable presupposes the rationale of the being that is to be known, and because to be knowable in such and such a way or through such and such a medium is something very extrinsic to the thing itself. This is confirmed, first, because for this very reason we said that to be a measure in this way cannot be the primary rationale of quantity, but at most can be assigned as its property; therefore the same must be said of real duration. It is confirmed, second, because what is measurable as such presupposes in the thing that rationale according to which it is measurable: thus what is measurable in magnitude presupposes in the thing an extension of quantity, and what is measurable in perfection presupposes in the thing perfection. Therefore, similarly, what is measurable in duration presupposes duration in the thing; hence duration is not formally constituted by the relation of measure. Finally, passive measure expresses a relation to active measure. If, then, duration is measurable, by what, I ask, is it measurable? Clearly only by a duration, because measure and measurable must be homogeneous, as Aristotle testifies. Therefore the rationale of duration as such is common to active and passive measure; hence in neither of them does the rationale of duration consist, but those are relations or quasi-properties attributed to duration.

Resolution of the Issue

10. Among these opinions the first two appear more probable and differ little in reality. We may add that duration, properly taken, formally says a positive permanence in existing, which differs from existence only by reason or by some intrinsic connotation. To make this clear, I presuppose that no thing properly endures at the first instant of our time in which it begins to be. This is very much in accord with the strict and proper signification of the word and with the common manner of conceiving—two points that are of great moment here, because this whole distinction is chiefly founded on our mode of conceiving. The verb "to endure," if we attend to its Latin force, signifies some permanence in a thing or action already begun; therefore, since at a single instant a thing does not yet have permanence in existing, it cannot properly be said to endure for that instant. This seems also to be the common sentiment of theologians: almost all judge that duration requires some perseverance in being, nor do they admit that substantial generation properly "endures," but rather that it comes to be and passes away in a flash. The same is to be said of any instant, which of itself does not increase duration but terminates it, as a point terminates a line.

11. Successive Things Are Compared With Permanent Ones As To Duration. This presupposed, it is easy to say that existence and duration are distinguished by reason, as production and conservation are. For "existence" expresses the actuality of a thing outside its causes absolutely, and without connoting any pre-existence; "duration," however, expresses some perseverance in that same existence—a perseverance that is not something distinct from existence itself, but, according to our mode of conceiving, connotes the pre-existence of that same existence, or that such an existence can be conceived as existing before whatever instant for which it is said to endure. Here a difference is to be noted between a successive thing and a permanent one. A successive thing is said to endure or to persevere by a real addition, because something new is always being made in it and added to it; a permanent thing, speaking per se, is not said to endure because

something is added to it, but because it remains the same in the same being. Thus that difference between existence and duration seems to have place only in permanent things, for in successive things duration appears to add something of the thing to its existence. Although this seems true as to manner of speaking, yet if we attend more carefully to the matter, the same rationale holds in successive things. For since successive things exist only while they are being made, they are said to exist even if not all the parts of the successive thing have been made; and from this it follows that they are said to endure so long as new parts are being made that previously had not been made. Nevertheless, in the reality itself, as the new parts are added, the being of the thing grows and is consummated. Wherefore duration adds no thing over and above the being of such a thing; rather, that very being is of such a sort that, by the flow and addition of its parts, it is in the nature of things, and therefore in the same way it endures. Thus, both in successive and in permanent things, it is universally true that duration adds no thing over and above existence, but only connotes pre-existence—either according to reason (if it concerns the whole being, as in permanent things), or according to reality (if it concerns only a part, as in successive things).

12. Comparison Of Existence With Duration. In this regard existence and duration are in a certain way equivalent to production and conservation: just as conservation is not distinguished in reality from production, but only by a certain connotation (as was explained above), so duration is distinguished by reason from existence according to a certain connotation, as I have said. There is, however, some difference in this comparison. Production connotes the negation of the immediately preceding existence, and conservation connotes that the action itself under the ratio of production has preceded. Existence and duration are not wholly compared in that way. Although duration also connotes or includes some pre-existence or antecedence in existing, for it expresses perseverance in existing (and to persevere presupposes being), existence as such, or to exist, does not connote

the negation of a preceding existence; rather it prescinds and absolutely says that a thing is actually, whether it was before or not. Hence a thing which is conserved after the first instant is not said to be produced but only conserved; yet a thing which endures, as long as it endures, is always said to exist, and not only in the first instant—because to exist does not include the lack of a preceding existence, as production does. I add also that existence and duration are broader notions than production and conservation; they have place even in a thing which is neither produced nor conserved. For the divine nature exists and endures perpetually without any effecting or conserving. The comparison, therefore, is to be taken according to a certain proportion, not as a complete likeness.

13. Thus the opinion so set out seems true and straightforward, and differs little in reality from the first opinion of Ockham and the Nominalists. The only difference is that what they explain by coexistence with successive duration—actual or possible—we explain by mere permanence in existing and by a formal or virtual presupposition of existing which duration includes as duration and not as existence. This difference is almost nothing in reality, and concerns only our mode of conceiving. For in the very fact that we conceive the permanence of duration according to a certain relation of before and after, we already conceive it after the manner of a true or imaginary succession. Nevertheless it remains true that our mode of conceiving is not included in the signification of that word, even if we cannot otherwise explain it. I suppose that Ockham and others will not deny this, and this alone is proved by the earlier arguments brought against that same opinion.

14. Duration Of A Permanent Thing Begins By The Last Non-Being. The later arguments by which it is intended to prove that a thing endures in its first and last instant, provided it begins and ends by the first and last instant of its being, we readily admit as regards the last instant. For if in the last instant the whole thing exists or remains as before, then properly it endures. As to the first instant, the case is

not similar: before the first instant the thing does not exist, so that in that instant it could be said to persevere in being. Hence, just as a thing is said to rest in the last instant but not in the first in which it ceases to be moved—because in the last it is disposed as before (which is to rest), whereas in the first it is not so, but rather is disposed otherwise than before—so in the last instant it is properly said to endure, but not in the first. For duration stands to rest as permanence in being. Thus, although permanent things (in which these points are chiefly in place) begin to exist by the first instant of their being, they properly begin to endure only by the last instant of their non-being; just as, although the creation of a thing begins by the first instant of its being, conservation as such begins by the last instant of its non-being. Wherefore, in the first instant in which a thing exists, it is not properly said already to endure; yet it may be said to begin to endure, not intrinsically but extrinsically, as has been said. Hence a thing that exceeds another in existing merely by an instant will not properly be said to endure more than the other, although it may be said to be prior in existing. Likewise, a generation that exists only for a single moment is not properly said to endure, but to occur or to exist in an instant. If at times such a thing is said to endure for a single instant, the verb "to endure" is taken broadly as synonymous with "to exist." Because the difference between the significations of these verbs is small, one is readily used for the other. In this way the arguments made last against the first opinion and against the supposition established here—namely, that a thing is not properly said to endure in the first indivisible instant of our time in which it first begins to be—are easily satisfied; although, since these matters depend greatly on a manner of speaking, another probable way of replying and speaking could also be devised, as will immediately be clear.

15. For someone might say: if the existence of a permanent thing begins by the first instant of its being and duration by the last instant of its non-being, then they are distinguished by more than reason. Indeed, it seems to follow further that every duration is

successive, because that is the mode by which successive things begin. I reply that the argument clearly also presses in the case of creation and conservation. It must be said, therefore, that when duration or conservation is said to begin by the last instant of non-being, this is to be understood not as to the inception of a thing, but as to that denomination by which it is denoted that the same thing has already pre-existed, if only for an instant. And therefore from that different mode of inception neither can a distinction greater than that of reason be inferred—since this suffices for those different denominations—nor can succession be inferred, but rather a negation of succession and of variation in the being of a permanent thing, as I shall explain more at length below. A suitable example is found in rest, which philosophers say begins by the last instant of non-being—not because it is successive, but rather because it consists in the privation of successive motion. One might express the matter otherwise by saying that permanent duration can be taken in two ways. In one way, as to sufficiency only; and in this sense it says only existence, insofar as it is of itself sufficient to remain long in being; and under this consideration or denomination duration begins together with such existence, by the first instant of its being. In another way, duration is taken as it exercises the act of enduring or persevering in being—which seems to be most properly signified by the verb "to endure"; and in this respect I say that duration begins by the last instant of non-being. Yet this act, or this exercise of enduring, adds nothing positive and real over and above the sufficiency for duration, but expresses the same existence as remaining in the same way. If there is a certain existence of some thing which neither actually remains nor is sufficient to remain in being, that does not merit the name of duration, but may be called the beginning or the terminus of duration.

16. Again, this manner of explaining duration does not differ much from the second opinion reported above; indeed, as to the matter itself, they come to the same thing. For that permanence which we have set out, insofar as it is actually exercised in the thing, adds

nothing to existence except the negation of variation, change, or destruction—or even of cessation. This is best explained by the example, cited above, of rest. For just as rest expresses permanence in the same place, so duration expresses permanence in the same being; therefore just as rest adds in reality only the privation of motion, so duration adds only a negation. Speaking consequently, according to our opinion, that negation of destruction or of ceasing which duration includes must not be referred, as it were in the composite sense, to the being of the thing for the same instant conceived indivisibly (according to our mode of conceiving), but to being itself absolutely, and in the divided sense, as they say—and indeed as it can be conceived as pre-existing. Although, if someone wishes to speak in such a way as to say that a thing endures even for a single instant and includes that negation in the first way, he will not speak altogether improbably. Whether under the word "duration" and under the concept corresponding to it that negation is formally imported, or whether by that negation the positive permanence of existence is merely explained, seems a matter of small moment; and either can easily be defended—though to explain this matter by negation seems the more expeditious and easier way. Just as identity, although it can be explained by the mode of a positive relation of reason of the same to itself, is more easily explained by the negation of division. In this way the first and second opinions can readily be recalled to their true sense.

17. The third opinion, understood of active measure, in no way declares the proper rationale of duration as such, because to be an extrinsic measure is very accidental and extrinsic to duration as such; and to be an intrinsic measure does not belong to active measure, as has been shown. Understood of passive measurability, that opinion could be recalled to our exposition if the sense is not that the formal rationale of duration consists in that relation of measure, but that by it, as by a kind of property, duration is declared. In that case the meaning would be as if one said that existence, insofar as it is apprehended as

measurable in its exercised act of existing, has as such the rationale of duration—for according to its permanence it is so measurable. And this indeed is true, especially in finite durations. How this may suit an infinite, that is, eternal, duration, and how it ought to be applied to it, I shall explain below.

18. Why There Is A Distinction In Reality Between "Where" And The Thing Situated, But Not Between Duration And The Enduring Thing. One difficulty remains concerning what has been said in this and the preceding section. In every created thing there is some real mode, distinguished from the nature of the thing, as we shall suppose from what will be said in the next disputation. Therefore duration is also a mode distinguished from the nature of the enduring creature. This consequence is proved thus. To explain local presences and durations of things, two infinite spaces are conceived by us: one as if permanent and infinitely extended on all sides without boundary; the other as if successive, stretching from eternity to eternity. Both these are, as it were, actually and necessarily "filled" by God—the former by immensity, the latter by divine eternity. Hence, in created things, there is a mode distinguished from the nature of the creature because there is a definite presence to a determinate part of the former space. Consequently, the "where" (ubi) itself varies in the same thing, since the same thing can now exhibit its presence to one part of that space and now to another. Therefore, by the same rationale or proportion, duration will be a mode distinguished from the nature of the enduring created thing, because it is nothing other than a kind of presence to that latter, successive space—not coextensive with it (since it is not infinite), but to some determinate part of it, which will correspondingly vary as it corresponds or is exhibited to diverse parts of that space. Therefore, there is the same proportion between the two. From this it further seems to follow, against what has been said, that just as a thing is said to be "somewhere" and to have its own "where," even if it does not exhibit its presence to some part of that space but only to an indivisible point, so a thing should be said to endure by the

very fact that it is really present to the latter space—namely, time—even if it does not correspond to it according to any divisible part of it but only according to an indivisible instant.

19. To this objection the reply must be given without yet disputing whether those spaces are truly thought or imagined by us to explain other times or places intrinsic to things (what sort they should be conceived to be will find a more suitable place below). For now we presuppose that those spaces are not real things, since they are neither uncreated things (as is obvious), nor created entities, since they are apprehended as eternal and per se necessary. They are conceived, therefore, as certain capacities—of bodies or of motions. Local space is conceived as apt to be filled by bodies; the temporal space (so to speak) as apt to be filled by motions. From this it also follows that we conceive not only bodies but also other things as able to be present to the former space by some local presence accommodated to each; and similarly, to the latter space or to imaginary time, we conceive not only motions but also other existing things as able in their own way to be present and as it were to coexist with it. In these respects there is some likeness and proportion; yet there is a difference. For into that space which is apprehended as successive (and is commonly called infinite imaginary time) a thing enters by the force of its actual existence, even if nothing else superadded to it is understood; but into the other, local space a thing does not enter by the force of existence alone, but by another presence superadded to the existing thing. A sign and sufficient proof of this is that the same thing, retaining the same existence, can change its presence to any determinate local space—not by the change of another, but by its own change; yet a thing cannot in that way change its presence to the other, imaginary time, if it retains the same existence. If anything is conceived there after the manner of change, it is only on the side of the other extreme—namely, because that imaginary time is conceived as flowing.

20. Because of this difference the consequence of the argument does not hold. Local presence is a mode superadded to the

existence of a thing, since a created thing by the force of its existence alone does not have a relation to place, nor does it (so to speak) fill some part of imaginary local space. Duration, however, does not express a mode added to existence, because any thing by the force of its actual existence, as such, necessarily "falls into" imaginary time or into some part of it; and, as far as depends on itself, if the same existence perseveres unchanged, it can coexist with the whole of it even if it is conceived as being extended successively to infinity. By this the existence itself is neither diminished nor increased, which is not the case with local presence. For the same presence cannot be contained within an indivisible point or extended to a divisible space unless it is changed in itself—either increased or diminished. The reason for this difference can also be given from the fact that the space to which local presence corresponds is conceived as permanent and immutable, and therefore a created thing cannot be present to a greater or lesser space unless there occurs in it a change with respect to the increase or decrease of presence. The other space, however, temporal space, is apprehended as flowing; hence even a created existence, persevering unchanged, can of itself be present to a larger and larger part of that space or of that imaginary time. Thus, from that comparison or proportion the opinion proposed concerning the rationale of duration is not only not disproved, but is even more clearly explained; and from what we shall say concerning individual durations in particular, it will be made clearer still.

SECTION III

WHAT ETERNITY IS, AND HOW IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM CREATED DURATION

1. Duration is first and chiefly divided into created and uncreated. Uncreated duration is eternity simply so called, or "by essence"; created duration is every duration that is not true eternity.

Section III

That an Uncreated Duration Exists

2. Concerning this division, first note that it supposes that there is a true, uncreated duration—a point Aureolus seems to deny, according to Capreolus, in the arguments he proposes in the fourth place against the opinion of St. Thomas, by which he strives to prove that there is no duration in God; whence it follows plainly that there is no uncreated duration. From this it would follow that eternity is either not a duration or not in God; and that it is not anything real, but only that infinite space of imaginary time with which we conceive the divine being to coexist. The foundation of Aureolus's position is that he thinks succession belongs to the formal notion of duration. Nevertheless, the contrary is certain. First, God is truly and properly said to have endured from eternity in a real way; therefore by a real duration existing and not in another; therefore by an uncreated duration existing in God Himself. Again, God has always really existed, such that in Him no beginning of existing could ever be marked; and He has remained and remains in His being. Therefore He has really endured and endures by His intrinsic duration, which can be only uncreated. Finally, if the heavens had been moved from eternity, they would really have endured; but God exists and remains in His being such that of Himself He suffices to coexist—or, so to speak, to co-endure—with that infinite time. Therefore He has in Himself a true, real, and uncreated duration by which He endures. As to Aureolus's foundation, the assumption must be denied, about which we shall say more in the next section.

3. Second, as regards the name "eternity," note that this name is taken in various ways and is sometimes attributed to created durations that are in some way infinite or very long. For "eternal" is said quasi extra terminum—"outside a boundary" or "without a boundary." Therefore, what exists in such a way that it is never to end is said to be eternal; and the same would hold if something created

had existed without a beginning of duration. From there, almost by hyperbole, the term is extended to signify what lasts through many ages. For just as what is very difficult is wont to be called "impossible," and what is of huge magnitude "immense" and "infinite," so what lasts very long is wont to be called "eternal," as is taken from Dionysius (Divine Names, c. 10). These significations are less proper. That duration alone is truly and properly beyond a boundary which of itself is incapable of a boundary and in its intrinsic notion includes infinity in duration; therefore that alone is properly and simply called eternity. Such a duration can be only uncreated, because no other is of itself and from within without a term; for every created duration can both begin and end. It was rightly said, therefore, that uncreated duration is proper eternity. By this duration God alone is called "eternal." Hence a disputation concerning this duration does not belong to this place but to that in which above we treated of the attributes of the First Being. For in this place, as the method of this work shows, we are dealing only with the accidents or accidental attributes of created things; but eternity by essence is an attribute of God alone, which has been demonstrated above to belong to Him per se and essentially (Disputation 29, Section 9). From that place, however, we referred to this one to explain what this duration is which is called eternity, because, until the common notion of duration was explained, it could not be sufficiently declared there. Therefore what eternity is must be briefly set out here.

How Eternity Differs from Other Durations

4. The First Opinion Is Refuted. Theologians usually raise the question by what eternity differs from other durations. It does not seem sufficient to say that they differ in that eternity is uncreated, while other durations are created. This difference is, as it were, material; we are now inquiring about the proper and formal diversity within the notion of duration. Some of the ancients thought that the

primary and per se difference of eternity from every other duration is that eternity alone is a permanent duration, whereas all others are in some way successive. But this opinion, taken strictly and properly as it is asserted by St. Bonaventure and others, is false; for among created durations there are also some that are permanent, as will be evident from the course of the disputation. Whether this opinion can be reduced to some true sense I shall explain immediately.

5. The Second Opinion Is Refuted. Others said that the proper feature of eternity is to lack both beginning and end, and thus to be an infinite duration; and they said that it differs from other durations in that all have a beginning and some will also have an end, such as time and every corruptible duration. Yet if this difference is understood only with respect to what has in fact already occurred, it does not sufficiently declare the proper difference of eternity from other durations; for although, in fact, according to our faith, no other duration is without a beginning, nevertheless absolutely speaking it is not repugnant that there be such, as was said above. Hence, if God had created an angel or the heavens from eternity, there would be no beginning of duration in it; and nonetheless its duration would be created and essentially different from eternity. In this sense Richard of St. Victor (On the Trinity II, c. 4) said that "sempiternal" is one thing and "eternal" another: whatever lacks both beginning and end can be called sempiternal, while "eternal" further requires immutability. Isidore (Etymologies VII), however, thinks the two words have the same signification, and strictly speaking this seems so; Richard accommodated the terms in order to indicate the diversity of things signified. Thus St. Augustine (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 19) said: although every eternal thing is immortal, not every immortal thing is aptly said to be eternal; for even if something always lives, nevertheless if it undergoes mutability, it is not properly called eternal. In common speech, indeed, a creature is said to be "eternal" if it is from an eternal creation; yet strictly speaking it will be said more truly to endure "by an eternity," not "by a duration which is eternity." But if that difference

is understood not only de facto but also de possibili—namely, that eternity is that duration which neither has nor can have a beginning or an end, and that it is distinguished from all others in that every other duration either has or can have an end or a beginning—then, in this sense, this difference is true, as will be clear from what follows.

6. The Distinction Assigned By St. Thomas Between Eternity And Other Durations. Description Of Eternity. St. Thomas explains this difference otherwise (ST I, q. 10, a. 5). Eternity, he says, is a duration that admits no succession, neither in being nor in the thing's proper and internal acts or operations; every other duration is such that it either has succession in itself, or at least admits it as conjoined in some operations or motions of the same supposit. This difference is very true in both parts. The former was sufficiently indicated by Boethius in the accepted definition of eternity as "the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life." In saying "the whole, simultaneous," the exclusion of succession is signified; in saying "of interminable life," the exclusion of every possible change in being is signified (for "to be" and "to live" are the same). Finally, in adding "perfect possession," it is signified that that lack of succession must hold not only in being itself but also in every internal act of the eternal thing. For this reason God alone is eternal, because He alone has that necessary stability in being and in every perfection and internal operation.

7. From this the other part of the distinction is also clear: every created duration is such that it admits succession or variation either in itself or in the operations of its supposit. For although a substance could be created that is permanent and even immutable in its being, yet no created thing is or can be created that does not admit some variation or succession at least in its accidents or internal motions. I say "always in the internal acts or motions," because although in external acts or denominations resulting from them there can be succession or variety, this does not hinder true eternity. For God begins to create and ceases from creating, and He moves things in

time by an action that is also temporal and successive, without any variation or diminution of His eternity; for this succession in these actions or external denominations does not imply any variety in an internal act or in a proper perfection of God, as St. Anselm rightly noted (Monologion, c. 24). It belongs to the notion of eternity only that it exclude succession entirely from the eternal thing itself and from all its being and perfection.

8. Although this distinction assigned by St. Thomas is true, it can seem less fitting because it is not taken from what pertains formally and per se to the notion of duration, but from adjuncts and extrinsic features. This is made clear thus. In a created thing—say, in an angel—the duration of its being is one thing, and the duration of its operation another; and in the former there is no succession, whereas in the latter there is. Nevertheless those two durations are essentially diverse, and one is not constituted in its own rationale by the other, but each by its own intrinsic formal rationale; and by the same each differs from the other and from eternity itself. Therefore the difference between eternity and other durations—especially the permanent and immutable ones—is not rightly assigned from the conjoined succession which they admit; for even if that succession is abstracted, there must still be a diversity in their intrinsic formal rationes.

9. The Stated Distinction Is Approved. I reply that what is assumed in the objection is true on the part of being; nevertheless the distinction, as set out by St. Thomas, is aptly and wisely taught. If we wish to assign the primary difference, it lies in this: eternity is a duration per se and from within necessary and dependent on nothing, and consequently utterly immutable, both by an internal incapacity for change and with respect to every extrinsic power. All this is indicated by the phrase "of interminable life." No other duration is so necessary or independent or immutable, because since every other duration has its origin from an external cause and depends upon it, at least by that power it can fail. This, therefore, is the first and most essential difference, which seems formally to pertain to the notion of duration

as such. For since duration formally expresses permanence or perseverance of a being, which varies in the rationale and mode of remaining in being, it also formally distinguishes durations. But to persevere in being with absolute and intrinsic necessity is the noblest mode of remaining in being, diverse more than generically from every other; therefore, from this head the difference between these durations is formally assigned. In this sense it can in a way be said that eternity alone is a "permanent" duration: it alone stands in such a way that it can in no way fall or fail—wherefore St. Augustine, as if by antonomasia, attributes "stability" to eternity (Sermon 38 on the Words of the Lord). According to this difference taken precisely and formally, even if, per impossibile, we were to imagine some variation or succession in God's internal acts—for example, in knowing or willing creatures—the duration of the divine being would nonetheless retain the essential notion of eternity, for it would still be an independent and utterly necessary duration. Conversely, even if we were to imagine a created substance incapable of accidents or invariable in them, nevertheless the duration of its being would not be eternity, because it would be simply dependent and mutable by extrinsic power. As to this part, then, what is assumed in the objection is true.

10. Nevertheless, St. Thomas was right to explain this difference by the absence of every succession, both formal and "accidental," or concomitant (so to speak), in order by this to indicate a certain excellence of eternity. It belongs to eternity that it be an adequate duration of the thing of which it is the duration—not only as to its being, but also as to everything that is in that thing or can be conceived in it. Or, to speak more properly: eternity is essentially the duration of such a being as essentially includes every perfection of being, and consequently every act or internal operation of such a being. Therefore, if a duration is such that it is defined and limited to the being of the thing and does not extend to the other perfections or operations of the thing, or conversely if it is the duration of an

operation and not of the being itself, or of one operation and not of another, it cannot have the true rationale of eternity simply. For eternity is the duration of being by essence; and as that being is the very fullness of being, so eternity is (so to speak) the very fullness of enduring. Consequently, it belongs to its rationale that it be the full and perfect duration of the whole being and the whole perfection and operation of the eternal thing. Hence eternity is rightly distinguished from every other duration which, however permanent or immutable or indivisible it may seem, has conjoined succession; for by that very fact it falls short of the fullness of duration which eternity requires.

11. Eternity Excludes The Distinctions Of Past And Future. On this understanding of eternity the foundation is found for what not only theologians but philosophers also teach: in an eternal reality, as far as it is concerned, there is nothing past or future—neither in its being, nor in its knowledge, nor in its love, nor, finally, in any other perfection. For if a thing is truly eternal, whatever is in it endures by true eternity; therefore none of these can pass away or succeed in it, but must always remain. Thus Plato says in the Timaeus that "was" and "will be" are not properly assigned to the eternal substance. The Fathers, both Greek and Latin, imitate him: St. Gregory Nazianzen (Orations 35, 42), St. John Damascene (De fide orthodoxa II, c. 1), Eusebius (Preparation XI, c. 7); the point is also taken from Dionysius (Divine Names, c. 10); St. Augustine on Psalm 2 ("This day I have begotten you") and in his sermon on Psalm 101 concerning the words "Thy years are unto generation and generation"; St. Gregory the Great (Moralia XVI, c. 21); St. Anselm (Proslogion, c. 18 and following).

12. I said "in an eternal thing, as far as it is concerned," because as regards us—that is, as regards the mode by which we can conceive and speak of an eternal reality—such expressions of past and future are also attributed to God. We say that God has always been, is, and will be, because we do not conceive the eternal thing as it is in itself, but in our way, by comparison with some real or imaginary succession. Thus we say that God "was," because we conceive Him as

coexisting with past time; indeed, even before this real time which is in the motion of the heavens, and before whatever duration is apprehended as temporal and finite, we conceive God to have been. In this way we apprehend the whole eternity which has existed up to this instant as a kind of space or flowing breadth without beginning, and we conceive God to have existed through that whole; and proportionally the same holds for the future. In reality, however, in God's eternity there is no flux, and consequently no past or future, but only an extrinsic denomination from the coexistence of our time according to our mode of conceiving. Wherefore, since in these distinctions of past and future there is usually included a negative together with an affirmative, such expressions are not attributed to God by reason of the negation but only by reason of the affirmation. In the past (especially the perfect), when it is said that something "has been," it is indicated that it now is not, although it once had being; conversely, in the future it is indicated that it is not yet, although it will have being at some time. To God, however, "to have been" is attributed in such a way that "to be always" is understood; and "to be going to be" is predicated so that He is not said to be about to acquire being anew, but to remain in the being which He already has. What has been said of being is to be understood likewise of knowledge, love, and the other proper and internal acts or perfections of God. From these points it seems enough, as far as the matter is concerned, that the notion of eternity and its difference from other durations has been declared.

SECTION IV

WHETHER ETERNITY, IN ITS FORMAL NOTION, INCLUDES ANY RELATION OF REASON

1. Theologians customarily inquire with subtlety and metaphysical care whether eternity, as such, is an entirely real attribute, or whether it includes something of reason, and whether it is

wholly positive or includes a negation. Many think that eternity is not only really undistinguished from the divine being (which is common to all the divine attributes), but also that it cannot even be distinguished by reason except insofar as it includes some "being of reason." They do not mean that eternity itself is a being of reason—this is clearly false, since it is a real duration and a great perfection—but that, as we conceive it as distinct by reason from the divine being, it includes some element that is of reason.

First Opinion: Establishing Eternity By a Relation of Measure

2. This has been proposed in two ways: first, by invoking a rational relation; second, by invoking a negation. The first way is followed by the Ferrarian commentator on the Contra Gentiles and by other recent Thomists on the First Part of St. Thomas, question 10. St. Thomas himself appears to favor this when he says there (q. 10, a. 1) that the notion of eternity consists in apprehending the uniformity of that which is outside motion; and in the same place he compares it with time, whose notion consists in numbering the before and after in motion, under which notion time includes something of reason (as Aristotle holds in Physics IV). They explain this "relation of reason" to be a relation of measure. For the Ferrarian author thinks that eternity, as such, is the measure of the divine being—not as to the thing (since it is God's very being), but as to reason. He therefore thinks that this rational relation of measure is included in the notion of eternity and formally completes it. The opinion seems to gain support from St. Thomas and other Doctors, who often call eternity the measure of the divine being (cf. St. Thomas, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3, and a. 3), where he also explains that it is a measure according to our apprehension. Others among the Thomists agree that eternity embraces the ratio of measure, which is a relation of reason, but they differ in that they do not think this relation is intrinsically or directly included in the formal notion of

eternity, but only connoted obliquely, since eternity is a real attribute and therefore cannot be constituted formally by a relation of reason.

The Preceding Opinion is Rejected

3. This entire position rests on a false foundation—namely, that the formal ratio of duration is constituted by a relation of measure. From that premise those authors inferred that the formal ratio of this particular duration, eternity, also lies in such a relation of measure. But just as the premise is false (as shown above), so is the conclusion. From the very nature of eternity it can also be shown that eternity is not constituted by a ratio of measure, indeed that it is not properly a measure at all, as Ockham and Gabriel note. For "measure" is either passive or active; if active, it is either intrinsic to God Himself or extrinsic with respect to other things. The latter cannot be said, for although eternity can be a measure of the perfection of other things, it is not a measure of duration in the quasi-quantitative sense. Neither the divine intellect (as is obvious) nor ours can use the divine eternity to determine how long a creature has lasted, both because eternity is out of proportion for that use on account of its infinity and because it lacks all quantitative character—without which (or something analogous) we do not conceive the ratio of measure.

4. The other part, concerning an intrinsic measure of God, is also mistaken. If eternity is God's measure, what does it measure in Him? Authors often say it measures God's duration. But not rightly. For God's duration is eternity. If, therefore, eternity measures God's duration, then eternity measures eternity; thus eternity would be the measure of itself, which is false, since the same thing is not its own measure. Nor is it enough to reply that, while it is not the measure of itself in reality, it can be so "according to reason." Even then, some rational distinction must be presupposed so that one can be taken as the measure of the other—"as if" one were saying that God's goodness measures His mercy. But eternity and God's duration are not

distinguished even by reason; they are absolutely the same. Hence even according to reason one cannot feign a relation of measure and measurable here. Nor do we in fact use eternity as a medium for knowing God's duration; rather, by knowing eternity we formally and immediately know God's duration. Others speak more plausibly when they say eternity is the measure of the divine being, perhaps because, by knowing the force of eternity, we know how much and in what manner the divine being lasts. But although this mode of speaking is common, it is not strictly proper or true. First, being can be measured only in perfection or in duration. If the phrase concerns duration, it resolves to the previous answer already rejected; if it concerns perfection, it is false. For in any conceivable ratio of measure between the perfection of the divine being and that of eternity, it is rather the divine being that would be the measure of eternity than the reverse, since from the perfection of the divine being we infer how perfect eternity is—just as one would say that the perfection of an essence measures the perfection of its properties. Second, we do not know how long the divine being lasts by eternity as by a measure, but by eternity as by the form that constitutes God as durative; just as one who knows a subject to be supremely hot because he apprehends the power and energy or degrees of its heat is not said to use "heat" as a measure to know the hot thing—unless, speaking broadly, all cognition through the constituting cause or ratio be called cognition through a measure. Even on that broad understanding, the ratio of measure cannot constitute the ratio of such a form; it presupposes it. In the present case, eternity is presupposed as that which formally constitutes God as durative; from this it follows that, by knowing eternity, we know how and how much God lasts. Likewise, by knowing the excellence of divine wisdom we know how and how much God is wise; yet no one will therefore say that wisdom is constituted by a ratio of measure. In no way, then, is eternity constituted by an active ratio of measure.

5. From this it follows that neither can it be constituted by a passive ratio of measure. For if God were "measurable" by reason of His eternity, by what measure would He be measured? Not by eternity itself, since eternity is not an active measure of God. Not by time or any created duration, both because all such measures are incommensurate (being of an inferior order and as distant more than by genus) and especially because neither the divine intellect (as is obvious) nor a created intellect can use such a measure here. A created intellect would either apply the measure by simple comparison (which cannot suffice between things so unequal), or it would apply it by repetition (as we measure a year by days); but in that way it is impossible to measure eternity, which lacks both beginning and end. This is the a priori reason why eternity is not measurable: in the order of duration it is infinite; and what is infinite, as such, is immeasurable.

6. You will say: even if it cannot be measured by a finite measure, the infinite can be measured by a kind of adequation; for if there had been time from eternity, we could measure eternity's infinite duration by that. And now, by comparison with such possible time, we measure and conceive God's eternal duration. I reply: even if time had been infinite from eternity, we could not measure it as to the whole, but only by parts—which does not apply to eternity, which has no parts. Since the entire quantity of the measure (the time) would not be known in itself—at most only confusedly—we could not measure eternity by it. We could only know that the two were coexistent; this is not to measure one by the other, but only to know, from the known extremes, the relation of coexistence resulting between them (whatever it may be), which, strictly speaking, is different from a relation of measure. Moreover, that way of conceiving or explaining eternity by its relation or coexistence to an infinite imaginary time does not pertain to the ratio of measure, since that imaginary time is nothing; neither is it a medium for knowing eternity, but rather serves so that, by denying all succession, we may conceive the uniformity of eternity, as St. Thomas indicated.

7. Finally, whatever one says about that way of conceiving, and by whatever name one calls that fitting or comparing of eternity to an infinite imaginary succession, it is clear that the ratio of eternity does not consist in its being knowable under that respect to imaginary succession; this is too extrinsic and accidental to it. Here Gabriel went astray when he said that eternity includes a respect of coexistence to an infinite succession, real or imaginary, attributing our mode of conceiving to the thing itself—a source of error. Otherwise we would ascribe many false things to God whenever we conceive Him after the manner of creatures. Therefore, although eternity really is such that, as far as it goes of itself, it suffices to coexist with an infinite succession (and although we may conceive or explain its infinity in this way), nonetheless in its own ratio it does not include these respects—whether of measure or of mere coexistence—either directly or obliquely connoted, since all of them arise from our mode of conceiving, which is extrinsic to eternity considered in itself.

8. From this it follows incidentally that eternity is not properly called the measure of the divine being; and if grave authors sometimes speak that way, they are using the word "measure" broadly, intending only to signify that eternity is, as it were, the adequate and proportionate duration of the divine being—in which they rather mean that such being is immeasurable in the way eternity is immeasurable. In a similar mode of speaking, St. Augustine says God is "bounded" by His own knowledge—that is, only to signify that the knowledge is as infinite as the knowable itself.

Second Opinion: Asserting That Eternity Is Completed by a Negation

9. Another way to explain the "being of reason" included in eternity is by some negation (which too is an ens rationis). John Duns Scotus and Cajetan, among many others, hold that eternity includes a negation. Yet they differ over how to explain that negation. Some think

it is the negation of measure—or rather of measurability—so that eternity formally signifies an immeasurable duration, and in this sense is called "interminable," that is, not definable or terminated by any measure. Although it is true that eternity is immeasurable, I do not think this negation is formally imported by the name or concept of eternity. First, because it has been shown that the ratio of measure or of the measurable does not belong to the formal ratio of duration as such; this holds also of finite durations (as the arguments there show). Therefore the infinite duration that is eternity will not be constituted formally by a negation of measure. Second, because "measure" toward the measurable formally expresses a relation of reason. Either, then, the negation is merely the negation of such an actual relation—which is nothing more than the intellect's not conceiving such a relation—or it is the negation of the capacity or foundation for such a relation, and this presupposes another real negation, namely the negation of beginning and end. Hence rather that negation is included in the ratio of eternity, and it is what the word "interminable" more properly signifies.

10. Scotus understands this negation to be formally included in the ratio of eternity: just as the attribute of infinity includes the negation of a term to perfection, so the attribute of eternity includes the negation of a term to duration. Since lacking a beginning and end can be communicated to an infinite duration that is not eternity, Scotus adds that the negation here is not merely of actual cessation or inception, but also of the capacity or possibility of cessation—something not true of other durations. For this reason he thinks Dionysius said that God is the "age of ages" and the "King of the ages." Cajetan does not differ much when he says that eternity consists in the uniformity of the divine being. "Uniformity" is nothing other than the lack of all variety and succession; for, as the term indicates, it is a unity in form—that is, in disposition or habit of being. As Cajetan rightly notes, "uniformity" is analogical and very broad; it can be predicated not only of permanent things but even of motion—and, indeed, in a

sense, of difformity itself, if it proceeds uniformly and proportionately. God, by antonomasia, is attributed the most perfect uniformity in everything conceived by us under the mode of a form or perfection of God, that is, in being, in knowledge, and the like. But as unity includes a negation, so does uniformity; it is a kind of unity contracted to a form. If, then, eternity consists in the uniformity of the divine being, it includes in its concept the negation that uniformity signifies. Hence St. Thomas, in I Sent., dist. 19, q. 2, a. 1, does not use the word "uniformity" but "unity," saying that permanence of act, as it is understood under the aspect of the one, belongs to the ratio of eternity. Therefore, according to this opinion, eternity includes the negation of every actual and possible succession in the whole being of the eternal thing; thus it includes the negation of before and after, and the negation of beginning and end, not only as actually absent but as impossible. For beginning and end cannot be without some succession—at least between being after nonbeing or, conversely, nonbeing after being—which succession the uniformity of the divine being also denies. Finally, it includes the negation of every concomitant succession in any intrinsic act or perfection of God, since it is absolute uniformity in the whole being of God, within which every form and perfection of God is included.

11. Cajetan further adds that the ratio of eternity consists in the ratio of uniformity, insofar as uniformity has the ratio of a measure. In this he seems to embrace both positions, that of negation and that of a relation of reason. But the arguments that prove that eternity is not completed by a ratio of measure also prove that eternity does not include such a relation even together with negation. On this point we do not follow Cajetan.

Resolution of the Question

12. As to the other part, I think Cajetan rightly interprets St. Thomas's statement that the ratio of eternity consists in the

apprehension of uniformity, provided this is understood not of the formal apprehension by our intellect but of the objective apprehension—that is, of the uniformity apprehended by us in the divine being. Our apprehension does not pertain to the ratio of eternity; otherwise, unless we apprehended the divine being—or added something to it by our apprehension—there would be no eternity in God, which is absurd. For this reason I hold in general that nothing of reason, insofar as it depends on the apprehension of our intellect, can be included in the formal ratio of eternity. When St. Thomas, then, mentions the "apprehension of uniformity," he is only explaining the ratio of eternity by the objective concept corresponding to our apprehension when we conceive eternity.

13. Next, I judge that this uniformity and the ratio of eternity are rightly explained by the negation already described. This does not make the attribute of eternity unreal or something that belongs to God only because of our intellect, for that negation is "real" in the mode in which a negation can be real—namely, by excluding a real imperfection and succession. Simplicity, too, is a real attribute even though it bears a negation; and above we also said that duration in common is well explained by negation, even though the permanence of duration exists in the thing itself. The more simple and the more permanently self-same the divine duration is, the more naturally we conceive and explain it by negation. Finally, "aseity" (esse a se), though a real divine attribute, formally includes only the negation of dependence; eternity, however, includes in its concept that it is a duration simply necessary and thus independent of another, as St. Thomas also taught. In this sense it is rightly said that eternity, considered as a distinct attribute, includes a certain negation.

14. Eternity is nevertheless distinct from immutability. Although the two attributes are closest—and thus often used for each other, as is evident especially in Isidore and St. Augustine—they are distinct by reason, even in the negations they contain. Just as motion and time, though really the same, are distinguished by reason, so the

negation of change that immutability signifies is distinct by reason from the negation of temporal succession—or of any created succession of duration—which eternity includes.

15. I also think that, by this negation, we circumscribe or declare the positive perfection of the divine duration signified by "eternity." This is self-evident from all similar divine attributes, and especially we explained it in the attribute of simplicity. All such negations have their foundation in a divine perfection that we cannot conceive adequately or as it is in itself; hence we declare it by multiple and by negative concepts. What precisely is that positive perfection here? Some say it is simply the intensive perfection of that duration by which the divine being is full and immutable, and thus cannot admit any change or cessation; this is Scotus's view. Others say it is an "extensive" infinite perfection—not that there is extension in eternity itself, but that there is an eminent perfection by reason of which it suffices of itself to coexist with any extension whatever. The disagreement is slight and verbal. For that eminent perfection whereby eternity has power to coexist with every succession, insofar as it is something positive, is nothing other than the intensive perfection of the divine being, from which it follows that this being has, at once and of itself and immutably, its whole perfection; in this consists the positive permanence, absolutely necessary, of eternity—by reason of which it has that power to coexist. This suffices concerning eternity, as far as can be inquired by reason.

SECTION V

WHAT THE AEVUM IS, AND HOW IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM SUCCESSIVE DURATIONS

Various Divisions of Created Duration, in Which the Existence of the Aevum Is Presupposed

Disputation L

1. After explaining the primary division of duration and its chief member, it is fitting to subdivide the other member and then descend to a treatment of the several durations. Created duration can first be divided into permanent and successive. "Permanent" is said of a duration that persists whole at once, without succession of parts; "successive" is said of a duration that persists only so long as one of its parts follows upon another. We shall speak later of the latter; for now the former must be explained. Before subdividing it, one might ask whether there is any created duration that is truly permanent. Because this is more commonly treated under the special heading of the aevum, by explaining the nature of the aevum the general question will be settled more conveniently. Permanent created duration is therefore further divided into a duration that, by its nature, is immutably permanent—this is called aevum (aeviternity)—and a duration that, while permanent, does not of itself have immutable permanence but is by nature defectible. This latter duration has no universally received common name, though some call it the "instant of discrete time." We shall speak of it in the next section; for now the nature of the aevum is to be explained.

2. As to the name: sometimes aevum is taken for eternity (since in Greek the name does not differ); sometimes for a very long duration, by the same reasoning by which we said this of eternity. Properly, however, in the usage of theologians it signifies the duration of incorruptible creatures. That there is some duration which may rightly be called aevum we presuppose; it will be proved once we have explained the essential notion of the aevum as it signifies the duration of created incorruptible things. That these things "last" is evident, since they remain in their real being; they therefore have a real duration. That this duration is distinct from others—and hence is rightly signified by the name aevum—is easily understood from the peculiar nature and mode of being of such things; it will be made clearer when the ratio of the aevum is set forth.

St. Bonaventure's Opinion

3. Whether the Aevum is a permanent duration. On these presuppositions, one first asks whether the aevum is suitably counted under the genus of permanent duration, that is, whether it is truly permanent with no real succession in it. There is a well-known opinion of St. Bonaventure, who denies that the aevum is a permanent duration, even though it is the duration of something permanent. He distinguishes three kinds of duration: one that has no succession or change—neither in itself nor in the being whose duration it is, or which it measures (as many say), or which our mode of conceiving affects or formally constitutes as "durative"—and this he calls eternity; a second that has succession and variety both in itself and in the being whose duration it is—this he calls time; a third, as it were intermediate, which has in itself variety and succession, though not in the being whose duration it is. If you ask how there can be variety in the duration if not in the being, Bonaventure replies that the same being can flow continuously from its source, like light from the sun. For light proceeds differently from the sun than water from a spring: water continuously flows from the spring, yet is always other and other; light, however, proceeds continuously from the sun while remaining the same. Thus, although in the being of the light there is no variety, in its procession from the sun there is continuity and succession. So, he says, it is in every created being with respect to God; and thus, by reason of the continuous emanation of created being from God, there can be variety in its duration, even if not in its being. Hardly any scholastics have followed this opinion, though Scotus and Richard count it probable. Aureolus, who (as we noted above from Capreolus) held that succession belongs to the very notion of duration as such, would a fortiori say the same of the duration of incorruptibles —if he admitted true duration in aeviternal beings.

Arguments for Bonaventure's View

4. First, the opinion can be grounded in a general reason: no created duration as such can be absolutely permanent. For there is no duration that does not admit "more and less" according to extension of duration; therefore there is none that is not quantitatively extended successively. The consequence is proved because, among indivisible things as indivisible, no comparison according to "more and less" can be understood. The antecedent is clear: comparing angels among themselves, it is true that they have lasted equally; compared with God, that they have lasted less; compared with humans or corruptible things, that they have lasted more. Indeed, if God were now to create and conserve a new angel, it would have lasted less than those already created; and if He were to annihilate one of those created, it would have lasted less than the rest.

5. Second, Bonaventure chiefly proves this by saying that it is repugnant to created duration to be "all at once," for then present, past, and future would be in it together, as they are in eternity; but this is impossible. The inference seems evident: if those distinctions were successive in a created duration and not simultaneous, that duration would not be permanent (since it would not have parts together but one after the other); therefore, for a duration to be permanent, those three differences—conceived by us as distinct and ordered among themselves—must be together and indivisible in such a duration. The minor is proved thus: otherwise it would be impossible for such a duration, once existing, not always to be—which cannot pertain to created duration, as is most certain; at least by divine power it can fail to exist. The inference is clear: it is impossible to make what has been not to have been, or to make what is (in the composite sense) not to be at the same instant in which it is supposed to be; therefore, if some created duration is such that in its present it simultaneously includes "to have been" and "to be going to be," then, if it once be supposed to

be, it will also have been and will be in the future. Again, if it includes in its very being "to have been" and "to be going to be," it does not include these within any definite bounds; none can be assigned, since such a duration can always last more and more. Therefore such a duration includes "always to have been" and "always to be going to be." Hence, just as, once it is supposed to exist in the present, it cannot in that present not exist, so too it cannot not always exist—or not always have been and be going to be—since in that present supposition the supposition of the whole past and the whole future is included.

6. Bonaventure therefore further infers that such a duration must be actually infinite in the order of duration. The inference holds, both because that duration actually includes "always to last" and whatever can be conceived in its past or future duration—which is the infinite in the genus of duration—and because the angel's duration today can also be tomorrow and the day after, and so on to infinity. Either then it now actually has tomorrow's duration and every other, and thus actually has an infinite duration; or it now has only the potency for tomorrow's duration and those that follow, and so that duration is not permanent nor wholly at once, since it is in potency to be increased by a succession of duration.

7. Lastly, St. Bonaventure confirms this with the testimony of the Fathers, who everywhere indicate that it is proper to the divine eternity to be wholly present without succession of past and future; hence this cannot be communicated to created duration. He adduces St. Jerome and the Gloss on Exodus, and St. Isidore, and words of St. Augustine and Boethius—that "only the divine now always remains the same; ours always flows."

Opposed & True Opinion

8. The opposed opinion is common among theologians. It is held by St. Thomas (I, q. 10, a. 4–5; Quodlibet X, a. 4), by Capreolus, Cajetan, and other Thomists. Richard, Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus, and

Ockham incline the same way; and also Alexander of Hales, Albert, Henry of Ghent, and Giles on the measure of angels. This opinion seems to me true and certain. To ground it and dissolve the arguments to the contrary, we must explain more distinctly both the matter itself and our mode of conceiving—whence arises a mode of speaking that often occasions error, when we attribute to things what belongs solely to our way of apprehending. In the present question this must especially be avoided.

Notes for Resolving the Question

9. First, we must distinguish real succession from imaginary or conceived succession. As has often been said, that "interval" which we apprehend as coexisting with eternity as a whole we think of under the mode of a certain succession; yet in reality it is nothing, nor can it possess real succession. We are not speaking now of that, for it is not an intrinsic duration of any thing; nor can "coexistence" with it be called a successive duration unless there be in the thing an intrinsic and real succession—both because that alleged coexistence is not real but only conceived as if it were, and especially because from coexistence there results only an extrinsic denomination, which can be successive without any real and intrinsic succession in the denominated thing. From this mode of conceiving taken precisely, all that follows is that we conceive a duration after the manner of succession; our question is whether there truly and really is succession in the aevum.

10. Next, two kinds of succession can be understood: one negative or privative on the side of the other extreme, the other positive on both sides. I presuppose that true succession cannot be except between two things that are in some way distinct in reality. There is no true succession unless when one thing is now not, but was, and another either now is or will be. Just as the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be and not be, so there cannot be true succession in

the same thing in the same respect. Therefore true succession must be either between two entities, or between two parts of the same entity, action, or motion, or certainly between being and nonbeing of the same thing. I call the last "privative succession" on the side of the other extreme; it is not a proper succession in the positive thing itself, but only with respect to the opposed privation.

11. The conservation of a created thing has its own proper modal being. Since, as was said above concerning efficient causality, conservation is a true efficiency and action distinct by nature from the term—that is, from the being conserved by it—it follows that conservation itself, as a certain real mode distinct in the thing from the form or entity conserved, also has its own proper modal being (to speak so), similarly distinct from the being of the term or thing conserved, according to the general doctrine previously set out touching the being of the existence of a created thing.

12. From this it follows necessarily that, in the conservation of a thing and in the thing conserved, there are two durations distinct by nature. This is clear, first, from what was said in Section I: duration in a thing is not distinguished from the persevering existence; therefore, as there are two existences distinct by nature—the existence of the conservation and the existence of the thing conserved—so there are two durations. Second, because the conservation really lasts, and similarly the thing conserved formally lasts; and the latter does not formally last by the former, since nothing lasts by something distinct by nature from itself and its essence, as was proven. Therefore each lasts by its own proper duration. Hence, if the conservation changes and its duration is taken away, the thing conserved may, by another action, remain in the same being and in the same permanence of being, and thus in the same intrinsic duration. Finally, as action is related to its term, so the duration of the action is related to the duration of the term; they have the same distinction in reality.

First Assertion

13. I now say, first: it is impossible for there to be a positive, true, and real succession in any respect unless there be a real succession and variety in some being of existence of the thing. This must be taken proportionally: if succession is said to be in the entity of the thing itself, it will also be in its substantial existence; if in some mode of the thing, then in the modal existence; if in some accident, then in some accidental existence. In this sense St. Thomas rightly said that it implies a contradiction for there to be succession in anything without a change in being—or, what is the same, without a renewal in being—provided the two be taken proportionally, as explained. Nor, perhaps, does Bonaventure wish to contradict this; not without reason did he distinguish being from conservation, so that he could attribute the succession to some thing or real mode which he would not deny to have its own proper modal being; otherwise nothing would be distinct by nature from anything else, and accordingly succession could no more be in the one than in the other. The reason for the conclusion is that a real positive succession exists only in some positive thing or mode; therefore there must also be a succession in the being of such a thing or mode. The consequence is clear: a thing is not distinguished from its being, nor a mode from its proportional being. Second, because duration and existence are the same in the thing; therefore, if there is real succession in real duration, there must be real succession in some real existence. Finally, the same can be shown inductively: if there is succession in a substance, there is in its substantial being; if in an operation, in the being of the operation; and so on, as will be clearer below.

Second Assertion

14. Some created duration is entirely without succession. This follows plainly from what has been said: it is not repugnant that there be an existence in which there is no real variety or succession—of which the divine being is most certain and evident; therefore it is not

repugnant that there be a duration in which there is no real variety or succession. The consequence holds because that being has its intrinsic duration, as was shown in the previous section; and there cannot be variety in duration where there is none in the being; therefore, etc. The same discourse can be applied to created duration: it is not repugnant that there be a created existence in which there is no variety and succession; and it has its intrinsic duration, since it truly and really remains in being; therefore, in that duration there will be no intrinsic and real succession, since this is inseparable from variation in the very being whose duration it is. The antecedent is as evident as the fact that there are created entities that remain for a long time without any variation in being, whether substantial or accidental; this is especially evident in incorruptible things, which are our topic. If Bonaventure speaks consistently, he cannot deny this; he concedes that there is no succession in the substantial being of the heaven or of an angel, for there is no change or variation in it; he only posits succession in the conservation of that being. Therefore he already admits a created being whose intrinsic permanence has no succession; therefore he must necessarily admit a created duration without succession, since we have shown that the duration of being itself is distinct from the duration of conservation.

Third Assertion

15. The duration of incorruptible things—considered as to their being—which is called aevum is permanent, without any intrinsic real variation or succession either in itself or in the being whose duration it is. This follows manifestly from the foregoing; and besides the scholastics already cited, St. Augustine seems to teach it (City of God XII, 15), where he sets a difference between the substance (or, as he says, the immortality) of the angels and their operations: in the latter there is a succession of past and future, not in the former. The very name aevum suggests as much, as if attributed to

this duration because, in this, it bears a likeness to eternity—namely, permanence and intrinsic immutability. Hence Augustine says that what is immortal is sometimes called "eternal," though less properly. The reason is evident from what has been said: real succession cannot be in duration unless it is in the being whose duration it is; but in the being of an incorruptible thing there is no succession (as even Bonaventure concedes); therefore neither is there in its duration. The major was proved above and is further explained from motion and its duration: the duration that is time has succession because motion has succession in its being; thus Aristotle rightly said that the extension or succession of time arises from succession in motion—in its very being. Conversely, where there is no succession in the being, neither in its duration.

16. Furthermore, the same major is confirmed thus: either duration and being are considered as they are in the thing—and then they are the same without any real distinction; therefore one cannot understand that duration is really successive while being is not, for the properties "permanent" and "successive," being opposed, cannot both belong to the same thing as the same—or duration is considered as distinct by reason from being; then it is conceived either under the mode of a measure of being (as many speak), or under the mode of an accident affecting being. In either case, it must be conceived proportionally to the being. Therefore, if the being is conceived as indivisibly permanent, its measure or accident must be conceived as indivisible and lacking real parts, which real succession necessarily requires. Finally, where the formal effect is the same, the form is the same. But so long as a thing retains identically the same being without variation, it is identically the same "lasting" and "remaining in being." Therefore the duration, too, is wholly the same; as the being is the same without variation of parts, so also is the duration.

17. You will say: although the being is not varied because it is not increased, the duration is varied, because it becomes greater; thus the formal effect of duration is varied, since, although it is the same

"lasting," it is "lasting more and more." I answer: in that way of speaking lies an equivocation; the "more and more" expresses only an extrinsic denomination in our way of conceiving, not a real increase. Otherwise, if part is added to part in duration, then either, when one part arrives, the prior part passes away and ceases to be, or the later parts of duration remain together with the earlier parts. The first cannot be understood. If the angel's being remains wholly the same so that nothing in it passes or ceases to be or grows old, how can anything in its duration pass away and perish, since duration is nothing but permanence in being? And the duration is as incorruptible as the being itself; therefore it can no more cease by parts than being can, nor can any cause be assigned for such a passing away or cessation. The second is also unintelligible. In no duration can more than something indivisible remain together "according to succession." If something that had been made successively should at some point thereafter remain together, the succession would be accidental, and it would then remain not as successive but as permanent. Therefore, if the whole duration from the beginning of creation up to now in the angel remains really "together" in this "now," then it includes no succession in itself; it is not then successively made; there is no cause or necessity for such succession; therefore it was whole in the angel from the beginning. This is all the more so because one cannot understand how the angel's present duration has parts made earlier and later, since from neither the subject nor the mode of intensity or permanent extension can it have such parts. Therefore no succession or variation in the duration of the angelic being can be understood unless there is also succession in the being itself.

Fourth Assertion

18. There is no real succession or variation in the angel's conservation and its duration; from this side also the angel's duration is an aevum, by nature invariable. The conclusion may be proved first

thus: it seems impossible that an action vary in no way varying its term, its principle, or any other condition requisite for acting; but none of these is varied in the continuous conservation of an angel; therefore that continuity of action is not by variation nor by succession of parts of the action, but by simple permanence of the same indivisible action; therefore, in the being of that action there is no real succession; therefore neither in its duration, according to the principles already demonstrated. The major is proved: if all the principles of a thing are the same, the thing cannot vary. The minor is clear from what has been said: the term of that action is the being of the thing, in which there is no variety (as even Bonaventure concedes); the agent is the same—God—with the same conditions.

19. It can be answered that it is not repugnant that an action vary around the same term, and therefore conservation itself can be continuously successive even if its term is entirely the same.

20. About this reply several points must be made. First, even if we grant that the continuation of the conservation can be—or even is—by variation in the action alone and not in its term, it does not follow that the duration of the term is anything but without variation; thus it will be the aevum of which we speak. The assumption is clear: the duration of the thing conserved is, in reality, the term of the conserving action as such; conservation tends directly that the thing remain in the being which it has formally by duration; therefore, if there is no variety in the term of conservation, there will be none in the duration of that term. Indeed, even if someone were to contend that the duration of the thing is not formally the term of conservation but follows upon the being which is its term, still there is no reason to deny that its duration is as invariable as its being. Just as the intellect, which follows upon the term of creation and conservation, is always invariable and the same, even if conserved by a variable action, so why will not the duration and any other property that intrinsically accompanies such a term be equally the same?

21. Next, even if we concede that a permanent thing can be conserved by God through a successively continued action because of the liberty of the agent, still this could not be so for a cause that acts and conserves naturally; for in such a cause no reason can be given why it should change or vary its action. The efficacy of the argument made above shows this: there all the principles determining such an agent to this action concur; therefore naturally the action cannot vary unless the will of the first cause intervenes.

22. From this we say further: be it granted that it is not necessary, nonetheless God can conserve such a thing by the same indivisibly permanent action—which Bonaventure seems to deny; otherwise he could not infer anything from the supposed necessary continuation of conservation. That this is possible and lies within God's will is clear: if all the principles of the action are considered, they demand not variation but permanence and identity; if the action itself is considered in itself, such indivisible permanence is not repugnant to it, nor does it have anything that requires variation. Both points are clear: the action is indivisible, like its term; therefore it is no more repugnant to it to be permanently invariable than to its term, nor does it demand variation of parts, since it requires no parts. Hence I add that not only can God conserve such a thing by such an action, but such a mode of conservation is more connatural and therefore due to the natures of things. For nature of itself shuns variation whenever it is not necessary from some natural principle. In every variation there is some cessation, at least of the action or of a part of it, which, in that respect, may be called a kind of corruption; but nature avoids every mode of cessation or corruption as far as it can.

23. Lastly, one may form an argument: the creative action of an incorruptible thing is, by its nature, incorruptible, since it has no intrinsic principle of cessation; therefore by the will of God alone should it cease or pass away; therefore it remains the same so long as the thing is conserved. For this reason, above we said that creation and conservation are, strictly speaking, not distinct actions but the same

action indivisibly permanent. Thus it is sufficiently shown that not only the being of the thing conserved by God is invariable, but also the being of its conservation; consequently the duration of both is permanent and invariable.

24. Finally, for greater abundance I add that it seems impossible that the conservation of a permanent and indivisible thing be effected by a successive and continuous action, as Bonaventure thinks. There can indeed be discrete variation of actions in the conservation of the very same thing (as an objection drew from what we said above). I call "discrete succession" that which is between two total actions, one of which precedes and, that one ceasing, the other succeeds in its place about the same term—just as light made by one lamp, that lamp being removed, can be conserved by another distinct action. I call this succession "discrete" not because there is any interval of time between those two actions (for otherwise the second action would not be conservation but a new production), but because those two actions, being indivisible, are not parts of one continuous action; rather, each is a total action, and one immediately succeeds the other, as I shall say a little below concerning angelic instants. From this it is shown probably that the conserving action cannot be by continuous succession. For the creative action of an angel, for example, is one total and indivisible action, and therefore is necessarily done "all at once," nor can it be done by parts any more than the angel himself. Therefore it cannot be varied by parts; but if the total action is varied, it must all at once be changed into another total action; therefore conservation cannot be continued by a continuous succession, but either by the indivisible permanence of the same action, or, at most, by discrete and immediate succession of total actions.

25. From either mode it further follows that, for the continuous conservation of the thing, there must intervene an action that, as coexistent to our time, lasts wholly invariable for some time—which is chiefly intended. I explain this last inference with respect to the latter mode (for as to the former it is clear). If the thing is

conserved by the same indivisible, invariable action, then in it there will be permanent duration, as we intend. If, however, the continuous conservation is by immediate succession of actions, then either the first action exists in reality for only the indivisible instant of our time, or it remains wholly invariable for some time. If the latter be granted, that is what we intend. If the former be said (which is not impossible, at least by God's power), it is then necessary that the other conserving action immediately following begin to be intrinsically by coexistence to our time; for in our time immediately after an instant there is not another instant but time. Therefore that conserving action must, the same and invariable, remain for some time of ours—which is what we intend. The consequence is clear: since that action begins by coexisting to our time and is in itself indivisible, it cannot, part to part, coexist with parts of time; therefore it must, whole, coexist with the whole, and whole with each part; and this is precisely to last invariable while coexisting to variable time. Bonaventure therefore did not rightly infer from the necessity of continuous conservation that there is succession in the conservation itself, since conservation can be done without any succession by the indivisible permanence of the same indivisible action; and it cannot be done with respect to an indivisible and permanent term by a proper continuous succession. If any succession can sometimes intervene, it must necessarily be discrete; and in it some part must of necessity be an action invariable and permanent for some time of ours, as has been shown.

Final Assertion

26. There is no created duration so permanent in itself that, with respect to the opposed privation or negation, it is not capable of a kind of privative succession. The meaning of these words has already been explained; the truth of the assertion is evident: there is no created duration that cannot have a beginning and an end, at least by extrinsic power. A duration is said to have a beginning only when it

has being immediately after nonbeing; and an end only when, after being, it passes into nonbeing. Therefore, in every created duration there is room for this transition—from nonbeing to being, or from being to nonbeing. But in this transition alone consists the "succession with respect to the opposite term," which we call privative; therefore there is no created duration that is not capable of such succession. You will say: then there is no created duration that is simply permanent—contrary to what has been said; the consequence seems to hold, since any succession diminishes or removes absolute permanence. I answer, first, by denying the consequence as to intrinsic permanence; that privative succession is not proper and intrinsic, but only according to a relation to an extrinsic, opposed term; hence it does not diminish the intrinsic permanence about which we spoke in the foregoing assertions. Second, I say that this succession is not opposed to permanence, but to intrinsic necessity or to stability of permanence; hence all that follows is that no created duration is so permanent as to have from within itself the necessity of simply remaining in being—which is most true, and in no way conflicts with what we have said hitherto; indeed, it is the foundation for solving the contrary arguments. This is strongly proved by the reason Bonaventure hints at: every created duration depends on conservation and, as it were, on a continuous emanation from God, who can suspend that conservation or emanation. From this it does not follow that the emanation or the duration conserved by it is intrinsically successive, but only that it is such that nonbeing can succeed it—or it succeed after nonbeing.

Replies to the Arguments for the Contrary Opinion

27. To the first argument (from Aureolus) I respond that, if "absolutely permanent" means "in every way immutable in its permanence," then it is true that no created duration is absolutely permanent; but this is wrongly attributed to duration as such, since

the divine duration is permanent in that way. If "absolutely permanent" means only "without intrinsic positive succession," then not only of duration in common but even of created duration it is falsely denied that it can be permanent in this way. To the proof I answer: all those comparisons by which one permanent duration is said to be greater than another, or (what is the same) by which one permanent thing is said to last more than another, if we look to the thing itself, are verified not according to any greater or lesser positive extension, but according to the privative succession described above; and, according to our mode of conceiving, they are measured by an order to some real or imaginary succession; hence they are explained by comparative terms of quantity.

28. I explain each point. When two angels are said to have lasted equally, nothing more is signified than that they simultaneously had being or began to be, and that nonbeing did not succeed either after being received. When one is said to last more than another, it is signified that one had being after nonbeing, while the other remained under nonbeing—if the inequality be on the side of the beginning; if it be on the side of the end, it is signified that in one a succession occurred to nonbeing after being, while in the other it did not. Thus, in reality, by those comparisons no true quantity or extension is signified in those durations, but only a different or the same relation to the opposed negation or privation. Because we do not conceive these indivisibles as they are in themselves, we "measure" them by coexistence to our time; hence we say that a thing lasts more or less which coexists with a greater or lesser time, and that what coexists only with an instant rather than with time is not properly said to "last," but to "begin duration." Thus we call one of these durations greater, lesser, or equal to another not by intrinsic succession and comparison, but by an extrinsic denomination to a greater, lesser, or equal time of ours.

29. Strictly speaking, although such locutions and comparisons are made among distinct permanent durations, they are not

made by comparing the same duration to itself. Divine duration is not greater today than it was yesterday, nor less than it will be tomorrow; nothing of duration has been added to it, nor has it suffered any lack of duration or existence at one difference of time rather than another. Nor does it matter that God now coexists with today to which He did not coexist yesterday; even if we grant that (which is controverted), all that follows is that the duration is increased on the other extreme, whence a new extrinsic denomination is taken—without the duration itself being increased. Hence coexistence may be called greater or lesser, but not the duration itself considered in itself, since coexistence includes an extrinsic denomination, whereas duration does not. As to comparison with other durations, eternity cannot be called less, because it can never not be when others are; nor can it be called equal, because it surpasses them in perfection and de facto has always existed even when others did not. In a sense it may be called greater, not only in perfection but also because it sometimes "has being" when others do not. But as to the propriety of comparison in extension or quantity, it is neither greater nor less; rather, it indivisibly and eminently contains the whole extension of other durations, whether actual or possible.

30. Objection: the same angel—or even God—has lasted more today than yesterday; therefore the same duration can be said to be greater now than before. I reply: the antecedent is most improper in expression and false if attributed to God in strictness; God has not, in Himself, lasted more, but on the side of the other extreme one may say that "more time has lasted with God" or "coexisted with God." From this an extrinsic denomination is taken, and a change of phrase ensues, which should not be extended but explained or corrected. With respect to an angel or any creature the locution has less impropriety, because the angel lasted yesterday and lasts today in such a way that absolutely it could have lasted yesterday and not today—not only by extrinsic denomination (i.e., because the other extreme could fail to coexist), but because intrinsically it could be deprived of its own

duration for today, even if yesterday it had it. Thus, when it is not deprived today, it can in some sense be said to "last more," not by an augmentation of duration (as if it became greater in itself), but because the same duration has been conserved for a longer time and not destroyed, even though it could have been destroyed.

31. To the second argument (Bonaventure's foundation), I deny the assumption that it is repugnant to a created duration to be "all at once." To the proof I answer that it is not so proper to say affirmatively that, in a permanent duration, past and future are present "together," as it is to say negatively that, in it, there is neither past nor future, but only being—so long as it persists. In two ways past and future can be attributed to such a permanent duration: intrinsically, by its proper existence; or extrinsically, by an extrinsic denomination from the coexistence of another thing. In the first way there is in such a duration neither "to have been" nor "to be going to be"; therefore they cannot be "together" in it—for how can things that are not be "together"? The antecedent is clear: nothing passes away or newly arrives intrinsically and by its own existence in such a duration; therefore, intrinsically and by its own existence, there is in it neither "to have been" nor "to be going to be." In the second way, "to be," "to have been," and "to be going to be" are not together in the thing but successively, according to the succession of the other coexistent thing from which the denomination is taken—even successively—with no intrinsic succession in the denominated thing, as was explained above for eternity. From the proof of the consequence in that argument nothing else can be gathered except that such a duration intrinsically lacks past and future.

32. From this the inconveniences inferred do not follow. The first was that such a duration would always exist by necessity. This does not follow; although such a duration is, while it is, wholly present, nevertheless whether it exists depends on another's will. Hence, absolutely, it does not always exist by necessity. It is also true that, although such a duration is not intrinsically capable of positive

succession, it can be followed by its opposite term—that is, by negation of its being. In the same way is solved the other inconvenience, that such a duration, once existing, cannot be annihilated. This does not follow, for the same reason: although it is permanent, it is not necessary; and although intrinsically it has no future, it positively includes in act and together a capacity to be present in the whole future duration that is possible. The third inconvenience was that such a duration is infinite; this does not follow, but only that it is indivisible, and if it is an aevum, that it is incorruptible. It is true that this duration is such that it is of itself, without any addition or increase, apt and sufficient to coexist forever with successive duration—real or imaginary—whose entire sufficiency it has all at once from the first moment it begins to exist. If one calls this "infinity," it is only "in some respect"; to admit that is no inconvenience. Still, it is not infinite simply—even in the notion of duration—for it does not include, in act, such a power or virtue in lasting as to contain of necessity, in itself indivisibly, any durational extension however great. For this reason it is better said that this duration is of a higher order than any successive or corruptible duration than that it is infinite. Thus the whole foundation of Bonaventure's argument has been satisfied so far as it rests on reasons. From what has been said here and in the first argument, many other sophisms can easily be solved that might be multiplied here; I omit them, as they proceed only from locutions grounded in our mode of conceiving. Once that is understood, and the significations of the terms are rightly explained as they have been, their solution is most easy.

On the Testimonies of the Fathers

33. To the testimonies of the Fathers I answer, first, that almost all of them can be verified by reference to real change and succession in the accidents and operations which a created aevum

admits, whereas divine eternity admits none. Thus when the Gloss says that only God does not "know" future or past, this is sufficiently understood to mean that God, neither in being nor in knowledge nor in any perfection, "knows" past or future, but only "is." Hence it follows that, with respect to God's knowledge, all other things are said to be present and not future or past, because they are always presented to it in the same way as objectively present in their own durations. Created things, however, even when permanent in their substance, nevertheless have past or future in their operations. Thus the angel, for example, by his knowledge regards other things as past or as future and, in a certain way, depends on their real presence and existence in order to perceive them—of which elsewhere. In this way the words of Anselm and of Augustine and Boethius are easily explained. Second, the Fathers' locutions can be understood of a permanence that excludes succession even with respect to the lack of real existence or duration. It is proper to God's eternity that it cannot either succeed upon nonbeing or be followed by nonbeing—something that cannot belong to created duration, as has been sufficiently shown. In this sense it is rightly said that God alone is immutable not only as to operations but also as to His substantial being; for every creature is mutable even in its substance, at least by extrinsic power. Therefore eternity, insofar as it is grounded in immutability, is proper to God and excludes that particular succession—or rather, the capacity for such succession—which a creature cannot lack.

An Objection Asking Whether Durations Can Vary in the Same Thing

34. One last objection remains. If God can annihilate an angel after it has really lasted, He can also reproduce the same angel. I ask, then, whether the duration that the angel previously had and the duration which it subsequently receives are one and the same, or distinct. Whatever you say, something contrary to the doctrine taught

will follow. If the duration is the same, it follows first that in the same duration of the angel there is a real "before" and "after"; the angel was created before he was annihilated, and annihilated before he was reproduced; therefore, from first to last, the angel was first created than recreated; therefore he first had duration by creation than by recreation; therefore, in that same duration, there is a real before and after—which, since they cannot be understood in the same indivisible thing, plainly makes the duration extended and divisible. This is confirmed: if the duration is the same, then the action by which he is reproduced will be the same as that by which he was first produced—and consequently the duration of the action will be the same; but this seems unintelligible, both for the argument already made (which applies here) and because it would follow that God can reproduce the same numerically identical motion in the same mobile through the same space, and consequently reproduce the same time. If, however, one says there are two durations in the angel, then durations are multiplied in the same being; consequently there will be a distinction by nature between duration and being, since one duration is separated from such a being and another newly adjoined. It further follows that there is some succession in the duration when there is none in the being, for between those two durations there is the succession of a prior and a posterior, while the being is the same and indivisible.

Reply, in Which the Negative is Defended

35. Some think that God could reproduce that angel either with the same numerical duration or with numerically distinct durations. This latter is rightly rejected by the reasons alleged against it. I judge that such an angel must necessarily be reproduced with the same numerical duration. Just as it is impossible that the same individual thing, once corrupted or annihilated, be reproduced with a numerically distinct existence (since existence is not distinguished by nature from the entity of the thing), so it cannot be that the same

individual thing with its existence be reproduced with a numerically distinct duration, because duration and existence are not distinguished on the side of the thing. To the first objection I reply that it is one and the same duration, as it were, repeated twice; hence there is no inconvenience if the same duration, as earlier produced, be prior to itself as later reproduced—or, in our mode of conceiving, by reason of coexistence to before and after in our time, or rather on account of the succession which in that case intervenes—first between being and nonbeing, and then between nonbeing and being. The annihilation interposed between conservation and recreation brought about that succession in the same duration insofar as it was twice effected with annihilation interposed. From this it does not follow that the duration is extended or has parts, because that succession is not continuous but discrete; discrete succession can exist between indivisibles and, by God's power, can even be of the same indivisible to itself if it is repeated twice with the interposition of the privation or suspension of the same being. That this is true we can prove thus: what we say of duration, others will necessarily say of the very being of the angel, which without controversy is one and indivisible and yet is first created and later recreated.

36. To the other confirmation I reply that the repeated creation of that angel can be done either by a repetition of the same action or by a distinct action; there is no repugnance in either, and so it depends on God's will which is done, as we have already said again above. If, therefore, the recreation is by a distinct action, it will also have a duration distinct from that of the prior action. Nor is it necessary, if the duration of the term is the same, that the durations of the actions not be distinguished; the being of the term is one and the same, even if it be effected or conserved by diverse actions. If, however, the reproduction is effected by the same numerical action repeated, then in that action too the same indivisible duration will be reproduced; and this is no more inconvenient than that the same being with the same indivisible duration be reproduced. Nor do I

think it inconvenient that what is inferred about reproducing the same numerical motion follows; I think God can do it, if it be in the same mobile or to the same numerical terminus (as has been touched on earlier, and more extensively in the third tome of the third part). What should be said about time I shall say below.

SECTIO VI

WHETHER AEVUM ESSENTIALLY DIFFERS FROM OTHER PERMANENT AND CREATED DURATIONS

1. Up to this point I have explained, so to speak, only the proximate genus of the aevum. To complete its account, I must now set forth the proper difference by which it is distinguished from other created and permanent durations and by which it is constituted in its own being. For I presuppose that there are other permanent durations distinct from the aevum, as will be said in the following section.

First Opinion

2. Those who take the position that duration is formally constituted under the notion of a measure think that the notion of the aevum is completed by its being a permanent duration that measures the being of created incorruptible things. Theologians commonly speak this way: St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 5–6; and in the same place Cajetan and other Thomists; Capreolus, In II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 1, where Scotus also agrees, q. 2 and 3; Richard, a. 1, q. 1 and 2; Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, a. 4; and as to this part concerning the notion of measure Bonaventure agrees, q. 1 and 2; likewise Alanus, Albert the Great, and Aegidius, cited above. This position can be understood either of an extrinsic measure only, or only of an intrinsic one, or of both together. In the first way the Thomists seem to defend

it, as does Scotus, who for this reason says there is only one aevum, which measures the being of all incorruptible things and the being in the highest created and incorruptible substance. In this they merely imitated a certain proportion to temporal things and their measure; for in temporal matters there is only one extrinsic measure of duration, which is judged to be in the motion of the heavens as the first and noblest, and under that relation time is constituted. Scotus further adds that the duration of any higher angel is the measure of that of a lower, and thus in order down to the lowest incorruptible substance. From this it follows that all incorruptible substances except the lowest have a duration which is an aevum, and conversely all have a measure of their being except the supreme.

3. In the second way of speaking, Aegidius seems to follow: he thinks the aevum is an intrinsic measure, and thus that in each incorruptible substance there is its own proper aevum; he does not place the extrinsic measure in the aeviternal things themselves but in eternity. A third way of explaining is found in Argentina (Thomas of Sutton/Argentina): he thinks the aevum is indifferent to intrinsic and extrinsic measure, and thus is multiplied in individual aeviternal beings as their intrinsic measure, and also exists in one supreme as the extrinsic measure of the rest. Some Thomists also adopt this manner of speaking, but in another sense: they say there is only one aevum in the supreme aeviternal, and that this aevum is the extrinsic measure of the lower beings and the intrinsic measure of the supreme angel himself.

Refutation of the Preceding Opinion

4. This opinion cannot be defended given the principle I established above. I showed that duration as such is not constituted by the notion of measure. From this it follows that such a duration cannot be constituted as a specific kind of duration by reason of a determinate relation of measure, since the differences that contract essentially must

of themselves and formally contract or determine the divided genus. This can be further confirmed and extended here. First, that the notion of the aevum cannot consist in the notion of an intrinsic measure is proved because, in reality, it is not distinct from that very being with respect to which it is called an intrinsic measure; therefore it is not truly called a measure of it, since a true and real measure ought to be really distinct from what is measured, as was shown above. And this reason also proves that the notion of the aevum cannot consist in both measures together, extrinsic and intrinsic, nor even indifferently in either of them; for by force of the argument made, such an intrinsic measure is entirely excluded in reality. Nor can it be said to be a measure "according to reason," first, because there is no measure "according to reason" unless, at least according to our conceptual distinction, it serves as a means of knowing the quantity of something—as a quantity would—which cannot hold here, as will easily be clear by applying what was said above about duration in general and about eternity, and a fortiori from what we will say immediately. And chiefly because such a "measure according to reason" is only a denominative notion; but the notion of the aevum, insofar as it is essentially such a duration, is intrinsic to things and independent of extrinsic cognition. This argument also shows that the proper difference of the aevum cannot consist solely in the notion of extrinsic measure, because the notion of duration is intrinsic to the enduring thing, as was proved above; for the fact that a thing endures is not an extrinsic denomination but an intrinsic one, and thus to endure in this way cannot be something extrinsic. Likewise, to endure does not signify something relative but something absolute. Finally, the reasons made above have proportionate application here; for that reason I touch on these points briefly.

5. I add further that not only does the proper and essential notion of the aevum not consist in such an extrinsic measure, but such a kind of measure does not seem able to have a place among aeviternal realities considered in themselves. I explain the first point by

comparing it with time: in the duration of motion, which has extension, it is easy to understand how one duration can be measured by another in its durational breadth; and therefore, in the duration of motion, the distinction between intrinsic duration and extrinsic measure has a place, and so does the denomination of "time" under one or the other notion, as we will explain below. But in the aevum considered in itself there is no intrinsic extension or durational breadth, and therefore, even if there is an intrinsic aevum—which is the intrinsic and proper duration of each incorruptible thing—such a duration does not seem capable of being measured by an indivisible extrinsic measure. Consequently, the notion of such an active extrinsic measure has no place in that order of things.

6. I show the first point by this general reason: the indivisible as indivisible is not measurable; but the aevum as such is something indivisible; therefore the aevum as such is not measurable; therefore among aeviternal beings there cannot be an aevum that is the extrinsic measure of the rest, for measure and measured are correlatives, and when one is removed the other must also be removed. The major is clear, because only a quantum, or what is taken in the mode of a quantum, is measurable (from Metaphysics X); otherwise, if we speak of measure in some different sense, we are using terms equivocally. But the indivisible as such is neither a quantum nor taken in the mode of a quantum. This may be clarified further: if one aevum is the measure of another, either this is understood as a measure of perfection, or as a measure of permanence or duration in being, and no other kind of measure occurs that can be accommodated to these realities. Of these two types, the former is extrinsic to the thing, because that sort of measure is not proper to durations, but has a place in any genus of things; thus the highest essence in some genus is the measure of inferior essences, and the highest existence of existences, and so on for other attributes, which do not on that account receive any special notion or denomination beyond a conceptual relation. Moreover, for measure and measurable to have a place in this way, the thing is not

considered as wholly indivisible but as having some latitude of perfection, according as it more or less approaches the perfection of the measure.

7. The latter kind of measure cannot be understood among durations that are in themselves indivisible, that is, insofar as they are indivisible. For if two angels, for example, are compared in duration, one can only say that they endure equally insofar as they begin to exist at the same time and one does not cease to exist without the other. That relation is not properly that of measure to what is measured but of mutual coexistence, for it is not a relation of disparity but of parity, of the sort that equality or coexistence is. A sign of this is that, although one of them is more perfect than the other, nonetheless as regards their mutual relation of equality in enduring they depend on each other equally, both in being and in being known. For, if the duration of the higher angel is known, the other's equal duration is not known by it unless the other's duration is also known and that they were created at the same time and neither was annihilated without the other; therefore, as regards this equality, the proper notion of measure does not intervene there. If, however, there is inequality of duration between angels, it consists only in this, that either one was created earlier or is annihilated earlier than the other. But, supposing such a case, no one can measure by the aevum of the angels how great the interval of duration was between one angel and another, because the aevum itself is in itself indivisible and remains the same whether that interval was small or however great; therefore one cannot, by a known aevum as by a measure, know how large that interval was; therefore one cannot know how much longer one of those angels endured, but that must be known either by simple intuition and comprehension without any measure, or by the measure of our time.

8. The reason is that that interval, considered in itself, is nothing; and thus it cannot be known as greater or lesser unless insofar as a greater or lesser portion of our time actually occurs in it or could occur in it. But by an indivisible duration this cannot be made

known, because an indivisible duration is entire or can be entire in that whole interval and in any part of it, and in any other interval greater than it; therefore it is not apt to measure its quantity. For the same reason, by an indivisible aevum no one can measure how long another angel has endured—if that "how long" is taken in the mode of extension and durational breadth. An aevum cannot be conceived as a quantum except by relation to an interval in which there is or can be succession of time. But, as I said, any indivisible aevum is indifferent to that temporal interval, since it can exist as a whole in any such interval and in any of its parts; therefore it cannot be an apt measure that would render us certain about the aforesaid quantity of duration.

Resolution of the Question

9. It must therefore be said that the proper difference of the aevum, whereby it is constituted in its species of duration and distinguished from others, consists in this: it signifies a permanent duration that is by its nature immutable or necessary. Thus Cajetan takes it in I, q. 10, a. 5–6, followed by other more recent authors, and it is also gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, who distinguishes the aevum from eternity by this, that in itself it does not admit succession, though it can admit it in its operations as adjuncts; both are to be understood according to an intrinsic natural capacity. And although the second point is not of the formal notion of the aevum, it is necessarily conjoined with it by the nature of the thing, and thus is used to explain it. This assertion is clear. First, the duration of created incorruptible things has an intrinsic immutability, though dependent. This is proved because that duration is, as it were, their being; but the being of such things is incorruptible and of itself necessary—though not absolutely so, because it is dependent—as was treated above; therefore their duration is of the same order and the same immutability. Again, by that difference the aevum is distinguished from eternity, as has been explained above, as falling short of its

perfection; and from other permanent durations it differs as exceeding them, since they are mutable from within. That this difference is essential is manifest, for dependent and independent differ by more than a genus; and corruptible and incorruptible differ at least generically, as Aristotle testifies.

10. You will say: although these differences sufficiently indicate an essential diversity, nevertheless they do not seem formally and properly to explain the specific and essential notion of the aevum, since those differences are general—either between creature and God, or among created substances themselves. I reply, first, since duration in reality does not differ from being, it is no wonder that it is distinguished by those differences which primarily and per se make being itself diverse. In being itself, taken first in an absolute way, the primary and chief difference is that it be dependent or independent; and in created being one of the essential and generic differences is that it be corruptible or incorruptible. Next, I say that by that difference the formal constitutive notion of the aevum is very well declared in the order of such a duration. For since duration as such formally signifies the permanence of existing—which is expressed by the negation of ceasing to exist—by the intrinsic mode of such permanence and by the inclusion of such a negation the proper notion of duration is understood to be constituted and specified. In a reality that is intrinsically immutable there is a special mode of permanence in existing, for it is, so to speak, essentially more permanent and has the negation of ceasing more intrinsically conjoined. Therefore, by that difference the proper notion of the aevum is very well constituted. This difference has a foundation in the Fathers, who describe the aevum by stability. See St. Basil, Contra Eunomium II; St. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, q. 19 and 72; St. Anselm, Proslogion c. 50; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, metrum 9.

Corollary from the Above Resolution on the Multiplication & Variety of Aevums

11. From this it is understood first that the aevum of this sort is multiplied in aeviternal things according to their number; for just as existences are multiplied, so too are durations, because in reality they do not differ, as has often been said. Also, because duration is intrinsic to the enduring thing, in each enduring thing there is its own intrinsic duration; therefore, in each incorruptible thing there is its own intrinsic aevum. But you may ask whether, as the aevum is multiplied with the multiplication of things, it is also distinguished as much as the things are; that is, whether in angels that differ in species there is also a specifically different aevum, or only numerically different. Many think there is no need for as much distinction in the aevum as there is among the things or existences whose duration it is; for although they differ in the grade of essential perfection as regards being, yet in their way of remaining in being they have the same uniformity and specific agreement. Indeed there are some who think that this similarity in the mode of persevering in being is so great that they say there is an aevum of the same species in the heavens and in the angels, although the duration of the former is material and of the latter spiritual—a view St. Thomas seems to indicate, I, q. 10, a. 6, ad 2. Just as the succession of motion or the duration of time seems to be of the same species in all motions, even if otherwise the motions differ in their being in species or even in genus, as between material and spiritual intensification. On the contrary, if duration in reality is not distinguished from existence, it is not clear how existences can be specifically diverse and nonetheless the durations be of the same species. Further, comparing spiritual substances to incorruptible material ones, they have a nobler and very different mode of incorruptibility: the former are incorruptible because of the simplicity and actuality of their substance, the latter because of the indissoluble bond among the parts of which they are composed. Hence spiritual substances have a higher mode of immutability and permanence than bodily ones, however incorruptible. A sign of this is that they depend on fewer causes: they lack a material cause and consequently also a formal cause taken as

distinct components; they therefore lack parts mutually dependent on each other.

12. For this reason I do not doubt that at least among these there is an essential difference even in the aevum itself. Nor did St. Thomas say that these are of the same species under this aspect, but only that they are measured by the same measure; for that, it is enough that they be of the same genus—if, however, that mode of measure can be found among aeviternal beings. In a proportionate way it also seems that as angels differ specifically in their simple entities and existences, so too they differ in the mode of immutability they have, conjoined with some mutability; from that conjunction St. Thomas deduces the nature of the aevum. Now one angel is more mutable than another according to specific diversity, for the higher an angel is, the simpler and more uniform are his motions; therefore he will have a simpler and more permanent aevum. By a much greater reason the aevum of the rational soul will be distinguished from the aevum of angels, and the aevum of prime matter from all the rest as the lowest of all substantial things. Therefore, as regards what the duration of the aevum positively signifies in an aeviternal reality, that is, as regards the foundation of that negation indicated by the uniformity of the aevum, I do not doubt that there is a specific diversity; the negation itself of substantial variation can be said to be of the same notion in all. As to what is to be thought concerning time, I will say below.

13. From this I add further that the aevum is not only multiplied and diversified in different incorruptible substances, but also in a substance and in its incorruptible accidents (for it is otherwise with corruptible ones, as we will say below). This is proved because there is no doubt that in such substances there are some incorruptible accidents—namely those that flow from the nature of the thing and are conjoined with the essence of the thing, or are present to it by natural necessity, and have no contrary, and for which there is no natural way by which they can be deprived. Such is light, for example, in the sun, and intellect in the soul or in an angel, and the

like. Next, it is certain that, just as these accidents have their proper existences, so they also have intrinsic durations proportioned to themselves and not distinct in reality from their existences; therefore, in each of these accidents there is a duration distinct from the duration of the substance. Finally, that this duration is an aevum is clear from the notion of the aevum explained above, because that duration is permanent and by its nature immutable in the being of such an entity, although it depends on another, and otherwise it can have an associated variation either in its own operation or at least in other accidents of the same subject; therefore such a duration is truly included under the aevum. This accidental aevum will, as to its positive essence, be more diverse from a substantial aevum than one substantial aevum is from another, as is a fortiori clear from what has been said.

Difficulty Concerning the Duration of the Beatific Vision

14. From this there arises a theological difficulty: either the received definition of the aevum is not complete, or the beatific vision also endures by an aevum. The consequence is clear; for in that vision there is also an intrinsic duration which, though accidental, is nevertheless so permanent that it admits no variation from within, even if it depends on an intrinsic cause. Therefore, the whole definition of the aevum fits it; hence either the definition is not sufficiently given, or that duration is also an aevum. But the latter member of the consequent conflicts with the received opinion of theologians who say that the blessed vision is measured not by an aevum but by a participated eternity, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 1, and Opusculum 36, c. 1; Cajetan and Capreolus, and other Thomists cited above. Nonetheless Scotus, In II, dist. 2, q. 4, and In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, admits the second part of that consequent for the reason given, and with that view the difficulty disappears: every

duration to which the given definition applies is conceded to be an aevum.

15. We can add that these positions are not contrary in the thing, even if they seem so in words—either because the aevum itself can fittingly be called a participated eternity; in this sense St. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions q. 23, says that the rational soul by its immortality participates in the divine eternity, and that only God is eternal of himself, other things being such by a certain participation; or, more in line with St. Thomas's mind, because although that duration agrees with the aevum in its common notion, nevertheless, since it is supernatural and in its own way of a divine order, by antonomasia it deserves the name of participated eternity.

St. Thomas's Teaching on the Unity of Aevum Explained

16. Another objection could be made against the doctrine set forth, from another statement of St. Thomas which seems altogether contrary, I, q. 10, a. 6, where he defines that there is only one aevum, which is in the highest angel—whom St. Thomas supposes to be the only individual in his species—just as there is one time in the first motion of the universe, which is the motion of the heavens. I reply that St. Thomas there considered the aevum under the notion of a first measure, which in each genus is one and by which the rest contained under that genus are measured. We, however, do not understand in the aevum any other notion of measure than the one that can be in the notion of perfection. About that we also concede that simply speaking there is one, although relatively in each hierarchy or order of angels the highest can be called the measure of the rest, and among the heavens the empyrean or the primum mobile with respect to the lower. Indeed, under that consideration, even God's eternity is the measure of all aevums, as Aegidius held, which is true as a measure of perfection and the supreme one in the whole order of durations. But

speaking of a supreme and homogeneous measure within the range of the aevum, it is very fitting to say that such an aevum is one only and is in the highest angel.

17. Nevertheless, we do not speak of it in that way, but under the absolute notion of duration; for that notion of a measure of perfection, as I said, has no special character in durations or in the aevum more than in other genera or perfections of things. As to the measure of duration with respect to permanence and the kind of breadth that is conceived, I have already said that no aevum as such can properly have the notion of a measure; therefore neither under that notion can the aevum have unity. At once, the question arises: if an aevum cannot be measured by an aevum as to duration, by what measure is it to be measured? This will be explained more conveniently below, when we treat of time.

SECTIO VII

WHETHER THINGS THAT ARE PERMANENT AND BY NATURE CORRUPTIBLE HAVE THEIR OWN PROPER AND INTRINSIC DURATION, AND WHAT THAT DURATION IS

St. Thomas's Opinion Reported

1. Authors who distinguish these durations only by the notion of measure deny that in corruptible things there is any proper duration distinct from time, since all these things are measured by time. In this view St. Thomas seems to stand, I, q. 10, a. 4, where he says in the reply to the third objection that the being of corruptible things is measured by time. According to this opinion, however, one must distinguish between corporeal corruptible things—which can be both substances and accidents—and spiritual corruptible things, which can only be certain accidents or motions or operations of

immaterial substances. For although all these are said to be measured by time, not by the same time; since these things belong to different orders, they must have measures proportioned to their orders, nor should superior things be subjected to an inferior measure. And therefore, besides this time of ours by which we measure corporeal things, there is posited another spiritual time in the higher motions of angels or in the acts of the highest angel, in which there is their own succession or duration by which the motions of lower angels can be measured. And because those motions can occur with continuous succession or with discrete succession, a twofold time is distinguished in them as well, continuous and discrete, to which their parts and their own instants are assigned.

The Same Opinion Explained, & It Is Shown That These Permanent Things Have Their Own Duration

2. Although we grant that all this has its truth when one considers only the notion of a common or extrinsic measure—as we will explain in the following—I nonetheless maintain that in permanent and corruptible things, of which we are now speaking, there is a proper and intrinsic duration, by which they are formally denominated as enduring. This follows sufficiently from what was said about duration in general and about the other durations we have discussed thus far. Those considerations show in general that in every thing the very fact of enduring is something intrinsic and absolute to the thing. Indeed that opinion about an extrinsic measure must suppose this; for if time measures the being of corruptible things, what in that being does it measure? Not perfection, since from the duration of time one cannot know whether the being of one thing is more perfect than that of another, nor does a greater duration in time add greater perfection to a permanent thing, strictly speaking. Therefore time measures that being with respect to its duration, or (which is the same) with respect to the permanence in the actual exercise of

existing. Therefore that measure, if there is such, presupposes an intrinsic duration in these things. Hence all permanent things, even corruptible ones, have their own proper and intrinsic duration; and this is, as it were, the first foundation or principle of the present question. From this it will be easy to define everything that can be inquired about this sort of duration, keeping a proportion to what has been said about the others.

What This Duration is Like

3. First, it follows from that principle that the intrinsic duration of these things is permanent, strictly and properly speaking. This is proved, first, because as the being is, so is the duration; second, because there cannot be succession in duration unless there is succession in being itself. You will say that the being of these corruptible things is not simply permanent but variable, not only because it easily passes from being to non-being, but also because the very being seems to consist in a certain continual acquisition and loss of its parts, as is clear in corruptible living things, and in qualities which almost always persist in a kind of change. I reply, first, that from the fact that such being is changeable into non-being or generable after non-being, it follows only that in this duration there is, as it were, a discrete succession with respect to the opposed term, in the way I explained for the aevum; this is not inconvenient but, with equal or greater reason, necessary as in the aevum.

4. It is false that the being of corruptible things consists in continual succession or variation. For, first, there are many corruptible things that last long without acquiring or losing any part of their substance or entity, as can be seen in gold and stones and almost all inanimate things that are not easily acted upon or altered by contrary agents. And in permanent accidents this is also manifest; in particular, in the operations of angels I will explain it below. Then, even though in corruptible living things there is a continual or almost continual loss

and acquisition of some substantial part—which we experience in its own way in fire—nevertheless the substantial being of these things does not consist in this succession; rather, they need some action of their own by which they conserve themselves in being. Yet the whole substance itself is nonetheless simply permanent, and those parts that are acquired successively endure permanently in actual fact, and those that are successively corrupted also had permanent being, though corruptible. Therefore these things have a permanent duration and, of itself, the whole at once; although, because they are corruptible and also have parts of extension, it happens accidentally that certain parts are corrupted while others remain, or even that new parts are generated and added to those previously existing. This does not change the nature and notion of a permanent duration, for that is accidental; per se they are such as to remain and to be able to exist simultaneously.

How the Duration of Permanent Corruptibles Differs from Aevum

5. Second, from the same principle we gather that this duration is of a different notion from the aevum, as was said of the latter in the previous section. For although they agree in the common notion of an indivisible, permanent, and dependent duration, they differ essentially in their mode of permanence. This is proved because this duration is such that it is permanent and yet from within is defectible; therefore it differs essentially from the aevum, which cannot fail from within. These two modes of remaining in being differ no less in the notion of duration than corruptible and incorruptible differ in the notion of being. But you will ask what duration this is, since it is neither eternity nor aevum nor can it be time, since it is not a successive duration as time is. I answer: if you ask what it is in the thing itself, this has already been explained by its definition: it is a created permanent duration that from within is defectible. If you ask

how it is to be named, the question is of little moment. Some call it an aevum, not in the strict propriety explained in the previous section, but insofar as that word is extended to signify any longer-lasting duration. This does not please me much, because the name "aevum" is already appropriated to a more perfect signification, and because this duration is indifferent to long and short. Others think it can be called "time," not because it truly and intrinsically is time, but because it is measured by time, which is also quite improper. Durandus, In II, dist. 2, q. 6, calls it a "permanent instant." It can also be called "the duration of corruptible things." Finally, if it has no simple name imposed, it can be named by its definition or by some complex expression; we need not insist further on this.

How This Duration is Not a Measure

6. Third, it follows from what has been said that this duration is in no way a real measure of duration with respect to permanence and, as it were, its continuation. All admit this in such a duration, even if they speak otherwise about the aevum. It must, however, be proved for the same reason: this duration cannot be an intrinsic measure of that thing whose duration it is, because it is neither distinct in reality from it nor does it make known its being or duration in the mode of a measure. Again, no duration of this order is an extrinsic measure of others in the aforesaid sense and property, both because, being per se indivisible with respect to permanence, it cannot, of itself, serve to make known as a measure a breadth or extension; and because this duration is of itself indifferent to enduring more or less according to coexistence with real time; strictly and per se it is neither increased nor diminished by that; therefore, of itself, it is not an apt measure to yield certain knowledge of the quantity or permanence of another duration. Finally, what we have said on this point about the aevum is common to this duration, because the reason why these durations are not per se apt to measure in the way mentioned arises from the

indivisibility and permanence in which they agree, not from the intrinsic immutability in which they differ. Nor does any difficulty of moment remain here, for we have already said that we are not speaking of a measure of perfection, which can be attributed to a most perfect duration in this order with respect to the others, just as in any genus it can be attributed to the most perfect species.

How This Duration is Multiplied

7. Fourth, it is gathered from what has been said that this duration is in no way one for all corruptible things; for if it is not one in the notion of extrinsic measure and of duration as such, no mode remains by which it could be one. Therefore this duration is multiplied in individual enduring things according to their multitude, which is also easily concluded from the first principle set down, namely, that this duration too is intrinsic to the enduring thing, to such an extent that in reality it is not distinct from it. Hence it follows that according to the variety of such enduring things, the durations themselves are also various, in the same proportion as we said about the aevum. Therefore this duration is both of substances and of accidents; but in substances it is always material, in which it differs from the aevum, which can be both immaterial and material. The reason is that a corruptible substance can only be material, whereas an incorruptible one can be either material or immaterial. But this duration, insofar as it is in accidents, can be either material or immaterial; for not only material accidents, but also immaterial operations that are otherwise permanent and indivisible with respect to the extension of enduring, can from within be corruptible and changeable as to their being. Thus the free operations of angels—whether elicited, as works of the will, or commanded, as works of the intellect—are defectible and changeable in being through the intrinsic power and capacity of their cause, which by its freedom can endure more or less in such an operation or pass from one to another. I speak of free operations; for if

there is in an angel any operation altogether necessary from intrinsic nature, that must be judged incorruptible and consequently to endure by an aevum, as St. Thomas probably holds of the natural cognition by which an angel intuits himself (Quodlibet V, a. 7). It is otherwise with other operations that are changeable of themselves.

Digression on Angelic Instants & the Time Composed from Them

8. From this it is also understood what the angelic instants are, which theologians attribute to the operations of angels—Scotus alone excepted, who attributes to them the duration of an aevum (In II, dist. 2, q. 4)—because he did not sufficiently consider that the difference between a duration mutably from within and one immutably from within is essential. Therefore the duration of those free and changeable operations cannot be an aevum; and so, to make it understood as distinct, it was called an angelic instant—an instant because it is indivisible, and "angelic" because it does not pass indivisibly like the instant of our time but can remain for a long while. From this Durandus took the idea of calling all similar durations, in the common notion aforesaid, "instants." This doctrine of angelic instants is that of St. Thomas and of others whom I shall cite immediately.

What Discrete Time is

9. Because in these operations of angels a certain succession is found—insofar as an angel passes from one intellection to another, or from one volition to another—theologians go further and consider among the durations of these operations a succession not indeed continuous, since it is among indivisible realities, but discrete. And the duration that arises from that succession they call discrete time, which they say is composed of the aforesaid indivisible instants that follow

one another. This doctrine is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 1, and q. 56, a. 3; all Thomists embrace it, as does Henry, Quodlibeta XII, q. 8. They think St. Augustine spoke of this time (De Genesi ad litteram VIII, c. 20) when he said that God moves the angelic creature "through time."

Whether Discrete Time Properly Constitutes a Species

10. This doctrine is true as to the reality it contains. I only note that such discrete time is not to be considered as some entity that is per se one, or as belonging to any species of quantity, as Henry above thinks, in which he is rightly refuted by Scotus. For neither are those instants continuous quantities, so that for that reason their number should properly be called a species of discrete quantity; nor is that succession according to any per se order that such instants have among themselves, but only from the mutability and will of the agent. Likewise, there is in this time no more proper notion of measure than in its instants, because number or multitude does not share in the notion of measure except by reason of unity or by reduction to it. Furthermore, from this angelic time no certainty can be taken about the operations of another angel, either as to their number—since while one angel, whether higher or lower, remains in one indivisible operation, another can have a succession of many, and conversely—or as to the permanence of individual operations, for the same reason; namely, because one indivisible operation can endure in one angel for the discrete time of several operations of another angel, and conversely; and the instants themselves, which are indivisible in themselves, are indifferent to long or brief duration, and therefore nothing fixed and certain can be drawn from them so as to take on the notion of a measure. Wherefore all these durations are to be considered only under the absolute notion of durations and, accordingly, they keep a proportion to the enduring things and are

multiplied in them, as has been sufficiently explained. Whether they can be measured in any way and by what measure, we will say below.

SECTIO VIII
WHETHER THERE IS A PROPER DURATION OF SUCCESSIVE THINGS THAT IS ITSELF SUCCESSIVE AND IS CALLED TIME

1. From what was said at the end of the preceding section, we now presuppose that there is no question here of discrete succession; that was sufficiently explained there in passing, and it has no peculiar notion of duration in reality, and in the notion of duration it adds nothing peculiar beyond the instants of which it consists, except for the multiplication and succession of one indivisible duration after another, which is per accidens, since per se it is not ordered to the composition of one duration, nor are the individual indivisible durations by their nature parts of any integral or total duration. We are therefore speaking of a duration having continuous succession, about which philosophers dispute with Aristotle in Physics IV, because physical time seems to follow upon motion. Yet just as the notion of motion and continuous succession is more abstract than bodily motion—as was touched on above—so this successive duration is of itself more abstract, since it can be found in things lacking matter, as will appear; and therefore its exact consideration also belongs to metaphysics.

2. We can treat of this duration in two ways: first, according to its real essence or species; or according as in it some notion of measure is considered, which, although it is not essential—as was proved above in common—nevertheless is without doubt in some way a property of it, whether in the thing itself or in relation to reason, and either actively or passively taken, as will be explained later. First

we shall speak of the former consideration, which is more proper to our present undertaking.

It is Shown That There is Time

3. First, it is certain that in things there is a real successive duration, which we shall now call under this general notion "continuous time," although by common usage this word seems also to have a special signification, as we shall say. All philosophers suppose this assertion as self-evident; for the common voice and sense of human beings is that there is time in things. To this consent the words of Scripture are favorable (Gen. 1): "Let them be for times, and for days, and for years." Although from these words it is not proved that in the time of which there is speech there and of which human beings commonly speak, or which they use to measure their actions, nothing of convention is included, nonetheless it is proved that there is in things a real successive duration that can be taken up for that office of measuring and which is the foundation of that institution which human reason can effect. The reason for the conclusion is that every entity really existing and remaining in its existence has some real duration proportioned to it, as is clear from what was said in the first section; but among entities there are some successive ones, which exist in such a way that they necessarily remain for some interval in their being, for this is intrinsically annexed to succession; therefore in such things there is a real duration proportioned to them. Just as therefore the being of a successive thing does not endure so that the same thing remains wholly the same during the whole interval of its duration, but so that a part of it comes after a part, so too the duration of such a being does not have a stable permanence but a flowing permanence—if indeed it deserves the name of permanence. Broadly speaking, however, it "remains" or "endures" as long as its flow does not cease or end. The consequence is clear from the general principle set down above, that duration accompanies being, or rather, in reality

is the same with it. Hence the difference between this duration and the others we have discussed is evident: the others have their own permanence in the same being in which they either are of themselves or are conserved by another; this one, however, never remains in the same being in the same respect, but is continuously varied according to new parts, by reason of which it is said to endure as long as some part of it exists or is being made.

Time is Found Only in Motion

4. From this principle it follows that such a duration cannot be anything but in successive and continuous motion, as is openly taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 13, where for this reason he says that time takes its extension from motion; and there is no other extension of time than its continuous succession. Hence in Physics IV he defines time by motion, saying that it is the number of motion according to before and after. In this all agree. The reason is that duration as such at least in the order of reason presupposes the being of which it is the duration, and outside of that it is not found; but in nature there is no successive entity that can be presupposed to a successive duration except motion; therefore this duration can only be motion. The major is evident from the first section; the minor is known by philosophical induction. The reason is that nothing is per se in continuous succession except insofar as it is in becoming (in fieri), whereby it acquires its being not all at once but little by little; therefore continuous succession exists first and per se only in motion. Action and passion must be included under motion; for these too can consist in continuous succession; but because they are not really distinct from motion but only by a mental precision, they are rightly included under motion; and they have succession only insofar as, actively or passively, they pertain to the actual emanation of an effect from its cause. Therefore successive duration is found only in successive continuous motion.

5. You will say: apart from motion there seem to be some things that have their being in continuous succession, such as sound, voice, impetus, and the like; indeed, whenever a thing comes to be through motion there is not only succession in the motion itself, but also in the terminus produced by motion, insofar as it acquires part after part. I answer that qualities are not properly and per se transitory, but dependent on their causes; yet, because sometimes they depend on motion as a cause or at least as a necessary condition for their being, they therefore endure little and pass away with the motion. Hence sound, although for that reason it may be called easily transitory or flowing, nevertheless does not have its being properly consisting in succession; for in reality many parts of it remain together and endure for some time in being. The same is still clearer about impetus. The terminus of motion, although it is produced little by little, nevertheless as to its being remains entire all at once; wherefore, per se and simply speaking, it neither has nor requires intrinsic succession. Therefore continuous succession in being is attributed per se and primarily to motion alone.

How Time is Present in Every Motion

6. From this it follows further that in every continuous motion there is an intrinsic and real successive duration, and consequently, if by the name "time" only such a duration is signified, it follows that there is not one and the same time of all motions, but that it is multiplied according to the number and multitude of motions and also varies according to their diversity. In this sense many philosophers have said that time is not only one but many. St. Augustine concurs with this opinion, Confessions XI, c. 23: "I have heard from some learned man that the motions of the sun and moon and stars are themselves times and years. Why should not the motions of all bodies rather be times? Or indeed, if the lights of the heavens ceased and the potter's wheel were moved, would there not be time?"

And later: "Let no one say to me that the motions of celestial bodies are times; for when, at the prayer of Joshua, the sun stood still that the battle might be completed, the sun stood still, but time went on; for by the span of time sufficient for it that battle was waged and finished." The assertion is proved by the same reason and from the same principles by which we proved a like assertion about the aevum and about the duration of permanent corruptible things: every thing that in its real being has some permanence properly endures in such being, because to endure is nothing other than to remain in being; but motion successively remains in its real being, whatever that be; therefore motions endure. Again, every thing that endures in real being endures by a real and intrinsic duration; therefore each of these things endures by a real duration intrinsic to it; therefore these durations are multiplied according to the multitude of those things that so endure. And from this it is further clear that, according to the variety of continuous motions, there is variety in these durations, for the same reason and proportion.

Various Divisions of Time

7. Time Is Divided into Corporeal and Spiritual. From this arose the primary division of continuous time, which theologians also use: they divide time into material and spiritual. Material time is this physical time that is consumed in bodily motions; spiritual time is that which is found in the spiritual motions of angels. This is not to be understood of motions that proceed effectively from angels; for motions of bodies can also be produced effectively by angels, and in them there is a true transitive action of the moving angel; nevertheless the duration of such motion belongs to material time, because in itself and formally the action and motion are material, even if they look to an immaterial extrinsic cause. It is to be understood of motions that exist in the angels themselves. They too can be moved continuously, if they will, locally by their own motion received in them—as we shall

touch upon in the next disputation—and while they are thus moved they necessarily consume time, because continuous succession cannot be understood without time. Hence, as by that time such motion endures, so it has in itself an intrinsic spiritual and successive duration, which is called immaterial time. This time can also be discerned in a certain successive change of spiritual intensification or increase that can be found in the acts of angelic intellect or will, which, by its freedom, can operate more intensely or more remissly in knowing or loving, and thus can also continuously intensify the same act by continuously applying a greater exertion of its powers through its will. Although this mode of operating is not necessary to an angel, nor perhaps much accommodated to that nature—for he can very easily operate with the whole connatural exertion—nevertheless it does not simply repel and is subject to angelic will, because in these acts he exerts himself no more than he wills.

8. The Same Holds, Proportionally, for the Separated Soul. Indeed, it also holds in the conjoined soul. For although many contend that the operations of the intellect and will of the soul united to the body are measured by material time because of the concomitance and some dependence on phantasms—about which we shall see later—nonetheless no one can reasonably hold that the intrinsic duration of these acts is material time, since the acts themselves are immaterial in themselves and in their being, and their intrinsic duration is not distinct from their being. Therefore that duration is immaterial. Hence, if an act arises suddenly and indivisibly and thus remains, its duration will be an indivisible instant, as it were, an angelic or "permanent" instant; if, however, it happens that the intensification of such an act is effected and increased by continuous succession, its duration will without doubt be immaterial time. And for the same reason, if a habit of the mind or soul is successively and continuously intensified, that spiritual alteration (so to speak) includes an intrinsic spiritual, successive, and continuous duration, which belongs to this spiritual time. And, proportionately, in material

motions—of growth, of alteration, or of place—a proper material time is included. How great the diversity among these durations is can be understood from the diversity of the motions in which they inhere, in proportion to what we have said about the other durations. A certain special difference among the successions of these durations we shall treat below.

SECTIO IX
WHETHER TIME IS DISTINCT IN REALITY FROM MOTION

Time Differs from Motion Only by Reason

1. This question too is easily settled from what has been said. One must say that time is not distinguished from motion according to reality, but only according to reason with a foundation in the thing. The first part is proved from the general principle that duration in reality does not differ from that being of which it is the duration; but time is the duration of motion; therefore in reality it does not differ from motion, but only by reason. Nor can any special reason be given why there should be a greater distinction between motion and its duration than between other things and their durations; indeed, it even more clearly appears that they cannot be distinguished in motion by the nature of the thing. For some stay and permanence in being are altogether inseparable from successive motion; hence, from the mere fact that motion exists in nature—even if we separate from it every thing or mode distinct by nature from it—it necessarily remains in being and consumes some interval; therefore, since time is nothing other than the stay of motion, it cannot be distinguished from it by the nature of the thing. Nor does Aristotle's definition of time disagree with this, that it is "the number of motion according to before and after," that is, that it is the number of the parts of motion succeeding

one another according to before and after; therefore it is those very parts of motion that compose time according to the mode of existence they have in nature, which is only according to the succession of before and after; by this very fact they effect a stay and permanence in the being of motion; therefore time itself is not distinguished in reality from this motion.

2. The second part, that of a distinction of reason, is admitted by all, and has its foundation not only in Aristotle but also in the common way of speaking; for all speak of motion and time as different and do not think those words are synonymous. Hence St. Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 24: "Do you bid me approve, if someone says that time is the motion of a body? You do not bid me; for I hear that no body is moved except in time." And at the end he concludes: "Therefore the motion of a body is not time." It can also be proved by reason: motion formally and precisely signifies a way to a terminus; time, however, signifies the stay or permanence in being that such motion necessarily has; therefore these at least differ by reason.

Principal Difficulty Concerning the Distinction of Motion & Time

3. Against this there is the common and not easy objection touched on above: in the same motion there can be more and less time, and conversely in a motion twice as great there can be equal time; therefore they are distinguished by more than reason. The consequence is proved because any separability in reality is a sure sign of some distinction in the thing itself (as is clear from what was said above, disp. VII). But this is some separability in reality; for, although time cannot be absolutely separated from motion, nonetheless any designated time can be separated, which suffices as a sign of distinction. Thus a body cannot be conserved without any place, but because it can be separated from any designated place, that is a sufficient argument of distinction by nature. That this is so in the

present case is shown by proving the antecedent. If the primum mobile were moved with a velocity twice as great, the complete circulation of the sun would be the same motion as it is now—for it would be the complete passage of the same mobile through an equal space—yet the time of it would not be the same as it is now: now it is the time of a whole day; then it would be only half a day; and thus time in the same motion can be diminished to infinity, just as the same motion can be made infinitely faster. Conversely, if the sun were moved more slowly, it could consume two whole days, say, in one circulation, and then the motion would be equal to what it is now in one day, but the time would be twice as great. Therefore there is in reality something distinct from motion, since an addition or diminution of time is made to the same motion.

First Reply

4. I reply first that it is one thing for there to be more or less real duration in some motion, and another that the motion itself endures more or less according to coexistence with some other, extrinsic time—whether real or merely conceived in imagination. Just as the same permanent duration, which in itself neither really increases nor diminishes, is denominated as enduring more or less by coexistence or comparison with real or imaginary time—and from that no inference can be drawn for a distinction in reality between that duration, whether considered in itself or as greater or smaller, and the being of which it is the duration, because the whole being itself remains with that duration—so, proportionally, one must judge in a successive duration. For in the same motion, for example in a single circulation of the heavens, there is the same real duration, because the real being of such a motion is the same, and consequently the same is its real permanence; although that whole duration, by comparison to extrinsic time or to imaginary succession, could be said to endure more or less according as the passage of that motion is faster or slower.

5. In this way, to the argument I deny that in the same or equal motion there is greater or lesser duration as to its real entity; the argument drawn therefrom, from the speed or slowness of motion, does not prove that, but only that an equal motion can endure more or less—which, however, does not come from its having more or greater parts of duration, but from its having those parts more or less passing (so to speak), or more and less, as it were, compressed and conjoined, which arises from the speed of the motion. I explain: that motion is called equal which has equal parts corresponding to the parts of the space; but there is no part of the motion that does not have a part of duration as distinct from the partial duration of another part as one part of motion is distinct from another. Therefore in that motion there are as many parts of duration as there are parts of motion, and equal as to their entity; therefore, as that motion is always called equal for that reason, so the duration will always be equal as to the entity or reality of the duration. And then, as that motion, although equal, is called slower or faster because of a different mode of passage or extension it has through the space, so that duration, although it is the same or equal in reality, is said to endure more or less because of the greater speed of the motion and the lesser extension of its parts in comparison to imaginary succession.

Second Reply

6. Second, to make this clearer, I reply that a slow and a fast motion through the same space, although they are called equal, nevertheless in reality have some mode of being distinct by nature. For that a motion is fast is some real mode, since that a motion be fast is not defined by reason nor is it an extrinsic denomination but belongs intrinsically to the motion; therefore it is a real mode of it. Hence there is no doubt that a slow motion and a fast motion are distinguished at least as to these diverse modes in reality. It is uncertain, however, whether in a fast motion the motion itself, as to its

substance, is distinct in reality from its speed as from a mode distinct by nature—and similarly a slow motion from its slowness—or whether those two motions are distinguished from each other without a distinction within each between the substance of the motion and the mode of speed or slowness. That is, that a fast motion is not in reality something composed of motion and a mode of motion, but is a simple motion that is by itself thus constituted; and consequently that a slow motion and a fast motion are always distinguished as two motions at least numerically, not as one and the same having diverse modes. It is indeed probable that the matter stands in this latter way, because motion, since it is only a kind of way or dependence, is only a mode of the terminus itself, as was seen above; and therefore it does not seem to be made this way or that by another distinct mode, but because it itself is made otherwise by itself. For as action is made by itself, so a mode is modified by itself; and therefore, as, the relation of action being varied, the action is necessarily varied, so, the mode of the motion itself being varied, the motion is necessarily varied, at least according to number.

7. If we suppose this, we should say consequently that duration or time does not follow upon motion absolutely, but upon motion as it exists in reality: to a motion thus fast in so much space there follows just so much duration or time, and there cannot be any variety in that duration unless there is in the motion itself. Hence it is not rightly inferred that there is a greater distinction between motion and time than between motion absolutely and motion as fast or slow; for the distinction is only as between something indifferent and abstract by reason. Nevertheless, in reality, in a fast or slow motion the notion of motion is not distinguished from that particular motion, and consequently the duration included in each of them is not distinguished from it. And as a fast and a slow motion are distinguished between themselves in reality, so it is no wonder that they also have distinct times or durations, one of which can be said to be greater than the other, not because of greater reality but because of

a different mode of being—just as one motion is said to be faster than another not because of greater reality but because of a different mode of being. And thus it happens that each motion, compared to its own duration, and conversely each time to its motion, does not have a distinction in reality.

8. If someone wishes to defend that in a fast motion (and the same proportionally for a slow one) the motion and its speed are two things distinct by nature which are compared as substance and mode —this too being probable—then, in the same proportion, he could speak about time. Hence, even in this way, if time and motion are compared formally, they will not be found distinct in reality. For as in permanent quantity one distinguishes quantity itself and its density as thing and mode, so, proportionally, speed can be understood in relation to motion; it is, as it were, a certain compression and condensation of its parts. According to this way of speaking, in the same way one can distinguish the duration of the motion and of its parts from the modal duration of its speed. For we said above that in each thing there is its own duration proportioned to it, and in the modes of things there are also, in the way in which they have existence, proper durations. If therefore speed is a mode distinct by nature from motion, it will have its proper duration, distinct in the same way from the duration of motion. Indeed, as speed is a mode of motion itself, so the duration of speed is a mode of the duration of motion; for by it, formally, it comes about that the parts of duration which are in the motion are affected among themselves in that same way and, as it were, more conjoined and compressed, as are the parts of a fast motion.

9. Wherefore, if by the name "time" only the duration of motion is signified, abstracting from the mode, it is clear that time is not more distinguished in reality from motion than in other things duration is distinguished from existence. Likewise it is clear that such a duration in an equal motion is always equal, as that argument proves, because there are as many parts of duration as there are parts of

motion, since there is no part of motion that does not have an intrinsic duration. But if by the name "time" is signified not the duration of motion absolutely, but the duration affected in such and such a way, namely in the way that either consists in speed or according to reason follows from it, then time is not to be compared with motion taken precisely, but with motion as affected also by its mode, i.e., as fast or as slow, since the duration itself has such a mode only from such a mode of the motion. In this way, if the comparison is made, it is also manifest that time and motion are not distinguished in reality nor are they unequal. If anyone contends that by the name "time" there is only signified either the speed itself or the slowness of motion, or the duration affected in that way, and therefore that it is distinguished by nature from motion taken in itself, he will be making a question only about a word and will not be speaking according to the usual manner; for no one has ever called the speed of motion the duration of motion or time; and, moreover, just as a motion is called fast or slow, so the time of the same motion is called long or short. There is, therefore, as to these matters the same ratio and proportion between motion and time, if the comparison is made with a suitable proportion.

Second Difficulty Concerning the Reproduction of the Same Time

10. But a second objection immediately occurs. God cannot reproduce the same numerical time; yet he can reproduce the same numerical motion; therefore motion and time are distinguished by more than reason. The consequence is clear from the principle set above. The minor we conceded above, because there is no greater contradiction in reiterating the same numerical action than in reproducing the same numerical terminus, nor is there greater repugnance in reiterating the same numerical successive action than an instantaneous one. The major is also proved from the common axiom that there is no power over the past; the time, therefore, that

once was cannot not-have-been; therefore it cannot be present again, because these two repugn. It is confirmed: it is impossible that God make that a day past and a day present be one and the same day; therefore he cannot make yesterday's past day be again today; otherwise yesterday and today would be only one day.

The First Reply is Rejected

11. Because of this difficulty some say that it involves a contradiction that the same numerical motion which has preceded should again be made by divine power, just as it is a contradiction that the same numerical time should occur again; for one follows from the other, not only on account of identity but also because, as Aristotle testifies in Physics V, numerical unity of motion is taken, among other things, from the unity of time.

12. Nevertheless, as I noted elsewhere, I have seen no sufficient reason why it should be denied that God can reproduce the same numerical motion which has preceded. For He can place the same indivisible action twice in nature; since, just as He can conserve it continuously for an hour, so too He can interrupt it and again place it in nature; therefore He can also place the same successive action twice in nature, if otherwise it is made about the same terminus and through the same space; for no sufficient reason of difference can be assigned. This is further made clear: if God annihilates a body existing in this place, He can produce it with the same numerical ubi; for what is the greater repugnance in reproducing that body with the same numerical whiteness or other accidents? I presuppose that He reproduces it by filling the same imaginary space in which it previously was. If, therefore, God can in the same body reproduce the same numerical ubi, He can also reproduce the same numerical motion tending to the same ubi through the same space. Add that in a motion of alteration it can naturally occur that the action of intensification that is made successively nevertheless remains all at

once by conserving the terminus produced, as is clear in illumination and as was explained above; therefore much less could not God by supernatural power reproduce that action, even if it has already passed, either with a like succession or all at once, according to His will.

13. Finally, the argument taken from the unity of time either proves nothing or begs the question. For when it is said that motion has numerical unity from the unity of time, either this is understood of extrinsic time, in which motion is made as in an extrinsic measure—of which Aristotle spoke most notably—or it is understood of intrinsic time, of which we are now speaking. In the former sense, even if we admit that the unity of that time is a necessary condition for the unity of motion as it is produced by a natural agent, nevertheless with respect to divine power there is no such dependence; for intrinsic individuation of motion is not taken from that extrinsic time, which at most can be an extrinsic condition, on which the infinite power of God does not depend, since it is above all time. If the discourse is of intrinsic time, the principle is begged; for the same controversy stands about such time as about motion itself; and in rigor it is false that a motion is individuated by this time, because, insofar as they are the same, one is not individuated by the other; but, insofar as they are distinguished by reason, rather time is individuated by motion, in which it is judged to be in its own way as in its proximate subject.

True Reply

14. The Same Numerical Time Can Be Reproduced by God. How "There Is No Power Over the Past" Is to Be Understood. I grant, therefore, that God can reproduce the same numerical motion successively, and consequently I also grant that He can reproduce the same numerical time that has passed, both because of their identity and also by parity of reason. Nor is this opposed by the principle, "there is no power over the past." For, although God reproduces the past time, He does not make that what has been should not have been

—in which sense that axiom is advanced—but He would make that what once was should be again, which is not contrary to that axiom; indeed this very thing occurs in the reproduction of a permanent thing. Nor does it repugn that time already past should now be present, in the way in which time can be present by reason of the instant; the same instant that has passed can now be present and continue the same parts. But here we must beware of an equivocation and a sophistical deception; for "past time" says two things, namely, the time itself and pastness, which is constituted by the negation of existence of what once was. When, therefore, it is said that past time is again made present, we must not imagine that that time, as it were, goes back and ceases to be under the prior negation of having passed and becomes present; for that involves a repugnance, as was said. Rather, the same time which once was and thus always remains past is again constituted in nature and thus becomes present. As to the statement that yesterday and today must of necessity be two days, I say that naturally it is true; supernaturally, however, I say it can be one and the same day repeated twice. For just as a foot-length of quantity cannot naturally be made equal in place to a two-foot quantity, yet supernaturally it can if it is placed twice in the place—as I have treated more broadly elsewhere—so too the same numerical motion cannot naturally fill a double duration; but if it is repeated twice in nature, this can occur without repugnance.

15. To understand this better, we must distinguish between that successive imaginary interval or space which we conceive mentally as necessarily flowing from eternity and the real duration of motion which is called true and real time. This real duration can be considered in two ways: first, absolutely according to its own reality; second, as coexisting with and, as it were, filling some part of that imaginary succession with which it is conceived to coexist. For just as in bodies we conceive a certain permanent space of which any body existing in a place fills some part, so in the succession of times we conceive a certain flowing and successive space of which any motion

really flowing fills some part. If motion had been from eternity, it would be understood as filling that whole space and coexisting with it. Therefore, if the real duration of motion is apprehended as coexisting with that part of the imaginary succession which has passed, and is called "past time" under that connotation, it is impossible that it be produced again under that connotation and concept of reason—not indeed because of itself, but because of the other extreme. The reason is that this imaginary flowing space is conceived as altogether necessary and immutable in its flow; and therefore the part of it that is conceived as once past cannot be conceived as repeated; for that space, since it is conceived as altogether necessary and not caused, must also be conceived as having an intrinsic necessity in the flow and order of its parts, and hence what has once passed cannot be conceived as returning. From this it follows that the part of real time which once coexisted with the part of that imaginary succession that is past cannot coexist with it again. Therefore past time, under this concept of coexisting with or filling such a part of successive imaginary space, cannot return.

16. But the very real duration of the past motion—which was also past time—can be made again as coexisting with another part of that imaginary succession. And because duration, as coexisting with a greater or lesser part of that imaginary succession, is conceived by us as greater or lesser, even if in itself it is not really greater or lesser (as is clearly evident in indivisible durations), therefore the same duration of the same motion, if it is extended twice or is conceived as being extended through two parts of that imaginary succession, is also conceived as a greater duration or as equivalent to two, say, or three days, even if in itself it is not really greater or distinct according to parts, but the same again. Nor do I find any greater repugnance in successive durations than in permanent ones as to this. Indeed, whenever we speak of past time as irrecoverable, as something that cannot return again, either we apprehend that continuous imaginary succession as altogether necessary and immutable, or, if at the same

time we conceive some real duration or circulation of the heavens, we apprehend it as existing in such a part of that successive interval as cannot have been before or be again afterwards. In this way St. Augustine seems to have spoken in the cited c. 23 of Confessions XI. For when he had said that with the motion of the heavens ceasing, Joshua's battle was fought by its own span of time which sufficed for it, he concludes: "I see, therefore, that time is a kind of distension." And St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, c. 1, makes mention of that imaginary succession, which he calls "as it were a temporal motion," and space "which," he says, "is stretched out along with eternal things," whence it is also stretched out along with real time. And St. Gregory Nazianzen also mentions such a space (Oration 35, near the beginning, and 38, about the middle), which he calls an aevum because it is conceived as perpetual.

17. The Objection Is Answered. But someone will finally say: A body cannot, with the same numerical ubi, be present, that is, fill two different parts of imaginary local space; for from the very fact that we understand the body to change its relation to local space, we understand its ubi to be changed; and if the same body were posited in two places and consequently in two parts of imaginary space, it would necessarily have two distinct ubi. I presuppose all this from what will be said in the next disputation. Therefore, in a similar manner, the same motion cannot, by the same numerical duration, be present to different parts of successive imaginary interval; therefore, from the very fact that a motion is understood to exist as coexisting with different parts of that succession, it is understood as having distinct durations.

18. I answer by denying the consequence, and the reason for this is already clear from what was said above about permanent duration. For local space is conceived as permanent and immutable, and therefore a body is not understood to be present to different parts of it except by a change in itself and consequently by the acquisition of some place or mode of being. But temporal space is apprehended and

conceived as passing and successive; therefore, in order that the same motion be understood as coexisting with different parts of that imaginary succession, it is not necessary that it should have distinct real modes or durations in itself, but only that it be made again and again; it happens to it that it coexist to this or that part of imaginary succession. Hence, on no side does it repugn that the same successive motion be reproduced; nor does it repugn more to time if it is considered according to itself and really. That it repugn to it when conceived as coexisting with such a part of imaginary succession adds only a certain denomination of our reason. Whence it is not lawful to infer from this a distinction in reality between time and motion, since the whole of that is the work of reason; and the same can be said of motion if it is conceived and named as coexisting in the same way.

Third Difficulty Concerning the Nature of a Successive Entity

19. A third, more obscure objection remains concerning this successive duration: it seems impossible that such a mode of duration exist in nature, because the parts of it, of which it is said to be composed, never have a real being, since they are only either past or future. But what are past no longer are, and what are future are not yet; therefore the parts of time never are. For there are no parts present, because none exist together; but what is present is only the indivisible instant, lacking all parts and all extension; otherwise either as to those parts the duration would not be successive, or already in that extension some parts would be past, some future. Therefore the parts of time are never existing parts; therefore neither are they real parts; therefore such a duration is not real. From this there arises another difficulty, namely, that it cannot be understood how parts of time can be past that were never present; by what way (so to speak) did they pass? And for the same reason no parts will be future; for "future" is said in relation to "present," since what will be present is called future.

Reply

20. Do Successive Things Exist Only by Reason of One Moment? This difficulty is the same for successive motion insofar as it is such; for in it too no part is wholly present all at once, otherwise it would not be successive in itself as a whole. Thus, although this difficulty is obscure in itself, nevertheless, as it pertains to the present point, it rather confirms the identity of time with motion; for from it arises that time has the same mode of existence or of composition of parts as successive motion has. I answer, therefore, that duration is proportioned to the thing that endures. Because time is the duration of motion, it has a successive and transitory existence, as motion itself does. To the stated difficulty the common reply for motion and time is that successive things never exist in act except by reason of one moment; and that this suffices for their parts to be said to exist and to be present, because they are coupled to one present instant; or to be past because, by reason of some past instant, they were once present; or to be future for a proportional reason. Thus Seneca, Naturales quaestiones VI, near the end: "Time flows and forsakes even those most greedy for it; nor is what will be mine, nor what has been. I hang upon the point of fleeting time." And St. Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 15: "If any time is understood which can be divided into no parts or only into the smallest moments, that alone is said to be present, which nevertheless so rapidly flies from future to past that it is extended by no little space; for if it is extended, it is divided into past and future; but the present has no space."

21. Hence some affirm that time is nothing other than a flowing instant; which is not to be understood as if there were truly and really in time such a flowing instant—both because real flow and succession repugn to the true notion of an instant, and because from the very fact that an instant is understood to flow, it is understood to pass and perish and other instants to come. But just as mathematicians

describe a line by the flow of a point—although there is no point truly flowing, but one is imagined to explain the dimension of the line—so the succession of time is explained after the manner of a flowing instant, in order that it be understood that in time nothing ever exists all at once, except the instant through whose "flow" the succession of time is explained.

22. The Author's Meaning. Although in the flow of time nothing ever exists all at once except the instant, we must not therefore think that time consists only in the succession of instants such that, one passing, another immediately succeeds, and after that another, and so on. If this were true, the stated difficulty would indeed be more clearly set aside; for if the parts of time were only instants or composed of instants, it would be easy to understand that those parts pass by means of instants that are present and follow one another. But that cannot be true in any way; for time cannot be constituted from indivisibles any more than motion can; nor can motion more than magnitude or the breadth of space, from which it has extension; these keep proportion among themselves. But it is established that magnitude cannot arise from indivisibles, as was touched on above and is proved more at large in the Physics. Therefore, time exists with instants mediating in such a way that its indivisible parts truly and really flow, and after every instant a part follows, and in every part there are instants, and between every pair of instants there is a flowing part. Wherefore, as Durandus rightly noted (In II, dist. 2, q. 4, n. 14), it is not to be understood that time is said to exist by an instant so that its parts have no real existence except the existence of the instant; otherwise nothing would be real in time except the instant. Therefore time is said to exist by the instant as regards that which is conceived in it as existing all at once; thus it is true that time is denominated as existing from the present instant. Nonetheless, adequately and intrinsically, time exists by its parts that exist—not indeed together, but successively or in their passage, which is the mode of existence of such things. Hence such parts are not said to be real precisely insofar

as they are past (which now are not), nor only insofar as they are future (which are not yet), but insofar as they are passing. In this way St. Augustine said (City of God XI, c. 26)[1]: "I measure time, I know; but I do not measure the future, because it is not yet; I do not measure the present (i.e., the instant), because it is extended by no space; I do not measure the past, because it is no longer. What then do I measure? Perhaps passing times, not past ones?" Nor does it matter that the parts of time, while passing, are not yet fully made; it is enough that they are actually being made, because the being of successive things is to be being-made, as Averroes rightly said (Physics III, comm. 57), and St. Thomas, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2. This reply is common and true; to expound it more fully belongs to the philosophers in Physics III and IV, who also treat more expressly in VI about the nature of successive entities and the manner of their composition.

23. According to this doctrine, one must reply formally to the stated difficulty: first, that a successive entity, in order to be, insofar as it is a positive entity, is not composed of parts which are not insofar as they are not, but insofar as they really are being made and are passing. Conversely, insofar as those parts are considered either as now not existing or as not yet made, the successive entity which is composed of them is not altogether a positive entity but includes some negation in its concept—namely, that it is not all at once, and especially that something of it remains to be effected.

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[1] Augustinus: Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio. Fidenter tamen dico scire me quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. Duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? Praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. Si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit? Ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse?

24. Second, we say that this negation is per se and formally more required on the side of the future than on that of the past. Thus, in a successive entity, it is per se that each of its parts be made after another, so that we cannot assign any which is made all at once, but whatever part is designated, another prior part has been made. In this way Aristotle defined time as the number of motion according to before and after. From this order of parts it follows intrinsically that, as long as a thing endures successively, something remains to be effected; for if nothing remained, the whole succession would already be finished. But that which remains to be effected intrinsically includes not having been made, and consequently not yet being; thus this negation is intrinsically necessary on the side of the future. On the side of the past, however, it is per se necessary only that before any designated part some prior part preceded or was made; that the part which preceded now is not—this is not so intrinsically included in the notion of succession. For although we feign that the whole action which is gradually made remains in being according to all the parts gradually made, there would nonetheless have been a true succession in the action itself. The reason is that, for any part to be prior, it is enough that it was made earlier, even if it did not immediately pass away and cease to be. Therefore, this negation of existing is not so intrinsically included or required in the part already made, which is called past, as in the future part. Hence also, in the previous disputation, we said that in the intensification of qualities there is a successive change in the very first production of the intensification (so to speak), which by the mode of conservation can afterwards all remain together; because the parts of that action which are successively made do not always pass away as to their real being, but can sometimes remain by a mode of conservation. If this is true, it is very well declared from it that the parts of a real succession, even though they are successively made, nonetheless have true and real existence, since according to that they can sometimes remain together if it be necessary or if no repugnance arises from elsewhere.

25. You will say that it follows from this that the parts of time, although successively made, could, as they are made, not immediately pass away but remain—which is unheard of; for it is as if one said that the whole past time could now be together. I reply, denying the consequence, formally speaking about time as time; for formally it consists in the before and after as such, which are numbered or can be numbered in motion, as is clear from Aristotle's definition. Hence, from the very fact that the ratio of before or after ceases or passes away, the ratio of time ceases. Nonetheless, if it is true that the parts of the same action made successively can be conserved together, it is also true that the real duration of those parts which was made successively can all remain together; but while it so remains, it no longer has the ratio of time, but of a single instant—just as that action or change no longer has the ratio of successive motion, but of instantaneous action or conservation. Thus proportion is always kept between motion and time, and their identity according to reality is more clearly declared.

26. Finally, as to the last part of the proposed difficulty, one must say that the flow of time and of any successive thing occurs through the present and the past. What is called "present," if it is understood as whole all at once, is only the instant. Yet because after every instant a part immediately comes to be, that too can be called present—not because it is whole all at once, but because it is that which is actually and immediately being made. However, just as no determinate part is immediately adjacent to the instant as a whole, so there is none which after the instant is wholly present, if "present" is taken definitely; for before any designated part there is another, because that presence is not simultaneous but successive. Such is the nature and composition of a successive thing, which we cannot further declare.

SECTIO X
WHETHER THE NOTION OF MEASURE OF DURATION PROPERLY BELONGS TO SOME TIME, AND WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THINGS

1. Up to this point we have discussed duration in general and in particular, according to the absolute notion and essence of duration, and at the same time we have shown that it does not consist in the notion of measure. Since, however, this notion of measure can be added to duration, and the notion of duration is often named and explained according to it, we must also clarify that. We must distinguish passive from active measure, as we did when treating quantity. We must also distinguish a measure of perfection from a quantitative measure, that is, a measure after the manner of quantity. Here we are not dealing with the first; for, as we have often said, that mode of measure has nothing peculiar to durations but is common to all genera, inasmuch as what is first in each genus can in this way be the measure of the others, as was noted around METAPHYSICS X, c. 2. We are therefore dealing with the measure of duration, insofar as it can measure in a quantitative way or after the manner of quantity.

First Assertion

2. As regards passive measure, it is certain that temporal duration is measurable in its being. For whatever is in some way quantitative or extended is measurable; but successive duration is in its own way quantitative and extended, at least per accidens, which is sufficient for it to be measurable under that aspect, as is clear from what we said above concerning quantity. This is also evident from usage itself; nothing is more frequent than that we measure our actions by time; and what we measure in them most of all are their

durations. Therefore all such durations are by themselves measurable; for the same reasoning applies to all similar cases. Whether the same holds for permanent or indivisible durations will be discussed below. First we must inquire by what measure such durations are to be measured.

Second Assertion

3. Time is not the measure of the motion of which it is the duration. On this point it is also certain for us that no successive duration is the measure of that motion of which it is the duration, but that, in the way in which successive duration is measurable, it must be measured by another distinct duration. This has often been proved above, because nothing is a measure of itself, especially when we speak of a real measure. Moreover, measure is taken as a means for knowing that which is measured; but we do not know how long an action lasts by means of its own proper, intrinsic duration, but by comparing it with another distinct duration whose quantity is better known to us. If we were to know an action by its very own duration in such a way that we could immediately judge it without another medium, we would not use that duration as a measure, but we would know the action immediately and through itself.

4. Nor does the instance help which some object concerning the time that is in the motion of the primum mobile, which is said to be the intrinsic measure of that same motion, because it has no higher extrinsic measure by which it could be measured. The reply is to deny the assumption when speaking strictly and adequately of an intrinsic measure; at most we can measure the whole by a repeated part of that motion, as by the hour, the day, and by the day the year, and so on. In this mode of measuring there is already a measure in some way distinct in reality from what is measured; nevertheless, we cannot measure the whole by itself, nor even a designated part, however minimal, by itself; rather we must either suppose that part as known

through itself without measure, or we must use another extrinsic duration to attain sure knowledge of it—even if that measure is inferior in perfection; for that matters little, provided it is better known and suitably proportioned for the use of measuring, as we shall also show below.

Third Assertion

5. Successive duration is not connatural to a permanent measure. Furthermore, it is certain that successive duration is not by its nature measurable by a permanent duration. This is also sufficiently clear from usage. And it can be proved in reason from the axiom that the measure must be homogeneous with what is measured. Permanent and successive measures are not homogeneous. One might reply that it is not necessary that measure and measured belong to the same proximate genus; it is enough if they agree in a remote genus; indeed at times an analogous agreement suffices, for the first being is said to be the measure of all others. If you say that this is true in the measure of perfection—because in that case a less proper mode of measuring is found—whereas in quantitative things that are measured a closer and generic proximity is always required (for we measure weight by weight, length by length, and so forth), there is an obvious counter-instance in motions themselves. Not all motions agree in the same proximate genus, and yet all can be measured by the duration of the same local motion. Therefore it is not necessary that the measure and the measured agree in the same proximate genus. Yet in a remote genus permanent and successive duration do also agree; therefore from that standpoint it is not repugnant that successive duration be measured by a permanent one.

6. Nevertheless, it could still be held, with some probability, that in quantitative measures a proximate generic agreement between the measure and the measured is required, as induction seems to show in permanent quantities. And in answer to the instance about

successives, one might say that although motions differ as motions, their durations are of the same notion, or at least of the same genus. But although this could be defended plausibly, it is not necessary to restrict the force of the argument to that principle. When one says that the measure must be homogeneous with the measured, this need not be understood of the proximate genus, nor of the remote, indeed not even of the proper genus; rather it concerns such a likeness as suffices for the due proportion between measure and measured that is necessary. But this proportion cannot be the same in all measures or in all things; nor can one and the same rule be assigned for all cases; rather this must be judged according to the diversity of the things and of the measures. For in some measures of perfection an analogous agreement suffices; in some quantitative measures one requires not only a generic but even a specific agreement—for a line or length can be measured only by a line or length.

7. In the present case, therefore, the difference between permanent and successive duration is so great that it leaves no proportion necessary for a permanent duration to be the measure of a successive one. I explain thus: a quantitative measure has proportion for measuring only through a certain adequation or coextension of the measure and the measurable; but permanent duration is not coextensive with successive duration; hence, in itself, it can be neither adequate nor inadequate to it; therefore it has no proportion to it so as to be its measure. And this is confirmed: the indivisible, as such, is not apt for measuring the quantity of a divisible thing; but permanent duration under that aspect is indivisible, whereas successive duration is divisible; therefore the former cannot be the proportionate measure of the latter. You will say: one of the conditions of a measure is often given to be that it be indivisible. I reply: with respect to discrete quantity a measure can indeed be assumed insofar as it is indivisible; thus we measure number by the unit, for a number is composed of units insofar as under that aspect they are indivisible. With respect to continuous quantity, however, although the measure must be

indivisible—that is, consist in an indivisible—nevertheless it cannot be a measure as an indivisible in that order, but only insofar as it has magnitude or extension; otherwise it cannot be proportionate, so as to equal the extension of the thing measured either by itself or by repetition. In this way, therefore, permanent duration is disproportionate to be the measure of successive duration; therefore successive duration can be measured only by another successive duration which is assumed as its extrinsic measure.

Fourth Assertion

8. From this it must further be said that by nature there is no motion or successive duration that is the measure of other motions, but that this depends on human choice and capacity. Nevertheless, there is a motion in the order of things that is of itself more apt to be assigned to the task of measuring actions and successive durations—namely, the motion of the heavens—in which the very foundation or capacity by which it is assumed into measure is some real property; the institution and fitting so that it might have the proximate notion of measure is, however, only a denomination of reason. All this will be easy to explain and recommend if we keep before our eyes what was said about the notion of measure in DISPUTATION XLIII, sect. 3, where we also set down the conditions necessary for this extrinsic measure—namely, that it be known, certain and invariable, and proportioned to what is measured. These conditions are presupposed in the thing itself so that it may be apt, as it were remotely and fundamentally, for the office of measuring. But in order that it now have a proximate aptitude for measuring, a human convention is necessary, by which it is proposed in a certain and fixed quantity and reduced also to some minimal term, so that it may be apt for measuring in a human manner; for in great quantity deception more easily occurs, and it cannot so conveniently be applied to all measurables, even the smallest.

9. Thus, speaking of a measure that is proximely apt, it is clear that no motion is by its nature a measure of others, because none contains the partition and designation necessary for measuring; this always depends on reason and human decision. But speaking of the foundation that can exist in reality for this kind of measure, it is also clear that this is found especially in the motion of the heavens. For that motion is most well known by reason of the stars, especially the sun and the moon; it is also most certain and most regular; and inasmuch as it is the swiftest, it is also in a certain way the briefest; therefore it is of itself the most apt to be assumed for measuring other motions or their durations. This truth accords with Sacred Scripture, which reports that God said in the creation of the universe: "Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, and let them be for signs and for seasons (times), and for days, and years." Plato seems to have alluded to this in the TIMAEUS when he said that time is the revolution of the heavenly world. Many other ancient philosophers felt the same, as Simplicius reports on PHYSICS IV, and Albert the Great there as well, Treatise III. And to the same effect comes Aristotle's definition of time as "the number of motion according to before and after"; for he speaks of time as the extrinsic and common measure of durations, and as it has been destined by human reason and institution to the office of measuring; and he places it in the motion of the heavens, and as it were by antonomasia he understands this motion by the name "motion" in the aforesaid definition, as is clear from the tenor of those chapters.

10. It is also clear that this motion has the nature of time and measure only insofar as the parts of "before" and "after" in succession and duration are counted in it. Those parts are called "number," not according to the proper notion of discrete quantity, but insofar as number can be found in parts of a continuum; which number, as number, is not actually in the thing, but only potentially; and by an operation of the soul it is in a way completed or counted. Hence Aristotle signified by that clause that this time, in the notion of

measure, is in some way completed by the operation of the mind; for by that numbering and quasi-division by the mind it is reduced to a definite quantity by which it can exercise the function of measure, either by application or by repetition. This is what the Philosopher more expressly taught in the same place, c. 14, text 131: that time depends on the soul. St. Augustine taught the same in Confessions XI, c. 28; and it is the common view.

How There Is a Single Time, & a Direct Resolution of the Question

11. Hence, finally, that we may answer the proposed question directly, it is concluded that there is a single time in the universe which has the proper notion of extrinsic measure, and that it exists in the motion of the heavens. This is the opinion of Aristotle in PHYSICS IV, and philosophers and theologians interpret and follow him thus. Among them the following distinction is frequent: time is taken in two ways. In one way absolutely, as the intrinsic duration of a motion; and thus times are multiplied as motions are, as said above. In another way it is taken as the extrinsic and common measure of other motions —existing in part by nature fundamentally or inchoatively (so to speak), and in part divided by reason and made suitable for measuring —and in this way there is only one time, and it is in the motion of the heavens. This is gathered from St. Thomas, In II Sentences, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2 and 3, and in Quodlibet 48, ch. "De Quando," although elsewhere he says simply and without any distinction that there is only one time, as is clear from Opusc. 36, c. 2, and Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, a. 6, and q. 66, a. 4, ad 3; though from this last place the aforementioned distinction and doctrine can also be drawn. Cajetan has the same, I, q. 10, a. 6, where he explains St. Thomas thus; and Capreolus, In II Sentences, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 3; and Jandun on PHYSICS IV, q. 23, and there the same in q. 28. That distinction was handed on by Alexander of Hales, Summa, II part, q. 9, mem. 9; and St.

Bonaventure, In I Sentences, dist. 3, in 2a pars, near the Master's text, n. 33; and Thomas of Argentina, In IV Sentences, dist. 48, a. 4, q. un. The reason for this is clear from what has been said, because only in that motion are found all the conditions required for this sort of measure. Usage itself sufficiently confirms it; for whenever we wish to judge the duration of some action or inferior motion, we compare it with the motion of the heavens so that we can know it.

12. Nor does it matter that sometimes we use other lower motions in the role of extrinsic measure of other actions, as the motion of a clock; for we also assume those motions as themselves measured by the motion of the heavens, and thus they measure only as it were in virtue of it and insofar as they make its duration known; and besides, of themselves they are imperfect and (so to speak) inconstant measures, because of the easy variability and irregularity of those motions. For the same reason it does not matter that sometimes we also seem to use lower motions to measure the duration of the motion of the heavens itself; for in truth we do not use them as measures, but as signs more accessible to us, by which we learn how great a part of the celestial motion has elapsed, so that we can use that as a measure of our actions.

SECTIO XI

WHICH THINGS, AND WHAT IN THOSE THINGS, THIS TIME MEASURES

1. First of all, it is certain that all physical and bodily motions are measured by this time, or are measurable by it. It should always be so taken, to avoid all difficulty.

2. Second, it must be added that time measures in these motions, first and per se, their span and duration. This is self-evident from experience, and also evident in reason, because the measure must be homogeneous; hence it measures what is measured insofar as

it has the condition of the same kind. Consequently it measures the swiftness or slowness of a motion, along with the quantity of the space; for swiftness is known by comparison to both quantities, since the swifter motion is the one that traverses equal space in less time, or greater space in equal time. Finally, it also measures, consequently, the uniformity or difformity of motion, for this arises from the equal or unequal swiftness of the parts of the motion. Some also add that it measures the perfection of a motion; but, as I have already said, that mode of measure does not pertain to the present topic. All the more because under that aspect time, as time, does not measure a motion; rather one motion, as a more perfect motion, is the measure of another. And in that order it is not clear that the motion of the heavens, as to the essential perfection it has in the notion of motion, is more perfect than all others, although in those conditions which are required for the measure of duration it surpasses them; about which we spoke above.

3. You will say: how can time measure motions, since it is not better known than they are? I reply that a twofold comparison can be made here. One is of the celestial motion to other motions; the other is of time as such to motion under the aspect of being better or less known. In the first way some say that, although celestial motion is less known to us, it is by its nature better known, and that this is enough for its duration to be assumed as a measure. But this is not well said: both because that measure is not such that God or angels should use it, but men; and the measure ought to be more known to those for whose use it is instituted; otherwise how will it serve them so that by it they may know other things that are to be measured? And also because, if that motion is not better known to us, to whom is it said to be by nature better known? For it is not simply nobler in the genus of being, nor do other motions essentially and per se depend on it; hence to angels our local motion, or the motion of growth or of alteration, is just as well known. Therefore it must be said that that motion is more known to us to the extent necessary for the notion of measure; for

although perhaps as to its efficient cause and the like it is less known to us, and although it is not perceived to the senses as vividly as lower motions, nevertheless as to its existence, its uniformity and its perpetuity it is simply and generally the most known with respect to all men, at least through the heavenly bodies which are set as signs of that motion.

4. As to the other comparison, some doubt that time is less known than motion, and thus seems unsuitable as a measure of motion. The antecedent appears true because motion is manifest to the senses by itself, whereas time is most difficult to know. I respond that, if these two are compared in general and proportionately, neither is more known than the other; for as to the "that it is," it is equally known that there is time and that there is motion, because it is equally evident that a motion endures while it occurs, that is, that it consumes some span, and that a motion exists or occurs; now time, speaking in general, is the very duration of motion. If they are compared as to the "what it is," they are explained with equal obscurity in each. Finally, if they are compared under the aspect of measure and measured, just as time measures insofar as it is a certain duration, so too that which is measured in motion by it is the duration of motion; therefore as to this the ratio is equal. The comparison, therefore, ought not to be made between time and motion, but between one motion and others, and between the duration of one and the durations of others; and in this way the notion of time is most properly constituted, and the difference or superiority is that that duration is assumed into measure and receives the complete notion and denomination of time which is in the motion that, by comparison with other motions, is more known and otherwise has the conditions required for measuring, as we explained.

5. Which among the celestial motions is the measure of the others? Someone will ask: granted that this is true in comparing the motion of the heavens to lower motions, what must be said when we compare the celestial motions among themselves? I reply: absolutely

speaking, the motions of the lower celestial spheres also are measured by the motion of the primum mobile, and thus in that motion—simply speaking—there is time as having the role of the first and most universal measure; although from the proper motions of the sun and of the moon it receives, in our manner of conceiving and speaking, the division and denomination of years and months. For just as the complete revolution of the primum mobile is called a day, so the complete revolution of the sun's own sphere is called a year, and its twelfth part is called a month, and likewise the complete revolution of the moon's sphere according to its proper motion is called a lunar month; but each revolution, both that of the sun and that of the moon, is measured by the number of days; and thus, simply speaking, the motion of the primum mobile is the measure of all bodily motions that unfold beneath it.

By What Time Spiritual Motions are Measured

6. Someone may ask again whether this celestial time is also the measure of other successive actions that are not physical motions. Here we are speaking only of continuous succession, as in an angel's spiritual motion, whether local or of intensification, supposing that it can occur in spiritual acts. In this sense the common opinion in the school of St. Thomas is that these spiritual motions are not measured by this time, but that another time must be established in the highest angel, for example, which is the measure of such motions. Thus St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 5, and q. 58, a. 3, where Cajetan and other recent authors hold the same; and Capreolus, Henry, and others cited above. Yet the following consideration tells against this view. There is no spiritual motion in angels into whose duration that notion of time could enter; for for this notion of measure it does not suffice that the duration or motion be in the most noble movable; it is much more necessary that the motion be regular, uniform, and also always in act and perpetual, so that it can always

serve for measuring. But no angelic motion is of this sort; since it is voluntary and entirely free, it neither always endures nor occurs in a regular and uniform way. I know that it can be replied that even if such a regular motion actually existing is not given, nevertheless it can be given and therefore conceived; and that this is enough for the notion of measure, since a measure exercises its function only insofar as it exists in the mind. But this reply is not convincing: both because the argument shows that such a regular and perennial motion is not only not actual but is not connatural to spiritual substances; and because such a conception of a merely possible motion is irrelevant to angelic cognition and is of itself more difficult than the cognition of any existing motion; and finally because otherwise, by the same reasoning, one could say that not a time or aevum existing in a created angel, but as conceived to be in another more perfect possible being, is the measure.

7. Therefore, if we speak with respect to us, it is clear that every such spiritual motion is disproportionate for us so as to be a time by which we can measure spiritual actions, because it is unknown to us. True, spiritual actions themselves as such are unknown to us, and thus they are not measurable by us, and therefore we do not need any time that is a measure of them. However, insofar as those actions can be known by us in some way—namely, if they have some conjunction with material actions—then they can be measured only by this celestial time; and thus we measure our own acts of intellect and will by this time. If, however, we speak with respect to the angels themselves, they surely need no measure to know the duration of their actions, because to them any duration is as well known through itself as it can be by comparison with another, as we shall explain a little below. If, however, they wish, they can, at their good pleasure, use such comparisons and know that the motion of an inferior angel lasted as long as that of a superior; but that would not be so much to know one by another as by a measure as to know their equality or inequality in duration; in the same way an angel can also know how long his own

motion lasts by comparison to the motion of the heavens. Indeed, not only an angel, but also God, although He neither needs nor can use an extrinsic measure to know the duration of any motion, nevertheless cannot know the coexistence of one with another and their equality or inequality in enduring unless He knows both at once and compares them with one another, because correlatives are known together.

Whether Discrete Succession Can be Measured by Time

8. Again one can ask whether celestial time is the measure of discrete motion or succession. On this all agree in the negative. Thomists, who speak chiefly of this discrete succession in angels, also assign another discrete time which is the extrinsic measure of all similar lower motions. In this discrete succession, however, two things can be considered: one is the span of each instant and consequently the span of all the instants taken together and immediately succeeding one another; the other is the number or multitude of such instants. The former consideration is per accidens to the notion of discrete succession as such; for per se it pertains only to the plurality of units under the aspect of indivisibles, which is the notion of discrete quantity; that those units have longer or shorter duration is accidental. Thus in a triad of stones, for example, it is accidental to the notion of the triad that those stones be of large or small quantity, and that, placed next to one another, they make a larger or smaller bulk. The same, proportionally, applies to a discrete succession or composition of instants. Wherefore that duration and permanence of individual instants, and consequently of the whole "time" as an aggregate of them, either is not measurable because of the indivisibility of the individual instants, or must be measured by continuous time, in the way we shall immediately say concerning the aevum.

9. As to the second, that is, the number of instants, it is clear that discrete motion as such cannot be measured by any continuous time, whether bodily or spiritual, because neither from the length of

continuous time nor from the coexistence of the discrete motion in any given continuous time can it be known how many instants there were in such a discrete motion during a day or an hour, for example, of continuous motion; for in any part of continuous motion there can be a discrete motion consisting of more or fewer instants without any fixed bound.

10. And for the same reason I do not see how discrete motion can be measured by an extrinsic discrete time existing in a higher motion; for it cannot be measured as to the permanence of instants, since this is per accidens, as I said, and it is not fixed and certain in any of these times or instants. Nor can it be measured as to the number of instants, for no fixed number of instants corresponds in one motion by comparison with another; while in a superior angel there is a discrete succession consisting of three instants, in an inferior there may be another consisting of ten or more instants, and conversely. Therefore the number of instants in one motion cannot be measured by the extrinsic time of another motion. An extrinsic measure is not therefore necessary with respect to discrete succession, as such; rather it is to be measured by the repeated unit, just as every number is measurable by the unit; for if sometimes one number is measured by another, this is only insofar as one is materially a part of the other (as two is of six), and then it is taken after the manner of a unit.

Whether Incorruptible Things are Measured by Time

11. Further, it is commonly asked whether this celestial time also measures corruptible things as to their substance or substantial permanence; and the same question arises for all permanent corruptible things. The common view is that all these are measured by this time, as is clear from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 4, and from the other authors cited above; it is also taken from Aristotle, PHYSICS IV, c. 14, text 133, where he says: "All things that are generated and corrupted are measured by this time." Durandus adds,

In II Sentences, dist. 2, q. 6, n. 15, that time is not a homogeneous measure of these things, but is of a different kind, since time is a successive duration while the durations of these things are permanent. If you object that the measure must be homogeneous, he will perhaps reply that this is true with respect to what is per se and proximely measurable, but not with respect to what is measured only in virtue of another and, so to speak, by some concomitance. This doctrine does not displease me; for time per se and first does not measure the permanence of corruptible things—which in itself is indivisible and consequently also immeasurable—but it measures per se and first the changes of these things—namely, their generations, growths, alterations, and corruptions—and consequently it also measures the duration of their being, insofar as it underlies or can underlie these changes. Thus Aristotle also said, PHYSICS IV, c. 12, text 118, that time per se measures motion, but accidentally rest; for time per se measures the before and after, which are per se found in motion, but in rest only by relation or comparison to motion, as Albert well explained in the Summa de Quatuor Coaequaevis, I part, q. 3, a. 1, ad ult. And so it happens that time per se and immediately is the homogeneous measure of the duration of motion, but of permanent duration only as it were per accidens and by reference to another, as a measure of a somewhat different sort—something we shall explain more in the next point.

Whether Incorruptible Things are Measured by Time

12. First opinion. Second opinion. Lastly one can inquire whether time also measures the duration of incorruptible things, which we have said to be the aevum (not the eternity of God, which does not come under question, since it is infinite and immeasurable). St. Thomas and his followers and other theologians, who deny that spiritual actions or motions—even successive and continuous ones—

are measured by this time, deny a fortiori that the being or duration of incorruptible things is so measured, and therefore they establish a single first aevum which in that order has the role of extrinsic measure of such things as to their being. This view is favored by Aristotle, Physics IV, c. 12, text 117, where he clearly holds that incorruptible things are not measured by time. And for this reason, On the Heavens I, c. 3, text 20, and c. 9, text 100, he says that the heavenly bodies and higher substances are not subject to time. Some philosophers teach the same in those places. Other theologians, however, think that even the angelic being is measured by this time as to its duration. Thus Durandus, In II Sentences, q. 5; and Gabriel and Ockham, In II Sentences, q. 13, do not dissent. A foundation for this could be that above it was shown that one aevum cannot be the measure of another as to its duration, because from the comparison of one to another it cannot be known how long the other has lasted; but by comparison to our time it is excellently known how long an angel has lasted in his being; therefore there is no other measure even for these things than our time.

13. My own view. I for my part think, first, that our time does not have the role of measure for the angels themselves so as to know the duration of their own being. This is proved from what has been said: first, because the duration of time is not more known to angels than their own, indeed if any comparison can be made, their own duration is more known, as being more connatural and more immaterial, and therefore of itself more intelligible. Second, because it would be a great imperfection to need such an extrinsic measure for knowing their own durations.

14. Objection. You will say: an angel cannot, by looking only at himself or at another angel, know how long he has lasted, unless he compares his own duration or that of another to our time; therefore he needs this measure. The antecedent is clear, because his proper and intrinsic duration is entirely indivisible; in itself and absolutely it does not have "so much" or "how much"; therefore it can be known under

that aspect only by comparison to some quantitative duration. I reply by conceding that that indivisible duration cannot be known after the manner of quantity unless with some relation or connotation of succession—either actual or possible, that is, imagined; for this much the argument proves. Hence, for an angel to know how long he has lasted from his creation until now, it is necessary that he know with how much successive time he has coexisted or could coexist; otherwise he will not be able to conceive his own duration as quantitative, because that denomination does not belong to it from within and according to itself; thus it must be by comparison with something quantitative, either actually existing or conceived. Yet from this it does not follow that an angel uses time as a measure for that cognition; it only follows that the cognition, on the side of the object, is in some way relative, and therefore that one extreme cannot be known unless as terminated and compared to another.

15. Wherefore not only an angelic intellect but even the divine does not know the duration of an angel as "so much" or "quantum" except with the said concomitance—both because the necessity of knowing correlatives together holds for every intellect, since it arises intrinsically from the connection of the objects, and because that denomination of quantity is in some way extrinsic and cannot be known as it is in itself unless the form from which it is drawn is known. If someone objects again that the same should be said of eternity itself, we answer that eternity is not "so much" or "quantum," but infinite; and this infinity it has of itself and absolutely without comparison to another. If, however, someone wishes to conceive it as extended and quantitative, he will not be able to conceive it except with the relation of coexistence to successive duration, at least imagined—not as by its measure, but by the term of coexistence, by reason of which it is conceived after the manner of quantity.

16. Hence it follows that even with respect to our intellect the angelic aevum is not properly and per se measurable by our time, but

only per accidens and due to our imperfection. First, because the notion of measure and measurable with respect to some intellect presupposes that both are in themselves knowable by that intellect; but the angelic aevum is not thus knowable to us. Hence by the force of our time we can never know how long an angel has lasted, unless perhaps by measuring some effect of his in which there is succession and then, from the duration of the effect, inferring the duration of the cause. Thus, because an angel moves the heavens, we rightly infer that the angel has lasted as long as the motion of the heavens has lasted. Yet this measurement is both very remote and per accidens, and even then it cannot be a complete measurement of that being; for at most it is inferred that such an effect was not without its cause; it cannot, however, be inferred whether such a cause existed before the effect, and how long it lasted.

17. Our time does not measure aeviternal beings. From these considerations it is finally concluded that we must absolutely deny that our time is the measure of aeviternal beings. Consequently we must also grant that those beings are not measurable in themselves as to duration; for if with respect to no intellect can they thus be measured, then absolutely they are not thus measurable. Wherefore, when St. Thomas attributes extrinsic measures to these spiritual beings, I think it must not be understood of the measure of duration as to its extensive quantity (so to speak), but as to perfection, in the way in which what is first in each genus is said to be the measure of the rest.

SECTIO XII

WHICH DURATION BELONGS TO THE CATEGORY "WHEN," AND HOW THIS CATEGORY IS TO BE CONSTITUTED

A Description of the "When"

Section XII

1. It remains to gather from all that we have said about durations the notion and constitution of the category "when" (quando). Among the authorities there is great uncertainty as to wherein the formal notion of this category consists. For although from the very name it is sufficiently clear that "when" pertains to time and consequently to duration, what precisely it is remains obscure. The word quando, in Latin, is not the name of a thing, but a temporal adverb that we use to ask "at what time" a thing is or acts, and so forth. From there it was transferred to signify that thing, or that denomination or denominating form, which we ascribe to a thing when we answer the question about "when"; for we say that something is or was "today," or "yesterday," or "at some other such time." Hence Aristotle, when he touches on this category, says nothing else than that "when" is the same as "being in time," as "being yesterday," or "in the past year." Gilbert defines: "'When' signifies the notion left by the incidence of time, not time itself." And below he says it is a certain (so to speak) affection added to things, by which they are said to be, or to have been, or to be going to be in the future—not truly to be time itself. From this place the common description seems to have been taken, which St. Thomas also uses in Opusc. 48: "'When' is that which is left by the adjacency of time." In all these descriptions the authors are speaking of extrinsic time that is in the motion of the primum mobile, insofar as all temporal things are said to be in it or in some part of it.

Various Opinions About the Nature of "When" Itself

2. What this is which is "left by the adjacency of time" is variously explained. Some say it is a relation—either of time to the thing which is in time, or conversely of the temporal thing to time—be it a relation of contained to container or, conversely, of container to contained. However, this opinion, which attributes relations to the last six categories, was rejected above in general. And in the present case it

does not seem plausible, because the relation of container and contained seems to be attributed to temporal things with respect to extrinsic time only by a metaphor; for in reality there seems to be nothing but a certain coexistence, in which time is denominated "container" because it always exceeds temporal things, especially corruptibles, which begin and cease with time, while it itself always flows and endures; and for that reason they are said to be "contained" in it. This way of speaking includes a metaphor; the propriety consists only in the coexistence of things with time or with some part of time; but the relation of coexistence does not belong to a special category. Moreover, the relation of measure and measured, if we pay attention to what was said about measure in Disputation XLII, sect. 3, is not real but of reason; for it has no other foundation than that one thing is a means and, as it were, an instrument for knowing another; but this does not posit in the things themselves a real and intrinsic habitude. For whatever reason some thing is more known to us, and is otherwise apt to be compared with another, and thus to serve for showing its quantity, can exercise the function of measure, which is a work of reason alone; in the same way the unit has the role of measure with respect to multitude, and yet that relation is neither real, nor, if it were, would it constitute a special category. The same argument can be made about all human measures, such as the modius or the pound. These share with time that they come under the notion of measure not solely by the conditions of the things, but by a certain human institution and operation of reason; therefore from this alone it is manifest that the relation of measure and measured founded in them cannot be a relation of reality but only of reason.

3. Second opinion. Rejected. Others have said that what is left by the adjacency of time is some formal, absolute and intrinsic notion which is in the temporal things themselves insofar as they are in time; so that "when" does not signify only an extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic one, and not a relative, but an absolute [form], left by the adjacency of time. But this opinion can neither be explicated nor

understood; therefore it is entirely false and gratuitously invented. What, indeed, is that absolute [form] in a temporal thing left by the adjacency of time? Either that [form] is presupposed in the temporal thing from its intrinsic nature, such that it is measurable by time—and then it is false that it is left by the adjacency of time; for it is present of itself and would belong to things if they existed with their natural properties and conditions even if there were no extrinsic time in things. Hence such a property can be only either that things are corruptible, or at least that they have being in some way consisting in motion, or at least that they endure in such a way; which properties do not pertain to the category "when," save for duration for the moment, about which I shall speak below; as for the others, this is self-evident. Or else that absolute notion results in things from the adjacency of extrinsic time; but this cannot be said either, because, as I said, that adjacency in reality is nothing but coexistence; and from mere coexistence of things nothing absolute results in them, strictly speaking, but only through an efficient cause if one could act on the other—which cannot be said of time. Any other adjacency beyond coexistence is a mere measuring which is effected by reason; and much less can anything absolute arise from this. Therefore this assertion has no plausibility.

4. Third opinion. Others, more commonly, say that "when" is only an extrinsic denomination, arising for things from extrinsic time insofar as it measures. St. Thomas follows this in the aforementioned little work, although with a distinction, and Gilbert implies it. For when he had called this denomination an affection, he immediately added a correction, "so to speak." Soto also in his Logic and others follow this. But difficulties arise in this opinion: some ad hominem, others absolutely. For if "when" is an extrinsic denomination from time, then without cause do the said authors banish time from this category, saying that "when" is not time but something left from time. If they say that "when" and "time" are distinguished as whiteness and "being white," garment and "being clothed," and, in general, as a form

and the "being" arising from the form, granted this is true, it follows that "when" is compared to time as form to formal effect, or as concrete to abstract; and therefore these should not be distinguished or separated in this category any more than in others—especially since those authors place time in the category of quantity, as the very extension of motion.

5. But they will say perhaps that the same time, insofar as it is compared intrinsically to the motion in which it is as its extension, belongs to the category of quantity; but insofar as it is compared to things measurable by time as an extrinsic form of them, thus it belongs to the category "when," just as the ultimate surface, as affecting the body in which it is, or as containing a body extrinsically, belongs in the first respect to the category of quantity and in the second to the category "where" (ubi).

6. Nevertheless—passing over that this example is as doubtful as the very point at issue, and whatever is the case about whether time is a true species of quantity—absolutely speaking, it is hard to believe that this extrinsic denomination suffices to constitute a real category. For the form from which this denomination is taken is not real but of reason, and the denomination itself is not in things alone unless the operation of reason intervenes; therefore it is not sufficient to constitute a real category. The consequence is clear because the categories of accidents are real, and ought to be constituted from real forms; otherwise many other categories would have to be multiplied; for there are infinitely many other denominations of reason, as is clear from what was said above about the sufficiency of this division, and from the argument just now made concerning other human measures, which is most apt and familiar to the present matter. As to the antecedent, the first part is evident from what was said above concerning time as a common extrinsic measure: we showed, even from Aristotle's doctrine, that time as such is completed by reason. The other part is proved thus: between extrinsic time and the things which are said to be in it there is no real

conjunction, even extrinsic, but only measuring, which is performed by comparison of reason; therefore the whole denomination is merely of reason.

7. This is confirmed and made clearer: to be in time is nothing other than to be measured by time; but to be measured by time is nothing other than to be known through time as through a measure, that is, through a certain extrinsic means of cognition; therefore to be in time is finally reduced to a denomination of reason, like "to be known." If you say that "to be in time" is not the same as actually to be measured by time, but as being apt to be measured—that is, to be apt for being measured by time—the difficulty is not solved. For either this is to be understood formally of an aptness or measurability as such, and thus it no more can belong to a real category than "to be measured" as such, because that too is either a relation of reason or a denomination from the extrinsic faculty of the soul, which can compare one thing with another and cognize the quantity of a thing through such a medium; in the same sense, "to be countable" or "knowable" are extrinsic denominations arising from the soul's faculty to count or to know. If, however, "to be measurable" is taken fundamentally, then to be measurable by time is nothing other than to have a duration of such a nature that it is apt to be measured by time; but this is not an extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic property of the thing.

The Final and More Probable Opinion

8. Because of these considerations there can be another way of explaining this category, namely, that this category is constituted solely by each thing's intrinsic duration. To understand this more clearly, we must distinguish three elements that must be distinguished in every category of accident: namely, the form affecting or denominating; the affected or denominated subject; and the denomination itself by which that formal effect is expressed which

such a form confers upon such a subject; this is usually signified not only by some verb, but also by a concrete noun. Thus in the category of quality there is whiteness, which regards the subject to which it confers the being-white, whence the concrete "white thing" arises. In the present category, therefore, the form or quasi-form, taken in the abstract, is duration itself, about which what it is has been sufficiently said; the subject or quasi-subject is the motion or other thing that endures; for to it duration confers precisely this, namely, "to endure" in being; and the concrete is precisely what is called "enduring."

9. This view can be recommended first by an argument from sufficient enumeration: no other way of explaining this category appears sufficiently probable. Second, because this denomination by which a thing is called "enduring" is real and intrinsic, and there is no other category to which it can be reduced. Third, it can be confirmed by a similar case in the category "where," of which we shall show below that it is an intrinsic denomination taken from the internal mode of the thing; and the same ratio seems, as to this, to hold in "when" and "where"; and if "when" signifies an intrinsic denomination, it can be taken only from the intrinsic duration.

Objections Against the Position & Replies

10. First. Difficult objections are not lacking against this view. The first is that we said that duration is not really distinct from the existence of the enduring thing; therefore it cannot constitute a special category of accident. The consequence is clear, both because the existences of things are not placed in a category, and because, even if they were, they would not belong to a special category, but the existence of each thing would be reduced to its own category.

11. Second. The second difficulty is that motion does not belong to a special category, but because of its imperfection it is placed outside the series of beings and is treated in the postpredicaments; therefore neither can the duration of motion… The consequence is

clear, because the duration of motion is either of greater or at least of equal imperfection to motion itself; and since time is nothing other than the duration of motion, under no consideration can it be the form constituting the category "when."

12. Third. The third is that if the duration of motion, precisely insofar as it is intrinsic to that motion of which it is the duration, belongs to a special category, then for the same reason every intrinsic duration of a permanent thing will belong to this category "when." But the consequent is false; therefore, etc. The inference is evident from parity of reason; for as to perfection of being, any duration of a permanent thing is more perfect than the duration of motion; and as to the mode of affecting and denominating, duration is as intrinsic to motion and as identical with it as it is in any other thing; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: both because it is foreign to the mind of Aristotle and of all who thus far have spoken about the category "when"; for all make time the one and only form from which this category is derived; and also because one cannot give a single, unique notion of duration that would be the highest genus of this category, since indivisible and successive duration do not seem to agree univocally, and much less the duration of substance and of accident.

The First Difficulty is Treated & Resolved

13. Asserting the foregoing view, one can reply to these difficulties. Those who say that duration is a mode really distinct from any thing and from its existence easily dispatch the first difficulty by denying the assumption. Others, although they judge that duration is not really distinct from existence, consider it probable that the existence of a created thing is a special accidental mode of the created essence, which can pertain to a special category; for although it is common to things of other categories, it is not so as their essential predicate, but as a mode necessarily concomitant upon their production or bringing into being. Thus too the relation of a creature

is common to all created beings, and nonetheless it is placed in a special category. But this view supposes a modal and real distinction between the existence and the actual essence of a creature; it also supposes that a creature's existence is a true accident of it; but both suppositions were shown to be false above.

14. Wherefore we must say that it is one thing to speak of a real and metaphysical distinction of things, and another to speak of a logical and categorial distinction; and we must concede that duration, metaphysically and really, is not a true accident of the enduring thing, as the argument proves, because it is not distinct in reality from it; nevertheless it has such a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing as suffices for a mode of accidental predication, by reason of which it can be placed in the category of accident. For we have already said above that for the distinction of categories an actual distinction in reality is not always necessary, but sometimes a distinction of reasoned reason suffices; we also said that not all categories of accidents are true accidents, and hence "accident" is not univocal. Some things therefore constitute a category of accident solely because of a mode of accidental denomination, as we shall say below about habit. In this way duration can constitute a special category of accident, because it is predicated of created things by an accidental and contingent predication, and thus it is conceived as a mode of the thing of which it is predicated, belonging to it accidentally; this is enough for it to be placed in its own category, even if it is not distinct in reality.

15. Why existence does not constitute a special category of accident. You will say: by the same reasoning actual existence will constitute a special category of accident, because it too is said contingently and accidentally of a created thing and is conceived as a mode of the essence. I reply that the case is not the same. First, because existence does not presuppose something to which it accrues; rather it primarily and formally constitutes a real being in act, which must be necessarily presupposed for anything to accrue to it; but

duration is conceived as something added to a thing already existing. Second, because existence, as existence, corresponds to being as such, and is of its intrinsic notion either in potency or in act, according as "being" is taken; and therefore, just as "being" does not constitute a special genus, so neither does existence; but duration as such is not of the notion of being, but is conceived as an affection of it existing outside its notion. You will press that duration, as it is distinguished from existence, formally signifies only a negation of the destruction or loss of being; but negative predicates as such do not belong to a real category; therefore neither does duration. I reply that although duration is properly explained by a negation, nevertheless by that negation the positive notion that pertains to this category is circumscribed, namely, the permanence of existing insofar as it is conceived as a certain mode of the thing existing.

Reply to the Second Difficulty.

16. To the second difficulty some answer that the duration of motion is counted as a complete being, although motion is not. But I do not sufficiently understand this; for duration cannot have a more perfect notion of being than the thing that endures. I therefore reply that, as was said above concerning action and passion, time is properly the duration of motion as it is an act of the movable, and as such motion is counted among complete accidents and, taken generally, it constitutes the category of passion; hence its duration also can belong to a proper category of accident. Nor does it matter that motion, considered precisely under the notion of a way or of an incipient term, is counted as something incomplete and reduced to the category of its term; for one may say either that that consideration, which has a place in motion as motion because of its various respects, does not have a place in duration, which as such prescinds from those respects; or certainly one must say that duration of motion, considered under the same imperfection, is not a complete being or accident.

Which Durations are Placed in This Category, & Reply to the Third Difficulty

17. First view. In the third difficulty we are asked to explain which durations pertain to this category. For if we attend to the force of the word "when," it seems that only the duration of time constitutes this category; and thus Aristotle seems always to explain this category, as is clear from ETHICS I, c. 6, and from the CATEGORIES, c. 4, where he assigns the various predications of this category through the differences of time alone; and this seems to be the common method of interpreting it. And this very view can be understood in two ways. First, that it be understood of time under the aspect of extrinsic measure; and Aristotle seems to hint at this sense in the places cited, when he says that "when" is nothing other than "yesterday" or "last year"; and in the ETHICS he says that the good in time is the occasion of it, and thus that the time of war is one thing, that of healing another, and so on—all of which are said in relation to time which is the extrinsic measure. And perhaps for this reason Aristotle said in c. 9 of the CATEGORIES that "when" is one of the manifest categories which need no interpretation, because extrinsic denominations drawn from time are clear; for intrinsic duration—what it is, of what sort it is —is not plain, nor easy to interpret. According to this view some say that in this category there is no coordination of genera or species, but only a single lowest species under which the past, future, and present are divided as its individuals. Yet more truly they would say that there is only one individual de facto; for those differences of time are not in reality distinct individuals, but the parts of one and the same individual, which are distinguished and counted by reason.

18. Finally, according to this view, it must be said that that time, as it affects the motion of the heavens itself, does not belong to this category; for intrinsic affection and extrinsic denomination differ by more than a genus, and therefore cannot per se belong to the same

category—especially since it was shown above that intrinsic duration with respect to its proper subject does not have the true notion of measure; therefore, if the notion of measure is what constitutes this category, time, as the intrinsic duration of the motion of the heavens, cannot confer the proper denomination of this category. If, however, not under the notion of measure, but under some other aspect, it affects that motion so as to belong to this category, then by the same reasoning any intrinsic duration of any motion will belong to this category, which is contrary to the view we are explaining. Therefore, according to that view, one must philosophize as I have said; and the difficulties that arise concerning it were set out above. What we have added also seems difficult to believe, although I do not deny that it agrees fairly well with Aristotle's doctrine or manner of speaking.

19. Second view. Another way of explaining that view is that only the duration of time indeed constitutes this category, but not under the aspect of extrinsic measure; rather as it is the intrinsic duration of motion, and consequently not only the time that is in the motion of the heavens, but every such duration included intrinsically in every motion pertains to this category. And in this way one can distinguish in this category not only various individuals under the same species, but also various species under the genus of time, according to the various modes of durations of motions, whether spiritual or material, and so on. But, for this view to be altogether probable, it must render some sufficient reason why the durations of motions rather than the durations of other things pertain to a special category. Indeed, if it were true that in reality the duration of motion is more distinct from motion than in permanent things any duration is from the thing itself, then a sufficiently probable reason for that difference would be given; for in motion, in reality, duration or time would be its accident distinct from motion, whereas in other things it would not be so. However, the foundation of this reasoning did not please us above, because neither can that greater distinction be

understood, nor can any sufficient reason be given for that difference between motion and other things.

20. Others try to give a reason from another difference between the duration of motion and that of other permanent things, namely, that the duration of motion is really extended and has a certain real breadth in enduring, whereas in permanent things it is indivisible. From this difference it seems to follow that successive duration has in reality the notion of duration, whereas permanent duration does not, but only according to a certain coexistence or adjustment to the succession of time, whether real or imaginary—a consideration that is very extrinsic. But this reason, although it seems plausible, does not satisfy: both because it was shown above that every duration is something intrinsic, and that the connotation or adjustment of indivisible duration to imaginary succession pertains to our mode of conceiving, not to the formal notion of the thing conceived; and also because, just as in other things duration is the permanent existence itself, so too in motion; and the only difference is that in other things it is the whole existence that remains in itself, whereas in motion it remains only by parts or with a changed being, inasmuch as part succeeds part; which difference seems very accidental for one duration to be in the category and not the other.

21. Third view. Hence others have thought quite the contrary, saying that every duration is indeed to be placed in some category of accident, and as to this the argument from parity of reason convinces. Nevertheless they say that in this category not time or successive durations are placed, but that these belong to the category of quantity; and that in this category are constituted permanent created durations, because there is nothing else to which they might belong. However, this view is first of all contrary to all philosophers, who in the first place place time in this category, or some affection or similar thing arising from time or its adjacency. Next, it supposes something false, namely that time properly and per se is placed in the category of quantity, whereas above it was shown that it is not quantity per se but

per accidens; for that succession of before and after which is in motion per accidens arises from quantity, and taken in itself it is not quantity but the intrinsic and entitative composition of motion itself, and at most it adds the mode of velocity or slowness, which is not quantity, as is self-evident. And even if I were to grant that in motion there is included some successive quantity which would be a true and per se quantity, no reason could be given why permanent quantity should be of one category and its duration of another, while nevertheless the successive quantity of motion would not have its own proper duration which could belong to the category of durations. If someone says that the extension of motion consists in its very duration and through it, then this rather concludes that that very durative extension belongs more to the genus of duration than to the category of quantity, because it has a greater and more essential agreement with other durations in the notion of duration than with quantity in the notion of extension. Likewise because those two kinds of extension—according to time, or according to place or in relation to place—are of entirely diverse notions. And besides, it is still uncertain whether that extension is anything positive in motion beyond the negation of simultaneous existence of its parts.

The True Resolution of the Third Difficulty

22. All created durations belong to the category "when." Wherefore it remains for us to say that all created durations belong to this category; for the uncreated certainly cannot belong to it, both because it is simply infinite in the genus of being, and also because it is not a quasi-accidental duration but duration itself by essence. Among created durations there is none that can be excepted, if the arguments made are effective; from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, this conclusion remains. That the very name "when" has been taken from time is no argument that only the duration of time belongs to this category; for the name was taken from what is more known to us, not

adequately from the whole thing. And from this occasion and from our mode of conceiving it may also have arisen that Doctors almost always explain this category through an ordering to time; for we cannot speak of other durations except by the words of our time.

23. That in reality not only time is comprehended here, but also other durations, was taught by Albert the Great, On the Six Principles, Treatise IV, at the beginning. He even extends this category not only to the aevum, but also to eternity—which, as I said, is false. He adds that the aevum pertains to this category under the aspect of extrinsic measure of other aeviternal things, and so too for other durations—something we also cannot approve, both because of what was said concerning time as extrinsic measure, and also because the aevum is a measure only of perfection, as was said above, and that notion of measure is a certain common respect to all genera. In this, then, alone does Albert's opinion please me: that he says that time and other created durations pertain to this category in the same proportion, and that the name "when" can be extended to all these.

24. Divisible and indivisible duration agree univocally. As to the difficulty about univocity, there is no problem with respect to divisible and indivisible duration. For why cannot they have a univocal agreement, just as instantaneous and successive action, and divisible and indivisible substance do? As to the other part, about substantial and accidental duration, there is greater difficulty. One can say that, although they do not have a univocal agreement in reality if they are considered materially according to their entities, nevertheless when they are considered formally as accidents, they have the same mode of acceding to and denominating the things of which they are durations; and that this suffices for a univocal and categorial agreement, in the way in which above we said that one can probably reply concerning substantial and accidental action. If this does not satisfy someone, he must say that duration is something analogous; and that according to its first signification it is univocal to its inferiors, that is, to substantial durations, and thus it constitutes one highest genus, and that to this

the other accidental durations are reduced because of a proportional agreement. Or certainly, conversely, he can say that accidental duration more directly constitutes this category, as being accidental, while substantial duration, insofar as it is a substantial mode, is reduced to substance. But the first reply proceeds more consistently, given the other points we have said about the number and distinction of the categories and about the constitution of this category.

25. How many genera and species the category "when" has. From this point the other desiderata concerning the category are easily resolved: namely, what genera or species it has—for this is clear from what has been said about the distinction of durations; also in what subject it exists and what denomination or effect it gives to it; and other similar matters, which have been touched upon in the course of disputing about durations. As for the properties of this category, nothing needs to be added. Two negative properties are usually attributed to the category "when": that it has no contrary and does not admit of more and less. These are true, understood of a proper and immediate contrariety and of more and less according to intensity. For according to extension it is clear that time and consequently also "when" receive more and less; thus one thing is truly said to endure more than another; and between past and future there is a certain repugnance, but not a proper contrariety—rather it borders more on contradiction. These properties, therefore, can also be attributed to duration in general; nor do other properties occur that belong to it as such. To the diverse durations, however, various properties can be attributed—such as being indivisible or divisible, simple or composite—according to what has been handed on concerning the distinction of durations.

DISPUTATION LI

ON WHERE OR UBI

After the accidents that are wholly intrinsic, the category of ubi is commonly reckoned to pertain most directly to substances or to whatever things exist. Hence moral philosophers also enumerate "where" (ubi) among the circumstances that are wont to befall human actions, just as they number "when" and the like. Therefore, after considering the other categories, it is fitting to take up this disputation on ubi. There will be no need to inquire whether it exists, for nothing is more evident. Rather, three principal difficulties arise: namely, what ubi is; how it is related to place; and to which things this predicamental ubi, of which we are speaking, properly belongs. From this it will also become clear how many kinds of ubi there are, and consequently how this category is to be coordinated; finally, we shall ask what properties may be attributed to it.

SECTION I

WHETHER UBI IS SOMETHING EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC TO THE BODY THAT IS SAID TO BE SOMEWHERE, AND WHAT IT IS

Section I

1. Although ubi is not restricted to things that are quantified and corporeal, as I shall say below, nevertheless, because bodily things are better known to us, I will explain its notion in them, which it will then be easy to apply, by proportion or abstraction, to other things. Now in every accidental category three items may be considered: the abstract (which stands as a form), the subject (which is affected by such a form), and the concrete or composite resulting therefrom. In order to know the essence of this category exactly, all these must be explained. As to the subject, since we have already presupposed that we shall speak of bodily things, it is clear that the subject of ubi is the quantified body itself that is said to be somewhere. It must therefore be explained what that abstract item is—the form or quasi-form by which a body is said to be here or there—how it is related to the subject and distinguished from it; and then it will be easy to see what the concrete is that coalesces out of these.

First Opinion Reported

2. In this matter I find three, or rather four, opinions. The first is that ubi is a certain extrinsic form that denominates extrinsically the thing said to be somewhere, namely the ultimate surface of the containing body. This can be grounded, first, because to be somewhere is nothing other than to be in some place. Therefore, the form of this category by which a thing is "located" (if I may speak so to make the point clear) is nothing but the place by which it is circumscribed or contained. But place is the ultimate surface of the immobile containing body, as the Philosopher testifies in Physics IV, at the beginning. Therefore the form of ubi is place; hence this ubi is something extrinsic and an extrinsic denomination, for the place or containing surface is something extrinsic and gives an extrinsic denomination to the located thing.

3. Second, to be in the containing place is a real and accidental predicate. Therefore it belongs to some accidental category.

But it does not belong to the category of quantity, as was said above; therefore it pertains to the present category, since there is no other to which it could belong. Thus the form of this category is nothing but the extrinsic place; to be placed (locari) and to be somewhere will be the same; consequently the formal effect of this category consists only in an extrinsic denomination or adjacency.

4. Third, the same attributes or differences are ascribed to place and to ubi, for example "above" and "below." These are differences of place, as Aristotle witnesses (Physics IV, text 27). But if one asks where a thing is, one rightly answers that it is above or below; therefore these are also differences of ubi. This is a sign that ubi, formally and in the abstract (for thus we are speaking), is the same as place. St. Thomas favors this opinion insofar as, in Metaphysics V, he teaches in general that all the last six categories are extrinsic denominations, a view some follow. And in Summa Theologiae I, q. 110, a. 3, he says: "A mobile according to place is not in potency to something intrinsic as such, but only to something extrinsic, namely to place." He says nearly the same in De Potentia q. 6, a. 3; and in Contra Gentiles II, c. 13, he expressly states: "Sometimes a thing is denominated from that which is outside it, as from place something is said to be somewhere." Therefore, since by local motion the ubi itself is acquired and lost, St. Thomas clearly thinks the form of ubi is extrinsic place.

Second Opinion Reported & its Difficulty Shown

5. The second opinion is that ubi is not the extrinsic form or ultimate containing surface, but rather something intrinsic passively left in the located thing by the circumscription of place. According to this opinion, although ubi is not constituted formally by the extrinsic form, it nevertheless requires it as its root or foundation, so that from adjacency to it "location" (we have no other abstract noun) arises. This is the view of Gilbert of Poitiers in his little work On the Six

Principles, where he defines: "Ubi is the circumscription of the body arising from the circumscription of place." Hence he later infers that place is not the same as ubi; for place (he says) is contained in the surrounding body, whereas ubi is in the body that is surrounded. This opinion is followed by Soto and other moderns, indeed also by Scotus in the place to be cited immediately. And all who hold that place belongs to the category of quantity will consequently deny that it is the form of this category; thus they cannot constitute this category by any extrinsic denomination, for aside from extrinsic place nothing can be imagined from which it might be taken.

6. If one asks the authors of this opinion what that intrinsic item is which is left by the circumscription of the extrinsic place, some answer that it is a certain relation of the contained body to the containing place, which we explain by this denomination: "to be contained in a place." For to be somewhere seems to be nothing other than to be contained in some place. This opinion is attributed to Scotus, who says in general that these six last categories are relations supervening from the outside. In Quodlibet XI he says that place is a relation of the container; hence conversely he seems to constitute the notion of this category in the passive relation of the contained to the container, a view also held by Antonius Andreas in his book On the Six Principles. But I have already spoken of this opinion in general. Indeed, if in the present case there arises some real relation of the located thing to the place, it will be predicamental, like the relation of proximity and distance and other relations of contact or union; for it has its whole being to another in the same way and arises equally, given the proximate foundation and terminus, as will be clear from what is to be said. Likewise, otherwise the relation of the container that is in the place would be a supervening extrinsic; therefore it would constitute a distinct category, as the relation of action or passion does, according to their opinion.

7. Others, like Soto, merely say that ubi is neither a relation nor place, but "being contained in such a place." But this explains

nothing: first, because "being contained in a place" is only an extrinsic denomination, or, if it is something else, let it be explained what it is; second, because a denomination, whatever it may be, is taken from place as from the denominating form. A denomination taken from a form is referred to that category to which the form itself belongs, for a form and its formal effect belong to the same category. Soto adds that ubi further includes a certain "being in a place" which cannot be explained without a relation of distance to the world's center or poles. Yet he neither declares what that is, nor, had he declared it, could he say that it is something left by the circumscription of the extrinsic place, as will be understood from what follows.

8. Albert the Great, differently, in his book On the Six Principles (tract. III, c. 1), says first that to be circumscribed is for what is contained to be given the figure of the container. Then he distinguishes a threefold circumscription: first, of the containing body, which he says is a kind of action; second, of the contained body, which is a passion; third, the commensuration of the located to the place, which he says proceeds from the two preceding and which he says is ubi, insofar as it is a special category, since it belongs to no other category. Thus he concludes that ubi is a circumscription not coming immediately from place, but from the passive circumscription of place. But this explanation is more obscure than the thing itself. First, as to what it presupposes: for a thing to be circumscribed by an extrinsic place, it need not be given a figure by it; sometimes this happens, but more often the reverse, because all solid things that are in air or water or in some similar fluid or easily divisible body rather confer their figure upon the place; sometimes indeed neither gives figure to the other, as is evident in the heavens and in any solid things. For circumscription it suffices that the containing and contained bodies have proportioned figure; sometimes this is presupposed, sometimes it is caused in one body by contact with the other, more solid, whether that be the place or the located thing. Next, "active" and "passive" circumscription are not properly action and passion, but rather stand

as a sort of extrinsic informing, quasi active and passive. Finally, that "commensuration" appears to be nothing other than a relation of equality or measure; but this cannot constitute a special category, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore the whole of this opinion is exceedingly difficult to explain.

Third Opinion: That Ubi Is Space, Set Out & Refuted

9. The third opinion is that ubi is in no way the containing surface nor anything left by it, but is that space which is filled by the very body that is said to be somewhere. For example, in a vessel we understand there to be a certain space between the vessel's sides, enclosed and circumscribed by the vessel's ultimate convex surface—a space that would be void if it were not filled by water or some similar body. This opinion says that this space is ubi itself. This was the ancient view of the philosophers before Aristotle, which some even after him followed, as Simplicius extensively reports (Physics IV, on ch. 5, in the digression on place), and Avicenna (Metaphysics II, ch. 6); indeed Philoponus in Physics IV seems to follow it. Its foundation can be taken first from an attack on the other opinions: ubi does not require an extrinsic surrounding body, as is clear in the last heavenly sphere. Next, because ubi, as the very name suggests, is that "in which" the body said to be somewhere is first received; but this is nothing other than that space. This is clear, first, because that space is what is most proximate and immediate to the body itself as that which it fills; therefore the body is also most proximate "received" in it. Second, because in the whole of that space the whole body is received, and in part of the space a part of the body; and the innermost parts of the body are received in the inner parts of the space, and so with all the rest proportionally. Third, because from this the body immediately has that it is here rather than elsewhere, and not from the surrounding

body; for although that varies around the body existing somewhere, the surrounded body itself remains always in the same ubi.

10. But immediately the question arises in this opinion: what is this space? In explaining this, its authors have been gravely mistaken. Some said, as Simplicius reports, that the space is an indivisible and immaterial body—in which words a contradiction appears. Perhaps they meant "indivisible" not because it lacks parts, but because its parts cannot be separated; and they called it "immaterial" because it is penetrable by any body; likewise they said it is immobile because by its very notion this space is not in a place nor moved locally, otherwise one would have to inquire about another space for it. But this view not only contradicts reason; it also seems to be against the faith. For one would have to say that this space is eternal and even uncreated, because there cannot fail to be an infinite space apt to be filled by bodies; and otherwise such a body, if created, could be annihilated, and then one would still understand there to remain an empty space there. Moreover, in such a "body" there would necessarily be three real dimensions; therefore there would be quantity; therefore it would be impenetrable with other bodies; therefore it could not be the ubi receptive of others, as we shall now say.

11. Therefore the older opinion was that this space is sheer quantity, having its dimensions diffused everywhere. Aristotle attacks this view expressly in Physics IV; and it is incredible on its face: both because quantitative dimensions cannot by their nature exist per se separated from all substance, and also because, since bodies that are constituted in place have their own proper dimensions, they cannot be penetratively together with such a space, as is clear from what was said above about quantity. Here too the argument from the principles of faith has a place: either that quantity is uncreated and eternal—which is against the faith—or it is created together with other things; and thus a space can be presupposed in which it was created and which would remain empty if God were to annihilate it; and so that quantity is impertinent to the issue.

12. Others, more plausibly, say that that space, insofar as it is understood as distinct from the bodies that fill it, is not something real and positive, but a certain vacuity that of itself includes the lack of a body together with an aptitude to be filled by it; and they say that this space, thus explained, is that in which a body is received and, as such, constitutes the category of ubi or the proper place of bodies. Toletus judges this opinion probable (Physics IV, q. 3), and that it cannot be demonstratively refuted. Nevertheless, it seems sufficiently convincible that that space, insofar as it is co-distinct from the containing and contained body, is really nothing, for it is neither substance nor accident, neither created nor temporal, but eternal. And although it is understood after the manner of capacity, it is not a real, passive capacity; on its side there is only a non-repugnance, and rather on the side of bodies there is understood a certain aptitude to occupy such a space. Therefore that space cannot be the form of this category, nor of any real category whatsoever. First, because it is not a real form. Second, because in itself it is conceived, at most, after the manner of a privation; but this category is not constituted by a privation, for to be here or elsewhere is not something privative. Third, because if by divine power there were made a vacuum equal to the space of this hall, that empty interval between the walls would be in no category, because it would be nothing; therefore when that emptiness is filled by a body, it cannot belong to a real category as a form giving some being to that body.

The Fourth, More Probable Opinion

13. The fourth opinion affirms that what is formal in the category of ubi is a certain real mode intrinsic to that thing which is said to be somewhere, by which such a thing has it that it is here or there. This mode in itself does not depend on the circumscribing body nor on anything else extrinsic, but only materially on the body that is somewhere, and efficiently on the cause that places or conserves that

body there. Hence this mode is not posited to be a mere predicamental relation, because it has no real terminus which it regards or on which it depends; rather, it is something absolute, although we cannot explain it except after the manner of the foundation of certain relations of distance or proximity, and so it is said to be "relative in being said." It is also probable that it includes a transcendental habitude to such "space," for a transcendental habitude does not always demand a positive real terminus. Finally, this mode is posited to be distinct in reality from its subject, because the subject can remain without it and acquire it anew; therefore at least a modal distinction is necessary, though no greater one is posited, because there is no reason indicating a greater distinction; and otherwise such a mode cannot be understood without some subject that is somewhere. This opinion, in my judgment, comes closest to the truth; yet in order to comprehend the whole matter, it must be explained step by step.

First Assertion

14. In every body there is a mode distinct from it by which it is constituted in a place. I say, therefore, first, that in every body there is a certain proper intrinsic mode, distinct by the nature of the thing from the substance, quantity, and other accidents of the body, by which formal mode of being each body has, formally, to be locally present somewhere, namely there where it is said to be. This is proved because when a body is said to be here or there, by these words something real is signified as belonging to such a body: both because on the side of the thing this is true without any fiction of mind, and because it can be acquired and lost by a real change; for local motion is a real change, and yet by it one acquires or loses nothing other than to be here or there. Moreover, this very being-here or being-there is a necessary condition for real actions or passions and is judged to be the foundation of real relations.

15. Further, this something real, which underlies the words "to be here or there," is not something merely extrinsic to the body that is said to be here or there, nor can it consist solely in an extrinsic denomination. This is clear, first, because by a change of extrinsic denomination alone the thing is not really changed—for even in God the extrinsic denomination by which He is said to be in this or that creature varies, and yet God is not thereby changed. But if a body is now here and later elsewhere, it is intrinsically and really changed; therefore it is not merely the extrinsic denomination that varies in it, but something intrinsically existing in it; this we say is signified by the words "to be here or there." Second, if it were something extrinsic, it would most of all be the surrounding body or its ultimate surface. But it is not this. For although the surrounding body varies, nevertheless the body remains in the same place where it previously was; nor is the surrounded body really changed by that variation of surrounding bodies or surfaces, as is clear in the case of a tree or a stone standing in a river. Conversely, a thing that was here is placed elsewhere, even if it is circumscribed by the same surface of the same surrounding body, as is clear in a man who is ferried in a ship. Therefore that in which, intrinsically, being-here or elsewhere consists is not solely that extrinsic denomination arising from the circumscribing body. For if the circumscription changes and the same being-here remains, then this being-here is something other than an extrinsic circumscription; for if they were the same, one could not lose the one and retain the other, as is clear from the principles posited about distinctions in Disputation VII. It remains, therefore, that this mode is intrinsic to the body existing somewhere, that is, existing in it and affecting it by a true union or identity with it.

16. From this it is also easy to prove that this mode is distinct, by the nature of the thing, from the subject, quantity, and other accidents, because this mode can be acquired and lost with no other change made in the subject, nor in its quantity or other qualities. For by local change this mode is acquired and another of the same order is

lost, without any change being made in any other thing, speaking per se; therefore from the same sign a distinction by the nature of the thing, at least modal, is rightly concluded. It is impossible to understand a real change taking place in something without its thereby acquiring something real if the change is positive, or losing something if it is privative. But local change, since in bodies it is always from one positive terminus to another, necessarily includes both; what is newly and really acquired by the mobile cannot but be at least modally distinct from what it had before.

17. That the formal effect of this presence or mode is to constitute its subject here or there is also easily proved from what has been said. For as long as a thing preserves in itself this mode of presence, it always remains where it was before, even if either other things change around it—as in the example of the tree standing in the river—or the thing itself changes in other accidents, as in heat or color and the like. Conversely, when this mode of presence is changed, the thing ceases to be where it previously was, even if no other change is made, either in adherent or adjacent things, as also was shown in the example of a man ferried in a ship. Therefore it is a sign that the proper formal effect of such a mode of presence is to constitute somewhere the thing of which it is the mode. Second, by local motion one primarily acquires or loses this mode of presence, as has been stated and will be clearer below. But what is primarily acquired or lost by local change is to be here or there, as is sufficiently clear of itself and from the doctrine of the Philosopher (Physics V). Therefore this mode is that by which a thing is formally constituted somewhere.

Second Assertion

18. How ubi stands to the surrounding body. I say, second, that this mode of presence not only does not proceed formally from the extrinsic body or surrounding surface, but in no way results from its circumscription, nor does it of itself require it; although, because of

the natural order of the bodies of the universe, it is never without it, except in the last heavenly sphere. The first part of this assertion is evident from the preceding: this mode of presence is intrinsic to the thing of which it is the mode; therefore an extrinsic surface cannot be its formal cause. The consequence is clear both because the containing surface only extrinsically adjoins the contained body and thus as such cannot have an intrinsic formal effect, and because this mode is a kind of form affecting its subject; therefore it needs no other form.

19. That this mode of presence does not result, under any kind of cause, from the circumscription of the surrounding body is proved by running through the genera of causes. As to the material and final causes the matter is clear. As to the efficient, it is proved that, speaking per se and by reason of circumscription, the containing body has no efficiency upon the contained: for it would act either by its surface as such, and that is not active; or by some qualities, which are accidental to the notion of container and contained, since in that way it often happens conversely that the contained acts upon the container; and sometimes there can be no such action at all because of equal resistance or the incapacity of the patient. You will say that the argument rightly proves concerning proper efficiency, not concerning some resultant. But this is refuted by the same reasoning: proper resultant action is not without some mode of efficiency; nor can such a resultant proceed from qualities, for, as I said, they are accidental to the notion of container and contained, and moreover for acting they presuppose presence or proximity; they do not cause it, except perhaps certain qualities that are specifically motive powers, which, however, do not have efficiency by circumscription, but by some traction or impulse. Again, neither can that resultant be from the circumscribing surface as such, because that is in no way active, especially upon an extrinsic subject. This may be further clarified: a natural resultant of an intrinsic mode is always from some form giving to the subject or composite some intrinsic being; but the containing surface confers no real being upon the contained body; therefore this

intrinsic mode cannot physically result from it. Thus at the same time it is proved that this mode does not result from the circumscription of the extrinsic place under the formal cause, because it does not result immediately as a proper formal effect—as was proved in the preceding part—nor secondarily and mediately, because there is no other immediate effect intervening through whose mediation it could result.

20. Hence the third part of the conclusion also stands proved: namely, that this mode of presence does not of itself depend upon the circumscription of the extrinsic place; for in no genus of cause does it result from it; therefore there is no reason why it should depend on it. You will say that it depends on it as upon a necessary terminus to which that mode has a habitude; and in the same way one could say that it results from it, as a relation is said to result from a foundation and terminus. But against this, first, this mode of presence is neither a predicamental relation nor a real and physical union of the circumscribed body to the container; therefore in no way can it depend on that as on a terminus. The consequence is clear from the sufficient enumeration of parts, for no other mode of terminus can be conceived which could be accommodated here. The minor is sufficiently known of itself, because only contact intervenes between the containing and contained bodies; but contact is not a true union. The major was proved above against Scotus, and is further clarified thus: even if between container and contained there arise a real predicamental relation—of proximity, or contact, or of container and contained, or whatever else you call it—nevertheless the mode of presence does not consist in that relation, but rather is presupposed to it as its proximate foundation. This is clear, for it can happen that there pre-exist a body with a surface apt to circumscribe another body, and that the other body is also in existence, and yet the relation of container and contained does not arise between them until that body is moved and acquires such a presence; once acquired, that relation immediately arises. Therefore such presence is not a predicamental

relation, nor for that reason does it depend on the circumscribing body.

21. The last heavenly sphere as being in a place. This part is further proved by the example of the last heavenly sphere, which confirms all we have said. That body has a true and real presence there where it is, and yet it has no other body by which it is circumscribed; I speak of the empyrean heaven, above which there is none. Therefore this mode of presence does not of itself require a circumscribing surface, nor does it depend upon it. The major seems self-evident from the terms: for how can a body be understood to be near another and touching it, except insofar as it has a real presence next to it? Thus is that heaven situated next to the first moved sphere. That in that first heaven there is also a mode of presence distinct in reality from it is proved because it is separable from that body, the body remaining in existence: for God could transfer that heaven to another place, either moving it according to parts circularly (which suffices for us), or even transferring the whole as a whole—for example, within the first moved sphere. Who would dare deny these things to divine power? A similar argument is that God could annihilate the highest heaven, conserving the next heaven where it now is; it would then retain the same mode of presence without a circumscribing body; therefore it does not of itself and intrinsically depend upon such a body. Finally, God could move a body locally through a vacuum, as I now suppose, because no contradiction can be shown; then the body would acquire a mode of presence without a circumscribing surface; therefore there is no intrinsic and per se dependence here. That they are never separated in bodies contained beneath the highest heaven arises from the natural order of the universe, which is constituted so that naturally a vacuum cannot exist in it; hence it comes about that a body never acquires an intrinsic local presence without being at the same time terminated extrinsically by some ultimate surface of a surrounding body—not because the intrinsic notion of such presence or of the change by which it is acquired per se demands this, but because one

body is always contiguous to another by the order of the universe without any intervening empty space.

Third Assertion

22. What the concrete and the abstract of the category of ubi are. I say, third, that this mode of presence, which intrinsically belongs to a body existing somewhere, is the formal or abstract of the category of ubi, whose subject is the body itself that is affected by such a mode. The concrete will be the whole composite of the body and such a mode, which has no proper name imposed, but is usually signified by adverbs when one says that a body exists "here" or "there." The first part of the conclusion, from which the others necessarily follow, is proved, first, because this mode is some accident in bodies and does not pertain to the other categories; therefore it constitutes this category of ubi. The major is proved because that mode of presence is distinct by the nature of the thing from the body of which it is the mode, and it comes and goes in it by accidental change; therefore it is a true accident of the body. The minor can easily be proved by running through the other accidental categories. Second, as Aristotle witnesses (Physics V), motion per se belongs to only three categories, and one of these is ubi, to which local motion tends. But local motion per se primarily tends to this mode of presence of a body in space; therefore this mode is what formally constitutes the category of ubi. Third, from a sufficient enumeration of parts this assertion is satisfactorily proved; for once the other opinions have been refuted, nothing else seems to remain that could constitute the category of ubi.

The Second & Third Opinions Refuted Again

23. In truth, little remains to be added about the second and third opinions. The second has been sufficiently disproved; nothing real and intrinsic can be understood to "result" in the circumscribed

body from the circumscription of another, speaking per se and by force of that, which could have the character of ubi, as has been amply demonstrated. Nor does that opinion have any foundation requiring an answer. Against the third opinion it has likewise been sufficiently shown that ubi cannot be some real thing really distinct from bodies which is a space into which bodies themselves are received. For a "real space" that has real dimension is not a thing distinct from the body which, according to our mode of understanding, fills a space that apart from it would be empty and nothing. Nor, indeed, can the arguments we brought against that third opinion harm our own view. We grant that space, as distinguished from bodies, is not something created, because it is not something real, but rather a certain emptiness; yet this does not prevent a body from having a real mode of existing and of occupying such a space, because that mode does not consist in some real relation to the space itself, nor in a union or contact by which the space is said to receive or contain the body existing there; for all these require reality in the other extreme. Rather, that mode consists only in the body's real quantitative presence, by reason of which, where such a body is present, there is a real space, whereas without it there would be nothing. Hence, not only does it not hinder this real mode that such "space" is of itself nothing real; it is rather necessary for it.

24. Some weighty authors add that this space, though it is not real, is nevertheless not something fictitious produced by the operation of the understanding, but something "true," eternal, and immutable, because in it a true capacity is understood for receiving bodies and their extension. But it is difficult to explain, since "true" and "being" are convertible, why this space is called "true" rather than a real thing. Again, if it is not a real being, what kind of being can it be except one of reason, since there is no middle between these? Therefore, insofar as this space is apprehended after the manner of a positive entity distinct from bodies, it seems to me to be a being of reason—not gratuitously feigned by the intellect (like impossible

beings), but with a foundation taken from bodies themselves, insofar as by their extension they are apt to constitute real spaces, not only those that now are, but to infinity beyond the heavens. Likewise, as we noted elsewhere when treating of God's immensity (Disputation XXXI), when a body is said to be "in imaginary space," the "to be" is to be taken intransitively, because it does not signify being "in another," but being there where, the body being excluded, we conceive an empty space; and therefore this "to be there" is really a mode of the body, even if the space itself as empty or imaginary is nothing.

Censure of the First Opinion

25. As to the first opinion, there is one point in which our view contradicts it and in which we do not approve it; two other points are not contrary to us and in themselves carry some doubt. The first is the claim that the notion of the category of ubi consists solely in an extrinsic denomination, the opposite of which I believe I have sufficiently demonstrated. Nor is any argument brought there against this part. That general thesis that all the six last categories are extrinsic denominations cannot be maintained universally, as has been seen above. When St. Thomas or another weighty author says that by local motion nothing intrinsic is acquired or lost, but only something extrinsic, this must be interpreted of a reality really distinct from the mobile, such as is wont to be acquired in alteration and augmentation; for they intend to establish that difference between local motion and other motions. They took it from Aristotle (Physics VIII), where he says: "Of all motions, local motion least withdraws what is moved from its essence, for by this motion alone nothing that is 'in it' is changed." But he declares how this is to be understood when he says: "As in what is altered, the quality; in what grows and diminishes, the quantity." Therefore no proper, real form is lost or acquired by local motion. Yet some intrinsic mode cannot but vary; otherwise it would not be a true change, as has been shown. Add that local motion of a

body, according to all, is subjectively in the mobile itself—as is almost evident to sense. But local motion, like any other, is nothing but a path to its intrinsic terminus; therefore the intrinsic terminus of such motion is also in the mobile itself, because the path and the terminus cannot be wholly distinct things and, consequently, cannot be in distinct subjects. But the terminus of local motion is ubi itself. Therefore, etc.

SECTION II
WHETHER UBI IS THE PLACE OF A BODY, SO THAT ONLY BY IT CAN ONE TRULY SAY THAT A THING IS IN A PLACE

1. Two further doubts arise from the foundations of that first opinion. The first is whether ubi, as we have explained it, is the place of a body, or whether besides it there is given a place that is something extrinsic to the located thing.

First, Affirmative Opinion

2. From what has been said the affirmative seems to follow. First, because by local motion one primarily acquires place; but one acquires only the intrinsic ubi, as has been shown; therefore, etc. Second, because local adverbs presuppose place and are taken from it; but they are taken precisely from ubi, for just as from ubi in general a thing has that it is "somewhere," so from this or that ubi it has that it is "here" or "there," which are local adverbs. Third, because the last sphere is in a place, for it is repugnant for a body to be and not to be in some place; but in it there is no extrinsic body that could be its place; therefore it is in a place solely by reason of its ubi; therefore ubi is place. Fourth, because otherwise, besides ubi, there would be given "place"; therefore one would have to constitute a new category on

account of it, since it does not pertain to quantity, as we saw above; therefore if it is also excluded from the category of ubi, it must constitute a proper category, since it cannot be denied that place is one of a thing's accidents. Philoponus and others wanted to teach this part when they said that space is place, although they did not sufficiently or suitably explain the matter. The arguments they use are aimed chiefly at showing that place does not consist in something extrinsic, such as a surface or containing body; once the extrinsic is set aside, nothing remains that could be place except ubi.

Second, Negative Opinion

3. On the other side stands, first and most of all, Aristotle (Physics IV), who, after a long discussion through the first five chapters, concludes that place is the ultimate surface of the immobile containing body. Second, the properties commonly ascribed to place cannot be accommodated to ubi, namely to contain the located thing and circumscribe it, to be equal to it if it be a proper place and not a common one, likewise to be "filled" by the located. These and the like cannot be said of ubi with respect to the intrinsic mode we have explained. Indeed from these properties it is gathered that place ought to be something discontinuous from the located in order to surround it; for this reason one part of a continuum is not the place of another, because they are continuous. Likewise, place is commonly divided into "natural" and "violent," "healthy" and "unhealthy," which cannot in any way be adapted to that intrinsic mode we have set out. Because of this, and especially because of Aristotle's authority, the latter opinion is more common among almost all the commentators on Physics IV, although they vary in the way they explain how a surface is place and how it is immobile.

A Resolution & a Certain Reconciliation of the Foregoing Opinions

4. For whom "place" was named. I think many things are involved in this question that concern only a manner of speaking, provided we agree on what has been said about ubi and about that intrinsic mode. Once this is posited, two things are certain. First, that in bodies existing in a place there is an intrinsic mode by reason of which they can terminate local motion. Second, that besides this intrinsic mode there is regularly, in bodies, an extrinsic circumscription of one body by another that is near and contiguous to it; this is evident to sense. With these two things certainly existing, the question seems to remain only about the name—which of these deserves the name "place." Therefore one should adhere to the more common way of speaking and judging of the wise. Some, however, to avoid verbal controversy, use a not unreasonable distinction between "intrinsic place" and "extrinsic place," and say that ubi is the intrinsic place, while the containing surface is the extrinsic place. Toletus reports and explains this distinction at length (Physics IV, q. 8) and judges it very probable. The arguments we made on both sides seem to favor it. If, however, we must speak simply, it seems that the name "place" is more properly imposed upon the extrinsic, containing place; and therefore Aristotle simply spoke of it under the name of place. For truly "to be in something as in a place," strictly speaking, seems to signify a habitude to another thing distinct from and containing the located.

5. Hence, if the circumscribing body is set aside, a body does not very properly seem able to be said to be "in something as in a place," because neither is it "in imaginary space" as in a place, since that space is nothing; and under the name of place all understand something real. Nor is it "in intrinsic real space" as in a place, for rather the body itself is such "intrinsic space," at least really. Nor will it be said properly to be "as in a place" in that intrinsic mode we have explained, for neither does that mode stand as a receptacle of the located—which habitude is signified by the phrase "to be in a place"—nor does that mode so affect the subject that it stands in any other way as "that in

which" the subject is, rather than "that in which" the mode exists. If therefore "to be in a place," in the propriety of the expression, says a habitude to a thing containing and distinct from the located, then "place" will not properly be said of ubi itself, but of the extrinsic place, whether proper or common or remote, as when we say that water is in a vessel, or in a house, or in the world.

6. How place is divided into mathematical and physical. This "proper" place is also commonly divided into "mathematical" and "physical," so that the former is any ultimate containing surface, while the latter is an immobile surface; for thus Aristotle defined it (Physics IV). This immobility cannot be understood of one and the same numerically identical real surface, for there is none that is not mobile with the motion of its body; rather it must be understood by relation or immutable distance to the world's center and poles, inasmuch as, in fact, these are fixed and immobile termini. In the order of possibility (since God could move the whole world locally at once), according to our mode of conceiving, we must have recourse to imaginary space; in it, just as we conceive extension, so also points, lines, and surfaces fixed and immobile; and according to this consideration that immobility is to be explained by an order to the surface or fixed termini of imaginary space. Of this matter more at large in Physics IV.

Reply to the Arguments Previously Proposed

7. To the first argument: by local motion one per se primarily acquires not place, but ubi; naturally, however, one always acquires extrinsic place consequently. From this natural concomitance arose the custom that, indifferently in ordinary speech, one says that by local motion one acquires "place" or "ubi." From the same root arose the fact that local adverbs are taken not only from extrinsic place but also from intrinsic ubi. For extrinsic place is better known, and from it these denominations are more frequently taken—and often from common place, as when we say someone is "at home" or "in the

square," etc. Sometimes, however, these denominations made by local adverbs are taken precisely from intrinsic ubi, namely when they do not connote a respect to another surrounding body but only indicate presence, as "to be here" or "there," which are called local adverbs because of their conjunction with some place; in propriety, however, they might be called adverbs of presence or absence. Thus the first and second arguments have been sufficiently answered.

8. In the third a very common question about the place of the last sphere is hinted at, which Aristotle and his interpreters treat at length in Physics IV, and which does not now matter to us. We hold it certain that it has its intrinsic ubi, as has been shown above. It is also plain that it has no extrinsic place by which it is contained on the side of its convex surface, because there is no higher body by which it is surrounded. Hence, following the way of speaking we have defended, it will have to be said that it is not actually in a place on that side, but only in potency, because it could be circumscribed by a higher body.

To Which Category Place Belongs

9. In the fourth argument the second doubt is raised, which I said arises here from what has been stated, and it obtains in either opinion. For whether we call ubi "place" and do not call the extrinsic circumscribing surface "place" but only "vessel" or "container," or conversely call the containing surface "place" and not ubi, or call both "place," one intrinsic and the other extrinsic, it seems certain that these two have primarily diverse ways of affecting or denominating. Hence it seems to me true that the extrinsic place, as such, does not belong properly and directly to this category of ubi, because neither intrinsically and essentially is it ubi, nor is it of its essence, as has been shown. Nor does it have with it an essential agreement, indeed not even a univocal one in the notion of accident. For ubi is a true accident intrinsically affecting and denominating: although perhaps there is no proper concrete name imposed to signify this

denomination—rather it is more often signified by adverbs—nevertheless in reality that mode truly affects the subject and constitutes its concrete, which (if one may coin a word) can be called "ubicized." And when a thing is said to be locally present, this denomination also is taken from intrinsic ubi; hence this has the proper and true nature of an accident. But extrinsic place, although in itself it is an accident with respect to the subject in which it inheres (for it is that subject's surface), nevertheless with respect to the body it surrounds it is not a true accident, because it neither truly affects nor changes that body, but only extrinsically adjoins and denominates it; hence only by a certain analogy and proportionality does it participate in the notion and predication of accident. For this reason I judge that such "place" and "ubi" cannot belong to the same category. By the same reasoning, applied proportionally, it can be shown that it does not belong to the category of quantity as a proper species thereof, in addition to the other reasons we have given above.

10. To which category extrinsic place pertains. When it is asked to which category extrinsic place pertains, it certainly seems to me to be reducible, under diverse aspects, to diverse categories. If place is considered as an extrinsic measure of the located, it can be reduced to the category of quantity—not as a species thereof, but as a property. If it is considered as an extrinsic terminus, then properly it belongs to no category, because under that aspect it does not have the notion of a form affecting, but only of an extrinsic terminus beyond which the quantity of another body is not diffused, which is a kind of negative notion. Hence, under this aspect, not only is the surface of the containing body the terminus of the contained body, but conversely the contained is the terminus of the container; thus the highest heaven, although on its upper side it has no extrinsic terminus, nevertheless has one on the lower side, namely the convex surface of the first moved sphere, which some therefore call the place of that last sphere. If, however, place is considered only as to the relations that result between it and the located, all those belong to the category of

relation—including the habitude of container and contained, if it is taken formally under the notion of relation and not merely fundamentally. Again, if place is considered as protecting and defending the located or conserving it, then it does not have the notion of an accident but of a cause: either per se, if by some proper influx it conserves the located, or per accidens, if it only protects the located by preventing harm—like a house protects a man. Finally, if place is considered as a certain extrinsic form of the located—which seems to be its proper notion—then it certainly seems to have the same mode of denominating as "habit" has with respect to the clothed man, and therefore it may not without reason be referred to that category, which we will explain more conveniently in that place.

SECTION III

WHETHER UBI, IN THE TRUE AND REAL SENSE, BELONGS ONLY TO BODIES OR ALSO HAS A PLACE IN CREATED SPIRITS

1. The reason for difficulty. The reason for doubting is that, although ubi and extrinsic place are distinct, they are nevertheless never separated; therefore things that are not, nor can be, properly in a place cannot have a proper ubi. Such are incorporeal substances; for these, as Aristotle testifies (On the Heavens I, c. 9), are subject neither to place nor to time. Hence theologians commonly say that incorporeals are not in a place—properly, that is—but only metaphorically; the axiom is taken from Boethius (De Hebdomadibus, c. 1). And the point is confirmed, for otherwise ubi would have a place even in God, which is false, since God is beyond every category. On the contrary, created spirits are not only metaphorically, but truly and properly moved locally; therefore the primary terminus of local motion truly and properly belongs to them;

but such a terminus is ubi itself, as has been said; therefore ubi properly belongs to them as well.

The Sense of the Question Clarified

2. It should be noted that two questions are commonly confused in this matter, which must be distinguished to avoid equivocation. Because we cannot philosophize about spirits except by proportion to bodies—either affirming something of them or removing—so, just as in bodies we find two things, namely an intrinsic ubi and an extrinsic place, so two things can be asked about spiritual substances: one, whether they are in extrinsic place; the other, whether they have a proper and intrinsic ubi. These questions are without doubt very different, although akin and conjoined. In the present discussion we are dealing directly with the latter question; we shall touch upon the former where something is needed incidentally.

First Opinion Denying that There is Ubi in Angels

3. Some hold that in spiritual substances there is not given an intrinsic ubi that belongs to them according to themselves, that is, immediately and without some conjunction to a body, but only by a denomination from a body; therefore it cannot be called an intrinsic ubi, but at most an extrinsic "place," by a certain analogy and proportion. Durandus necessarily presupposes this opinion (Sentences I, dist. 36, qq. 1–2) when he simply denies that an angel is in a place or is "somewhere." The same seems presupposed by those authors who say that an angel is "in a place by his operation," and, that being removed, he is nowhere; the first point is taught by St. Thomas (I, q. 52, a. 1), where he consequently denies that an angel has "situs" (which seems the same as having an ubi). Both points are more expressly taught by Thomists, inferring one from the other, as is clear from Cajetan there and at q. 53, a. 1; Hervaeus, Sentences I, dist. 17, q.

1, a. 2, and the treatise De Motu Angelorum; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles III, c. 68; and Capreolus, Sentences II, dist. 2, q. 1. The proof runs thus. First, ubi as such intrinsically presupposes quantity and extension; therefore it has no place in a spiritual thing. The antecedent is clear: to be somewhere, as we have explained it, is intrinsically to occupy or fill space—or, if one prefers to speak thus, to constitute real space, because with the thing that is said to be somewhere set aside, space is nothing. But a spirit, with the body set aside, cannot fill or constitute real space; therefore it cannot have a proper ubi. The minor is proved: to fill or occupy space is understood by us in bodies solely because a body existing thus cannot be together there with another; but this mode of occupying space has no place in spirits. Again, real space neither is nor can be understood except with a distance of parts; otherwise it is not a space or divisible thing. But a spirit does not have extension of parts in itself; therefore it cannot constitute real space in itself; therefore it cannot have an intrinsic ubi.

4. Hence, second, I argue: if a spiritual thing had an ubi according to itself, it would also have situs and distance. The consequent is false, for these cannot be understood without quantity. Third, if we conceive angels existing before all bodies, we cannot understand that they have an intrinsic ubi; therefore it is a sign that they are not capable of this accident because of the indivisibility of their substance. The antecedent is clear: for if they had an ubi, they could be understood to be distant from each other, and consequently one "above," another "below"—which the mind cannot grasp without extension and quantity. Likewise, then the angel could not be "whole in the whole and whole in any part," for there would be neither whole nor part, nor a real space in which these could be distinguished; and by the same token neither would the angel then be "in a quasi-quantitative point," because this has position in a continuum and thus implies relation to parts; therefore no intrinsic ubi could be understood in such an angel. Finally, otherwise God too would have His intrinsic ubi and consequently God would be everywhere even if

nothing created existed outside Him—a point the Scholastics more often deny (Sentences I, dist. 37), especially Albert (a. 4), Bonaventure (a. 2, q. 2), and Alexander of Hales (I, q. 9, memb. 4); and the saints favor this when they often say that, creatures being set aside, God is not "somewhere," but "in Himself."

5. First inference from the foregoing opinion. From this opinion it follows, first, that an angel is not only not in an extrinsic place by himself, but he is not "here" or "elsewhere" except by reason of an extrinsic body; for since ubi is proper to a corporeal thing, the local adverbs, which are as it were denominations taken from place or ubi, cannot belong to a spiritual thing except through the mediation of a body—as when my soul is said to be "here" because my body, to which it is united, is here. Hence a spirit cannot receive this denomination through the mediation of a body except by reason of some special union or conjunction with it, whether this be by information (as in the human soul), or by operation, or by whatever other kind of union.

6. Second inference. Second, it follows that an angel cannot be moved locally except by reason of a body by whose mediation he is said to be somewhere; for local motion is intrinsically terminated at ubi; but the angel has no ubi with the body set aside; therefore, etc. Hence if we imagined angels created before bodies, they could not be moved, because neither would they be "here" nor "there"; therefore they could not pass "from here" to another ubi. Likewise motion and passage require distance; with bodies set aside there is no distance, because there is no extension; therefore, with bodies set aside, local motion cannot be understood in a thing that is merely spiritual, with the body (I say) set aside that either moves together or at least constitutes the distance along which the spiritual thing may be moved.

Second Opinion, Attributing a Proper Ubi to An Incorporeal Thing, Approved

Section III

7. The second opinion affirms that there is in a spiritual substance a proper and intrinsic ubi. Although authors rarely speak under these terms, the thing itself is frequent. This, indeed, is what they intend who say that an angel is in a place by his substance or by a substantial presence, and that he will necessarily be somewhere even if he operates in no body and is really united to none. This opinion is held in Sentences II, dist. 2, by Bonaventure (part 2, dist., a. 4, q. 1), by Scotus (q. 9), Gabriel, Gregory, and others; by Alexander of Hales (II, q. 32, memb. 1, near the end, and especially in the solutions of the arguments); by Marsilius (Sentences II, q. 2, a. 2); and by Ockham (Quodlibet I, q. 4). I judge this opinion to be true. However, because about spiritual things as they are in themselves we can scarcely reason except from sensibles or by proportion to them, we must in the present case proceed likewise to declare and persuade this opinion.

First Assertion to Prove the Preceding Opinion

8. A spirit can be present by its substance in a bodily thing. I say, first: a spiritual substance can be in a bodily thing in such a way that according to its substance it is intimately present to it and non-distant from it. I am not now asserting that the substance of a spiritual thing is by itself a sufficient cause or reason of this presence; nor am I now disputing what this presence is—whether a relation, a mode, the substance of the thing itself, or an extrinsic denomination. I only assert that a spirit can truly be substantially present to a body intimately and, as it were, penetratively. In this sense the assertion is certain and evident. It is clear, first, by induction: God, who is the supreme Spirit, is intimately present to this corporeal universe not only by presence—that is, by knowledge—and by power or action, but also by essence or by His substance, as all theologians teach as something of faith, on account of divine immensity. And St. Paul says of the bodies of the just that they are temples of God (1 Cor. 3); in a most singular way the divinity is said to dwell in Christ's body (Col.

2), because the Word is intimately united even to Christ's body. Again, the lowest spirit, which is the rational soul, is intimately present by its substance to the human body, because a real union can neither be nor be understood without an intimate substantial presence, that is, without the absence of local distance; but between soul and body there is a real and intimate union. From these extremes one may infer something similar of angelic spirits, who, as it were, stand midway. For although they do not have so necessary a connection or union with a body as the human soul has in the notion of form or as God has in the notion of efficient cause, nevertheless they can, voluntarily or at the command of a superior, be present to bodies and operate in them. Thus Aristotle made the intelligences that move the heavens present to their spheres. And according to the doctrine of faith this is most certain: we believe that certain spirits are in hell, which is a bodily place, in which they are truly present by their substances; others are in the empyrean heaven, the seat of the blessed; and some at times in this air, moving among us, approaching and withdrawing from us. Therefore any spirit, as far as it depends on itself, can be non-distant from a body by its substance.

9. The reason is that any two things or substances can be non-distant with respect to each other, as far as it depends on them, if no repugnance arises between them from elsewhere; the repugnance between corporeal substances arises from quantity, as was treated above in Disputation XL—arises, I say, as to this, that they cannot intimately penetrate each other, not, however, as to this, that they cannot be together and non-distant at their ultimate termini; for this proximity repugns no bodies as such, unless from elsewhere by a special nature they are to be apart from each other. Therefore, with quantity set aside on either side or on one, it does not repugn that any two substances be intimately present to each other and non-distant, because neither has that by which it would exclude the other from itself or from its "place." For this reason a spiritual substance can be

present intimately in a body, whether it be in it or within it by its own efficiency, or be established there by the power of an extrinsic cause.

Second Assertion

10. Each angel can be present by his substance only to a finite space. I say, second: no created spirit can be present by his substance to a body of whatever magnitude; rather each has in this a limited sphere. This is likewise a certain thesis among theologians, who condemn as erroneous Durandus's view because he said that angels are everywhere—though he spoke in a more obscure sense of which elsewhere. Reason can also sufficiently demonstrate this from the limitation of angelic substance as to essential perfection, from which it follows that it has all its properties or powers finite and limited; one of these properties is to be able by its substance to be present to an extended body. Finally, from what has been said above about God's immensity this truth is sufficiently clear, since to be immense is proper to God, and therefore it is unnecessary to linger over proving what is certain.

Third Assertion

11. Any angel can change his real presence with respect to space. From these two principles a third follows, which is likewise indubitable, namely that a created spirit can truly and properly change the real presence and proximity and the real distance that he has with respect to bodies—not only by a change of the other term, but also by a change of himself, which sometimes can be made together with a body, sometimes without it. All these things can most easily be seen in the human spirit. Although at the beginning each soul is conjoined to its own body and does not depart from it as long as the body lives, nevertheless while the body lives it is transferred together with it from place to place, and it truly loses the proximity it had to certain bodies

and approaches others; for when the body is moved, it is necessary that the soul be moved with it, since it is adequately "in it." Again, at death it not only loses the information of the body, but also the proximity or non-distance, because it no longer remains within the body; it loses this not by the motion of another body, as is clear of itself, but by a proper change of the spirit. The same, proportionally, must be understood of angels. Although they are not united to bodies as forms, nevertheless they can be present to them—whether as movers or otherwise—and therefore they can either be carried together with them, as when an angel assumes a body, or transfer their substantial presence from one body to another, as when an angel descends from heaven to earth. All this is certain for us also from the manner of speaking of Scripture, which simply and in full propriety thus speaks of angels, relating history and narrating their deeds; but of this elsewhere.

12. The reason is that the angelic spirit can only exhibit his substantial presence to a finite body; and he is not by his nature determined to any certain body, nor to the same immutable situs of some body; therefore he can exhibit that presence now to this body, later to another; or now to this body in this situs of it, later in another. The minor, as regards angelic spirits, is clear: since they are not forms of bodies, they are bound to no certain bodies; and for the same reason they have by their nature no determinate situs in the universe in which each must necessarily be present to the body existing there; for there is in the angel no natural property by reason of which he determines for himself that quasi "natural place." The consequence is proved from the perfection of angelic substance, which is a living being in a perfect mode (as was said above, Disputation XXXVI). Although it matters little to the present point whether an angel can move himself or be moved by another; it suffices that, with respect to proximity or distance from a body, he can be changed.

Fourth Assertion

13. The change of local presence is intrinsic and truly in the angel himself. From these I infer, and I say, fourth, that this change is not attributed to the angel only by some extrinsic denomination, but is truly and really and intrinsically—or inherently—made in him. This assertion is contradicted by Cajetan and many Thomists (I, q. 53, a. 1), where Cajetan says that an angel is not moved as the subject of motion; the same was held by Hervaeus (Sentences I, dist. 17, q. 1, a. 2) and hinted at there by Giles (q. 10), and a fortiori by Durandus, who, since he thinks that, in the way he is in a place, an angel is everywhere, consequently denies that he can properly be moved. Ferrariensis (Contra Gentiles III, c. 102) and Soto (Physics IV, q. 2; VI, q. 4) think the same. I hold the contrary to be altogether true and certain—not only on the principles of faith, but also in natural reason. The assertion is proved, first, from the common notion of true change, of which it is of the essence that it be in the subject that is said to be changed, as is clear from what was said above about passion; for by a mere extrinsic denomination no one is truly changed. But when an angel is said to be moved or to change place, he is truly changed; otherwise those expressions would not be true in propriety but only in a metaphorical sense—just as God is said to "descend" or "come," which is plainly false if taken properly. Therefore when an angel is changed locally, he receives in himself a true and real change. The minor can be proved by a theologian from the frequent manner of speaking of Sacred Scripture, which all the saints understand to be proper and not metaphorical, because where a metaphor is not necessary it should not be feigned, especially where the expression is so frequent and the narrative historical, and nothing elsewhere in the same Scripture is said that would contradict the propriety of the expression.

14. Hence the holy Fathers make in this respect a great difference between God and other created spirits. Since God is immutable—and Scripture often teaches this—when elsewhere it says that God "descends" or the like, it is clear that it speaks metaphorically.

Of the other angels, however, it is never said that they are immutable; rather Scripture often signifies that this is proper to God, as when by antonomasia He says: "I am God and I change not." Nor does natural reason teach otherwise, even speaking of local immutability in particular. Hence Aristotle did not posit all intelligences to be immobile, but only the First Mover. And St. Thomas (I, q. 9, a. 2), teaching that it is proper to God to be immutable, says that created spirits are mutable according to choice and according to place, by a true passive potency existing in them; and therefore (q. 53, a. 1) he teaches that an angel is moved by leaving one place and acquiring another. This is also the common opinion of the Scholastics: the Master (Sentences II, dist. 9), Alexander (II, q. 33), Albert (De Quatuor Coaequaevis, q. 9), Marsilius (Sentences II, q. 7, a. 3). And that this is the sense of the holy Fathers is clear from St. Augustine (Ep. 57 to Dardanus), St. Ambrose (De Spiritu Sancto I, c. 10), where he speaks most excellently and at length; St. Gregory (Moralia II, c. 3); and St. Bernard (Sermon 5 on the Song of Songs): "That angels are changed from place to place," he says, "is as indubitably as manifestly proved by authority." The same is taken from St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 2, On Theology) and St. John Damascene (De Fide Orthodoxa II, c. 3; I, c. 17).

15. Next it is proved by reason. A created spirit is truly and properly present by his substance to some place or body, as was proved in the first assertion, and he is limited in that presence; and he does not otherwise have it by his nature determined to one body or to one situs of bodies, as was shown in the other assertions. Therefore he is capable of a true and proper change made in himself by which he passes from one bodily place to another. Therefore such a change must be made not only in extrinsic things that surround the angel, but also in the angel himself; for he truly transfers himself "according to his nature," as St. Ambrose says—that is, according to his substance and real presence—from one place to another.

16. Second, this is clarified and proved thus. An angel can be understood to change his presence or proximity to some body in three ways: first, by the transit or withdrawal of the body alone; second, without the local motion of any body, by the angel's change; third, if the body is moved and the angel together with it and in it. When the loss of presence or proximity is made in the first way, then truly there is only an extrinsic denomination in the angel; and therefore he then cannot properly be said to descend or to be moved locally, for in this way even God Himself ceases to be in a thing in which He previously was by the ceasing of that thing without any change in God. And one body can in this way lose contact or circumscription or proximity to many bodies without any change in itself, as we said above concerning a tree standing in a river. For this reason an angel that is the mover of some heaven is neither per se nor per accidens moved by the motion of his sphere, as St. Thomas noted (I, q. 51, a. 3, ad 3); for although he continuously changes his presence to diverse parts of his mobile, that whole change is by the mobile's change, the moving intelligence remaining in the same partial situs of that mobile. From this first member it is sufficiently clear that a variation of "material place," so to speak, by extrinsic denomination is not sufficient for an angel to be said to be moved.

17. But when the angel's change is made in the second way, it is necessary that, by a proper change received in the angel himself as in a subject, he lose or acquire presence or proximity to bodies; for that acquisition or loss is not made by a change of another; therefore it must be made by the angel's own change. The antecedent is clear because we suppose no other body to be moved locally; but it is impossible to understand that things which previously were conjoined are now distant unless by the local change of one of them. That the angel often changes presence in this way is clearly confirmed by the example of the rational soul which, when it is separated from the body, loses the real presence it had to it and acquires another in heaven or in hell; and then, speaking per se and necessarily, no local change is made

in the body that is deserted by the soul, nor in any other; therefore that change must necessarily be understood as subjectively and intrinsically in the substance of the soul. The same is the change which, according to our faith, frequently happens in the same soul from purgatory to heaven. What local change of some body is necessary for that change to take place? Therefore with much greater reason we understand this to be true in angels who ascend to heaven or descend to earth with no local motion made in bodies that is per se necessary. And according to the theologians' doctrine they accompany souls as they go to their places. The a priori reason is that an angel is moved not only per accidens but also per se. It would be a great imperfection in a mutable substance—or one needing motion—to be able to be moved only per accidens by the motion of another. Therefore, when an angel is moved per se, applying himself to this place or another, that motion cannot be except in the angel himself, because it exists in no other.

18. Hence it is further proved that the same must be said in the third way, in which a spiritual substance is moved together with a body—for example when an angel, having assumed a body, walks with it, as when an angel carried Habakkuk. First, because then the angel is moved per se as much as if he changed place alone; therefore the concomitance of another body moved by him does not take away that he truly receives in himself the motion, as if he alone were changed. The consequence is clear, because the concomitance of another does not impede a proper change, especially since it is not so much a concomitance as a consequent in the order of nature, as I now explain. The antecedent is clear first in that example of Habakkuk: for the angel was not then carried, but carried the man with him; therefore the angel per se was moved, but the man, as it were, consequently to the angel's motion or virtual contact—just as when a man or a horse moves, dragging a stone or a cart, the man or the horse is moved more per se than the thing dragged. And the same holds strictly even if the angel is moved in an assumed body by a motion that seems

progressive. For although as regards us—that is, in the external appearance—it seems that he is moved per accidens, because the whole appears after the manner of one living body, nevertheless in truth what is moved is not one per se, but two, which do not have between them a union except that of mover and moved; and therefore the angel is not properly moved by the motion of the body, but moves himself and carries that body with him, which is called "assumed" accidentally because of the motion with a peculiar mode and representation. Therefore then too the angel's proper motion is received in himself.

19. I clarify this further. Although the motive power of both —of the angel and of that body—is in the angel alone, nevertheless he does not move both by one impulse or one action. For the action by which he moves the body is in the body itself (I speak of a transitive action); that action would not suffice to move or carry the angel himself at the same time: both because there is presupposed no such linkage between the angel and the body by reason of which, when the body is moved, the angel is carried unless he carries himself, so to speak; and also because an angel could impel and project a body while remaining himself immobile. I add, even if we grant that the angel is then moved per accidens, it is necessary that he receive in himself a change by which he truly and in himself is changed, because he truly changes the "formal place," so to speak, in which he previously was—just as a man who is carried in a ship, although he is said to be moved per accidens, nevertheless truly receives a change in himself; for although he does not change the surrounding material place, he changes the formal place, which Aristotle said is immobile. Hence he is called "moved per accidens," not because he is not truly changed in himself, but either because that change is not per se, but consequent upon another change, or certainly because he is not moved as a whole but after the manner of a part of one integral mobile. The best example is the rational soul conjoined to the body: although it is said to be moved per accidens when the body is moved, nevertheless it truly is

itself moved and changes its partial place. Therefore much more will this be true in an angel, who is no less determined by his adequate place than is the soul by the body.

20. Finally, the point is proved by a reason common to all these cases. When the angel is moved together with another body in this way, although he does not lose his substantial presence to that body with which he is moved, he nevertheless loses the proximity he previously had to other bodies to which the body moved by him was previously near. For example, when the angel spoke with the Blessed Virgin, since the body through which he spoke was near the Virgin, the angel's substance too was near—not by an intimate substantial presence within the Virgin's body (for we suppose him to have been definitively in that assumed body), but by a certain local proximity proportionate to him. The mind cannot grasp that the body in which the angel spoke was near the Virgin and that the angel by his substance was intimately and definitively in it and yet did not have some proportional, though true and proper, proximity of his substance to the Virgin's body. Therefore when that angel departed by the local motion of his body, just as that body lost its proximity and gradually became more and more distant corporally, so too did the angel become more and more distant substantially and locally in a mode proportioned to him. Therefore this could not be done without a proper change received in the very substance of the angel. The consequence is clear because proximity between two things cannot be lost or changed except by the change of one of them; but then the Virgin's body was not changed locally; therefore that proximity could not be lost except by the angel's own proper change.

21. Nor can it be said that by the sole change of the assumed body the proximity between the angel's substance and the Virgin's body was changed; for that assumed body was neither the foundation nor the extreme of that relation; therefore by the sole change of it that relation is not taken away. Hence that body could very well have been moved by God or by the angel himself by an impulse, or have been

dissipated and corrupted, while the angel's substance remained equally near the Virgin's body, as, for example, by operating in the air or in another body introduced into the place of the other. Therefore the change made in the body is not sufficient for the angel's substance to lose proximity, unless some change be made in the angel himself. Thus it is sufficiently clear from these last two modes explained that an angel is so truly and properly moved that he himself is the proper subject of that change by reason of which he is said to be moved.

22. Nor do the cited authors object anything against this assertion or the preceding ones that requires a special reply. They merely presuppose the foundation that in a spiritual thing there is no proper and intrinsic ubi; and from that they consequently philosophize. For if an angel has no intrinsic ubi, neither can he have an intrinsic motion. We proceed in the contrary order: from what seems more known and evident we go on to demonstrate the contrary resolution of the proposed question.

Fifth Assertion Directly Answering the Question

23. Angels have a proper and intrinsic ubi. I say, fifth: in a finite immaterial substance there is given a proper and intrinsic ubi proportioned to it. This assertion follows manifestly from what has been said, and Gregory of Rimini defends it at length against Capreolus's objections (Sentences II, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2) posed at the end against the second conclusion, where he seems to speak indifferently in this respect about bodies and spirits. I speak of a finite substance because I am now dealing with an accidental ubi, which has no place in God; of which also above, Disputation XXX, section 7, something was said, and below, in solving the arguments, something will be added. Once posited, the assertion follows clearly, as I judge, from the preceding. For every motion inhering intrinsically in some subject leaves in it some real terminus (for motion is essentially a path to a terminus), and it cannot be that the path is in one subject and the

terminus in another, since the path is nothing other than the intrinsic acquisition and dependence of that which is made; hence if the path is in a subject, in the same the thing which is acquired through it is made. From this principle we argued above about the ubi of bodies; but the principle is in itself general for every subject and every change, for the reason given is universal and abstract. But in the substance of an angel, when he is moved locally, there is some true, real change, as has been shown; therefore something is acquired or lost by it in that substance which is intrinsic or inhering. But this can be nothing other than ubi, for local motion tends only to ubi. Therefore, in a finite spiritual substance there is given an intrinsic ubi. And this reason, which by itself seems to me sufficient, the principles being posited, will be yet more evident by declaring what this spiritual ubi is—something that will be done more conveniently in the next section.

SECTIO IV

WHAT PROPORTION DO THE WHERE OF BODY AND THE WHERE OF SPIRIT OBSERVE AMONG THEMSELVES

1. Before we reply to the foundations of the first opinion set out in the preceding section, the nature and rationale of the spiritual where (ubi) itself must be explained more fully. This cannot be done except through a comparison with the bodily where and by setting the two alongside one another.

2. The Angelic Where Differs in Kind from the Bodily Where. I say first that the angelic where differs in species from the bodily where. The proof is that the where of body is material, whereas the angelic where is spiritual. Again, by reason of the bodily where the subject is extended in relation to place in such a way that the whole is in the whole and the part in the part of the space it occupies; by contrast, by reason of the spiritual where the subject is not thus

extended, but is present indivisibly, so that, if the presence is with respect to divisible space, the whole subject is in the whole and the whole in every part. Third, the bodily where is such that it does not admit within the same space another body existing there naturally; but the angelic where, by its force and nature, does not exclude from the same space any other where whatsoever, whether bodily or spiritual. From these points one may sufficiently gather the essential difference between these two where's and, consequently, between the local motions of body and of spirit; this matter will occur again below, Section 5, where the agreements and differences between them will be more clearly set out.

3. I say, second, that one ought to philosophize about the angelic where with proportion, as we do about the where of bodies, with respect to many points in which they agree and which pertain to the present question. This is proved by applying, one by one and with proportion, what we said in Section 1 about the bodily where.

First Agreement Between the Where of Body & the Where of Spirit

4. The Angelic Where Is a Mode Really Distinct in the Thing from the Angel. First, then, this angelic where is a mode of the angelic substance, distinct from it by nature, by which the substance formally has, so far as lies on its side, substantial presence to a body occupying such-and-such a space. The proof is that this where is something that can be acquired and lost by a true real motion inhering in the spiritual substance itself; but whatever is of this sort is at least by nature distinct from the substance in which it is lost or acquired, as has often been proved above. This modal distinction suffices here, because by local motion the substance is not altered with respect to some thing really distinct from it; therefore neither is the local motion itself really distinct from the mobile, but modally. Hence a confirmation is taken: since local motion, as we have shown, is subjectively in the substance

of the angel, it must necessarily be its mode and distinct from it by nature, because it is something positive, real, and absolute that can be in it or not be in it; therefore the where, which is the intrinsic terminus of such motion, is a mode intrinsically affecting the substance of the angel itself.

5. The Formal Effect of the Angelic Where Is to Constitute the Angel as Present in a Place. Further, that the formal effect of such a mode is to constitute the substance of the angel as present here or there can be understood by the same proportion to bodies. Likewise, from what has been said about angelic motion and from other principles already posited, it is easily understood that this formal effect is necessary in the substance of the angel; there is no other form from which it could be given, nor is there any other formal effect which that mode could bestow; therefore so it is. The consequence and the minor are sufficiently self-evident. The major is briefly explained thus: the substance of the angel is truly and of itself intimately present to some body. That presence, although, inasmuch as it implies an order to another, is a relation, nevertheless, as it is the foundation of that relation, is something absolute not only in the body but also in the substance of the angel; for the sake of explanation it could be called "presence-being" (adsentia). But this foundation on the part of the angel is not his substance alone. For the angel, for example, who is now present to this hall, that same angel according to his whole substance could be in heaven, and there he would not found a relation of presence to this hall remaining in the same place. Therefore the substance of the angel as such, considered in itself, is neither the foundation of such a relation nor the formal terminus to which another's relation is directed. Hence something else must be joined to the substance; and this is nothing other than that "being here," which is understood in the manner of absolute presence in such a substance, which must formally arise from some intrinsic mode of that substance; therefore, so it is.

6. It is commonly answered that what is added on the side of the angel as the proximate rationale for founding this relation is not any mode in the angel himself, but his operation upon a body. But we shall refute this evasion below, showing that such an operation is neither necessary for that relation nor able to be the foundation or rationale of such presence. It is briefly shown from what has been said about the motion of the angel that the angel cannot have that presence formally through a mere denomination from some body or from anything else extrinsic to him, for it may happen that, when any given body recedes and another arrives, the angel, on his side, retains the same mode of presence, as was shown in the arguments above and will necessarily be repeated often in what follows. Therefore this formal effect of absolute presence or of existing here or there arises from some mode intrinsically existing in the very substance of the angel, which can be nothing other than the mode explained above by us.

Second Agreement

7. The Angelic Where Does Not Depend on an Extrinsic Body. Second, this where belongs to the angel, speaking per se, independently of an extrinsic body from which he perhaps here and now does not stand at a distance, or in which perhaps he operates—just as we said above that an intrinsic where belongs to a body independently of the surrounding body. This is proved in the same way, because in no genus of cause does such an angelic mode depend upon such a body: not as upon a form denominating extrinsically, as has been shown; nor as upon an efficient cause, because a body does not of itself act upon a spirit, speaking naturally; and with respect to the other genera of causes the matter is clear. Neither does it depend as upon a terminus, because it is not a predicamentally relational entity, but at most is the foundation of such a relation, and this will be confirmed more fully in a moment.

Third Agreement

8. Third, it must be added that this angelic where not only does not depend upon this or that body existing at the same time, but also does not depend simply upon body at all. In this it keeps proportion with the bodily where, to this extent, that just as the intrinsic where of one body does not essentially require another surrounding body, but can remain even if the remaining space is empty, so too an angel can retain the same real, spiritual, intrinsic where not only if bodies are changed, but even if they are altogether removed and the space is left void of bodies. The proof is that, just as it does not depend upon individual bodies, so neither does it depend upon all of them together, nor upon a determinate body, nor confusedly or disjunctively; for there is no greater reason for one dependence than for another.

9. Second, because this angelic where does not express an essential relation to real and bodily space; therefore, if such space is altogether removed, it could remain. The antecedent is proved thus: either that relation to such space would be as to a cause, or as to an effect, or as to a terminus. None of these can be said with probability; therefore, so it is. The minor is proved as regards the first part because, as I have already said, corporeal space does not of itself and naturally act upon a spirit, whether we are speaking of this space taken determinately, or absolutely of this or any other that might succeed here. As regards the second part, it is proved both because corporeal space as such and by reason of its entity is not, per se and of necessity, the effect of any created spirit; and although an angel can operate in such space, nevertheless this is neither always necessary nor can it be the rationale of presence, but rather presupposes presence, as I shall immediately explain. As to the third part, the proof is evident from what has been said: for this mode does not consist in a predicamentally relational entity; once that is set aside, no essential

dependence upon anything as upon a terminus can be understood in the present matter.

10. Third, I argue in this way. Let us suppose that an angel according to his substance is intimately present to some body. God can annihilate that body, conserving the angelic substance altogether unchanged with respect to every kind of real change and without producing or introducing any other body, but leaving that space, insofar as it was corporeal, empty; in all these things there is no repugnance, as is evident. Then let God reproduce that body with the same where that it had before; in this, too, there is no repugnance. Then I conclude: that angel is just as intimately present to the body so reproduced as he was before it was annihilated; therefore there is in the angel the same intrinsic mode of existing here, by reason of which he has that presence; therefore the angel always retained in himself that intrinsic mode, even when the space remained empty, and in this way we have shown in what the angelic where consists; and thus it is concluded that such a where does not of itself depend on corporeal space. The major seems self-evident, because the angel remained unchanged, and the body has recovered the same place or intrinsic where; therefore they will be as near and as intimate as they were before. Likewise, if the body had persisted without interruption of its existence in the same place and the angel also had remained unchanged, they would always have been together to the same degree; therefore, although their mutual presence was interrupted by the removal of one extreme, if that extreme is restored to the same state, the same nearness will be present. The first consequence is also clear from what has been said above, because to found mutual nearness it does not suffice that there be a foundation or where on one side without the other. Likewise, although that restored body were in the same where, if the angel had been changed from that where, they would not have the same nearness; therefore something must persist in the angel that by his change can be acquired or lost, which must be his intrinsic mode. The second consequence is clear from the first

supposition: the body was annihilated without a real change in the angel, and consequently was reproduced without any real addition made in the angel; therefore every real mode that is found in the angel both before the annihilation of the body and after its reproduction persisted in the angel during the whole time in which that body was annihilated and the space empty. Therefore the angelic where, as far as depends on itself, can equally be conserved whether the space is real and corporeal or empty—that is, nothing besides the angel himself.

Fourth Agreement

11. Fourth, from what has been said it is inferred, with greater reason, that this angelic where does not intrinsically depend on the angel's operation upon some body nor on any other real union with a body. The proof is that, if it does not depend on a body, as has been shown, much less will it depend on operation upon a body. Next, from what is proper to the case: if the angelic where depends upon operation upon a body, then either it does so a priori, as a cause or rationale of the angelic presence, or a posteriori, so that the operation necessarily follows upon the presence. Neither can be said; therefore not. The first part is proved thus: the operation by which an angel acts upon a body is understood either as transient and received in the body itself, or as immanent in the angel himself. The former is in itself material and at least for this reason does not have a causality upon the angel that can properly be called causality by real influx. It is also an action extrinsic to the angel, which at most can extrinsically denominate him as acting here, but cannot formally confer an intrinsic spiritual mode existing in the angel himself.

12. The latter operation, the immanent one, from which the transient proceeds effectively, is nothing other than the volition by which the angel wills to act upon a body. But this volition cannot by itself formally constitute the angel as present to that body, because that volition is an act existing in the will; whereas the intrinsic mode by

which we said the angel is constituted as existing somewhere immediately and proximately affects the substance of the angel itself, as does his local motion; therefore it is not formally a quality nor a vital act, but some accident of another rationale and of its own predicament. Hence even if we understand the angel to be without every vital act, we can very well understand him to remain substantially present where he was before; therefore the angelic where is not formally constituted by that operation. Indeed, it can effectively be caused by the will of the angel; yet this is not done by the volition whereby he wills to act upon a body, but by the volition whereby he wills to move and apply himself to this or that place—an objectively different volition. Add that, although the where arises effectively from this volition, it is not necessary that it depend upon that volition for its conservation; for after the angel by his will has moved himself and made himself present to some body, even if he does not have that actual volition, provided he does not have the contrary will of departing, he will remain present there, because there is nothing that necessarily changes him. Therefore in no way does the angelic where depend upon his operation as upon a cause.

13. And this is confirmed, for rather the angel's operation upon a body depends in some way upon his where as upon a cause, that is, as upon a necessary condition that it presupposes. For a finite agent, although spiritual, just as it operates given an already posited subject, so it presupposes conjunction or proximity to that subject in order to be able to act upon it, according to what we set out at length above, Disputation XVIII. But that proximity presupposes, on the part of the angel, such a where; for by the power of his substance alone as such he does not have it. Therefore operation upon a body presupposes the angelic where; it is not therefore its cause, unless perhaps a final cause, in that the angel applied himself to such a body in order to act upon it—an aspect of causality irrelevant to the present matter.

14. Now the other member is proved, namely that the angel's operation upon a body is not required as a necessary consequent of the angelic where. First, because such operation is free to the angel, not only as absolutely existing but also as existing here, that is, as having such a mode of presence, since nothing can be conceived that would necessarily determine the angel's will to such operation, speaking per se and by nature and setting aside God's extraordinary actions. Second, because the angel's operation upon a body cannot be anything except the local motion of that body, as was shown above in Disputation XXXV; but for the angel to have his intrinsic mode of presence and the respect of proximity to such a body existing somewhere, it is irrelevant that that body be locally moved, as is self-evident; therefore it is without foundation to say that such motion necessarily follows upon the angelic where.

15. Third, this is clear by induction, which confirms both members of the dilemma. First, the rational soul separated also has its own intrinsic where, as is proved by everything we have said, for these points are common to a finite spiritual substance as such; and yet the separated soul has no operation upon a body. Second, the angels, according to the common opinion of theologians, were created in the empyrean heaven and yet could do nothing operative there, since it remained always unchangeable; therefore they had there presence without operation. As to what Capreolus says that they were present there to adorn heaven, these are words only. For I ask whether they adorned heaven effectively, producing some ornament in it; and this cannot be said. What qualities, or what other thing, would they have produced in that heaven? Or he means that they adorned it quasi-formally, as a gem adorns a ring or a prince the throne on which he sits; and this mode of adornment consists in presence alone without operation. Add that the demons are in hell, not to adorn it nor to operate there, but rather to suffer, a passion which many theologians think consists chiefly (with respect to the pain of sense) in violent detention within the lowest and vile body, which they apprehend as an

instrument of divine justice. And although perhaps besides this pain there is another greater pain, nevertheless there is no doubt that this too is a punishment and that it could be the only one if God so willed; and yet that, strictly speaking, does not include any external action or passion beyond intimate presence. Furthermore, the angels, as we firmly believe, move among us and are present with us, and yet they are not always actually operating either upon us or in this middle air; for what continual operation of this sort can be plausibly imagined? As to what some say, that they are always attentive to operate if need be, this is irrelevant to the present matter, because that attentiveness is a purely immanent act, and even those existing in heaven could have it. If they reply that here they already have their power applied, this, apart from the inward purpose of the will, is nothing other than that they are already present and, as it were, proximate for acting, even if they do not actually act; and this is what we intend.

16. Convinced by these reasons, some admit that the angel's actual operation upon a body is not necessary for him to have substantial presence or proximity to it; yet they say that some real union of the angel to a body is necessary, by reason of which he is immediately said to be "in" the body to which he is united, and by reason of that union he is said to be distant or near to other bodies; for such relations, they contend, cannot be understood in the angel except through a body, nor can they befit him through a body unless some union to that body is posited. This may be understood and explained by a certain proportion to the rational soul united to a body. But those who think thus have invented something new, quite unnecessary, and inexplicable. For which of the ancient and weighty theologians ever posited a formal union between an angel and a body, setting aside efficiency? Or what necessity is there for this formal union to understand the intimate presence and non-distance of a spiritual substance with a corporeal one? Although in the soul this is found because it is the form of the body, and in the divine Word with respect to the body of Christ—or rather in the body with respect to the Word

—by reason of the peculiar mystery of the hypostatic union, yet between God and all corporeal creatures we find intimate substantial presence without such a union. If someone says that there efficiency intervenes and that union is necessary where efficiency is lacking, the reply is that, as we saw above, efficiency is not the rationale of that presence on God's side, but rather presupposes it; on the side of the creature, that efficiency is necessary because by it the creature comes to be and consequently comes to be present. Similarly, the union of the soul, although it is along with the intimate substantial presence between soul and body, is not the rationale of that presence nor altogether the same thing with it in reality; for before by generation the soul is united to the body, by creation it is made intimately present to it; and in the resurrection, for example, of Christ's body, before that soul was again united to the body, by local motion it ascended from limbo to the sepulcher, which local motion was not per se primarily terminated to the union of soul with body, but to local presence, upon which union immediately followed; therefore union is not the rationale of presence, but rather presence is presupposed for union.

17. Hence, according to absolute power, these do not convert as a consequence for subsistence, but presence is prior. For in no way can the union of soul to body be effected without intimate presence and proximity between them, as is self-evident; conversely, nothing repugnant follows if the soul according to its substance remains present to the body and is not formally united to it. Thus, for example, at the instant of death, when the union is naturally dissolved by the defect of the body's dispositions, God could very easily cause the soul to remain there locally present, unchanged; for what repugnance is there in conserving the soul present there without formal union, just as it is present to heaven and purgatory without a similar union? Moreover, it has been shown above that in angels there is an intrinsic mode of existing somewhere altogether independent of body, which, on their side, suffices so that, if a body exists there, they have between themselves an intimate and real presence; therefore beyond that mode

no real union between an angel and a body is necessary for presence; therefore it is not simply necessary, because no other rationale of this necessity can be devised.

18. Further, such a union is inexplicable. First, it cannot be a substantial union, as is manifest of the angels of whom we speak, because they neither inform bodies substantially nor do they supposit them or communicate to them their subsistence or existence; beyond these modes no substantial union of a spiritual thing to a corporeal can be understood. Nor can it be an accidental union, because, apart from a union by way of continuation, such as is through a mediating quantity—which has no place between spirit and body—no accidental union between substances can be understood except either through mere approximation and extrinsic denomination, as in bodies between place and the located, between clothing and the clothed; or through efficiency, that is, the impression of certain qualities, as fire is said to be united to glowing iron, and God united to the soul of the just. Besides these modes, up to now no other mode of accidental union between substances has been devised. So much so that Nestorius and other heretics who affirmed a merely accidental union between the divine Word and the man Christ could explain it in no other way.

19. And reason makes this clear. When two things are really united not by continuation but by their immediate conjunction with each other, it is necessary that some one real being be communicated from one to the other, because every real union tends to this, that from the extremes there result some one thing; and this does not happen unless either from them there somehow results one being or one communicates its being to the other. But from two substances as such there does not arise any one accidental being, nor can one of them formally or per se communicate to the other an accidental being except in an improper way—that is, through extrinsic denomination—because a substance as such does not have in itself such being and cannot formally communicate by itself except what it has in itself.

Therefore there cannot be between substances as such an accidental union except either effective or through some extrinsic denomination or relation, which are not true and real unions, nor do they require a proper mode of union in either extreme. In addition, every mode of union is reducible to some genus of intrinsic causality; but an angel standing by some place, if he causes nothing effectively in it, causes nothing at all; for it cannot be understood or explained what he intrinsically causes in the body; therefore neither can it be understood what peculiar union he has with it. Nor is there greater reason why an angel should have such a union to a body than a body to an angel, since the angel does not cause more in the body than the body in the angel; but to posit such a real mode in the body is very unlikely and incredible. Likewise, otherwise the separated soul would also be capable of this union to a body, setting information aside, because it too can be intimately present in some body; but that is unheard of and unintelligible. Finally, for the same reason one would have to say that when two bodies are placed penetratively by divine power within the same space, there is between them a real mode of union beyond their proper and intrinsic where's and the relations of presence resulting therefrom; but the consequent is plainly false, because it is altogether superfluous and without foundation. Now if two bodies can be understood as intimately present to each other penetratively without such a mode, why cannot a corporeal substance and a spiritual one be understood as mutually and intimately present to each other without that gratuitously invented and inexplicable mode of union?

Whether an Angel is Said to Be "As in a Place" in a Body in Which He Does Not Operate

20. It remains, therefore, that the proper angelic and spiritual where does not of itself depend upon a real union or upon operation in a body; and so a spiritual substance, by its intrinsic where, can be intimately present to some body having its own where suited to that

presence, even though there is no action or operation between them —just as one body can be near another or even penetratively present without action. Then a question arises, perhaps more about a way of speaking than about the thing: whether an angel, who is thus present to a body, can be said to be "in" it as in a place. In this it seems there is a diversity of opinion between St. Thomas and his followers and Scotus with his; for St. Thomas denies this, while Scotus affirms it, because for that it suffices to have substantial presence, by reason of which we say that angels are in heaven or are here, namely, as in a place. But if we speak with philosophical strictness, the opinion of St. Thomas is truer, because in such a body no relation can be understood to the angel by reason of which it would be called his place, for it has only the relation of proximity, as is clear from what has been said; and mere proximity does not suffice. For why should the body be called the place of the angel rather than conversely, since there is also in the angel a relation of proximity to the body? Likewise, even among bodies the located thing is near to the place, which does not suffice to make it the place of the located thing. Likewise, if two bodies are penetratively in the same space, neither is the place of the other, even if they are most proximate; therefore similarly here, and so on. The reason finally is that extrinsic place (for only of this can the question be) has the nature of a container; but that body in no way contains the angel, nor is it contained by him, but they are merely together concomitantly. Nor does Scotus prove the opposite by any argument; he only proves the substantial presence of the angel with respect to such a body. Whence those expressions—"the angel is in heaven," and the like—arose, and how they are to be understood, we shall explain a little below, where we shall make this clearer and confirm it.

Fifth Agreement

21. An Angel Created Before the World Would Have an Intrinsic Where. Fifth, from what has been said it is concluded that, if

God had created an angel before the corporeal world, he would necessarily have had his own proper intrinsic where, which would be a mode of his substance; in this, too, he keeps proportion to body, as we have explained. The proof is first from what has been said, because this angelic where does not depend on body; therefore, even if there are no bodies, an angel is capable of a proper where; therefore from this side there is no repugnance. But further, from the limitation of angelic nature there arises an intrinsic indigence and necessity of such a where even if there are no bodies. I explain this thus: if, after the angel has been created, God creates a body or this world, by the force of the creation of each it does not follow by intrinsic place that the angel and the body so created are mutually non-distant or intimately present substantially. In this there is a great difference between God and angels; for whenever and however a body is created, it must have God intimately present by essence—this comes from the immensity of God; but an angel is not immense, and therefore he is not necessarily, by his substance, present in every body that is created or generated, as even now we can see in the things of this world. Therefore, although an angel were created before a body, he would not necessarily be intimately present to the body afterwards created by virtue of its creation alone, although, if God so willed, he could also create that body so that it would immediately have intimate presence with the angel and the angel to it, for in this too there is no repugnance.

22. From each side, however, what we intend is inferred. For if the body and the angel so created do not have intimate presence, the reason is that each has a limited where, between which there is a certain distance, either real or apt to be made real, as we shall explain below. A sign of this is that that angel could become present to that body by his own local change, just as now by motion an angel becomes present to a body to which he was not present before, as has been explained above; therefore then the angel by that motion acquires a new where that can be adequate to his power; therefore he loses that which he previously had and received in his creation, even

before bodies. If, on the contrary, that body is so created that immediately, without a new change having been made in the angel, it is intimately present to him, this too is a sign that he already had beforehand an intrinsic where in which that presence could be founded, once the other proportional extreme is posited. An argument for this also is that, after that body has been created, the angel could depart from it and lose proximity to that body by his own change without the body's changing; therefore he would then lose some intrinsic mode of existing that he had even before the body was created— a mode that can be nothing other than the intrinsic where. Therefore, because the substance of the angel is finite, it necessarily receives a limited mode of existing according to which it can be absent or present, distant or near to other finite things. Thus, such a mode must necessarily be accidental and variable in the angel by his own change; in this consists the rationale of where. All of this properly befits the angel whether bodies exist or not.

23. And this is finally confirmed. If a single body is created, it necessarily has some where proportioned to it, even if no other created thing exists; this arises from its limitation. Therefore, proportionally, the same is true in the angel. You will say the case is not similar, because a body necessarily brings with it and constitutes real, extended local space, not so an angel. I reply that this difference is irrelevant; from it only this follows, that the where of body is extended and corporeal, not that the angelic where is so. For up to now we have said nothing about real space; nor do we hold real space to be necessary for a real where in general. Imaginary space is either necessary for every where or for none, because in reality it is not necessary, since in reality it is nothing; yet according to our mode of conceiving, neither the corporeal where nor the spiritual where can be explained by us except through a certain relation to imaginary space. Therefore, just as a single body is understood to have its own where without a relation to something distinct from itself, because it is really present to that space which we conceive as empty if nothing else is

there, so too a spiritual substance, even if it exists in a world without any body, can have its real where, not through a relation to something distinct from itself, but because it is present somewhere—somewhere where a body also could be present were it created there; and where we, too, conceive a space which, although we understand it to be empty of body, is yet no longer empty of every created substance, since the angel is truly and really there. And this opinion is favored by Aristotle, On the Heavens I, ch. 9, text 100, where he says that outside the heavens separated intelligences live the happiest life.

Whether the Angel's Intrinsic Where Suffices for Saying He Is in a Place

24. Immediately there arises a question similar to the preceding: whether then an angel can be said to be "in a place." And the same question arises when an angel is together with a body and does not operate in it: whether he can be said to be in a place by reason of his intrinsic where, even if the body is not his place, as we have said. I think this question too concerns a way of speaking. The reality is clear: namely, that by reason of this where the angel has, on his side, what suffices for him to be distant or near to other things. Likewise, it suffices for him to be able to be moved locally by changing diverse where's, for this is the intrinsic terminus of local motion. Hence I think it sufficient that, by this where, the angel is said through local adverbs to be "here" or "there," because these adverbs strictly do not signify a relation to an extrinsic thing, as we said in the case of bodies. These points being set, whether by reason of the intrinsic where alone the angel is to be said to be "in a place" has the same ground for doubt as exists in the case of bodies, about which we said it belongs to a way of speaking; and since these words "to be in a place" seem to signify a relation to something extrinsic, it is not proper to say this of a body by reason of its intrinsic where alone. With greater reason the same must be said of spiritual things. And for this reason, I

think, Boethius and others, indeed Aristotle as well (On the Heavens, ch. 9, text 100), have said that incorporeals are not in a place except metaphorically or equivocally. For they spoke not of where but of extrinsic place, which according to proper usage is not found in spiritual things, because by nothing extrinsic can they truly and properly be contained.

25. Angels Are Said to Be in a Place Metaphorically, as Grave Authors Hold. And of the same topic, as I think, St. Thomas spoke when, I, q. 52, a. 1, he said that an angel is "in a place" through operation or the application of power. For he is speaking of extrinsic and corporeal place, which, since it cannot befit angels properly—that is, according to proper quantitative contact—can be attributed to angels only according to a certain proportion and analogy founded upon virtual contact, which is through operation. And therefore, according to this view, neither an angel existing somewhere where there is no body, nor an angel existing where there is a body, that is, together with a body in which he operates nothing, will be said to be "in a place" in the aforementioned strictness and propriety. For, in the former way, there is no extrinsic thing that can be his place; in the latter way, although an extrinsic thing is present, it is merely concomitant, and without any relation between the angel and that body that could found either a proper or a proportional denomination of place; and therefore then the extrinsic body cannot have the notion of the angel's place, as we said; which being set aside, no other extrinsic place remains in which the angel can then be. Nevertheless, according to our manner of speaking, because spiritual things are compared to corporeal things as acts and forms, whenever they are present to bodies they are said to be "in" them; as when we say that angels are in the empyrean heaven. There, that "to be in" does not express a formal relation of place, but expresses presence in such real and corporeal space as is compared to the angel as something potential.

26. And according to this interpretation there is not a great diversity among theologians' opinions on the place of angels, some saying that an angel is "in a place" through operation, others through substantial presence. For if the former spoke of extrinsic place and the latter of intrinsic where, they say indeed different things, not contrary things—unless perhaps in a contention of words. If, however, those of the former opinion intend to deny angels' intrinsic where, or to constitute it as necessarily dependent upon actual operation upon a body, then there will be disagreement in reality, and in that sense we cannot approve that opinion. Similarly, if authors of the latter opinion constitute the intrinsic where in angels in such fashion that it is a sufficient rationale for saying that an angel is in another as in a place, we do not approve that either. By distinguishing, then, between proper where and extrinsic place, the reality itself, as I think, is easily understood and the modes of speaking are accommodated.

The Grounds of the Other Opinions are Answered

27. First. To the first foundation of the first opinion set out in the preceding section, the assumption is denied—namely, that where as such is intrinsically founded in quantity of bulk. For we think that where is something more universal than quantity; for besides a bodily and circumscriptive where, there is a spiritual and definitive where that does not need quantity. When it is objected that "to be somewhere" is the same as "to fill or constitute real space," the reply is that, if by the name of real space what is understood is that which actually has real and quantitative dimensions, then to constitute or fill space does not belong to the notion of where as such, but only of circumscriptive or quantitative where. And this, without doubt, is proper to the expression "real space," for by the name of space we understand a distance including quantitative dimensions; whence, when we add "real," we mean nothing other than that such space is filled by quantity of bulk. If, however, the name "space" is used more

broadly in reference to our mode of conceiving, then to fill space can be either quantitative or substantial—that is, by presence—which is nothing other than to be present there where a body is present or where we understand that a body could be present. And by this rationale we explain this where through an order to imaginary space—not because such space is anything, but because we need that manner of conceiving to explain these modes of things and the relations or habitudes resulting between things existing somewhere. Thus, above, when treating of duration, we often used the conception of time or imaginary succession, because we cannot otherwise explain the nature of duration or the relation of earlier and later of one thing to another, although that imaginary succession is nothing in reality.

28. Hence, to the second argument, which pertains to position (situs), we deny that it follows that position has a place in spiritual reality; for neither are position and where altogether the same, nor does position express a mode of every where but of bodily where, as we shall explain in the following disputation. With respect to distance, it must be said that this name "distance" can also be equivocal; for in local distance, of which alone we are speaking, many things concur: first, the extremes that are said to be distant; second, the interval that is between such extremes by reason of which they are said to be distant; third, the relation of distance that is believed to result in the extremes themselves. Therefore, distance can be called "real" either because all these elements are real, or at least because the extremes are real even if no true thing is interposed between them. Thus, the sides of this hall are so far distant from each other because they have such where's between which such a length of real quantity is interposed; yet if God were to remove the interposed air and leave the space empty, those sides would truly be just as really distant; indeed, as I think, they would retain the same relation of distance, because this is not founded upon a real medium interposed but upon the extremes themselves as having such where's, and it is terminated to the same. Although this real distance does not of itself and formally consist in an

actually interposed real quantity, it nevertheless necessarily requires that in act or in potency; for it is for this reason that the distance is so great, because the dimension of quantity is or can be so great between such extremes, nor can it be otherwise conceived or measured by us.

29. Accordingly, when in that argument it is inferred that there can be distance between spiritual things "according to themselves," that phrase can be taken in various ways. First, so that it means that a spiritual substance as such can be an extreme of real distance and have in itself the foundation of it, and consequently also the relation, if it has an extreme to which it can be terminated; and in all these respects I concede that a spiritual substance is capable of distance, either from a body or from a spiritual substance, as I shall immediately say. Then the phrase can fall upon "distance," inasmuch as it signifies the very interval that is between extremes that are distant, so that the sense would be that the spiritual substance by itself constitutes and, as it were, formally causes that interval; and this must be denied, because neither does it follow from what has been said nor is it strictly true. For although the angel can have his intrinsic where within that distance, nevertheless he is not the cause why that distance has breadth or extension; if it is real, this is always by quantity; if it is not real, it requires no real cause in act, but only aptitudinally, because such distance can neither be nor be understood by us except insofar as it can be filled by quantity of bulk. Another sense can be that "between angels according to themselves"—that is, between the angels alone—there can be distance, even if no real quantity exists in reality; and in this sense we think it true, because for this imaginary space suffices, which we conceive as apt to be filled with quantity. For two angels can have two where's by reason of which they found between themselves a relation of distance, because they can be so disposed that between them so much body could be interposed without their changing; and that suffices for distance, even if in fact no such body is interposed. The example is manifest in the distance of duration: for, setting aside all time or real succession, one angel can be

earlier or later than another in duration; and thus, although there is in them or between them no real extension of time, nevertheless they can be distant from each other in duration if God creates one before the other; and that distance is not conceived by us except through an order to imaginary succession and to real time that could be interposed between those two creations of angels. In the same way, then, one should philosophize about local distance; for similar reasons this does not always require quantitative extension in the things said to be distant, nor even in the intervening medium, although without an order to it or to the capacity for it that distance cannot be understood by us.

30. The Third Foundation Is Dissolved. Hence to the third argument the antecedent must be denied; for already it has been shown that, even if angels were created before the corporeal world, each would have his own proper and intrinsic where. I also concede that they would have between themselves local distance or proximity, for these are founded upon intrinsic where's even if extrinsic place is lacking. This is evident in bodies. For God could create another world whose outermost sphere would be distant from the outermost sphere of this world by a hundred or a thousand stadia, or by as much as God wished, as has been shown above when we were treating of God's immensity. The same rationale holds in this respect for spiritual substances; for to have distance it suffices that between the real extremes there be an interval that could be filled by so much extension of quantity. Whether those extremes are extended, or indivisible, or incorporeal makes little difference, because they do not cause distance but are in the termini of distance. This is explained thus: if one angel were in the empyrean heaven of this world and another in the outermost heaven of another world, they would truly be as distant from each other as those heavens themselves, because they would be defined by the places of those heavens, as I suppose; therefore, if God were to annihilate both corporeal worlds and conserve those angels intrinsically unchanged, they would still be distant from each other,

because they would retain the same foundation of distance; therefore, for the same reason, even if they were created before the corporeal world, they could be created substantially distant. The a priori reason is that none of them is immense, but each has a definite where that can be outside the where of another. And because by their nature they do not determine for themselves this or that particular where, nor do they exclude each other from the same space as bodies do, therefore they could also be created near or intimately present to each other substantially, according to the Creator's will.

31. Whether "Up" and "Down" and Other Such Differences Have a Place in Angels. As for what was added in that argument about the differences "up" and "down," it does not follow that these have a place among angels, bodies being set aside, because they are not taken from the precise rationale of where but properly from the heterogeneous parts of the human being or animal and their positions and peculiar operative powers, and from there by a metaphor are applied to this whole universe or heaven and its diverse parts. They are attributed to other things insofar as they are together with those parts of the world or in their positions; and thus the blessed are said to be "above" and the damned "below." Wherefore, bodies and the order of the parts of this world being set aside, that denomination could not be attributed to spirits. Likewise, if God were to create two worlds distant from each other, neither would be "up" or "down."

An Incorporeal Substance Does Not Always & of Necessity Have an Adequate Where

32. Concerning the confirmation of that argument in which it is asked whether, bodies being set aside, an angel existing somewhere would be "whole in the whole and whole in each part," or how he would exist, one must note that, although an angel according to the dignity and perfection of his nature determines for himself a certain sphere to which he can exhibit his substantial presence, nevertheless

he is not always of necessity present to the whole of that sphere, but he can be present to a lesser and lesser part, and even to a point—as theologians most often teach with St. Thomas (I, q. 52, a. 1; and In II, dist. 2), where Gregory at length, q. 2, and Major, q. 4, Bonaventure, and others. Only Scotus seems to call this into doubt, yet finally descends to the same opinion, which Ockham also holds (Quodlibet I, q. 4). Some moderns dissent from this view, saying that an angel necessarily has always an adequate where, that is, an adequate presence of his substance. They are founded partly on the fact that God always and necessarily has such a presence of his substance, and partly because this presence belongs to an angel by reason of his perfection; but he always necessarily has that perfection; therefore he has such presence.

33. Why God Necessarily Has Adequate Presence, But Not an Angel. Why a Body Necessarily Exhibits Its Whole Presence. But these arguments are slight. The case is far different with God, both because he is immutable and because his presence is in no way distinct in reality from his substance; both points are otherwise in an angel. And for this reason also the necessity of actual adequate presence does not rightly follow from the necessity of natural perfection, because in an angel these two are distinct by nature; and although presence follows upon natural perfection, it does not do so by a natural emanation after the manner of a proper passion, but by the free application of the will or of the motive power, or according to the Creator's will, if we speak of the first where created with the angel. There is, therefore, in this a difference between body and spirit: a body affected by determinate quantity necessarily (by natural necessity) has a where and occupies a space adequate to its quantity, but an angel by no means. The reason for the difference is that in a body the where and occupation of space arise from the natural repugnance that the parts of quantity have to each other with respect to the same space; but that a finite spiritual substance be present to extended space does not arise from any necessity intrinsic to it, and therefore it is voluntary within

the limit possible to it according to its perfection. In this a difference is to be noted between the rational soul and angelic substances: the soul, because it is truly the form of a body, is naturally not created except in a body and with union to a body, and therefore it is always created with presence proportioned and adequate to the body in which it is created; and so long as it is united to the body, by the same natural necessity it has presence adequate to its body. After it is separated from the body, it has in this the same indifference as other angelic substances who, since they are not forms of bodies, are not by their intrinsic nature determined to exhibit their presence within any certain extension.

34. From this example the common opinion can be confirmed; for the rational soul does not always have presence simply adequate to itself; for when it is in a small body, it does not have as great a presence as in a large body, nor in a mutilated body as in a whole one. Unless perhaps one imagines (as I once heard asserted by a certain theologian) that, when a man's hand is cut off, the soul does not lose its presence to that space in which the hand was, even if it loses union, but partly remains in the mutilated body and partly outside, present to the air, for example, contiguous to the arm. How absurd this is is sufficiently evident; otherwise by equal reason one would have to say that the soul of a child at the instant of conception is not only in the tiny body but, as it were, is diffused around through as much space as would be occupied by the greatest body that could be informed by that soul, because such a presence is absolutely adequate to such a soul; and thus it would come about that the soul, although created whole informing, would not be wholly within the body, because it would simultaneously be present to many bodies it did not inform—an absurdity most extreme and little consistent with sound doctrine. If, therefore, the substance of the soul does not necessarily determine all the presence it can have, since it approaches bodies more than angels do, neither will angels determine it.

35. How an Angel Created Outside Bodies Is Somewhere. Therefore, when in that confirmation it is asked how an angel would be somewhere if God created him outside a body, the answer is that he would be so as the Creator willed to constitute him; for then he would have a where by con-creation, and he would not determine by his nature a necessary mode or extension of his where. Therefore the determination must be taken from the efficiency of the Creator for the first instant of creation; afterwards it could be changed by the angel's will. In this I judge the same rationale to hold for an angel created outside all bodies or among them.

36. When it is objected that the angel could not then be "whole in the whole and whole in each part," because then there would be neither whole nor part, we reply first that there is an equivocation in that expression "to be in," for although when we speak of angels in comparison to bodies it signifies a relation to a real whole and to its parts, nevertheless, when we speak of an angel existing somewhere without bodies, it does not indicate a relation to a body, but such a mode of existing in the angel himself by reason of which, without any change in himself, he can be wholly present to a whole body and to each of its parts if he were present there, so that that mode is in act in the angel, whereas the relation signified by "to be in the whole," etc., is not actual but aptitudinal. And therefore that "to be in" is usually explained by an order to imaginary space, because then the angel would be whole in some space and whole in each of its parts—which we explained more at length above when treating of the immensity of God. Second, we say that, although in the substance of an angel there is neither whole nor part, nor would there be even if a body were present to the angel, because we suppose there is none, nevertheless in the angelic where there is whole and part; for it truly has some extension, not from the subject but from itself and, according to our mode of understanding, from its order to space, as was explained above when treating of immensity. Then, accordingly, one can say that the angel is "in the whole and in each part" with

respect to his where, and that his whole substance is in the whole where and whole under each of its parts. Third, God could then, if he wished, create the angel in a point—not a real point, because we suppose there is none, but according to our mode of understanding, in relation to such, because in imaginary space we conceive both the dimensions of quantity and points; and therefore, since the angel does not necessarily require extension in himself nor even in his presence, he could be created with an indivisible where, whether in a body or outside it.

37. The Predicamental Where Has No Place in God. Lastly, concerning the matter of the where of God himself—since it coincides with the matter of immensity, which was fully treated above—here it must only be added that predicamental where has no place in God, because predicamental where is an accident and a mode distinct by nature from substance; hence such a where is always finite and limited. But God's presence, which is his immensity, is infinite and is not a mode but is formally the very substance of God; hence it is neither an accident nor is it mutable in any way in God. Speaking, therefore, of this where, the inference of the argument must be denied. If, however, the discourse is of substantial presence, abstracting from the accidental mode, then it is true that in this proportion is kept: just as a finite spiritual substance is somewhere even if there are no bodies, so the divine substance is of itself everywhere—provided that "everywhere" does not signify a real relation to extrinsic place, but the mere rationale of the existence of the divine substance, which is of itself so immense that without any change in itself it is apt to be intimately present in any place. And the scholastics cited there do not deny this, but rather use this very distinction, although they indicate that the word "everywhere" properly indicates a co-presence to all things in which God is; which does not conflict with the truth of the matter that we have explained. See St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 22.

38. As for the inferences that that opinion draws, there is no need to respond, because the foundation from which they are drawn

has now been destroyed and the contrary assertions have been shown to be true.

SECTIO V
WHETHER WHERE (UBI) BELONGS ONLY TO SUBSTANCES, OR ALSO TO ACCIDENTS

1. Reason for Doubt. The reason for doubt can be this: where belongs only to those things to which local motion can belong, since where is the terminus of local motion; but only substances are properly moved locally, whereas accidents are moved only per accidens, by reason of substances. On the contrary, however, accidents are most properly said to be "here" or "there." But these are denominations taken from where and not extrinsic but intrinsic; therefore, so it seems.

First Assertion Concerning the Where of Quantity

2. Quantity Has Its Own Proper Where Distinct in Reality from the Where of Substance. In this matter, to begin from what is clearer, it must be said that quantity has its own proper where in reality distinct from the where of substance. This truth is manifest to us especially from the mystery of the Eucharist, in which, transubstantiation having been effected, the whole quantity of the bread remains, retaining the same where numerically that it had before consecration, and that is the proper where of quantity; for by reason of this one says that the quantity of the consecrated host is "there." One will perhaps say that this argument proves only that the where of the substance of bread remains, which before indeed affected the substance itself through the medium of quantity, but afterwards affects quantity alone; and hence it does not prove that quantity has a proper where distinct from the where of substance. But on the contrary: first,

the argument made concludes that the where which remains in quantity is really distinct from substance, but is only modally distinct from quantity itself. The first point is clear, because after consecration only accidents really distinct from substance remain, as has been said elsewhere. Likewise, because quantity is a thing distinct from substance; therefore, if that mode is really identified with quantity and only modally distinguished from it, it must be really distinguished from substance. Finally, God could also conserve the substance, destroying the quantity and its presence or where; and this is a sufficient sign of a real distinction—namely, when two things can be separated mutually and one can remain without the other. Conversely, a sufficient sign of merely modal distinction between quantity and that where is that such a where can in no way be separated from quantity, so as to be conserved in being without it. And finally, it has been sufficiently shown above that where by its notion is a mere mode of that thing which it affects first and makes present.

3. From this it can be further and easily shown that this where of quantity is distinct from the proper and intrinsic where by which the material substance is immediately affected in itself and made present even while it is subject to quantity. First, because God could separate quantity from substance, by corrupting quantity and conserving the substance altogether unchanged locally—which was amply proved above when we treated of quantity—and there is no contradiction in this. Then the substance would retain its own proper and intrinsic mode of presence, which cannot be anything other than a where; and according to that where the substance could by divine power be changed and transferred to another place. Second, because a substance is not present "here" merely by denomination from quantity or from a mode of quantity; it must have an intimate presence that is an intrinsic mode of its own—both for this general reason, that presence is always an intrinsic mode of the thing present, and because between quantity itself and its substance there is also an intimate and mutual presence and relation that has a foundation in each extreme.

But that foundation on the part of the substance is not its entity alone, for that entity of the substance could exist in reality and the quantity with the same where, and the relation would not follow, as is clear if God were not to change the substance of the bread of the Eucharist into another, but were to transfer it to another place and conserve it there. Nor is that foundation the inherence of quantity itself, because that presence, in order of nature, precedes inherence—at least on the part of the subject—as I shall immediately explain; and especially because, inherence being removed, God could conserve those two entities with intimate presence, as has been said above in similar cases.

4. Lastly, there is another reason. Substance is simply prior in order of nature to quantity; therefore, as such, it is presupposed to quantity with all the conditions required to cause materially, in its own genus, quantity itself; and one of the conditions required is to be "here and now." For just as it ought to be a singular thing, so it ought to have determinate and singular conditions of existing. Therefore this condition, which is to be present here, the substance does not receive formally from quantity. This is confirmed and made clear by what was said above concerning the rational soul: for it has its substantial presence in the human body equally intimate and non-distant from quantity as matter itself is, yet not with the same union, for soul and quantity are not united immediately as matter and quantity are. Hence the soul does not have its presence formally from quantity, but together with it. Again, between the soul itself and the substance of the body there is mutual substantial presence which formally at least and essentially is not from quantity; for by God's absolute power it can be conserved without quantity. But that presence is nothing other than a certain proper where of the substance; therefore the same must be understood of all corporeal substances.

Objections Answered

5. You will say: the common opinion of all is that a corporeal substance is not in a place except by means of quantity; but if each of them has its own proper and intrinsic where, then substance is no more in place by reason of quantity than conversely; therefore so it seems. Likewise, if quantity has its own proper where and communicates it to a corporeal substance, what need is there for another to be multiplied in the substance itself? Moreover, otherwise, as many accidents as there are really distinct in a thing, so many where's would have to be multiplied in each substance—a view both novel and superfluous.

6. How a Material Substance Is Said to Be in a Place by Reason of Quantity. I reply that a material substance is said, first of all, to be in a place by reason of quantity when we speak properly of extrinsic place by which it is contained and circumscribed. It must be noted that when one says that the rationale of being in a place is the intrinsic quantity of the body itself, the discourse is not about the formal rationale which denominates the thing as existing in a place. That formal rationale is rather the surface of the containing body; for just as the formal rationale of "being white" is the informing whiteness, so the rationale of "being in a place" (which is nothing other than being "located") is the place itself, as actually locating and containing. Therefore, in that expression the discourse is about the formal rationale that is on the side of the subject and renders it fit for such a place; and such a rationale is said to be in bodies the finite quantity, because by it they are rendered apt to be circumscribed and terminated by an extrinsic surface, so far as depends on themselves. For substance alone, lacking quantity, since it is penetrable to any quantity, can neither be physically touched nor contained by an extrinsic surface.

7. Again, if we speak of where, a twofold where must be distinguished: one circumscriptive—or rather circumscriptible—the other definitive; and we shall declare this distinction more fully in the following section. A material substance has, by reason of quantity, that

it be somewhere in the first manner by reason of quantity; and for that reason that mode is also usually called "quantitative." It consists in this, that a thing which thus exists somewhere necessarily has its parts in some way distant in partial places, so that one part is not intimately present to another, nor can they penetrate one another, speaking naturally. Now the whole rationale of thus existing somewhere arises from quantity, which is to be understood in the sense explained above; for to be actually somewhere in this way the quantified thing has from the quantitative where itself, yet the natural aptitude and necessity of thus existing it has from quantity alone, from which the substance and everything else inhering in it derive this, as is evident from what was said above in Disputation XL. For the parts of substance would not be repugnant to each other as regards intimate presence unless they were affected by quantity. But with respect to the other mode of being somewhere "definitively," which consists only in presence to a certain defined space, the substance does not have by quantity that it be capable of such presence, but from this alone, that it is such an entity; and, existing in reality, it demands such a mode of being. Hence, angels immediately and by their substance are capable of a proportionate mode of existing somewhere, and they always require some determinate mode.

8. From this the reply to the other question is clear. Because a corporeal substance, although under quantity, is a reality distinct from it and prior to it by nature, therefore of itself it necessarily brings with it an extrinsic mode of presence identified really with itself and distinct from the mode of presence of quantity. For what has quantity more, by which it brings with it a presence or location suited to itself, than substance itself? Therefore, just as quantity, by the very fact that it is, necessarily exhibits itself as present somewhere, so also substance by force of its entity, if it is considered precisely and separately. The only difference is in the mode of presence, as we have just explained. That those two presences are naturally conjoined, and that, one being varied, the other is also varied, does not take away their distinction but

arises from the conjunction of the realities in which such presences are rooted. And for an argument for distinction it suffices that it is simply not repugnant for one to be separated from the other, and conversely.

Second Assertion Concerning the Where of Other Accidents

9. Consequently, it must be said that where, taken in its whole latitude, is not confined to substances alone, nor among accidents to quantity alone, but belongs also to the other accidents, whether corporeal or spiritual, which exist in reality. This assertion is sufficiently proved for me by the third objection proposed above, in which this was inferred as something unacceptable; for truly, speaking consistently, it follows very well. For the arguments touched upon concerning substance and quantity prove equally with respect to any other entity. For if whiteness, for example, exists in reality—even if it is understood to be conserved by itself without quantity—it necessarily exhibits itself as present somewhere in a mode suited to itself. And in the Eucharist (as I have shown elsewhere) God could conserve whiteness without quantity, which he likewise could do by conserving whiteness altogether unchanged locally, and thus conserving it equally non-distant from other things as it was before; for there is no repugnance in this. Therefore it is a sign that whiteness has its own proper where, as it were definitive, distinct from the quantitative where proper to quantity. What has been explained in the case of whiteness is of the same rationale in any bodily accident and in spiritual accidents as well, such as angelic powers; for although they necessarily accompany their substance and are wherever it is, nonetheless there truly is in them their own proper mode of presence which each could retain if it alone were conserved, all other entities being destroyed.

10. Wherefore, in my opinion, those do not think rightly who say that separated substances are "in a place" by a power of operating

in a place and not by their substance as such. For if we speak of being in an extrinsic place, for this a power does not suffice; an operation is necessary by which they touch the place or the thing contained by the place, according to what we have explained in the previous section. But if they speak of being in a place inasmuch as it merely signifies "being somewhere" through intrinsic where, then it is false that a substance is somewhere by reason of power rather than by reason of itself; indeed, in some way the power accompanies the substance, although it too, by reason of its entity (if it has its own), requires its own peculiar mode of presence or location.

11. To the third objection, therefore—which is founded only on a certain wonder at the multiplication of modes of where—it must be said that there is no greater reason for wonder in where than in when, that is, in duration. For just as each thing, from the very fact that it has its own proper and intrinsic existence, has also its own proper and intrinsic duration, so it also has its own proper and intrinsic presence, although not equally identified with it; for it is not necessary to maintain the likeness in all points. Nevertheless, because all the accidents of the same subject are there "as one," and with it they constitute in some way one thing, and because they always naturally follow the presence of that whole composite, therefore that composite is said to have in some way one where, although in reality it is not strictly and per se one in its genus, but by a certain aggregation. Thus, too, a clothed man is considered to have one where, although there is no doubt that his clothing and the clothed body have diverse where's.

Reply to the Reason for Doubt Proposed at the Beginning

12. This can also be confirmed by the example of local motion (and so at the same time we reply to the reason for doubt proposed at the beginning). A thing is said to be moved per accidens by the motion of another, not because it is not truly and in itself

changed; otherwise it would be said to change not properly but metaphorically or by extrinsic denomination. But "per accidens" is equivalent to "through another." A thing is then said to be moved per accidens when the motion is not exercised primarily and per se about it but about another that carries it along, as is plain in the case of a man moved in a ship or clothing moved with a man. In this way, then, one must understand that accidents are moved by the motion of the subject per accidens—not that they are not truly and in themselves changed, for they truly change place and where, and consequently they also change the relations of proximity or distance to other things —but because they are, as it were, borne along by the motion of the subject.

13. Whether the Where Itself Is in a Place Per Se or Through Another. But someone will finally insist: if accidents have their own proper where, since where itself is a certain accident, it will also have its own where distinct from the where of the subject, and so there will be an infinite regress. The reply is the common solution usually given in a similar regress: each where is present by itself wherever it exercises its formal effect. For when a form in some way participates in its own notion and, as it were, its formal effect, it has that not through another form but by itself, as we said above in a similar case concerning quantity. In the present matter this is explained particularly by a difference to be noted between where and other accidents: namely, that in where itself the local presence can never be changed, whereas in the other accidents it can, except only in the relations of proximity and distance, which are founded upon where and therefore imitate it. The reason is that the other accidents become present by a distinct mode, but the where by itself; and therefore it cannot change presence, because it cannot change its own entity. Thus, too, we said above that an action cannot change the transcendental relation to the agent, because it becomes such not by another action but by itself; and therefore if the relation to the agent is changed, the action does not change the relation, but in the subject or effect the action is changed,

and one ceases and another succeeds in its place. In the same way, then, when the subject changes presence, the where itself does not change its respect of presence; rather, one where ceases and another is produced in the thing existing somewhere. And in this way it belongs to where to be immutable— a property that Aristotle attributes to place in Physics IV; but most properly and radically (so to speak) it belongs to where itself. For extrinsic place has it only according to a certain formal consideration of a surface as existing in such a where and insofar as all the surfaces succeeding there share that formal character, as I have explained elsewhere at length.

SECTIO VI

HOW THE PREDICAMENT OF WHERE SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED AND ORDERED, AND WHAT PROPERTIES ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO IT

1. From what has been said in the preceding sections, it is easy to gather briefly the remaining points that can pertain to the understanding of this predicament.

The Division of Where into Definitive & Circumscriptive Is Explained

2. First, from what has been said, it is clear that in this predicament one can assign a highest genus which by essential differences can be divided into subordinate species down to the last and to individuals. This coordination is suitably accomplished if we accommodate to where the division usually given for place—or rather for "being in a place"—namely, either definitively or circumscriptively. This division is taken from St. John Damascene, Book I On the Faith, ch. 17, and Book II, ch. 3, although he does not use the word

"defining" or "definitively," but only the word "circumscribing"; nevertheless, he declares that it does not have the same force in spiritual things as in bodily, and to signify this diversity theologians have used those two words, "circumscriptively" and "definitively." A thing is said to be somewhere circumscriptively when it is there in such a way that the whole is in the whole and the part in the part of the space it occupies; definitively, however, something is said to be somewhere when it is there in such a way that it is contained within a defined space and cannot naturally be at the same time outside it. The negation of extension must be understood here, for otherwise what is in place circumscriptively will also be definitively, because it cannot naturally be at the same time in another where. In this sense, "being definitively" can be taken generically insofar as it is distinguished from being everywhere, which is proper to God. Therefore, that it be a specific rationale, the negation must be understood—namely, that a thing is said to be in a place definitively which, although it does not have extension of parts in the place, is nevertheless so contained within certain limits that it cannot naturally be outside that where. And thus that division almost coincides with the division of where into corporeal and spiritual, which two members have been shown above to be specifically different.

First Objection Against the Division & Its Solution

3. Whether a Point Is in a Place Circumscriptively or Definitively. But someone may object: a point also has its where, in which there is no extension of parts so that it can be "whole in the whole and whole in each part," and yet a point is not said to be somewhere definitively but rather circumscriptively. The reply is, first, that it is not necessary that the where of the point be contained under that division; for just as Aristotle said that a point is not per se in a place but per accidens, and as a point is not quantity but the principle of quantity, so we can say that a point does not have where but the

principle of bodily where. Accordingly, it is further said that, in the way in which it is a where, it is reduced to the circumscriptive; and in the description of definitive where it must also be understood under the negation of extension of parts that there is included a negation of being in a place by the mode of a principle of such extension; which is otherwise expressed by saying that it is "an indivisible having position in a continuum."

Second Objection & Response

4. You will object again: the intrinsic where of material substance and of material accidents also—apart from quantity—is divisible, so that by reason of it the whole is in the whole and the part in the part; and yet of itself it is not a circumscriptive where, for this belongs per se and primarily to quantity alone and to another only by reason of it. To this two replies can be made so that the division be adequate. First, every where of a material thing can be included under the circumscriptive where; for although of itself and per se it does not necessarily have the extension of parts in relation to place, but has this by reason of quantity, nevertheless by its nature it demands to have that extension by the mediation of quantity. Hence circumscriptive where can be subdivided: one kind is such per se, by force of its subject or by nature of that which it affects proximately; the other does not have the aforementioned extension by force of itself, yet is apt to have it by the mediation of quantity. And according to this interpretation, if a material substance were somewhere without quantity by divine power and without a new miracle, it would have a material and circumscriptive where, because although in that state it would not necessarily be "whole in the whole and part in the part of space" by reason of the presence or where that it then had, nevertheless by its nature it would always demand this mode of being in a place by the mediation of quantity.

5. Second, we can say that every where—apart from that which is proper to quantity—pertains to the mode of "being in a place definitively"; and thus a material substance, when present somewhere, is present in a twofold way, namely both definitively and circumscriptively. Not as though one of these modes is included in the other, but as species specifically diverse, one of which belongs per se and by its own rationale to such a substance, the other belongs per accidens or by another—namely, by denomination and conjunction to quantity. Hence the former is more inseparable from the substance than the latter, as is evident in a material substance conserved without quantity which, according to this interpretation, would be somewhere definitively and not circumscriptively. And this mode of speaking seems more accommodated to common usage; for a thing is not said to be circumscriptively present unless either it is circumscribed by an external surface or at least is capable of being circumscribed, as far as its mode of being somewhere is concerned, as is the outermost sphere. But a substance lacking quantity would not be somewhere in that way; it would therefore be present rather definitively than circumscriptively. Hence, when in the definition of being somewhere circumscriptively it is said that it is "whole in the whole and part in the part," it must be understood "per se and from the intrinsic necessity of such presence"; and thus it belongs to quantitative where alone. Whereupon definitive where, thus divided from the circumscriptive, is not convertible with spiritual where, but rather must be subdivided; for there is one to which the extension of parts is repugnant—and this is the immaterial—and another to which it is not repugnant, although of itself it does not necessarily have it, but only by reason of an adjunct property. And each of these can be further divided into the where of substance or of accident; and thus there will be a perfect division.

The Third Objection is Solved

6. Again, one can object concerning the same division. For in the mystery of the Eucharist the body of Christ has its presence, which truly pertains to this predicament, since it is a certain accident insofar as it is a certain mode added to the substance of that body and does not belong to another predicament than this one; and yet it is not contained under the aforesaid division, because according to that presence it has neither extension of parts with respect to place nor is it repugnant to it to be elsewhere; whence it is neither circumscriptive nor definitive. But this objection demands a theological question that we have treated at length in Volume III of Part III, Disputation XLVIII, section 3—namely, whether Christ in the Sacrament is to be said to be present definitively—where we said that it is not necessary to include that presence under this division. Nevertheless, we think it probable that that presence directly and properly belongs to this predicament; for if it did not belong, chiefly because it is supernatural —this does not hinder it, because even supernatural qualities directly belong to the predicament of quality, for since they are finite they can have a univocal agreement with qualities of the natural order. Therefore, proportionally, I judge the same concerning that presence. Wherefore, in order that the division and partition may comprehend the whole scope of this predicament, one must either prefix a division of local presence into natural and supernatural, and then divide the natural into definitive and circumscriptive; or certainly (which can also be done without inconvenience) one could call "definitive presence" generally every presence that is without extension of parts in space—that is, by which a thing is present whole in the whole and whole in each part, without immensity; and this could then be divided further into that which is connatural to the subject or supernatural, or certainly into that which by its nature is defined to one limited where, and that which does not by itself have such limitation, although it is not immensity. Such, probably, one may judge the sacramental presence of the body of Christ to be, as I have declared at greater length in the place cited.

The Fourth Objection is Dispatched

7. Fourth, one can object to the same division: God, too, is somewhere, since he is everywhere, and yet he is neither circumscriptively nor definitively somewhere. But this objection rather shows that this partition is most suitably accommodated to predicamental where; for God is not "somewhere" by any where belonging to this predicament, because his immense presence is not an accident nor a mode of his substance, but is altogether his very essence. And in this sense Damascene, Book I, ch. 6, denies that God is "in a place," inasmuch as "being in a place" signifies something predicamental or finite, that is, containment within the scope of some determinate space. Thus too St. John Chrysostom, Homily 5 on Colossians, says that God is "nowhere," although he is everywhere. And St. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, q. 20: "God is not somewhere; for what is somewhere is contained by place." And in Book VIII of the Literal Meaning of Genesis, ch. 26, he says that God is "without time and place"; and in the book On the Divine Essence he calls God "illocal," which he, as it were, explains when, in Sermon 8 on the Words of the Lord, he says that God is not contained in a place; and many similar statements we have adduced above when treating of God's immensity.

Whether the Said Division is of a Genus into Species

8. Lastly, it is objected that that division is not apt for constituting this predicament, because it is not of one genus, indeed not even univocal; nothing is more frequent in the mouths of the wise than that incorporeals are not "in a place" except equivocally, as is clear from St. Thomas, III, q. 52, a. 1, and q. 53, a. 1; therefore where, which is common to incorporeals and corporeals, cannot be a genus. I

reply that above we have already said that, in propriety and strictness of speech, it is one thing to be present somewhere through intrinsic where, and another to be "in a place." The latter expression is usually said of being in extrinsic place; indeed, St. Thomas, in the former passage cited, expressly declares that it is to be understood of being in corporeal place. In that sense, without a doubt, it is very analogical to say it of an angel and of a body; for in the one it signifies being contained by place through quantitative contact, in the other it signifies touching place by virtual contact, that is, by operation; hence, just as "quantity" or "contact" is said analogically of quantity of bulk and of power, so too "to be in a place" is said analogically of those two modes. But speaking properly of intrinsic where, that expression could indeed be explained by an equivocation of thing or of genus—that is, in the way in which equivocations are said to lie hidden in a genus, or in the way in which "corruptible" and "incorruptible" are said to differ in genus. Speaking, however, metaphysically or logically, there is truly a univocal agreement between these where's; for each confers formally upon the thing it affects that it be really present and defined in a certain space. Nor is there any reason why a common genus cannot be abstracted from the bodily and the incorporeal mode, just as it can be abstracted from corporeal and incorporeal substance or quality.

9. Again, a question could be pursued here whether all the where's of bodies are of the same species within this predicament, or differ according to the diversity of bodies or according to the diversity of the positions of the universe (and the same proportionally can be asked about incorporeals). But this question already belongs to physics, and is conjoined with another: whether all local motions of bodies are of the same species. Therefore we abstain now from these questions. It seems more probable, however, that all these where's are of the same species and differ only either by respects of order among the bodies themselves or the parts of the same body—in which way one body is said to be "above," another "below"—or by respects to the

subject, in which way a superior or inferior place is said to be natural or violent.

On the Properties of Where

10. Lastly, from what has been said it is also easy to gather the properties of where. The first and chief of these is that it is immobile, which we left explained above. And from what was said there one can gather that, just as every where is unchangeable with respect to place, so conversely every where is corruptible, so far as depends on itself, because it is thus immovable that it is always in a changeable subject; and by a local change of the subject the where itself is corrupted. The root of this is that every subject of where has a finite and limited where; hence it follows that it can change it and, consequently, that the where itself can be corrupted.

11. Where Is Without Intension. Gilbert, Albert, and others assign two other properties—negative ones and almost common to the predicaments outside quality—namely, that it cannot be intensified or remitted and that it has no contrary. In the first there is no difficulty, because in that mode of presence there is no latitude with respect to intension; as to extension, in general it can be said that almost every where has latitude and can receive "more or less," as has been sufficiently explained above, both in the place of bodies and of spirits. I say "almost," because an indivisible place can be excepted, whether of a point or one that an angel can have by presence to a point alone, according to the probable opinion. But it is not necessary to add an exception, because this very indivisible where is, in its own way, the principle of extended where through space, and thus is contained under it.

12. In What Sense Where Is Said to Lack a Contrary. As to the other property, we must recall from what was said above in Disputation XLV that contrariety—even as it is distinguished from privative opposition—is twofold: one most proper, which is between

forms most distant under the same genus; another less proper, which is found between the termini of some latitude, inasmuch as there can be a successive passage from one to the other—in which sense, in augmentation, the lesser and greater quantity are reckoned as contrary termini, and in intension the remitted and the intensified degree. Therefore, when the lack of contrariety is said to be a property of where, it must be understood of the former and most proper contrariety; and thus the matter is clear, especially since it has been said that all where's which can naturally affect the same subject are of the same species. But the latter contrariety is found between where's, for local motion is the most proper motion; and every motion occurs between positive and contrary termini at least in that sense, as is clear from Aristotle, Physics V, ch. 2, text 10; therefore the terminus per se of local motion has another contrary to itself. But the primary and per se terminus of local motion is the where itself, as has been shown above and as the same Aristotle teaches in the preceding chapter; therefore where has a contrary at least in that latter sense. This contrariety consists only in this, that one where formally repugns another, and between them there is a certain latitude of space, in which the extreme where's have this opposition: that as one recedes from one, one approaches the other, and conversely. This mode of opposition can be found even between things of the same species, as is evident from what has been said. Here was being insinuated the question whether between many where's— especially corporeal ones —there is such great repugnance that even by God's absolute power they cannot be simultaneously in the same subject; which is to ask whether it is altogether repugnant that the same body be simultaneously in two places. But this question I have treated at length in Volume III of Part III.

DISPUTATION LII

ON POSITION

Consideration of Position Joined to the Treatise on Where. Position stands in the closest proximity to, and agrees with, where (ubi) itself. For that reason the present disputation suitably follows the preceding one. We shall dispatch it very briefly, because—as will be clear from its course—this kind adds nothing of reality to what has already been treated, but only a certain categorial denomination, which can be explained very briefly.

SECTION I

WHAT POSITION IS, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM WHERE

1. Various Senses of "Position." It is indeed difficult to explain what position (situs) is in such a way that it could constitute a kind of being distinct from the rest. The word position seems capable of being taken in three ways. First, it can signify in general the extrinsic place in which a thing is set, which is not a form or accident of the thing, but something like its support—for example, if you say that the portion of earth in which a tree is planted is its position. Thus it seems self-evident that position, in this sense, does not constitute a category.

Second, it can signify a certain relation of order, as in being above or below, or in an earlier or later place, or in a more worthy or less worthy rank. Such a relation, when it is real, belongs to the category of relation (ad aliquid). Third, it signifies the arrangement of parts with respect to place; and in this sense it is reckoned to constitute the present category. Yet even so it encounters the same difficulty, because in this arrangement nothing seems to be involved that does not pertain to other categories. For in the arrangement of parts with respect to place, either one considers the where of each part; and this is nothing but a partial where of the whole, and so is reduced to the same category as something incomplete. Or one considers the respect that arises among the parts themselves; and that belongs to the category of relation. Or one considers the complete disposition of the subject that arises from parts so arranged; and that disposition is either nothing but the total where of the whole, or at most it adds to where a certain figure belonging to the category of quality. Nothing new, then, appears that could be position. This is confirmed as follows. There is a twofold arrangement of quantitative parts. One is in the whole according to itself, that is, in relation to itself, as is clear from Aristotle in the Categories, "On Quantity." This consists in the fact that in the whole some parts are extremes, some are intermediate, some are considered as the center of others, and finally one is after another within the whole. The other arrangement is that of parts with respect to place, which consists in a similar coordination of them according to an intrinsic where, for an extrinsic place is not simply necessary for this arrangement of parts. But the prior arrangement of parts adds to quantity only the relations among the parts and therefore, as far as what is absolute is concerned, pertains to the same category of quantity. By proportion, then, position, apart from relations, cannot signify anything other than where itself.

First Opinion Rejected: That Position is An Extrinsic Denomination

2. In explaining this category there is no room for a merely extrinsic denomination, in which some place all the natures of the six later categories. That opinion is treated in general and extensively defended by Fonseca (Metaphysics V, ch. 15, q. 7). He says nothing, however, in particular about this category, although with respect to others—and especially to where—he sensed the difficulty. Yet the difficulty is no less in the case of position. For the denominations thought to pertain to this category can in no way be attributed to some extrinsic form or body, as Aristotle sufficiently indicated in the Categories, in the chapter on the six last categories, saying that the denominations of this category are taken from position. But position is not an extrinsic denomination, as is especially clear in particular cases. For example, sitting is a denomination of this category and is not taken from the seat on which someone sits, but from the session, which is a certain internal disposition of the body of the one sitting. Similarly, someone is said to stand not because of the surrounding air, nor because of the earth on which he happens to stand; for he could touch the earth in the same way even if he were not standing but had some other disposition of body. And even if there were no surrounding air, a man would truly be standing or sitting. Besides these, nothing extrinsic can be imagined from which that denomination would be taken.

Second Opinion Not Proven: That Position is a Relation

3. Wherefore, if in any of these categories the opinion of Scotus—that they consist in relation—has any probability, it has it most of all here, because nothing else intrinsic seems capable of being devised, as was proposed in the statement of the difficulty. Aristotle seems to favor this in the chapter On Relation (ad aliquid), where he numbers position among the things of that category, calling it position and giving as examples reclining, standing, sitting. Later, in chapter 9

on the six last categories, he says that position is nothing other than a denominative taken from position itself, declaring that position in the present case is not an abstract but a concrete name, whose abstract will be situation or position (situatio or positio), which Aristotle calls a relation.

4. Nevertheless, this opinion, if it is understood of predicamental relation, cannot be proved, because otherwise a new category would not be constituted. If it is understood of transcendental relation, it may perhaps be true, but it does not explain how position is different from where. If it is understood of another relation distinct from these—one of those called "superadded from without" (extrinsecus adveniens)—we do not admit such a relation, as was treated above in Disputation 48. Nor does it appear here what kind of superadded relation this could be. For if it is the relation of situal order among the parts themselves, this does not arise from without, nor is it effected by any action that per se tends to it; rather, it follows intrinsically once the partial wheres of all the parts are posited, on which it is founded. Hence no action is necessary for it besides the local motion by which such a where is produced. Or it is the relation of the whole to its parts and of the parts to the whole; and the same consideration applies and can be shown by the same reasoning. Or finally it is the relation of the whole to something else extrinsic; and such a relation is either not at all simply necessary—as we shall see below—or, if it is, it follows intrinsically from the respective wheres of the containing and the contained bodies.

5. Nor does Aristotle favor this opinion. For in the same way that he says position is a relation, he also says that it pertains to the category of relation. In what sense Aristotle spoke is treated at length by Cajetan in his commentary on the Categories, the chapter on the six last categories. Omitting other ways that he reports and rejects there, the true reply is that Aristotle numbered position among the things belonging to relation not according to his own settled view, but in accord with the first definition of relatives that he had previously

placed in that category, together with all that followed from it, a definition he later rejected. He therefore understood there to be a "respect according to predication" (respectus secundum dici), or a transcendental respect; and from that he later said the denominations of this category are taken. But what that respect is and how it differs from others he never explained.

Third Opinion Rejected: That Position is an Absolute Together with a Respect

6. Another opinion can be fitted to this category, defended by some with respect to all six, namely, that it signifies an absolute together with a respect. The absolute would be either the extrinsic place or a mode of where itself, while the respect would be the relation to some thing in which another is said to be placed: for example, the relation of one sitting to the seat, or of one standing to the thing on which he stands, or the like. But this opinion is excluded first of all by a general reason. Either it speaks of a predicamental or of a transcendental relation. If of a transcendental relation, where also signifies a transcendental respect; and it is not explained what other respect position would signify, for those respects that are to extrinsic things or containers—or conversely of the container to the contained—are not transcendental, but predicamental. If, however, the discourse is about predicamental relation, it cannot essentially compose the form of another category; for that would not be a per se composition but accidental. And by mixing in this way forms of diverse categories, we could multiply the categories to infinity.

The True Opinion: That Position is a Mode of the Thing

7. It remains, then, to say that position (situs), or placing (positio), is some intrinsic mode of the body that is placed, from

which it is denominated as sitting, lying, or the like. This seems sufficiently proved by an enumeration of the parts sufficient to exclude other options. For there is no need to feign a distinct entity—which is clear enough of itself—nor is anything left besides an intrinsic mode, once the other opinions are rejected. What this mode is, however, and how it is distinguished from where, is hard to explain. For my part, I judge that it is not a new mode distinct by nature from the very mode that is the location (ubicatio) of a given subject and of all its parts. This is shown by the reason for doubt set forth above. It is further clarified as follows. With respect to the same body, where and position are so related that they come to be and cease in precisely the same way. One who is standing does not become sitting except through local motion, nor does one lose sitting except through another local motion, either of the whole or of some parts. Hence it cannot happen that in such a subject position is separated from the integral and total where; nor, conversely, can such a where be separated from such a position. Therefore they are not modes distinct by nature. There is no indication of a distinction between them; nor does any reason or effect occur for which they should be distinguished. Indeed, such a distinction can neither be adequately declared nor conceived. And this is the opinion —though explained otherwise—held by Fonseca (Metaphysics V, ch. 7, q. 2, sect. 4), who says that although in popular usage position is distinguished from where, nevertheless, if the matter is judged by the standard of philosophers, it is not really distinct from the category of where. If he intends only this, namely, that these categories are not distinguished by a real distinction between position and where, his view is acceptable. But if he denies that there is a distinction of reason, that is, in the mode of predication sufficient for the distinction of categories, we do not admit this, nor do we think the received view should be abandoned.

8. Accordingly, to distinguish these two categories, one could say that the category of where is not constituted by that intrinsic mode, but by the extrinsic place—so that "being in a place," which

pertains to that category, is a merely extrinsic denomination from the containing place—whereas position is that intrinsic mode which we explained throughout the preceding disputation. According to this view all that was said in the earlier disputation would have to be accommodated to position, except for the points that pertain to the extrinsic denomination taken from the containing place. This opinion could be defended with some probability; nevertheless, we do not follow it. First, because Aristotle always said that the proper terminus of local motion is where; but local motion is primarily and per se terminated at that intrinsic mode. Second, because that mode, taken in general, is common to bodies and spirits, as we have explained; yet position is not properly attributed to a spiritual thing, indeed not even to all bodies, as we shall explain below, whereas where is properly attributed to all. Third, because that extrinsic denomination alone—namely, of "being in the containing place"—is not sufficient to constitute a category distinct from the others, as we left explained in the same disputation, section 2.

How Position & Where Differ in Reason

9. I therefore think one should say that the form of position or placing, which gives the denomination of this category, is where itself conceived under a different formal aspect—that just as to distinguish action and passion a distinction of reason suffices, so here a distinction of reason suffices between position and where. The distinction of reason consists in this: where as such signifies only that mode insofar as it constitutes a thing as present somewhere; and therefore we always explain where by relations of distance, proximity, or intimate presence, because we conceive only that as their foundation. Position, however, as such signifies that same mode insofar as it denominates a thing as disposed in itself by a disposition arising from the local coordination of its parts. In this denomination, the notion of presence is not considered, nor properly the order to

space, but the order of parts among themselves—order, I say, not as it is a predicamental relation, but as it is the foundation of such a relation. Aristotle signified this well in Metaphysics V, ch. 19, where he says: "Disposition is the order of that which has parts," and when he adds the first member, he adds "or according to place," which all understand to express the proper form of this category. Position, then, is a certain situal or local disposition arising in a whole from the locating of its parts. Although this disposition is not in reality something distinct from that mode which is where, we nevertheless conceive it as a certain distinct form that has a different mode of denomination and predication; and that suffices for a categorial distinction.

10. This is confirmed by the example of quantity. The arrangement of parts in the whole, in one way, signifies only the extension of continuous parts and thus pertains to the essential difference of continuous quantity; therefore it cannot constitute a new categorial notion. In another way, however, that arrangement can be taken for the disposition of the whole resulting from such extension of parts and their coordination among themselves; in this sense that disposition has a categorial notion different from quantity—yet it is nothing other than figure. Many interpret by this the third member of disposition posited by Aristotle in the place cited, which he calls form (or, as others translate, species); and St. Thomas seems to interpret it so. In this way position is related to where in those things capable of it. There is, however, a difference. Figure is more distinct from quantity than position is from where, because quantity has its own proper and real entity, of which figure is a mode separable from it. Where, however, is only a certain mode, and position is, as it were, a mode of that mode; and therefore it is not in reality a distinct mode, but only by a distinction of reason—either because a mode is not modified by another mode lest we proceed to infinity, or because it is so intrinsic as to be wholly inseparable. Thus stated, this view is confirmed only by the refutation of the others and by a sufficient enumeration of

possibilities; and, from the very account given, it is of itself plausible and consonant with the way of conceiving and speaking about these matters, and entails no inconvenience.

11. Objection Solved. It can be objected that a man existing in a vacuum would not be capable of position; he would, however, have where, as we said above. Therefore, even in reality these two are separable; and it is further concluded that position is not constituted by a merely intrinsic denomination, since it requires something extrinsic, whether circumscribing or sustaining, or something similar. The antecedent seems clear, because if someone were in a vacuum he could not be said to sit, even if in the mode of his where he had the same disposition and, so to speak, figure that he now has when he is sitting. Likewise, even if his body were upright, he could not be said to stand rather than to lie. For if one carefully considers the body lying or standing, it does not differ with respect to the local disposition that results in the body from the arrangement of its parts, but differs only in the way it is disposed with respect to the body by which it is sustained— a diversity that could not be understood in a vacuum. I reply that it is indeed true that in these denominations, as they are in common use, extrinsic denominations or relations are sometimes mixed in, even though these are not what constitute the categorial notion. The word position itself is equivocal and is sometimes taken substantively for the place in which a thing is situated, and not always for an adequate place, but for that portion of earth on which a thing is sustained—for example, if we say that the position of the body of Christ in heaven is that part of the convex surface of the empyrean heaven that His feet touch. Thus, when someone is said to sit, two things can be conjoined: namely, that he has such a disposition of his body, and that he has a seat by which he is sustained. The former is the aspect that per se pertains to the category of position, which someone could have even in a vacuum; the latter does not as such pertain to the category, because it is not taken from something that behaves by way of a form, but only by way of an extrinsic cause of sustentation—or

rather as an impediment preventing the body or its parts from descending further. Hence if a man were upright in a vacuum, in respect of intrinsic disposition he would be said to stand: not, to be sure, with reference to some extrinsic sustaining body, but because the parts of the body themselves would be disposed and ordered among themselves just as they now are in a man who is said to stand. We cannot explain this except by certain relations or effects—namely, that one part would be under another and, as it were, sustain it, as the feet the legs, and so on. Nor could a man be constituted otherwise in a vacuum, at least naturally.

SECTION II
WHICH SUBJECTS, SPECIES, OR PROPERTIES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS CATEGORY

1. Here we shall briefly dispatch the remaining matters that may be desired concerning this category.

Of the Subject of Position

2. First, we ask to what things position can be attributed. It must be said, first of all, that it cannot be attributed to incorporeal things, because it is a disposition of a whole arising from the order of parts with respect to place; but an incorporeal reality has no parts—it is whole in the whole and whole in each part. Hence it is not enough that its presence be divisible in some way and have parts with respect to space, since the whole substance is under each part of that presence. From that there results in such a thing no special situal denomination or disposition, other than this: to be present to a greater or lesser space. And therefore above we did not say that position is identified with just any where, but only with that in which it can be found.

3. Next, it is certain that position most properly fits animals, in which there are parts of diverse kinds and figures, and which by their own intrinsic power can be composed or arranged in diverse ways with respect to place. In other things—especially if they are uniform or homogeneous—position cannot so easily be distinguished from where, at least if one considers only the internal disposition of parts and not their external disposition without reference to the other bodies of the universe. Nevertheless, even in them some notion of position can be considered, consisting in that disposition of parts among themselves which we explain by analogy or proportion to the order of the universe. For in the universe itself, insofar as it is in some way one and, as it were, an artifact composed from the congruent disposition of its parts, a certain position and quasi-disposition of the whole can be understood, by reason of which different bodies are said to have different positions in the universe. Such a position is partial in each body with respect to the universe; yet with respect to such a body it is total, arising from the partial positions of its parts. Thus every body has its own position, insofar as its parts have a higher or lower place among themselves and within the order of the universe. Although position does not consist intrinsically in these respects, its account cannot be explained by us without them. Hence even in animals the arrangement cannot be altogether separated from such respects. For one who stands upright in the natural order of his parts is reckoned to have a different position than one who, reversing that order, would have his head below and his feet above, even if otherwise he had his body equally extended and disposed in the same figure. In this way position can be found even in inanimate bodies, though it is attributed especially to those that have parts of diverse kinds. Accordingly, artificial bodies, insofar as they consist of diverse parts, are judged to have arrangement and position—like a house, in which the foundation is below and the roof above, and so on. Indeed, even an army, insofar as it is in some way one thing, has its position when it is arrayed in an orderly way—not because position is a relation of order,

but because from parts so ordered there arises such a disposition of the whole.

What are the Species of Position

4. From these considerations one can easily understand that under this genus of arrangement many species can be distinguished. St. Albert the Great briefly gathers them in his little book On the Six Principles, in the treatise On Position, ch. 1, saying that the subordinate differences of this category are "equally" or "unequally placed," or "bent" or "straight." The specific differences are sitting, standing, and the like; among these he also numbers rough and smooth in ch. 2. St. Thomas also has this in Opusculum 48. From this it also seems to follow, as St. Albert himself objects in the same place, that curved or straight, insofar as they arise precisely from the arrangement of parts in place, pertain to the category of position. Admitting this is not a great inconvenience; for indeed standing and sitting differ especially by straightness and curvature—not that figure as such is position and pertains to this category, but rather that the disposition of the whole with respect to place, according to such an order of parts, from which such a figure follows. Consequently, just as the species of figures and the configurations of parts according to partial places can be varied and arranged in infinitely many ways, so too the species of position could be varied without number.

What are the Properties of Position

5. As to the properties of position, St. Albert discusses more at length in the places cited, which St. Thomas briefly gathers (Opusculum 48, ch. 2). First, they attribute to it the two common properties, namely, not to have a contrary and not to receive more and less. Nothing needs to be added beyond what was said concerning where: although one arrangement is repugnant to another, that is not a

proper contrariety but a specific diversity—just as one figure excludes another. One can, however, attribute to these species of position the opposition that is between the termini of motion, insofar as a man passes from standing to sitting, and so with others. Even so, that opposition does not primarily pertain to position as such, but to where, since, as we said, local motion is per se primarily terminated at where. They further add, with Gilbert of Poitiers, that it is most proper to this category to stand next to substance, and they lay stress on the verb to stand next to as distinguished from to inhere. I do not consider this property necessary. For even if under that verb to stand next to we include every mode, relation, or denomination that does not suppose proper and rigorous inherence, where more immediately stands next to corporeal substance (of which we are speaking) than position does. These points are of little moment; and therefore let what has been said about this category suffice.

DISPUTATION LIII

ON HABITUS, AS CONSTITUTING A CERTAIN GENUS OF ACCIDENT

In what sense "Habitus" (Having) is under discussion here. We explained the word habitus above, in Disputation 40, when treating the species of quality. Setting aside that meaning—by which it signifies either any abiding disposition of body or soul, or a particular species of quality—our concern here is with its other meaning, which is reckoned to be a peculiar genus of being. We shall first set out its common notion, and then briefly treat what pertains to its subject, its species, and its properties.

SECTION I

WHETHER HAVING IS SOMETHING THAT DENOMINATES EXTRINSECALLY, AND WHAT SORT IT IS

1. In explaining this category there is the same diversity of opinions as in the other six. We may set aside the view that conjoins an absolute with a predicamental relation, since the refutation of it is the same in all these categories. I also omit the opinion about "relations superadded from without" (relationes extrinsecus advenientes), for

the same reason and because, if any relation enters here, it follows intrinsically once the proximate term and foundation are posited and duly explained.

Gilbert's Opinion & the Definition of Having Examined

2. There remains, then, only the opinion signaled by Gilbert (and followed by some), namely, that having is a certain accident that results in a clothed body from the adjacency of the garment. Thus they explain Gilbert's definition: "Habitus is the adjacency of bodies and of the things that are around the body." This opinion can be confirmed from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 20, where he says that having (habitus) is a kind of act intermediate between the haver and the thing had: just as action, he says, mediates between agent and effect, so between the one who has a garment and the garment that is had there is an intermediate having; whence he infers that having cannot itself be had—namely, by another intermediate having—lest there be an infinite regress. Therefore, according to Aristotle's view, habitus is not the garment that is adjacent from without; rather (so to speak) it is the having of the garment. But this having, which mediates between the one clothed and the garment, is not in the garment but in the wearer, who is said to have the garment. Reason also confirms this, for a garment is not an accident but a substance. Moreover, if this mere denomination from an adjacent garment sufficed to constitute this category, then innumerable other categories would have to be constituted, since there are infinitely many such denominations.

The Form of This Category Shown to Be the Extrinsic Garment

3. Nevertheless, one must say that the form of this category is purely extrinsic—namely, the garment or something similar—which

"informs" only by adjoining and by denominating extrinsically. This is clarified by first setting out, in this category, the four items that occur in the other accidental categories: the form or abstract; the subject of the form; the union; and the concrete or composite that results therefrom. The form, then, is the garment itself. The subject is the man, for example, who is clothed. The union here is nothing other than the circumposition or adjacency of the clothing in that manner suited to the ornament or covering of the subject who is vested. The concrete is the whole thus constituted, "the clothed man," or, in incomplex speech, "clothed." That matters stand thus is sufficiently proved by the very exposition: these things are readily understood and suffice for the truth and common use of these denominations, and whatever is added beyond this is unintelligible. For in a body that is clothed with a garment, from the adjacency of the garment alone no real thing or real mode springs up—unless perhaps a relation of proximity or of contact, or something similar, which is undoubtedly predicamental. The point is confirmed in this way: without any change in himself a man can become clothed, solely through the adjacency or circumposition of a garment; indeed this very change is not per se terminated to the proper formality of this category as such, but to where (ubi), and from that the denomination follows at once. Therefore the form of this category is not some intrinsic mode of the thing or object to which the denominations of this category are attributed; for the subject is the man who is said to be clothed—on this all agree—yet in him no such mode can be devised that would be plausible.

Aristotle's Statement Explained

4. When, therefore, Aristotle said that having is a kind of mean between the garment and the one clothed, he was not speaking of the form of this category but of the union belonging to such a form, which, for clarity's sake, would be better called having (habitio). Note

that sometimes "to have" signifies indifferently any relation between the thing that has and the thing had—as when we say that a whole has parts, a subject has accidents, a father has a son, a master has a slave. Aristotle explains this signification in the Postpredicaments: it is highly analogical and quasi-transcendental. In this way a man is said to have a garment if he possesses it, even if he is not wearing it; yet that is not the denomination of the present category, nor then does the garment play the role of a form with respect to the wearer; rather, it is denominated "had," as the terminus of a relation of dominion or possession. For this reason Aristotle said that, just as action mediates between agent and effect, so it is necessary that between garment and wearer there be a mediating having, in order that the man may be denominated as having a garment in that special way by which he is denominated clothed or vested. This having is nothing other than the union fitting the garment to the man. Consequently this having has a greater proportion to formal union or causality than to action. And therefore, although under names that signify "informing" the man is denominated passively clothed or vested, while the garment is denominated quasi-actively clothing or adorning, nevertheless under the aspect of having the situation is reversed: the man is denominated actively having the garment, while the garment is denominated passively had—just as form is said quasi-actively to inform matter, and matter is denominated quasi-actively to have form. From this perhaps arose the usage by which the form of this category has been called habit (habitus).

5. If someone inquisitively asks what this having (habitio) really is, I reply that it is not any real union, nor even a new real mode added either to the garment or to the thing clothed, when both are constituted in such a place and position. The first point is evident: what real union can be imagined between a garment and the man who is clothed? The second is clear because, once the man and the garment are posited in such local and situal disposition and proximity, even if every other real mode is prescinded from in reality or by the intellect,

it will still be true to say that the man is clothed; therefore it is superfluous to feign anything further. Likewise, just as a man can be stripped of all clothing with no real change made in him, so we can understand—at least by the power of God—that a clothed man could be annihilated while the garments remain unchanged in the same where and position, and with every other intrinsic mode. This is a sign that no similar (intrinsic) mode intervenes; I omit predicamental relations, which are of no service for the point at hand, for if any are present in the garment and the wearer, they obtain only consequently. Therefore that having is nothing but the extrinsic adjacency and fitting of the garment to the thing clothed. Although in reality it is not distinct from the mode and disposition that the garment has in its place, nevertheless, because here and now, by reason of it, the garment is related to the clothed thing so as to adorn and, as it were, inform it, as such it is, so to speak, a certain union to it, and consequently by reason of it the clothed thing is said in a special way to have the garment. Hence that adjacency has been called having (habitio) or habit (habitus).

The Equivocation in the Word "Habitus"

6. From this there is also understood the equivocation involved in the word habitus. Sometimes it signifies a mere passive denomination from having, however the thing is had, and thus belongs determinately to no category, for it says only the denomination of the terminus of some relation or habitude: whatever is possessed or is had in any way can be called a habitus in that sense. In another way the word, taken almost substantively and as an abstract noun, signifies a definite species of quality, as we said. In the present context it can signify either the garment itself, or the fitting of the garment to the clothed thing; in this last sense Aristotle used the word in the place cited. To remove the equivocation, we call that having habitio; for in more common usage habitus more often signifies the

garment itself. In this way we say that habitus is the abstract name signifying the form of this category, which is only adjacent and extrinsic. Gilbert's definition can also easily be accommodated to this sense.

Replies to the Arguments to the Contrary

7. To the principal objection St. Thomas replies (in Opusculum 48) that not all predicamental denominations of accidents are taken from true accidents; some can be taken from one substance, insofar as it denominates another accidentally—especially (as he himself says) because one substance does not accrue to another merely according to pure substantial entity, but as affected by certain accidents, namely quantity, quality, and others as needed. We have said enough on this matter above, in Disputation 39, when explaining the division of accident into nine genera, where we also made clear which extrinsic denominations constitute diverse predicamental notions and which do not, but are reduced to others.

SECTION II
WHICH ARE THE SUBJECTS, SPECIES, OR PROPERTIES OF HAVING

Inanimate Things Lack Having

1. Regarding the subject of this category, St. Thomas (in the work just cited) indicates that it is man alone. Inanimate things are not clothed. Other animals nature has clothed with hair, feathers, and the like, which garments do not pertain to this category because (says St. Thomas) they are integral parts of their animals. Man alone, since he is born naked, received reason by which he could procure garments for himself; thus this category seems to belong to men alone.

By Human Artifice, Animate & Inanimate Things are Invested with Having

2. The same St. Thomas adds that the denomination of this category extends to certain other animals insofar as, by human industry, they are adorned or armed with clothing—for example, an ape or a horse. We can further add that by the same industry this denomination can be extended to inanimate things, at least insofar as they are images of animate beings, especially of men, in the way we clothe statues. Indeed, we sometimes adorn other things—houses, palaces, and so forth—with hangings or tapestries, which undoubtedly confer a denomination that pertains to this category.

Denominations Like "Gilded" & "Whitened" Belong to This Category

3. Finally, he adds that every denomination arising from one substance that is joined to another merely by way of ornament pertains to this category, even if, strictly speaking, it is not a garment according to the common use of the word. This is clear from what was said above in dividing the predicamental genera, where we showed that denominations such as gilded and whitened belong here, because they are accidental, pertain to no other category, and in addition have a sufficiently univocal agreement with the denomination conferred by a garment. Thus it turns out that the subject of this category can be any body, especially a composite; simples are not so apt for these denominations, although the earth—inasmuch as it is adorned with grasses and flowers—seems to share in this denomination.

On the Species of Having

4. From this explanation of the subject it is easy to gather the variety of species contained under this predicamental genus. For greater clarity, we might call the highest genus not habitus or garment but ornament, and distinguish it into proper clothing and ornament common to inanimate things as such. Again, human garments can be divided either according to diverse organic parts—so we distinguish a hat from a shoe, and so on—or according to diverse ends, by which garments proper can be distinguished from arms, which St. Thomas above refers to this category; and this seems especially true of defensive arms, for those that serve for offense are not conjoined to a man by way of form, but by way of instrument, and so as such do not confer a peculiar predicamental denomination. Next, the ornaments of other things can be varied in many ways: some merely hang or are adjacent extrinsically; others are conjoined in a more intimate manner, as gold in gilded silver; and among these a further and manifold variety and distinction can easily be devised.

Properties of Having

5. Lastly, as to the properties of this category, there is scarcely anything that needs to be said. Since the form of this category is some substance—as such a thing—it has the same properties as bodily substance, inasmuch as it is subject to various accidents; yet, insofar as the form is extrinsic, it has scarcely any peculiar properties. Certain accidents, however, seem particularly to pertain to constituting it under such an aspect, especially color and figure; for just as these two contribute much to beauty, so too to the notion of ornament. St. Thomas and St. Albert add, in the places cited above, that it is a property of this category to receive more and less. This must not be understood of receiving more and less by proper intensification; since habitus is a substance, it can no more receive more and less than substance itself can, and for the same reason it has no contrary. Rather, it is said to receive more and less according to a certain addition—not

only extensively on the part of the subject (which is common to other accidents), but by multiplication of garments even with respect to the same part. In this way, he is said to be more clothed who has two tunics than he who has only one.

6. Hence it is also peculiar to this category that one of its forms can be superposed upon another—either accidentally, by human choice, when the garments are of the same kind, or per se by the institution of such a habit, as when a toga is placed over other garments—although the denomination always refers immediately to the man himself; for it is the man who is denominated toga-wearing, and even if he were to lack the inner garments and had only the toga, he would still be so denominated. In a certain way it is also proper to this category that its forms are distinguished according to the organic parts of man and yet denominate the man simply: although shoes or a hat are only on the feet or the head, one simply says that the man is hatted or shod, and the inference is correct. For when a form is not apt to belong to the whole except by reason of some part, then, existing in that part alone, it denominates the whole—just as a man is called curly because of his hair alone. Thus, because the shoe is an extrinsic form of the foot alone, existing on that part it denominates the whole, and so with others. For the contrary reason, when a denomination is of itself common to the whole, it is not taken simply from such forms; therefore one is not said simply clothed if he has only shoes or a hat, and the like. And so much for the nine genera of accident.

DISPUTATION LIV

ON BEINGS OF REASON

1. The reason why the present treatise deals with the being of reason. Although in the first disputation of this work we said that the being of reason is not included under the proper and direct object of metaphysics, and that for this reason the Philosopher himself excluded it from that treatment in book VI of his Metaphysics, nevertheless I judge that, for the completion of this doctrine, it pertains to the office of the metaphysician to hand on those matters that are common and general to beings of reason. Knowledge and science of them are necessary for the human disciplines; scarcely do we speak without them, whether in metaphysics itself or in philosophy generally, to say nothing of logic—and what is more, even in Theology. Nor, in truth, can this task belong to anyone other than the metaphysician. For, first, since beings of reason are not true beings but, as it were, the shadows of beings, they are not intelligible in themselves, but only through a certain analogy and connection with true beings; therefore, they are not knowable in themselves, nor is there any science instituted primarily and per se for the sake of knowing them alone. The claim that some attribute this office to dialectic is a dialectical error; for the end of that science is only to direct and reduce to art the rational operations of man. These are not the beings of reason of which we now speak, but real beings. Accordingly, no craftsman and no science

intends per se and primarily the cognition of beings of reason; rather, such cognition must be imparted insofar as it is conjoined with the cognition of some real being. Thus the physicist treats of privation, which is conjoined with matter with respect to form, and treats of the void in comparison to place, and so of other cases.

2. In this way, then, it properly belongs to Metaphysics to treat of the being of reason as such, and of its common notion, its properties, and its divisions, because in their way these notions are quasi-transcendental and cannot be understood except by comparison with true and real notions of beings—whether transcendental, or at least so common as to be properly metaphysical. For what is feigned or apparent must be understood by comparison with that which truly is. Therefore, although other faculties, such as physics or dialectic, sometimes touch on certain beings of reason that are conjoined with their objects, as we have already shown by examples, still they cannot from their own principles set forth, as it were, the essential notions of these beings. This accordingly belongs to the metaphysician obliquely and concomitantly, as Alexander, St. Thomas, and others note on book VI of the Metaphysics, and they expound Aristotle in this way, as we have observed above. For this reason Aristotle himself did not altogether omit these matters in his Metaphysics, as is clear from book IV, chapters 1 and 2, and book VII, the last chapter. This, then, we must accomplish in the present disputation: first, we shall explain the nature—so far as it can be had—and the causes of this being; then, after adding a division, we shall indicate the various kinds of these beings, touching in detail on whatever seems to pertain to this doctrine.

SECTION I

WHETHER THERE IS A BEING OF REASON, AND WHAT ESSENCE IT MIGHT HAVE

Disputation LIV

1. There are opinions in this matter that are even extremely contrary—at least in words; for if the authors of those opinions are examined more closely, perhaps they are contending only about words.

First Opinion: Denying Beings of Reason

2. Some simply deny that there are beings of reason, claiming that everything said about them can be perfectly well understood of the things themselves and saved in them. Maironus tries to defend this opinion—more for the sake of disputing than asserting—in his Quodlibet, question 7; and a certain Bernardinus Mirandulanus defends it in his Exposition of the Predicaments. The foundation could be this: either something is called a being of reason because it is subjectively in reason, or because it is made by reason. Not the latter, since to be in and to be made are properties of real beings; hence it is clear that the acts and species that are made by reason and inhere in it are real beings. Or an item is called a being of reason because it is feigned by reason; but it involves a contradiction to say that such a being "is," for what is merely feigned is not—or at least (which is more to the point) it follows that such beings of reason are by no means necessary, either to doctrine or to conceiving true things, since the fictions of the intellect are not necessary for those ends.

Second Opinion: Attributing to Beings of Reason the True Notion of Being

3. Others hold a contrary extreme: not only that there are beings of reason, but that by a single signification and even a single conception they are contained under the common appellation "being," albeit by an analogical agreement. Indeed, there are not lacking those who posit a univocal agreement between some beings of reason and certain real beings—namely, between relations—whose

view we refuted above. Nor are there lacking those who attribute to beings of reason an entity independent of the intellect's actual cognition. Their opinion touches on the question of the mode by which beings of reason arise, or in their way are caused, and therefore we shall treat it more fittingly in the following section. The foundation of this view may be that beings of reason are absolutely said "to be," as blindness and the like; therefore they agree in some way in the notion of being with real beings. Likewise, the properties of being belong to beings of reason; for a being of reason is one or many, and is intelligible, etc.

The True Position

4. There must be beings of reason—but such as are neither true real beings (since they are not capable of true and real existence), nor do they have any true likeness with real beings by reason of which they would share with them a common concept of being. The first part of this assertion is common, as is clear from the common usage and mode of speaking in both Theology and Philosophy. It is also clear from the distinction treated above between real relation and the relation of reason; for a relation of reason is a being of reason. Aristotle too, in book V of the Metaphysics, text 14, distinguishes a twofold "to be": one that truly is in the thing, and another that is not always in the thing but only in the apprehension of the mind, as when we say that a man is blind. That being does not signify something that is in the man, but rather, when such a predicate is added, it removes something from him; nevertheless, because the intellect apprehends that lack of sight after the manner of a being, it therefore says that it "is" in the man—an "is" that signifies the truth of the proposition, not existence in reality. From this passage St. Thomas and other commentators infer beings of reason. In the same way Aristotle, in book IV of the Metaphysics, text 2, numbers negations and privations among those things that are in

some way called beings. This will be even clearer from what we shall say below about the divisions of the being of reason.

5. A division of the being of reason to be noted. This part cannot be confirmed by reason unless we first explain what sort of being, or what sort of essence, this being of reason of which we speak has. Now since a being of reason, as its very name bears on its face, expresses a reference to reason, it is customarily distinguished into many types according to diverse references. There is, first, a kind of being that is effectively made by reason by a true and real efficiency; in this sense all artifacts could be called beings of reason because they are made by reason. Yet this appellation is not in use, since an effect is not usually called in such a special way by reference merely to its efficient or exemplar cause. Another reference is to reason as the subject of inherence; this is a more proper denomination, for an accident is said to be of that subject in which it is, since an accident is a being of a being. Thus all the perfections that inhere in the intellect—whether made by it or coming from elsewhere or infused—can be called beings of reason. But we are not speaking of those now, because they are true real beings contained under the genera of accidents already explained; hence that sense of "being of reason" is not much used, because "reason" is considered in a very material way in that reference. There is, then, still another way: something is said to be in reason after the mode of an object, for since cognition occurs through a certain assimilation and, as it were, attraction of the thing known to the knower, the thing known is said to be in the knower, not only by inherence through its image, but also objectively according to itself.

6. Now that which is objectively in the mind in this way sometimes has—or can have—in itself a true real being according as it is set before reason; and this, absolutely and simply speaking, is not a true being of reason but a real being, because this being is that which simply and per se befits it, whereas being set before reason is extrinsic and accidental. But sometimes a thing is set before or considered by reason which has in itself no other real and positive being besides

being set before the intellect or reason thinking about it; and this is most properly called a being of reason, because it is in some way in reason—namely, objectively—and has no nobler or more real mode of being from which it could be called a being. Hence it is rightly defined that a being of reason is that which has being only objectively in the intellect; or, being that which is thought by reason as a being, although in itself it has no entity. Thus the Commentator rightly said, on book VI of the Metaphysics, com. 3, that a being of reason can have being only objectively in the intellect. And St. Thomas, Opusc. 42, chap. 1, says that a being of reason comes to be when the intellect strives to apprehend what is not, and therefore in some way feigns it as a being. He signifies the same in Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2; and I–II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 3: "that which is not in the nature of things is taken as a being in reason." In the same way Soncinas, on book X of the Metaphysics, q. 5; Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chap. 1; Durandus, on I, dist. 19, q. 5, n. 6; q. 6, n. 9; and dist. 33, q. 1, n. 10, explain the nature of the being of reason—although here Durandus adds that the entire being of a being of reason is an extrinsic denomination from the act of reason. That is equivocal and entails a difficulty to be treated in the next section.

7. From this explanation of the term—which is also the definition of the thing signified, so far as it can be here—it seems manifestly to follow that there is something that can be called a being of reason by that title. For many things are thought by our intellect that do not have real being in themselves, even if they are thought after the manner of beings, as is clear in the examples adduced of blindness, the relation of reason, etc. Likewise, many things are thought that are impossible and are feigned in the manner of possible beings, such as the chimera, which have no other being than to be thought. Moreover, this very fact that we are disputing about the being of reason does not occur without some thought of it; and by reflection we also conceive that we are disputing about a certain kind of being that truly is not in itself. No one, then—unless he ignores his own words—can deny that

there is something of this sort, feigned by mere thought, unless perhaps he falls into an equivocation in the use of the word "to be" or "to be given." For when we say that there "are" beings of reason, we do not understand that they are on the side of the thing according to true existence; otherwise we would involve a contradiction in terms. Hence if those who deny that there are beings of reason intend only to deny that, they do not contradict us; yet they are not using those words in keeping with the subject matter. For such beings are said to be or to exist not simply, but in a qualified sense, in keeping with their capacity—namely, only objectively in the intellect—and thus the matter is clear. The mode of this existence we shall explain more fully in the next section.

Why Beings of Reason Were Devised

8. Second, from what has been said we can gather the root or occasion for feigning or devising such beings of reason. Three reasons can be given. The first is the cognition that our intellect seeks to attain even of negations and privations, which are nothing. Since the adequate object of the intellect is being, it can conceive nothing except after the manner of being; therefore, when it attempts to conceive privations or negations, it conceives them after the manner of beings and thus forms beings of reason. St. Thomas hints at this in the places cited. This reason does not seem to have place in relations of reason, and therefore a second cause must be added, arising from the imperfection of our intellect: since it cannot at times know things as they are in themselves, it conceives them by comparing one to another and thus forms relations of reason where there are no real relations. For just as, because it cannot distinctly know in a single concept the whole perfection of one simple thing, it divides it into diverse concepts and thus forms a distinction of reason, so, when it compares things among themselves that are not related in reality, it forms a relation of reason. Yet it often needs this comparison, because it

cannot conceive a thing as it is in itself—or at least because it wishes in a mode suited to itself to explain what is in reality without such a mode, as when it predicates the same of itself by saying that it is the same as itself. These two ways are founded in some manner on things, or are ordered to knowing something that can truly be said of the things themselves. There is, however, a third cause arising from a certain fecundity of the intellect, which can out of real beings compose fictions by conjoining parts that cannot be conjoined in reality—thus it feigns a chimera or something similar—and so forms those beings of reason that are called impossibles and by some are called "prohibited beings." In these conceptions the intellect is not deceived, because it does not affirm that things are so in reality as it conceives them by a simple concept, in which there is no falsity. Thus the arguments of the first opinion have been sufficiently answered.

What Beings of Reason Share in Common With Real Beings

9. Third, from what has been said it is easy to show, against the latter opinion, that although a being of reason in some way shares the name "being," and not merely equivocally and by chance (as they say) but by a certain analogy and proportionality to true being, nevertheless it cannot share or agree with real beings in the concept of being. The first part is clear from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV at the beginning, where he expounds the analogy of being also with respect to privations and negations; likewise in book V, chapter 7, in giving a division of being he numbers beings of reason; yet in that book he does not distinguish names that are merely equivocal. Moreover, as is clear from what has been said, a being of reason is not called a being except because it is feigned and thought after the manner of a being—as is manifest in relations of reason; likewise, a "distinction of reason" is called a distinction by some proportion to a true distinction of the thing, or because it is in some way founded in the distinction of

concepts that the intellect makes. Finally, what cannot be compared to true being according to any reference or proportion cannot be called a being of reason nor share the appellation "being" in any way; therefore "being" is predicated of a being of reason only by some analogy, at least of proportionality, or by some reference—namely, because in some way it is founded upon being or refers to it.

10. No common concept can be assigned to real beings and beings of reason. A common concept has no place here at all, because such a concept requires that the form signified by the name be truly and intrinsically participated in by the inferiors. But "to be," from which "being" is named, cannot be intrinsically participated in by beings of reason, because to have being only objectively in reason is not "to be," but to be thought or feigned. Hence the common description that can be given of the common concept of being—namely, "that which has being"—does not in reality apply to beings of reason; therefore they cannot be said to have an essence, because essence, simply speaking, expresses a reference to being or a capacity for it; but the being of reason is such that being is repugnant to it. From this also arises the difference between an accident and a being of reason: an accident can be called a being absolutely and without addition, for although it is analogically a being, it is properly and intrinsically a being; but a being of reason cannot be called a being absolutely, but only with some addition that declares it not to be a true being but only thought of after the manner of a being. And this is confirmed: in the notion of being, a being of reason stands at a greater distance from a real being than a painted man stands from a real man; for in the latter case at least there is a real likeness in some accident, which cannot exist between a real being and a being of reason. You will say: by a similar argument it would be proved that even an analogy of proportionality cannot intervene here, because a being of reason cannot have proportion to a real being. I reply: although a being of reason as such does not have in itself a proportion or a foundation of proportion—because in itself it is nothing—still it is thought after the

manner of something having a proportion or reference; and this suffices to found some analogy, as St. Thomas taught in De veritate q. 2, a. 11, ad 5.

SECTION II
WHETHER A BEING OF REASON HAS A CAUSE, AND WHICH IT IS

1. A being of reason has no final cause. No formal cause. Whether it has any material cause. This question can be understood only about an efficient cause; for a being of reason of itself properly has no final cause, since it is not something per se intended by nature or by any agent. If, from the side of the man who devises or feigns beings of reason, some final rationale can be given, that pertains more to the final rationale of the man's act of thinking than to the object that is made and thought; and that end was sufficiently explained in the preceding section. Again, since the being of reason itself is feigned after the manner of some form—such as a relation or something of the sort—no other formal cause is necessary. Finally, since it is in no thing subjectively but only objectively in the intellect, as has been said, it has no material cause either—although if the thing that is denominated by the being of reason is considered after the manner of a subject, it can be called the matter, or quasi-matter, of that denomination or form. Consequently, if what is so denominated is considered as something composite by reason, it can be said to have a formal cause—namely, the being of reason taken in the abstract—as when a man, for example, is called a "species": that concrete "a species" is a certain being of reason whose matter is the man and whose form is the relation of species. This is to be explained in diverse ways, according to various opinions and the diversity of beings of reason, in keeping with what we shall say below.

First Opinion Concerning an Efficient Cause of Beings of Reason

2. It is only of the efficient cause, therefore, that we must speak. Some simply deny such a cause of beings of reason. Thus Soncinas felt, on book VI of the Metaphysics, q. 18, although he does not say absolutely that they have no cause, but that they have no cause that gives them being—and he speaks openly of the being of existence—in which sense the matter is very clear, because it has been shown that a being of reason has no being except objective being in the intellect. Yet, as I said above, these questions must be taken in keeping with the subject matter; therefore, granted what we have said about the nature of the being of reason, it would be senseless to inquire into a cause that would bestow being by a real efficiency, whether mediately or immediately. Still, since a being of reason is not always in that mode in which it can be, and yet sometimes begins to be in a proportionate way, it is not senseless to seek a cause of this whatever-kind-of-being of such a being.

First Assertion

3. There is an efficient cause of the being of reason, and in what way it reaches it. Accordingly, we must necessarily say first that there is some efficient cause from which a being of reason has it that it is, in its own way—although the efficiency, insofar as it is a real production, does not terminate in it as in the terminus of an effecting, but only as in the object of the produced terminus itself. The proof is this: although a being of reason does not have real being, it does have objective being; and yet it does not always have this; therefore the fact that it now has it and did not have it before must be referred to some cause in some manner efficient; otherwise no sufficient reason could be given for that variation—whatever it be. Likewise, that objective

being—although in the being of reason itself there is nothing—necessarily presupposes some real being in which it is founded or from whose denomination or reference that objective being, as it were, results; therefore the cause that brings about such a real being is the cause of the being of reason. Hence the latter part of the conclusion is easily clear: such a cause, by a real efficiency, produces something—namely, a certain cognition or fiction—which is something real in the intellect itself; all that efficiency, considered as a real production, terminates in the formal concept of the mind itself and there rests. From that, however, it comes about that this very formal concept in some way terminates, as to its object, at the being of reason that is thought or feigned. Thus, finally, the being of reason has objective being in the intellect.

Second Assertion

4. The intellect is the efficient cause of beings of reason; it produces them by producing only some thought or concept of its own, by reason of which the being of reason is said to have objective being in the intellect. This follows clearly from the preceding point and from the very appellation "being of reason," as we explained above; for if a being of reason has only objective being in the intellect, then it has that by means of some act of the intellect to which it is set as object; therefore by the efficiency of that act it has that being. That, therefore, is called the efficiency of the being of reason in a broad sense and in keeping with the capacity of the subject matter, as we have often said. Against this assertion one could adduce the opinion that holds that every extrinsic denomination is a being of reason even prior to any consideration by the intellect; I shall speak of this presently.

Various Doubts Concerning the Assertion Made

5. Many matters need inquiry and explanation here. First: what is that action or thought of the intellect by whose efficiency a being of reason is said to result; and, in consequence, whether by any and every act of the mind there results in the object some being of reason, or only by certain definite acts—and which they are. Then, whether to fashion beings of reason in this way is proper to the intellect, or whether it also belongs to the will, to the senses, and in general to powers that have their own objects. Finally, whether this should be understood only of the human intellect, or whether beings of reason result also by the divine or angelic intellect.

An Opinion that Makes the Being of Reason Consist in an Extrinsic Denomination

6. Some hold that beings of reason are nothing other than an extrinsic denomination by which a thing known is denominated from an act of the intellect according to some property or condition that befits it insofar as it is known. This denomination can be multiple. The first of all seems to be that by which a thing is said to be "known," for this too is an extrinsic denomination arising from an act of reason and does not apply to the thing except insofar as it is objectively in the mind. Then there are denominations taken from the various operations of the intellect: from the first, to be universal, genus, species, defined, etc.; from the second, to be affirmed, denied, etc.; from the third, to be antecedent, consequent, etc. That all these are beings of reason is the common agreement of all; and it is clear, because there is nothing real in the things so denominated, and yet they are conceived and spoken of as if there were something. Likewise because these denominations are attributed equally to non-beings: for a privation too is known, is affirmed, is denied, etc. That these denominations are taken precisely from an act of the intellect by which the thing is known in this or that way is proved thus: from the mere fact that the intellect knows the thing, the thing is said to be

"known." Hence, although understanding is in the intellect itself a true thing that intrinsically affects it, nevertheless in the object "to be known" is only a denomination of reason and thus a being of reason. And indeed from the fact that the intellect knows the thing in such a way—for example, abstractly—it is denominated "universal," and so with the others. Thus explained, this view is attributed to Durandus on I, dist. 19, qq. 5–6; whether he really thinks so we shall consider later.

7. First inference from the foregoing opinion. On this view it follows first that beings of reason result in their way not only with respect to things known by the human or created intellect, but also by the divine intellect; for considered as objects, things are also denominated "known." In almost this way Scotus said that creatures were from eternity produced by God in known being; for—as we have often said above—on Scotus's view that being is not the real being of existence, nor the being of essence (since the essence of a creature is not "to be known" but is that which is known). It will therefore be a being of reason. It is true that Scotus himself, on I, dist. 36, the single question, Ad secundum dico, declares that that being is not the being of a relation of reason but another being, diminished and absolute; yet he does not declare whether it should be called real or of reason.

8. Second inference. Secondly it follows from the said opinion that beings of reason result not only by the intellect but also by the will—and indeed by vision and similar acts—because from these as well objects are denominated according to some being which is nothing in them: namely, "to be willed," or "to be seen." Hence Scotus similarly says that creatures are produced by God in willed being by the will, just as in known being by the intellect, as is evident from II, dist. 1, q. 1; and with greater reason by the human will a thing is wholly extrinsically said to be "willed" and "loved," and by vision "seen." Therefore, in all these cases there is the same rationale and proportion.

9. Third inference. Third, from the said view it follows that there are not only beings of reason arising from the acts of these vital

powers, but that beings of reason can arise also from other things or from the relations of things, because in the things themselves before those acts there are found certain extrinsic denominations that put nothing in them and consequently will also be beings of reason. Such is the denomination by which a column is called right-hand or left-hand to an animal; likewise that which redounds upon the object from the power as such, as "to be visible" or "audible"; finally, all non-mutual relations which, from the side of one extreme, are said to be of reason, or the extrinsic denominations from other extremes. Rather, by parity of reasoning it follows that the denomination "clothed" from clothing, "located" from place, indeed even "agent" from action, are beings of reason, because the same or a proportionate rationale is present. For such a denomination places nothing in the denominated thing; hence it is called extrinsic; therefore that as such will be a being of reason—for what hinders this here more than in the others?

Not Every Extrinsic Denomination can be Called a Being of Reason

10. These corollaries, then, sufficiently declare, as I think, that the opinion in question cannot be true as regards the general rule that an extrinsic denomination as such constitutes a being of reason. For if the denomination is taken from a real form, it exists in things, and consequently does not pertain to beings of reason. The antecedent is clear, because that form has true real being without dependence on reason; therefore the denomination arising from it—although extrinsic—is nevertheless real and is not only objectively in the intellect or by the mind's handling or fiction. You will say: from the mere fact that it is only a denomination, it cannot be more than a being of reason, for denomination is a work of reason. I reply: if by "denomination" one understands the imposition of a denominative name, that indeed is a work of reason; but we are not now speaking of the imposition of names—for in that way even an intrinsic

denomination, as to the imposition of the denominative name, is a work of reason. Rather, we are treating of the unions or relations of the things themselves in which such denominative names are founded—relations that are not works of reason. For in intrinsic denomination there is a real union or identity or something similar; but in extrinsic denomination taken from the things themselves there is a real reference of one thing to another, from which it comes about that the thing to which there is such a reference is denominated after the manner of the terminus of another's reference. Under "reference" we include both the predicamental relation and the transcendental one.

Nor is a Denomination from an Act of Reason Always a Being of Reason

11. If that principle concerning extrinsic denomination taken from a real being is not universally true, neither can it be true when applied to acts of the intellect as directly denominating known objects. For an act of the intellect is as truly a real form as the others, and in reality it has a real and transcendental relation to the object, from which it comes about that the object is denominated "known." You will say that this is something peculiar in a denomination taken from acts of the intellect: that it can also apply to beings of reason[2], and thus for a special reason can be called a being of reason. But this is not sufficient; from it there follows only that some extrinsic denomination can be extended to beings of reason, even if, otherwise, it is taken from a real form—not, conversely, that this denomination suffices to constitute a being of reason. Therefore, as Scotus rightly noted in the passage cited, such extrinsic denominations can found some being or relation of reason if they are conceived as something in the denominated thing; yet when taken precisely, they are not properly beings of reason. The foundation for such a conception is not in the very thing that is denominated extrinsically, but in another, from

[2] Reading. entia in 1597 and 1960; elsewhere entem.

which it is denominated; and from that it comes about that what is conceived—as a being—in the thing so denominated is a being of reason.

12. One might say further that this is peculiar to denominations taken from acts of the intellect: that the being they confer is only objectively in the intellect—which is proper to a being of reason, as we said above; whereas extrinsic denominations taken from other things or acts, although they agree with denominations of the intellect in this, that they posit no real being in the things denominated, nevertheless differ in that they are not only objectively in the intellect nor do they depend on the intellect's actual operation. In this reply there are two defects. First, either violence is being done to the name "being of reason," or one must admit other genera of beings which are neither real nor of reason. This is clear, because if that being which is constituted by an extrinsic denomination from an act of reason has its own rationale of being distinct from real being, then likewise "a seen being," "a loved being," and, in general, "a being denominated extrinsically," will have a rationale of being distinct from real being; for the same rationale and proportion obtains, as has been shown. But if the stress lies on the name "being of reason," which seems to signify a peculiar dependence on the act of reason, then we can easily multiply similar or proportional names: "a being of imagination," "of sense," "of will," etc.—all distinct from real being because of the said similarity of rationale. If, however, we attend not to the name but to the thing, since in all these there is the same mode of being, they agree in the general rationale of "being of reason," not as it signifies a peculiar dependence on the act of reason, but as it signifies a being distinct from real being—what could be called "a being of extrinsic denomination."

13. Second, that evasion fails because it is, strictly speaking, false that a denomination taken from the direct act of the intellect has only objective being in the intellect; rather, it has properly formal being in the intellect rather than objective being. Hence we must avoid

an equivocation when we speak of "known being" or other similar denominations of the intellect. "Known being" can be taken as that being which is known, and this is properly objective in the intellect; or "known being" can be taken as that very being which a thing is said to have from the mere fact that it is known; and, by force of the direct cognition, this is not objective in the intellect, but rather is formal from the act by which the thing is known—although it is objective in a reflex cognition by which the intellect knows that it knows, or rather by which it knows that the thing is known. Moreover, although with respect to such cognition that being is objective in the intellect, it is not only objective; for the form from which that denomination arises is not only objective in the mind but exists in reality. Thus, when the intellect knows that the thing is loved, that "being loved" is indeed objective in the intellect, but this is not the whole being of it—so that for that reason it would have only objective being in the intellect—for in reality such an act of love tends to and terminates at such a thing, and this very fact is that the thing is loved.

14. Wherefore, if we rest precisely in the extrinsic denomination arising from a real form and from some non-feigned but true relation of it that exists in reality, I do not think it pertains to the being of reason, but is included under the broad heading of real being —at least on the side of the denominating form. Hence, if the intellect knows nothing more than such a form—for example, that vision has an intrinsic reference to such an object and terminates in it—and hence that such an object is extrinsically denominated "seen," it conceives no being of reason; for all those elements are in reality just as they are known: the denominated thing, the denominating form, and that whatever-kind-of union that completes the denomination, which is rather a real relation. And in this respect the same rationale holds for a denomination taken from the act of the intellect as directly knowing the thing, by which the thing is said to be known: without any fiction of reason, by the sole real existence of the act of knowing

with a real relation to the thing that is denominated "known." All this will be clearer from what follows.

First Assertion for Resolving the Question

15. A being of reason comes to be through an act of the intellect. We must therefore say that a being of reason is properly made through that act of the intellect by which there is conceived, after the manner of a being, that which in reality has no entity. This assertion is taken from what has been said in the first section, and from all the places of St. Thomas cited there, and from the causes or occasions we there numbered and which are in us for fashioning these beings of reason. Second, it is proved from what has been said against the preceding opinion: if a mere extrinsic denomination does not suffice, no other mode remains for explaining the causality of beings of reason. Third, it is made clear from the thing itself and, as it were, by a kind of induction. Blindness, for example (and the same holds of a simple negation), can be conceived in two ways. First, negatively only: conceiving that in such an organ the power of sight is not; and then no being of reason arises, because nothing is conceived after the manner of a being, but only after the manner of a non-being. From this, however, it comes about that, in order to form a simple concept of blindness itself, the intellect conceives it as an affection of the animal or of the organ—just as it apprehends darkness as a certain disposition of the air. Then, therefore, it conceives something after the manner of a being; and since it does not conceive a real being, then properly it forms such a being of reason. Something similar can be considered in beings of reason that have a foundation in extrinsic denominations, such as the relation of "seen," "known," etc. These denominations too can be taken in two ways. Either as merely extrinsic denominations; and thus, when the intellect directly knows that a thing is "seen," insofar as the vision existing in the eye terminates at it, by this cognition it forms or knows no being of reason. Or,

otherwise, these denominations are taken as respect-denominations; for our intellect does not sufficiently conceive something as the terminus of another's relation to it without immediately conceiving it after the manner of a correlative. Then, in the thing so denominated, there is conceived something after the manner of a respective being; and because that is not a real being nor a real relation, it follows that it is a being of reason. In this way we explained the matter above (disp. VI, sects. 6–7), and what we said there about the fabrication of the universal as such can be applied to other relations of reason. There, too, we assigned a mode for reconciling the various opinions and statements of Doctors about such beings of reason and about the cognition by which they are made; and according to what was said there, the first opinion treated above could also be explained. From what we shall say below in particular about individual beings of reason, this assertion will be even more evident.

Second Assertion

16. That sort of act of the intellect fashions a being of reason. I say, secondly: the act of the intellect by which a being of reason arises is in some way comparative or reflexive—especially when the being of reason is founded upon an act of the intellect. This is proved and explained thus: the act by which a being of reason is in its way fashioned and arises by its nature presupposes another concept of a real being, by whose proportion or imitation the being of reason is conceived or formed. In privation, for example, and in darkness, some cognition of light is presupposed so that the removal or negation of it may be conceived after the manner of the opposite affection. Likewise, in order that a wall be known as "seen," the cognition of a vision terminated at it is presupposed; and then there can be conceived in the wall, as it were, a certain passion in it arising from the vision that is exercised around it. Thus, broadly speaking, the fashioning of the being of reason can be said to occur through reflex cognition—

extending the name "reflexion" to every cognition that presupposes another and is, as it were, founded on it, which, generally speaking, is more properly signified by the name "comparison" than by "reflexion." Properly, however, this reflexion is found in respects of reason, which dialecticians call second intentions. In them a direct operation of the intellect precedes, and thereafter another act is superadded, by which there is considered in the known subject some condition after the manner of a being existing in it, whereas in reality there is nothing in the thing itself but only an extrinsic denomination. For example: first the intellect conceives that Peter is white. This is a direct operation by which the intellect fashions or knows no being of reason, but only what is in the thing—even though the mode by which it knows such a thing, namely by intellectually composing, by subjecting one thing and predicating another, is not in the thing. That mode, however, by the force of that act, is not attributed to the thing known nor is it known as something existing in it; thus that act does not yet pertain to the causality of the being of reason—except remotely and fundamentally. Afterwards, however, the intellect reflects and considers the order of those extremes as they are set before its composition; it understands that one is compared to the other after the manner of subject, the other after the manner of predicate, and thus it conceives them after the manner of a mutual respect—although in reality such a respect is not in them. In this way all similar second intentions are formed by reflex concepts upon prior denominations arising from direct concepts; these, as we said, do not pertain to the proper rationale of the "being of reason" or "fiction" of which we now treat. We must only note (as I remarked above when treating universals) that this reflexion can be multiple: after the intellect apprehends after the manner of a being that which truly is not a being, it can reflect again and consider what sort of relation that is which it feigns, and what terminus it has, and the like. Not all this reflexion is necessary for understanding that a being of reason has been fashioned, but as soon as that which is not a true being is

conceived after the manner of a being, then a being of reason is understood to have been fashioned. These points seem sufficient for the first inquiry and for all that is insinuated in it.

A Being of Reason Properly Arises only Through an Act of the Intellect

17. The senses do not produce beings of reason. Appetite does not fashion beings of reason. From this it is easy to dispatch the second inquiry. We must say that neither in the senses nor in the will or appetite are there formed or in any way found proper beings of reason. For neither the senses nor the appetitive power have the power to fashion or conceive, after the manner of a being, that which truly is not a being. The sense is not reflexive nor is it inquisitive of a thing's quidditative nature as the intellect is; for that reason it does not conceive after the manner of beings those things that are not beings—especially since being, as being, is not the adequate object of sense as it is of the intellect. In this respect the same holds for the will, which does not tend to "being" as being but to the good. And although at times the human will tends to that which in reality is not a good as if it were a good, nevertheless the will itself does not feign such a good; it presupposes it as apprehended and represented by the intellect. Hence, even if it be counted among beings of reason, it is not fashioned by the will but by the intellect. Although the will, like the senses, denominates its object "loved" and "desired" by a real extrinsic denomination through the reference of its act to such an object, still the will does not further reflect or inquire what it is in such an object to be "loved" or "desired," nor does it feign in it a relation of reason; this belongs to the intellect. And although the will can in its own order reflect on its act by loving love or desire, and can also reflect on the object as denominated from the act of the same or a similar will—namely, loving the object because it is loved by another—nevertheless by such a reflexion it does not feign, after the manner of a being or

good, something that in itself is not good; rather it tends to each thing as it is in itself or as it is proposed by the intellect. For the same reason, although the will can tend to a universal object, it does not itself fashion the universal, but presupposes it as fashioned by the intellect. The same holds of all objects toward which the will tends by reason of extrinsic denominations or relations which—if they are conceived after the manner of relations—are truly only relations of reason, as when the will loves some act because it is commanded. For "to be commanded" is an extrinsic denomination which—if it is apprehended as something existing in the thing commanded—will be a being of reason; yet this is not effected by the will but by the intellect. From these points, therefore, it is sufficiently clear that beings of reason are fashioned neither by the will nor by the senses.

18. Whether the imagination produces beings of reason. From this general rule, however, the human imagination can be excepted, which sometimes feigns certain items that truly are nowhere —or even cannot be—by composing them out of the things that fall under sense, as when it feigns a golden mountain that does not exist, although it is possible. In the same way it can feign an impossible thing, such as a chimera. For, from the very fact that it has the power of composing simple species and forming through them an image made up of the things represented by simple phantasms, just as it can compose things that do not involve repugnance even if in fact they are not found so composed, so too it can feign a composition among things that repel coherence. Hence dialecticians say that the "imaginable being" extends more widely than "the possible being." Thus, indeed, we must say that those beings of reason which are purely impossible and have no other foundation in reality than the power of a faculty that composes things which cannot be composed in reality can also be feigned by the imagination. However, because the human imagination in this shares in some manner the power of reason, and perhaps never does this without the cooperation of reason, all these

are called beings of reason; and, speaking simply, this office too is attributed to reason.

Whether the Divine Intellect Fashions Beings of Reason

19. From what we have said concerning the divine and human intellect, we can also judge of the angelic intellect or of any created intellect that understands in a more perfect and higher mode —such as the intellect of one seeing God as such. Insofar as they perfectly know things as they are in themselves or in themselves (that is, in their own proper being), they do not fashion beings of reason. The angelic intellect, however—if it at times understands something in an imperfect way and through alien species or concepts—can fashion some beings of reason; for example, in knowing God by natural cognition, it can know Him through some reference to creatures and form a distinction of reason in Him. We remit the rationale and exposition of this to the Theologians, for it presupposes a thorough understanding of the mode of angelic cognition.

20. The opinion of some. Many think it should not be denied to the divine intellect to form beings of reason; for it signifies a perfection in our intellect and involves no imperfection of necessity. To understand every intelligible is a perfection; these beings of reason are in some way intelligible; therefore it pertains to the divine perfection to understand them also. Again, it pertains to the perfection of one who understands to know each thing as it is and of what sort it is; but these beings of reason are such that they are not true beings in themselves, yet can be thought after the manner of beings; therefore it pertains to the perfection of the divine intellect to comprehend them. There will be no imperfection in the divine intellect for knowing these after the manner of beings when they are not beings; rather, the imperfection belongs to the object itself, which has such a mode of entity. The point is confirmed: the necessity of fashioning these beings

of reason does not always arise from the imperfection of the knower but from the nature and intrinsic necessity of the things to be known. This is evident first in negations and privations; they are therefore known after the manner of beings because nothing is per se intelligible except being, and therefore, insofar as they are non-beings, they have no intelligibility; and so, that they may be known, they must be conceived after the manner of beings. This reasoning is common to every intellect and is not founded on an imperfection of the knower but on the very nature of the intelligible object. For just as being is the adequate object of the human intellect, it is also, in its way, the adequate object of the divine intellect—speaking of the terminative object, whether primary or secondary; therefore the divine intellect too cannot conceive anything except after the manner of being; therefore it will also conceive negations and privations in this way. Again, this is clear with respect to relations of reason, because even the divine intellect conceives as rationally distinct those things that are not distinct in reality. For He knows the divine Word to proceed by intellect and not by will, and the Holy Spirit to proceed by will and not by intellect. Likewise, He conceives that man is created according to the idea of man and not according to the idea of lion, and conversely; and so in other cases. Many Theologians favor this opinion; when treating of the divine ideas, or of relations or attributes, they attribute to God both respects of reason and distinctions of reason by comparing the same thing to diverse things, as is evident in St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 2–3; Contra gentiles I, c. 18, and other theologians on I, dists. 35 and 36.

21. The opposite opinion. Nonetheless, from elsewhere it seems repugnant to the perfection of the divine intellect that beings of reason be formed by it, because a being of reason is not formed except by conceiving after the manner of a being that which is not a being; but this arises from the imperfection of the intellect and is repugnant to the perfection of divine cognition, for this consists in knowing each thing most clearly as it is. It cannot be, then, that beings of reason are

formed by the divine intellect. This is confirmed: it cannot be that the divine intellect conceive spiritual realities on the model of corporeal ones, for that is an imperfect mode of knowing; rather, it belongs to His perfection to behold spiritual realities as they are and not otherwise. Therefore, by a like reasoning, it cannot be that the divine intellect conceive as distinct things that in reality are not distinct, for this too is an imperfect and alien mode of knowing; therefore a distinction of reason cannot be made by the divine intellect; therefore, by a like reasoning, no relation of reason can be made by the divine intellect. The rationale is the same, or proportionally the same: God cannot understand as related those things that are not related, because that mode of conceiving would not be proper nor would things be conceived thereby as they are. Finally, for the same reason, God does not conceive negations or privations after the manner of positive beings, because He would conceive them in an alien mode and not as they are; therefore no genus of the being of reason can be formed by the divine intellect.

22. Hence it seems false, what is assumed in the contrary arguments: that the fashioning of beings of reason does not arise from an imperfect mode of knowing, or that it is necessary from the force of the object of intellect. For every conception of a thing which, on the side of the object or of the mode of representing, differs from the way the known thing itself is, is in itself imperfect and does not have that condition from the force of the object but from the side of the knower. I say "from the side of the object and in the mode of representing," because from the side of the knower and of the act, or of its entity, it can happen that the thing be formed in the knower otherwise than it is in itself, on account of the greater perfection of the knower. Thus we know material things immaterially; and God knows composites most simply and changeable things immutably and things in potency through pure act; for all these indicate only a perfection in that being by which the cognition is made perfect. But with respect to the representation of the object, it belongs to the perfection of cognition

to represent it as it is; and every cognition that departs from this propriety cannot have that character from the perfection of cognition but from some imperfection or limitation added, because the perfection of cognition consists in its adequation to the thing known and consequently in representing it as it is in itself. Hence it follows that from the force of the object of the intellect—even of the terminative object—it is never necessary to have another mode of cognition; rather, the object itself calls to be known as it is.

23. And, running through the individual objects or beings of reason, this can easily be shown. An absolute being, insofar as it is such, does not call to be known after the manner of a relative; no matter how two things may seem to us connected among themselves, if in reality they are not related, they will be more perfectly known as they are in themselves and with that connection which they truly have without any real or feigned relation, than if they were known by a relative mode that is alien to them. Similarly, a respective being does not call to be known after the manner of an absolute, nor a positive being after the manner of a negative—as far as it is in itself—nor, conversely, a negation after the manner of a positive. This last is thought more difficult, because a negation has nothing of entity that can be represented by cognition unless it be feigned after the manner of a being. But we must consider that the perfect cognition of a negation does not consist in this, that it be directly represented and after the manner of a being, but in this: that, by knowing most clearly the positive beings, one knows in them that one is not another, or does not have another, or that this is not united to that—without any other[3] direct representation of the negation or privation itself. In this way God most perfectly knows the negations themselves—not indeed without a positive act and judgment by which God, in beholding two things, most simply beholds at once that one is not the other, and is not conjoined to the other, or even cannot be united. But because,

[3] Reading. alia in 1960; elsewhere illa. "In other editions, illa, which seems to us less appropriate." Cf. BHF, t. VII, p. 414.

beyond this act, God has no other rationally distinct act by which He apprehends the negation itself after the manner of a positive being—this concept is neither necessary for God nor pertains to perfection. When God is said to "know the things that are not as things that are," He is not said to do so because, in order to know the things that are not, or the negations of beings, God must know the negation after the manner of a positive being, but because He knows things that are as clearly and distinctly as things that are not—knowing and judging of each what is or is not. Besides, God does not receive cognition from things, nor, in order to know them, does He depend on their existence; rather, He knows possibles as well as existents, and future things as well as present, yet knowing each precisely to be as it is or not to be as it is not.

24. The final opinion is proved. God most perfectly knows beings of reason. This latter opinion seems true to me and most consonant with the divine perfection. Only this must be added: although God does not of Himself and immediately understand by forming beings of reason, nonetheless He most perfectly knows the beings of reason themselves; and in that sense such beings can be said to have some being by the power of divine cognition. For their being is to be objectively in the intellect. If, therefore, they are known by God, they are objectively in the divine intellect; therefore they have, from the force of divine intellection, the being proportionate to themselves. That these beings are perfectly known by God cannot be doubted for the reasons set forth previously, which prove at least this and not something else. It can also be explained thus: God comprehends all the actions of human imagination or reason; therefore He comprehends all the formal fictions (so to speak) that can exist in these powers; therefore He also knows the objective fictions that correspond to or are set before those acts of the mind; and thus He knows all beings of reason that can arise in any way through the operations of these powers.

25. Yet someone may say that although God thus knows beings of reason, this does not suffice for their being said to actually exist in the mode in which they can exist, but only that they be said to be possible—or rather, "imaginable" or "feignable" by the human mind. I reply: we need not contend if someone prefers this way of speaking, for it will be a dispute about words rather than about the thing; and such a manner of speaking is not unreasonable. Since these beings are merely feigned, they are then said to "actually be" in their proper and special way when they are actually feigned; they are not, however, feigned by the divine intellect, but are known as "feignable" by the human intellect; and under that description they can rightly be said not yet to "actually be." Yet if we speak more broadly of any objective being of them, then, since they are actually known by the divine intellect, they can also be said to "actually be."

SECTION III

WHETHER THE BEING OF REASON IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO NEGATION, PRIVATION, AND RELATION

1. This division is rather common and has its foundation in Aristotle, Metaphysics IV at the beginning, where he places negations and privations among beings—although in reality they are not beings; hence he numbers them in this way only because they are beings of reason. Thus afterwards, book V, chapter 7, he declares that the being of such items is only "according to true predication," and therefore through the intellect; and in the same book, chapter 15, he hints at relations of reason. This division is also taken from St. Thomas, De veritate q. 21, a. 1; on I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3; and dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1; and all more recent authors use the same distinction.

2. There is, however, some difficulty—both as to the sufficiency of the division and also as to the distinction of the

members under such a division. Concerning the first point we shall speak in the next section. With respect to the second point, the reason for doubting may be briefly this: negations and privations seem to be numbered among beings of reason without warrant, because they are not something fabricated by the mind but truly belong to the things themselves. For in reality the air is dark and lacking light, and a man is not white if he is black. If these are said to be beings of reason insofar as they are feigned after the manner of a being, then in this way all beings of reason will be certain negations, because all are non-real and true non-beings and intrinsically include this negation. Again, it does not appear why negation and privation are numbered as diverse beings of reason. For if they are considered formally and with respect to the lack or the fiction of entity, they do not have diversity; and the fact that they differ by a reference or connotation to a subject or receptive potency does not differ, under that consideration, in any entity of reason but only, as it were, extrinsically in a real entity or in a reference to a real being. Finally, negation and privation are not conceived as beings of reason without a reference to another; therefore they are not rightly distinguished from a relation of reason. The antecedent is clear, because a privation is the privation of something.

The Division Explained & Proved

3. Nevertheless, that division is rightly given. There is no doubt that these three members, when conceived after the manner of beings, are beings of reason and not of the thing. I presuppose what we said above regarding the category of relation: there are some real relations and others of reason; and we said that these latter do not have in reality a true being toward another, but are thought as having a being toward another. Therefore the being of such relations is not a being of the thing but is a being that is feigned by thought; it is, therefore, a being of reason. Again, a negation does not of itself express anything of the thing, since it simply removes it. With respect to

privation, we must presuppose for this entire matter that Aristotle sometimes calls "privation" a form that is less perfect in comparison with a more perfect form opposed to it—like blackness in comparison to whiteness; nevertheless, that is not a true privation but a positive form, and therefore does not pertain to this division. A proper privation, then, is called the lack of a form in a suitable subject (book V of the Metaphysics, chap. 22; book X, chap. 7); therefore it is of itself and formally a removal and a non-being, as Aristotle also teaches (Physics I, chap. 8). Thus both negation and privation, if they are considered precisely insofar as they are non-beings as such, are neither real beings nor beings of reason, because they are not beings nor are they considered as beings, but as non-beings; and in this way they are not something feigned and are said to belong to the things themselves —not by positing something in them, but by removing; as Cajetan noted from St. Thomas (I, q. 48, a. 2), where St. Thomas holds the same view; and De malo q. 1, a. 2; Capreolus on II, dist. 34, q. 2, ad 1; Ferrarensis, Contra gentiles III, chap. 19; Soncinas, Metaphysics X, q. 15. And thus we say that privations are given in things: blindness in an eye, darkness in the air, evil in human actions; and in this way Aristotle posited privation as a principle of natural generation.

4. From this negation or removal of entity, and from the mode by which our intellect attributes it to things—not only by denying but also by affirming—it comes about that these are conceived by us not only purely negatively, but also after the manner of a positive being. Under that consideration they have the rationale of being—not of the thing, but of reason—as St. Thomas rightly noted on Metaphysics IV, chap. 2, where Aristotle is of the same mind. The first point is clear both because, in the affirmation "The man is blind," there is included, virtually, the predication of being, for the verb "is" includes the participle of being, and because our intellect does not conceive something as existing in things unless it conceives it after the manner of a being. The second point is clear because, in this mode of conception or affirmation, no falsity or deception is mingled; such

expressions are altogether true. Hence they are found in Sacred Scripture: Genesis 1: "and darkness was upon the face of the deep," and John 9: "He was blind from birth." Therefore this being is not attributed as positing some entity in the thing, but as a being of reason only—because what in reality is a mere lack is conceived and attributed to a subject as something existing in it; this is indeed an alien or improper mode of conceiving and predicating, though not a falsity. Thus, then, it is clear that the three members in question are included under the being of reason.

The Difference Between a Relation of Reason & The Other Two Members

5. That relation is, in that order and latitude, a diverse being of reason from the other two is clear first from the diversity of the foundation. For the foundation that the intellect has for conceiving a relation of reason is not some negation or removal of entity, but rather is some positive entity that is not perfectly conceived by us except after the manner of a respect. You will say: to conceive a respect of reason, there is always presupposed in reality a lack of a real respect; for if a real respect intervened, a relation of reason would not be feigned. I reply: it is true that such a lack or negation is presupposed as a necessary condition; yet not as the proper foundation of such a relation. Hence a relation of reason is not feigned in order to conceive the very negation or lack of relation[4] after the manner of a positive being, but to conceive something else that in reality is positive and absolute—something so connected with another that, for that reason, it is conceived by us after the manner of a respective.

6. From this it is further gathered what the proper and formal difference is between a respect of reason and the other two members: a relation of reason formally gives a respective denomination

[4] Reading. relationis in 1960; elsewhere negationi. "In other editions, negationi." Cf. BHF, t. VII, p. 419.

according to reason, and through it we explain something positive in reality—especially when such a relation has in reality some foundation, at least a remote one. I note this because at times it is founded only in our mode of conceiving; then it can happen that through it only some negation on the side of the thing is explained, as is clear in the relation of reason of the identity of the same to itself. This, however, is quasi-accidental to the respective denomination that a relation of reason as such confers. By contrast, negation and privation by their very kind denominate according to reason after the mode of the absolute and the positive—even though by that denomination we are only setting forth a lack; thus we denominate the air "dark," as if it were affected by a certain absolute disposition opposed to light, through which we declare this lack of light.

7. Nor does it matter that a privation is known and defined through the positive after the manner of a relation. For this arises more from the negative foundation itself that is presupposed in reality than from the mode of conceiving such a being of reason after the manner of the positive. Also, the mode of the privation's reference to the habit, in the way in which it can be in or be conceived in privation, is not after the manner of a relation according to being but according to saying—just as one of the contraries is known through the other. Hence it comes about that there can be a privation of a real relation which is not conceived after the manner of a relation, although it cannot be known without a terminus. For example, to be an orphan is a certain privation that immediately seems to take away the relation of sonship, which is removed by the father's death; therefore that privation cannot be sufficiently understood without the father, and yet it is not conceived after the manner of a relation, but rather after the manner of a certain absolute affection that remains in one extreme with the other removed. For, from the very fact that by that mode of conceiving we declare the privation of a relation, we conceive it after the manner of the absolute and not of the respective.

8. Finally, as regards the distinction between the other two members—namely privation and negation—there is no doubt that they are in some way distinct; for privation expresses a lack in a subject that is apt by nature to have the form, whereas negation expresses a lack in a subject absolutely and simply. Whether the difference is essential or formal is a question of little moment; we shall more conveniently settle it in section 5. For now I note only, with St. Thomas (De malo q. 3, a. 7), that "negation" can be taken in two ways: first, in common; and thus it is properly and adequately distinguished from a relation of reason and is further divided into "privation" properly so called and "negation" taken more strictly as expressing a lack in a subject not apt, or unfit, to have the form; and this is the second way negation is commonly taken. Thus the three-membered division we are treating contains two two-membered divisions. The first is the being of reason into the positive—which is the "to another" —and the negative. This first division is into members essentially diverse, in that way in which, in these beings, an essential constitution or diversity can be conceived.

9. The doubt is satisfied. One may still doubt whether this division is univocal or analogical, and, if univocal, whether it is of a genus into species—or what sort it is. These questions are of little moment; I leave them to the reader's consideration. To me it seems univocal, because there is no sufficient rationale for analogy. It also seems to be of a genus into species, for these respects can be attributed even to beings of reason, and in them a composition of genus and difference can be conceived, as I presuppose from dialectic. In the present case, too, the concept of being of reason can be abstracted in such a way that, in its own order, it is conceived as something complete and as having differences outside its own rationale. The other division, or rather subdivision, is that of the negative being of reason taken in common into negation strictly taken and privation; these we shall more conveniently explain in the two sections that follow.

SECTION IV
WHETHER A BEING OF REASON IS SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO NEGATION, PRIVATION, AND RELATION

1. The reason for doubting is that a being of reason can be divided proportionally through all the categories. Therefore it is not adequately encompassed by those three members. The antecedent is clear, because by running through all the categories, in each of them certain beings of reason are fabricated in proportion to real things, which can constitute, proportionally, as many "categories of reason." Thus, in the category of substance we conceive a chimera or similar monsters of reason which are conceived after the manner of substance. For they are not feigned as inhering in others, but as fictitious beings in their own right. In quantity there seems to be, first and foremost, imaginary space, which we conceive after the manner of a certain extension; likewise that quantity which, for example, we conceive in a chimera is a being of reason. Again, in quality there appears to be a broad field of beings of reason. For we conceive reputation, for example, and honor as a disposition befitting a person held in honor or of good repute, even though in that case there is only a being of reason. Likewise human lordship or jurisdiction is conceived as certain powers, which for that reason are wont to be called moral powers, yet they are beings of reason. Then, just as we feign a chimera, so within it we can feign its proper shape, which as such will also be a kind of quality of reason. And in nearly this way the remaining categories can be imagined in a chimera after the manner of beings of reason, as if someone devised within it proper actions or passions, or modes, and its own place (ubi), and the like. Moreover, in particular, action, if it is conceived as an absolute form inhering in an agent, is a certain being of reason, not after the manner of relation but after the

manner of action; and conversely, denominations such as "seen," "known," "loved," and the like, if they are conceived as something in the thing denominated, are conceived after the manner of a certain passion, and as such they are beings of reason. Likewise, in the category of when (quando), we conceive an imaginary extension or a denomination from extrinsic time as measuring, as though it were something in the thing denominated; and the same is true for the other categories. Therefore the partition of beings of reason is not rightly restricted to those three members. On the contrary, if that division is not sufficient, it will not have been aptly formulated, which would be against the common opinion.

There are Two Possible Ways to Explain the Said Division

2. The first is that this division is not to be understood as given for a being of reason taken in its whole latitude, but only for that which has some foundation in the thing. For, as St. Thomas noted, I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, and d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, there are certain beings of reason which have a foundation in things, though they receive their completion from reason, such as the notion of the universal or of a genus, and other similar notions; of this kind also are negations and privations, as can easily be understood from what has been said in the preceding sections. Other beings of reason, however, are fabricated wholly by the intellect without any foundation in the thing, as a chimera. Therefore the divided whole of that division can be the being of reason which has a foundation in the thing. And a justification can be given: a being of reason of this sort somehow serves for the sciences and for cognitions of things insofar as they can exist in human beings, and thus can fall under science and teaching. Hence, because that division is doctrinal in character, it is rightly delivered only about that being of reason; for another being of reason that is purely fictitious is entirely accidental and can be multiplied to infinity. Thus,

no being of reason which has a foundation in the thing is feigned after the manner of substance, but after the manner of something that adheres to another in which it is founded. For every being of reason that is feigned after the manner of substance is purely fictitious and without foundation. It is therefore not surprising that it is not included in that division. From this it also follows that all beings of reason which are conceived after the manner of accidents in such a fictitious substance are likewise excluded from this division, because they too are purely fictitious and without foundation. And finally, according to this interpretation it can be conceded that beings of reason which are purely fictitious roam through all the categories, or can be fabricated in imitation of them. It is otherwise with those that have a foundation in the thing.

3. Examination of the aforesaid reason for sufficiency. Yet according to this view there still remains to be explained why those beings of reason which have a foundation in the thing and which are feigned after the manner of accidents cannot at least be multiplied according to several of the accidental categories. For, as I said in the preceding section, a being of reason which is divided into negation, relation, and privation is beforehand, virtually, divided into positive and negative being. Therefore, in order that that division be adequate, every positive being of reason must also be relative. We thus inquire into the reason for this fact. For the argument given at the beginning seems to show that there are several beings of reason having a foundation in the thing, which are devised after the manner of other categories, especially quality or power, and action and passion.

4. Now the usual reason given for this is taken from the proper constitutive of relation as such, which is to be "toward another." For this mode, or quasi-difference taken precisely, namely, the "toward as toward," of itself does not posit something inhering in the thing that is referred; absolute accidents, however, according to their proper notions, signify something inhering. Hence it is that a being of reason, insofar as it is thought as a positive accident, is always

conceived after the manner of the relative, and not after the manner of the absolute, because that very "being-toward another," since in itself it does not imply inherence, can be thought as affixed or as it were adjoined by reason; yet it cannot be thought as something absolute and inhering, because to inhere—by its intrinsic concept—signifies something real.

5. This reason seems to have a foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 28, a. 1. Nevertheless, it must be rightly understood and explained, for it has difficulty in all its parts. First, because "being-toward another," taken truly and properly, is something real and inhering, as we said above, and yet notwithstanding this, reason imagines a "being-toward" not a true but a fictitious term; therefore the same could be said of "being-in" even of the absolute[5]. Second, because not all the categories of absolute accidents imply true inherence, but certain ones imply extrinsic adjacency, as was seen above; therefore from this side they too have a foundation for being feigned according to reason. What Cajetan says there, together with others, namely that the "being-toward," as such, abstracts from the real and the rational, so that upon this they ground the stated reasoning, has been rejected by us above.

6. Therefore that reason seems to be taken in this sense. Since relation according to its own proper and peculiar notion includes a habitude not only to the subject but also to the term, the intellect can consider this latter notion precisely, not expressly considering the other—even if in the thing itself it is included in a true "being-toward." This precision and consideration is sufficient for the intellect to be able to conceive and compare something after the manner of referring to another, even if in that thing there is truly no such respect. And thus there is in relatives a peculiar reason why positive beings of reason can be conceived after the manner of relations. This reason, however, is not found in the absolute categories, unless perhaps insofar as they include some transcendental respect; for under that aspect they are already, in a certain way, "toward another." If, however, certain beings

[5] Reading "absoluto" in 1861, 1960; "absoluta" in 1597, 1600.

of reason are devised after the manner of relations, by that very fact they are feigned after the likeness of predicamental relations and not transcendental ones, because they are such adventitious respects by the extrinsic conception of the intellect and are not conceived as intrinsically pertaining to the constitution of some being, which is of the essence of transcendental respect. But in an absolute accident, insofar as it is absolute, there is no foundation for thinking of some proportionate positive being of reason, whether such an accident be inhering or adjacent. For in all this breadth the absolute accident is to be taken in the aforesaid sense, and the very word "inhere" is sometimes used in that broad signification. And this reason, thus explained, will be made clearer by running through the individual examples set forth above.

The Initial Difficulties are Resolved

7. Imaginary space as a being of reason. The first example concerned imaginary space, which we conceive after the manner of dimensions. Although it is true that such space, so conceived, is a being of reason, it is nevertheless encompassed under negation or privation taken broadly, because that space, dimensions being excluded, is something negative; yet to explain it we conceive it and speak of it as if it were something positive, and herein consists the being of reason, which is a negation or privation, as has been said. From this it can rightly be concluded that beings of reason which are negations or privations can be referred to diverse categories according to the exigency of the forms to which such negations are opposed. This holds also in the example of imaginary succession, which we conceive with real time excluded; regarding this the same account holds as for imaginary space.

8. Another example was of certain denominations pertaining to the genus of quality, such as those which are taken from reputation or honor. Insofar as they are held in human estimation and are judged

certain goods, they are not proper beings of reason, but extrinsic denominations from real forms existing in others; and thus honor is said to be in the one who honors, and reputation to be a clear knowledge accompanied by praise. If, however, an occasion is taken from this for feigning some being of reason in the one honored, that is nothing other than after the manner of the relation of an object known, or by another mode of being signified or represented, as a little below we shall say about the object seen or known. Another example was that of the moral power of lordship or jurisdiction; this too is conceived by us after the manner of a certain superior relation. For in order to conceive this power we do not feign or think of something after the manner of a quality superadded to the one to whom such power is given; rather, we conceive only that a respect of superiority is added to him, founded on some extrinsic denomination arising from the will of another.

9. Moreover, an example was added concerning action and passion, of which the account is diverse. For if action is immanent, it is not conceived in the agent as something of reason, but as something of the thing. If it is transitive, either the agent is such that from it there results in it a real relation, and then neither can anything of reason be conceived in the agent on that account, but only something of the thing; or, if the agent is such that no real relation arises in it, then from such an action something of reason can be conceived in the agent. That, however, is only a relation. For a transitive action, as such, cannot be conceived in the agent except after the manner of relation, because it is repugnant to its proper notion to be conceived in the agent after the manner of an action. But passion, if it is proper and true, always signifies in the patient something of the thing and not merely of reason—whether it is considered according to the proper notion of passion, or according to the predicamental relation resulting from it. If, however, something is considered after the manner of a passion which is not a true passion in reality, but only according to the mode of conceiving and denominating, as "to be seen," "to be loved,"

and the like, then indeed either the denomination is extrinsic and real; or, if it is conceived as quasi-intrinsic and of reason, it is only relative, because in truth it is not a denomination of the patient as such, but of the object as terminating the act of a power and as referred to that act, inasmuch as another is referred to it. For in the object or in the term, as so denominated, nothing can be conceived that is entirely absolute apart from the denominating act or motion, and therefore it is necessarily conceived after the manner of a respect. This can also be gathered from Aristotle's teaching on non-mutual relatives given in Metaphysics V, chapter 15: namely, they are conceived and denominated as correlatives to others, because other things are referred to them. This must be said as well of every denomination of reason founded on some real extrinsic denomination; for such a denomination is always relative with respect to the form that denominates. Hence, if it is not taken from a real relation, it must be taken from a relation of reason. Therefore it is established that every denomination of reason which is made after the manner of a positive form, and not in order to conceive or explain some privation or negation, is made after the manner of relation.

Another Way of Explaining the Sufficiency

10. The interpretation of this division just given is quite suitable and sufficiently explains the matter. We can, however, add another way by which that division is adequate for the whole being of reason, by including under negation fictitious and impossible beings, whether they are feigned after the manner of substance or of accident. For since such fictitious beings are simply non-beings, they are rightly included under negation. Indeed, at times such impossible beings are feigned to explain, as it were, by a simple concept a complex and impossible negation. Because it is impossible that a horse be a lion, therefore that being which is conceived after the manner of a horse and a lion at once we say is fictitious, and we name it a chimera or

something similar; and similarly, to explain the necessity of this negation "An ox cannot fly," we apprehend a flying ox as something impossible and a being of reason. And this seems to be the more common sense of this division, namely, that all these are included under negation. In this way, with the additions we made in the earlier interpretation, it easily becomes clear that the division is sufficient, and it is not repugnant that beings of reason can be feigned through all the categories, for all the rest—apart from relations—are fabricated after the manner of privations or negations.

SECTION V
IN WHAT RESPECTS NEGATION AND PRIVATION AGREE OR DIFFER INSOFAR AS THEY ARE BEINGS OF REASON

1. We can treat of negation and privation either only insofar as they remove a positive form or entity, or insofar as they are beings of reason. For above we distinguished these two aspects, and according to them the considerations regarding negations and privations are also diverse.

2. For, as I indicated above, in negation (and proportionally the same holds for privation insofar as it is a removal), if it is a true negation, there is no fiction of the intellect. Rather, when the intellect conceives precisely that a man is not a horse, it truly conceives what is in reality, in the way in which it can be, namely either positively and fundamentally in the entities of the extremes, or only by way of removal according to the proper notion of negation. For truly and on the part of the thing, one is not the other, even if it is not considered or known by man. I said "if it is a true negation," because if the negation is false—for instance, if someone conceives a man who is not an animal—then that negation, even as a negation, is purely fabricated by the intellect and has only objective being in it; and therefore it is a

being of reason, or rather a negation of reason. For that negation, conceived precisely under the notion of negation, is not apprehended after the manner of a being, but rather after the manner of a non-being, and thus it is a certain negation fashioned by reason. Other negations, however, that are true, can be called real negations or privations insofar as they truly remove real forms or natures, and therefore we must not look in them for a true accidental or substantial essence, because they are not said to be "in things" by positing something in them, but negatively, that is, by removing something from them. Privation and negation, however, are beings of reason insofar as they are conceived after the manner of a being, as has been explained above.

Where Privation & Negation, as They are in Things, Agree

3. First point of agreement. Second. Leaving aside false or fictitious negations—for they do not pertain to the present consideration and require no new explanation beyond what has been said about falsity in Disputation IX[6]—a true and real negation and a privation agree first of all in this: each, as to that which it says formally (as they say, "in recto"), consists solely in a removal, as was said above, and Soncinas treats at length, X Metaph., q. 15, and Niphus, Metaphysics IV, disputation 3; and this is per se manifest. They agree secondly in that each is an extreme of a certain opposition found in things themselves in some way and not feigned by the intellect, namely privative or contradictory opposition. For these oppositions are not fabricated by the intellect, and although they are attributed in a peculiar way to certain acts or compositions of the intellect, nonetheless even in them they indicate a real opposition among those acts, and they presuppose in the objects an opposition that is not

[6] Passim.

made by the intellect but precedes all its fiction, as has been explained above in disputation 45.

4. Third, they agree in that each can have a foundation in the thing to which such negation is attributed, either in some condition of it taken absolutely, or in comparison to another. By "foundation" we mean not only the subject to which the negation or privation is attributed, but the proximate cause or root by reason of which such negation or privation is fitting to such a subject. And this foundation is more frequently and more easily found in negation, because since negation does not require a subject apt to receive the opposite form or nature, it can be founded in the intrinsic nature itself of such a subject, as in man the negation of neighing or bellowing, etc., is founded in the intrinsic difference of man. But privation, since it connotes an aptitude in the subject, cannot be founded in it as such, that is, in its intrinsic nature alone, but in some other form or adjoining condition. Thus, if a man is blind, that privation is not founded on the bare nature of man, but in some other cause which removes the form that the privation denies. This cause is sometimes a positive disposition of the subject; at other times it can be a contrary form, as heat in water brings about the privation of cold. Sometimes, however, it is the mere absence of an extrinsic cause, as in air the cause of darkness is the absence of the sun, although on the side of the air itself a certain nature is presupposed which, although it is apt for the form of light, nevertheless does not have it of itself, nor is it of itself and necessarily conjoined to the cause from which it can receive it.

5. Fourth agreement. Fourth, they agree because both negation and privation can truly and absolutely be predicated of a thing without any fiction of the intellect. I do not say without an operation of the intellect, since predication itself is a certain operation of the intellect; but I say "without fiction," because on the side of the things themselves a sufficient foundation is presupposed so that the intellect can deny one thing of another, conceiving each as it is in itself. Hence, just as the divine intellect or an angel knows negation or

privation without any fiction and without composition or division, so the human intellect, without any fiction, can know such negation, although by means of composition or division because of its imperfect manner of operating. As a result, it does not do this without an indirect and quasi-discursive cognition. For this too is common to privation and negation: they cannot be directly represented by their own species; since they are non-beings, they cannot have such a proper species. Therefore we know them indirectly and by a certain discourse through the species of the opposite form; and thus the cognition of privation necessarily presupposes the cognition of the positive, through which the intellect can arrive at the cognition of the privation. In this way it also happens that both privation and negation are known by a relation to the positive, by removing it, although by an act and concept different from that by which the form itself is conceived positively, directly, and in itself, as Soncinas and Niphus touch upon in the places cited above, and Iavellus, X Metaph., q. 10; Ferrara, I contra Gentiles, ch. 17; Capreolus, II, d. 39, q. 1, a. 3; and Giles, I, dist. 36, q. 2.

6. Now it should be considered that this is known by the intellect in two ways: first, by way of division or negation; and then it is properly known as it is, because by division one extreme is only removed from the other. Second, by way of composition and affirmation, as when we say "the man is blind," or "is not white"; and then there seems to be mingled a certain improper mode of knowing and conceiving. For since in the verb "is" being itself is included in some way, that which in reality is not a being is already attributed after the manner of a being; and upon this is founded, or from this is begun, the other consideration of negation and privation insofar as they are beings of reason, of which we shall speak immediately. It must be noted that in these affirmations the mode according to which the predicate is conceived is not attributed to the subject so that it be attributed to the subject in that mode; rather, only that which is conceived is attributed, namely the negation or privation itself.

Therefore, in reality that affirmation is equivalent to a negation as regards the removal of the predicate; or only by that copula is the truth of the cognition affirmed, as Aristotle indicated in Metaphysics V, chapter 7. Hence, when we say, for example, "Darkness is in the air," we do not signify that something really inheres in the air, but only that the air lacks light; and thus the air is truly known and affirmed to be dark. These, therefore, are common to negation and privation considered in themselves.

Where, as Found in Reality, Negation & Privation Differ

7. They differ, first, because privation signifies the lack of a form in a subject naturally apt for it; negation, however, signifies precisely a lack without the aptitude of the subject. This must be added in order to distinguish it from privation or from the general notion of lack, which can be common both to privation and to negation. This diversity, however, is not in the proper and formal notion which privation and negation say "in recto," but in the connoted element. For privation as such does not intrinsically include the subject or its aptitude. Otherwise privation would not be distinguished from the privated subject, which is as it were a composite of subject and privation, and it would not be a pure non-being, but would consist of the reality of a potency and the negation of an act or form—something contrary to the notion of privation. Therefore privation formally says only a negation, narrowing it to a subject capable of the opposite form; and in this way it is said to differ from negation "in obliquo," that is, insofar as it connotes a subject apt for the opposite form. This kind of difference is also wont to be found among positive forms conceived or signified in such a way. Thus Aristotle often says that snubness differs from curvature; for although formally they say the same figure, snubness signifies it with a reference

to such and such matter. That difference is not essential but material. So too must we think about negation and privation.

The Division of Privations

8. From this difference can be gathered the manifold distinction of privations which Aristotle touched upon in Metaphysics V, chapter 22. Since privation signifies a negation connoting aptitude, sometimes this aptitude is taken so broadly that it is not connoted in the subject to which the privation is attributed, but absolutely in beings—thus a plant (Aristotle's example) is said to be deprived of eyes. At other times the aptitude is connoted in the thing to which the privation is attributed not according to species, but only according to genus—as when a mole is called blind. Third, the aptitude is connoted in the thing according to species, but not according to time and all circumstances required—as when an infant is said to be deprived of teeth. Fourth and more properly, the aptitude is connoted in the thing according to species and according to all the circumstances which are required for such an aptitude. Moreover, privation sometimes connotes only aptitude or capacity—the way darkness or night do with respect to air. At other times, however, it connotes not only capacity but also some principle by reason of which the opposite form is due. In this way, for example, the rest of the earth at the center or of the highest heaven in its place, although it is a privation of motion in the former way, is not in the latter, because no motion is due to such a body existing in such a place. But the lack of cold or dryness with respect to earth would be the privation of a due perfection, which is the most proper privation. In this way a certain ignorance is usually distinguished as a negation, another as a privation. For although each presupposes capacity, and from this angle has the character of a privation, nevertheless that which is the lack of knowledge that is due has a more proper and rigorous character of privation, so that in comparison with it the other is counted a negation. Therefore, since

privation and negation adequately divide lack, as many modes of negation can be multiplied as there are modes of privation. For as much as one recedes from the one, to that extent one approaches the other, and conversely.

9. Again, privation is distinguished by Aristotle above into total privation and privation only in part. Thus a thing is called invisible which lacks color, or which has a very faint color; and so with other cases. Of these the former is simply a privation both in reality and in the mode of speaking. The latter, although in the mode of speaking it is sometimes signified after the manner of absolute privation, is in reality only a privation with respect to what it denies; for if it leaves something, it truly does not deprive with respect to that, as is self-evident.

An Incidental Doubt is Resolved: Whether Privation Admits of More & Less

10. Hence that question is also easily and incidentally resolved: whether privation admits of more and less. A difference is wont to be established also on this point between negation and privation, that negation does not admit of more and less, whereas privation does. But if we speak proportionally of them, there is almost no difference in this regard. For if a privation is total, there can be none greater than it formally and in itself. Another privation can be less if it is not total but only partial; and thus among partial privations there can be a greater and a lesser, according to the nature of the form to which they are opposed. For if the form has degrees of intensity, that physico-greater privation will be the one that removes more degrees of the form from the subject; the greatest will be the one that removes the form entirely; perhaps, however, no least can be given, because there is no least part of a degree of form that can be removed by remission. If, however, the opposite form has a breadth of extension, the privation too can be greater or lesser extensively, in the

same proportion and according to a physical consideration. I add "always according to a physical consideration," because morally the gravity or quantity of privation can be weighed from another source, namely from the greater indebtedness to have such a form. And absolutely, too, in the genus of imperfection or evil, the imperfection or privation will be greater if the opposite form is more due, even if otherwise the negation is equal. I also said that a total privation cannot be greater in itself and formally, because on the side of the cause or foundation sometimes one privation is said to be greater than another. Thus blindness which has a more vehement cause is called greater, even if it does not take more from the form; in this way one immateriality is said to be greater than another, and so with other cases. Yet all this inequality, as is evident from the explanation itself, always comes from the side of a positive reality, which either causes or founds the privation, or at least remains in the subject because it is not removed by it. All this can almost proportionally be applied to negation, because there can also be understood a total or partial negation and one having a greater or lesser cause.

11. Negation can be necessary to a subject; not so privation. One difference seems to intervene here between privation and negation: because negation does not presuppose an aptitude in the subject, it can be such as to be necessary, and the opposed affirmation impossible; in this it can be said to have an exact character of negation. A privation, however, if it is most proper, can never be necessary with respect to its proper subject, because it presupposes a potency for the opposite act. Where there is a potency for contraries, neither extreme is simply impossible or necessary, according to Aristotle's doctrine in Metaphysics IX. From this difference another can be gathered: negation can have an intrinsic and quasi-essential positive foundation in the subject to which it is attributed; but a proper privation, since it belongs per accidens, comes from elsewhere and as it were from an

extrinsic foundation, as was also hinted above when explaining a certain[7] agreement between privation and negation.

12. A difference that is assigned between privation, etc. Whether contradictories lack a middle, whereas privatives have one. From what has been said there follows an understanding of another discrimination that is usually assigned between privation and negation: namely, that between negation and its opposed affirmation there is no middle, whereas between privation and habit there is a middle. Concerning this difference, it should be noted that the discussion is not about affirmation and negation as they are found in the composition and division of the mind. In that case, if there is a proper contradiction, there is never a middle between affirmation and negation, whether what is affirmed and denied is something positive, or something privative. For just as it is necessary either to see or not to see, so too either to be blind or not to be blind—provided that affirmation and negation are made of exactly the same subject and under the same signification or notion of the predicate. If, however, there is not a perfect contradiction but either contrariety or subcontrariety, then in both there can be a middle, either by way of negation or by way of participation in both extremes, as logic teaches. Therefore the discussion here is not about mental compositions themselves, but about simple privation or negation compared to the opposite form which they remove and which we explain by such terms as "blind" or "not seeing." The difference is thus set with respect to the same subject.

13. This can be clarified by two affirmations in which predicates that are opposed contradictorily or privatively are predicated of the same subject. Those contradicted contradictorily have no middle, but one of them is truly said of any subject; nor can it happen that both are at once affirmed or denied without one proposition being true and the other false. In this manner Aristotle

[7] Reading "quamdam" in 1960; others omit the word ("Word omitted in some editions."). Cf. BHF, t. VII, p. 435.

teaches everywhere that there is no middle between contradictories, Metaphysics X, chs. 6 and 10, and Posterior Analytics I, ch. 2. The reason is that between being and non-being no middle can be conceived. You may say that a middle can be posited. I answer: there is a middle between perfect being and absolute non-being, but not absolutely between being and non-being, since it is absolutely something, and consequently in some way a being, as Aristotle takes it in Metaphysics IV, ch. 2. Hence the reason is made clearer: negation simply removes the form or that which it denies and does not require any special condition in the subject; and therefore it cannot be that either the form or the negation of the form does not belong to the subject. But in privative opposites there is a middle, not indeed by participation in both extremes, but by abnegation. For privation does not signify a simple negation but one connoting an aptitude in the subject; and therefore by the defect of this connoted element there can be a subject to which neither of the opposites belongs, as a stone is neither blind nor seeing, although it is necessarily either seeing or not seeing. From this it is consequently understood that with respect to the proper subject that has an aptitude for the form, no middle can be given between privative opposites, because then they already virtually include a contradictory opposition. Wherefore, although the aforesaid difference thus explained is true, nonetheless from it a proportional agreement is gathered: just as between negation and the positive there is no middle with respect to any subject—because with respect to negation or its opposed affirmation any thing whatsoever can be an apt subject—so too between privation and the positive, with respect to a proportioned subject, there is no middle.

14. An objection arises, because even between terms opposed contradictorily there is a middle by abnegation, at least with respect to a non-existent subject—as a chimera is neither white nor not white. For both affirmations are false since they are about a subject that does not supposit. The reply is, first, that negation has no middle if it is taken in the force of pure negation; but if something positive is

mingled, from that side it can have a middle. Thus, if this is false, "The chimera is not seeing," the reason is that vision is not purely denied, but being or existence is affirmed. And so, in order that contradictorily opposed predicates never have a middle even when they are signified after the manner of an affirmation, they must be taken with respect to a proper subject, which is some existing thing; and thus some proportion is maintained between negation and privation. Secondly, the assumption is denied. For of those two propositions, that which is about the negative predicate is true even if the subject does not exist —especially if (as dialecticians say) that negation is taken not "infinitely" but "negatively." This is necessary if the opposition is to be purely negative; otherwise some affirmation will be included on one side, as was rightly said in the first reply. That seems to be the case when that negation is taken "infinitely."

15. Privation belongs only to true beings; negation also to fictitious ones. From this there can also be gathered another difference between privation and pure negation. Privation cannot be attributed except to true and real beings. For since privation signifies the lack of a form in a subject naturally apt for it, it cannot be attributed except to a true and real being; for aptitude for a form exists only in a real being. Indeed it cannot even be attributed except to an existing thing, because since it presupposes an aptitude for the form, it does not belong to the subject of necessity but contingently, as we said above (for we are speaking of privation taken properly and strictly). Accidental and contingent predicates do not belong to things, nor can they be truly attributed to them, unless they exist in reality. This indeed is true according to propositions "of inherence"; for a non-existing man cannot truly be said to be blind. It will be otherwise, however, if a modal or "de possibili" proposition is made: he is truly said to be able to be blind; but then privation is not being attributed, but the capacity for privation, which is positive and intrinsic.

16. But negation can be attributed not only to true and existing beings but also to fictitious and non-existing ones, not only by

dividing but also by composing and affirming. For this proposition is strictly true in speech: "The chimera is a non-being." For if it is a fictitious being, then it is a non-being. Hence Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, says that this locution is true: that the non-being is a non[8] being, or nothing. If it is a non-being, it is also a non-man, a non-horse, and any other similar contained under "non-being." The reason can be that although these have the form of affirmations, in sense and signification they are equivalent to negations, so that although that negation in the order of composition follows the copula, in force and as regards sense it falls upon it. Or it can be said otherwise that the copula is freed from time, because, in the way in which the subject is conceived as a fictitious being, the predicate is of the intrinsic notion of the subject; and therefore that proposition can not only be true but even necessary. This response and the difference thus explained does not displease me. I only note that what has been said about privations is to be understood of true and real privations. For there can also be certain imaginary and fabricated privations in fictitious beings, as if someone were to feign a cage for the chimera or conceive an imaginary space as dark, or something similar. Such a privation can be attributed to a fictitious being with respect to a copula that abstracts or extends such fictitious being. And in the same way negations of others can be attributed to certain fictitious beings and one negation to another; thus it is conceived that the chimera is not a "hircocervus," and imaginary space is not something successive.

17. Why privation is numbered among the principles of a natural thing, whereas negation is not. Another difference can be assigned between privation and negation: privation is numbered among the principles of real change or generation; negation, as such, cannot assume the character of a principle. The first part is known from Aristotle, Physics I and Metaphysics XI, where he places privation among the principles of a material thing. The second part is proved because not from just any negation can a natural change come

[8] Reading "esse non" in 1861, 1960; "non esse" in 1597.

to be. The reason for both parts is that change cannot occur except in a subject capable of it; and therefore the lack presupposed in it must have the character of privation, since it is a negation in a subject naturally apt for the opposite form. Therefore that which is a pure negation and has not assumed the character of privation cannot be a principle of change. It is not, however, for us here to explain how privation takes on the character of a principle; that properly pertains to Physics I, and for the purposes of this topic it was sufficiently touched upon above, disputation XII, section 1. For it is a principle not properly as exerting an influence, but as a per se necessary terminus from which change is made. From this, moreover, it is rightly confirmed, along with Cajetan and others as we said above, that privation considered in itself—although it is not a real being—is not something fabricated by reason, but such a lack as is found in things themselves in its own way. For with all fiction of reason set aside, natural change can have its necessary principles, one of which is privation.

18. You may say: in this way negation too, taken in itself, belongs to things without fiction of the intellect, namely by removing, as we also said above. The reply is that negation is unable to be a principle of natural change, not because it lacks this condition, but because of itself it does not require a subject capable of the opposite form, which is necessary for natural change. Whence one can add that although negation alone cannot be a sufficient principle of change, nevertheless some negation can be, in its own order and as a terminus a quo, a sufficient principle of some action or production. Thus creation is said to be made "from nothing," just as generation "from privation"; "nothing," however, signifies a mere negation. It can nevertheless be added that the character of a principle is not attributed so properly to "nothing" with respect to creation as privation is with respect to generation, because privation, at least on the side of the subject, connotes or includes something positive, which seems necessary for the proper notion of a principle. But of this elsewhere.

Whether There is a Return from Privation to Habit

19. There next occurred here to be explained the common axiom: "From privation to habit there is no return," which is taken from Aristotle, Generation II and Metaphysics VIII, ch. 5, where we briefly declared that it is true with respect to the numerically same form, not with respect to the same in species except as regards an immediate return, and that not in all forms but in certain ones which by their nature determine among themselves a fixed order. There we spoke with Aristotle about a form which can be introduced by its proper action or generation, and about the privation opposed to it. But there are certain accidental forms which necessarily flow from some intrinsic principle and cannot occur otherwise; and in these, if a privation happens to occur, a return to the habit cannot naturally be made, neither to the numerically same nor to the same in species. Such seems to be blindness or deafness, which therefore cannot naturally be taken away, because there is in nature no intrinsic principle able to restore the organ of such a faculty to that disposition through the defect of which it also lost the faculty itself. But these matters now exceed the treatment of beings of reason, which we are handling in this disputation, and therefore let what has been said about privation and negation under the former consideration be sufficient.

Privation & Negation Compared Insofar as They are Beings of Reason

20. Privation has the greatest proportion to quality. In the second way we can treat of them formally insofar as they are beings of reason. Thus they also agree in all those things that are common to a being of reason as such, or to an absolute being of reason (so to speak), that is, as it is distinguished from a being of reason which is a

relation, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said in the preceding sections. Hence it seems common to each to be feigned or thought after the manner of a certain quality affecting the subject which it denominates—although not equally or in the same way. For of privation this seems to be universally true. For example, blindness is apprehended as a certain disposition of such an organ, and darkness as a disposition of the air. For whatever is apprehended after the manner of a positive being must be conceived by analogy or proportion to a being of some real category; and in respect of the thing which it denominates, the apprehension of privation has with no other genus such great an analogy as with quality.

21. An objection is answered. You will say that this is true when the form to which privation is opposed is a quality, but otherwise if it is something of another category. I answer by denying the assumption, which I show briefly by running through the other categories. For the privation of a substantial form is not apprehended in matter after the manner of a substantial form, but after the manner of an accidental disposition which can be present and absent, and thus even that imitates a quality. Quantity, however, is not naturally separable, and therefore there is no natural privation of quantity. If, however, by absolute power we suppose a material substance deprived of quantity, we will not apprehend that privation after the manner of quantity, but rather after the manner of a certain immaterial and simple disposition. The reason for the difference between quantity and quality seems to be that quantity never has another quantity contrary to it; and therefore the lack of quantity is not apprehended after the manner of an opposite quantity, but as a certain disposition of a different kind and as having a formal effect far different in kind from the whole genus of quantity. But one quality can have another contrary to it, and hence it comes about that when a quality has no contrary, its privation can be apprehended after the manner of the opposite quality and as having a formal effect opposed to the effect of the contrary quality—yet not outside the breadth or proportion of the

whole genus of quality. By almost the same reasoning I said above that the privation of relation as such is not conceived after the manner of relation, because by such a privation the proportion and likeness to a true relation is destroyed, since the order to another is denied. I do not deny, however, that along with the privation of one relation another positively opposed or diverse relation can be understood, sometimes real, sometimes of reason. Thus, when someone is deprived of the relation of similitude, a real relation of dissimilitude can arise; and in one who is deprived of the relation of sonship by the death of the father, a relation of reason can be conceived to the generator who has now passed—but this is not the conception of privation as such, but of another form.

22. The same can easily be understood in the last categories, insofar as some mode of privation can be found in them. For in action as such there does not seem to be a proper privation, because action does not regard the agent as a subject but as a principle. Therefore the lack of action with respect to the agent is not properly a negation "in a subject naturally apt," and thus is not properly a privation. Yet whatever kind of negation or privation it is, it is not conceived after the manner of action, because it is not conceived as flowing from the agent. Similarly with passion (and the same is true of change and motion), although with respect to it there is given a proper privation, it is not conceived after the manner of passion, because it is not conceived as something in process, but as something in accomplished fact and at rest. Thus rest, which is the privation of motion, is not apprehended after the manner of passion, but as a kind of disposition remaining in quiet. In duration there never intervenes a proper and pure privation, because duration cannot be wholly taken away unless its subject is destroyed. Nor is place, as I think, removed by pure privation, but by the opposite place; and the same is true of position (situs) in things which are capable of it. Therefore in these categories privations of this kind are not fabricated as beings of reason; and if they are in some way conceived positively, this happens only by

conceiving certain relations, such as absence or distance of place or time. Finally, with respect to having (habitus) a certain privation is conceived, because man is not properly the subject of clothing; and in the way in which "having" can have the character of a privation, it is not conceived in the image of having, because it is not conceived after the manner of something adjacent but rather as quasi-inhering; nor is its effect conceived as having a proportion with the effect of "having," but rather as entirely outside its whole breadth. Therefore it seems rightly said that privation, universally and if it is true and proper, is apprehended or thought after the manner of quality.

23. With what true genus of being negation has a proportion. In the case of negation, however, that general rule does not seem to be universally true, but a distinction is needed. Either negation is conceived as an affection of some subject that lacks such a nature or form, and then the same account is almost true of negation as of privation, and everything said can easily be applied. Negation has, however, this further feature: it can be apprehended outside any subject, which is repugnant to privation, since privation intrinsically signifies a negation in a subject naturally apt. Such a negation is not always apprehended after the manner of quality, but also after the image of other categories. For we said above that impossible beings which are feigned after the manner of substances are included under negation. Likewise imaginary space, which we conceive after the manner of dimensions, is in truth not a proper privation but a certain negation, because no subject or real capacity is presupposed for it; hence it also pertains to negation. The same is true of imaginary time or succession, which is feigned outside any subject.

24. Privation is always conceived as being in something; negation is not. From this one can further gather a distinction between negation and privation. Privation is always conceived as something adhering or adjoined to some subject, as has been explained; negation, however, is not always so conceived. For "nothing" itself is a certain negation which is understood as adhering

to no thing; and the same is clear from the other examples adduced above.

25. How great the diversity between negation and privation. From this one can also conjecture when between these two members there is, in our mode of conceiving, an essential diversity, and when only an accidental or material one. A negation that is conceived as per se and outside a subject by its very notion, formally differs from privation, and consequently also from that negation which in itself is conceived as adhering to something and denominating it. For they are apprehended under diverse notions of being, such as to be after the manner of something existing per se, or in itself, or in another. But privation and that negation which is conceived after the manner of something existing in another do not necessarily differ essentially, but according to the diversity of the forms to which they are opposed—just as negations among themselves and privations among themselves are distinguished, as St. Thomas noted, I–II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 1. Although this is especially true of negations and privations fundamentally considered, nonetheless it holds formally also in these insofar as they are beings of reason. For blindness and deafness, even insofar as they are apprehended after the manner of beings, are apprehended as diverse, and proportionally the same holds for negations compared among themselves. Hence, a fortiori, if privation and negation are opposed to forms essentially diverse, they too, in their own order, will have a similar or proportional diversity, not because they are privation and negation, but because they are of such forms.

26. When privation and negation are of the same form in comparison to diverse subjects—such as the negation of sight with respect to a man and an angel—then indeed in the notion of a being of reason they do not seem to differ essentially, but only by denomination or by a relation taken from their order to diverse subjects. This is clear: in real and positive forms, comparison to diverse subjects does not cause an essential diversity in the form, but only diverse denominations or relations, if otherwise the entity of the

form considered in itself has the same constitutive principle. Thus whiteness in snow and in a crow will be of the same species, even if in the former it is a connatural property and in the latter would be violent and preternatural (if it were present). Likewise the same motion downward is natural to earth, violent to air; and yet, on that account, in the kind of being they do not differ in species. So too the lack of sight in itself is of the same account, because it always has the same specifying principle and is apprehended under the same notion of being, although compared to an angel—on account of his incapacity—it retains only the notion of negation, while compared to a man it is denominated a privation. Therefore, under the notion of evil they also differ; for that lack is an evil for man, not for an angel, and similarly it can be denominated violent for man, but connatural for the angel. This, however, is to be understood of that lack considered in itself. If we speak of it as in "the composite sense," as a denominated privation or pure negation, then it includes diverse respects of reason to diverse subjects, which respects are essential to the denominated forms, as they exist under such denominations.

27. Finally (as I said above), here we are speaking of negation as it is conceived after the manner of an incomplex form. If the discussion is about complex negations, then an essential diversity can be understood between the lack with respect to diverse subjects to which it is compared as negation or privation. For this negation, "The angel does not have sight," or this affirmation, "The angel is not seeing," are far different from these, "The man is blind," or "lacks sight." The former are necessary propositions, the latter contingent; hence they have essential diversity. Nor is this surprising, because with respect to a composition the extremes themselves are intrinsically compared as components of that composition; and therefore, when one extreme varies, the composition and relation of the composition vary. It is otherwise in a simple form considered in itself; for it intrinsically includes neither this nor that subject, but only a relation to a subject quasi-adequate.

SECTION VI
WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A RELATION OF REASON, AND IN HOW MANY WAYS IT CAN BE FEIGNED OR DEVISED

1. The description of a relation of reason. Since a relation of reason is distinguished from all absolutes by the common, or quasi-common, notion of relation, and from real relations by the fact that it is not a true and real relation, it can be defined in general by the negation of a real respect: thus a relation of reason is any relation that is not real. Because that negation cannot be understood as conjoined with what "relation" says after the manner of something positive except by the fiction or thought of the intellect, a relation of reason can be defined positively in general as a relation which the intellect feigns after the manner of a form ordered to another, or referring one thing to another, which in the thing itself is not ordered or referred.

What is Required for a Relation of Reason

2. Therefore, since a relation of reason falls short of the truth of a real relation and is a certain shadow of it, two things seem to be required for it. One is that in it there do not concur all those things which are wont to be necessary for a real relation, such as a capable subject, a real foundation with the due ratio of founding, and a real term actually existing with a sufficient real foundation "from the nature of the thing," about which much was said above. All these things, taken together, cannot be common to a relation of reason; otherwise such a relation could not in any respect be distinguished from a real relation. The other is that something of those things which concur in a real relation should in some way found, at least remotely, the relation of reason—or rather the thought and mode of conceiving

by which the relation of reason is fabricated—the intellect itself supplying what is lacking in the thing for a true respect. I say that it is necessary that there be something in things which will at least remotely found, or give occasion for, this relation, because, as I have often said, we are dealing with beings of reason which in some way contribute to the cognition of real beings, which always have some foundation in the thing. If, however, we wish to comprehend all relations of reason whatsoever, we can add that a relation of reason is one to which some condition necessary for a real relation is lacking, or to which all are lacking, while something proportional to them is feigned or thought by the intellect.

The First Division of Relations of Reason

3. This, then, can be called the first division of the relation of reason: into that which is entirely fabricated by the intellect without any foundation on the side of the thing, and that which has some foundation in the thing, although not sufficient. By "foundation" I now understand all the conditions necessary for a real relation. In the first member are contained all relations of reason which are thought among other beings of reason, especially if such beings of reason are purely fictitious—as the relation of similarity between two chimeras, or of dissimilarity between a chimera and a "hircocervus," and the like. To this are to be referred as well relations of reason among two privations, in which way one dark place is said to be similar to another; and in imaginary space a relation of distance is conceived; and in imaginary succession a relation of prior and posterior. Although these relations founded on privations or negations of things have some greater foundation, at least remote, in the things themselves. Third, to this member can be reduced relations of reason among real possible things that are not, however, existing—such as the relation of the precedence of Adam to the Antichrist, and the like. These have a greater foundation in things, because their extremes are not altogether

beings of reason, although, as they are apprehended as extremes or subjects of relations, they are beings of reason. Hence, in these three orders of relations which we number under that first member there is included a certain subdivision of that member; and under those orders almost all modes of real relations can easily be devised by analogy or proportion.

The Second Division of Relations

4. Relations of reason, however, which have some foundation in existing things can be subdivided further according to the diversity of foundations or, conversely, according to the variety of defects of those conditions which are required for a real relation. Under this member, first, can be placed those relations which are attributed to an existing thing with respect to a non-existing term, whether that be a possible being or a fictitious one—for example, the relation of priority of Peter who exists to the future Antichrist, or of diversity of Peter who exists from a chimera. And by the same reasoning there pertains to this order the corresponding relation of reason in the other extreme, of the non-being to the being, or of a being of reason to a real being. For in these there is lacking a condition necessary for a real relation on the part of the term, namely that it be real and really existing. In this very order three modes of relatives could proportionally be distinguished, which are founded either on unity, or on action, or on the notion of measure. All these are relations of reason when the other extreme is not real and existing.

5. Secondly, under that member are constituted those relations which are conceived among extremes that are something real, yet which in the thing do not have a real or actual distinction "from the nature of the thing," but only a distinction of reason; for here there is lacking another condition required for a real relation. And according to the diverse distinction of reason between the extremes of this relation, there will be diversity among such relations.

Sometimes there is only a distinction of reason "on the part of the mind as reasoning" (rationis ratiocinantis), as in the relation of identity of the same to itself. Sometimes there is a distinction of reason "on the side of the thing as reasoned" (rationis ratiocinatae), which is fundamental or virtual in the thing, as in the relation of distinction among the divine attributes, and so with others. In relations of this sort, with the said defect of distinction in the thing itself, some foundation of unity or distinction is presupposed in effects or acts, or in some similar reality, from which the intellect takes the occasion for devising similar relations, as is clear from the examples adduced. Hence there are to be reduced to this kind of relation of reason those which, although they are conversant among distinct things, nevertheless lack a sufficient distinction of foundation because, namely, there is one and the same thing in each extreme—as the relation of likeness or equality among the divine Persons, about which we spoke above.

6. Third, in this order are constituted those relations of reason which, although they are conversant among distinct things and otherwise capable of real predicamental relations, are relations of reason because of a defect of the intrinsic foundation, either in both or in one extreme; these can be considered as two members of this very genus. Hence to this kind belong, first of all, all relations which are founded in each extreme only on an extrinsic denomination, as is the relation of a sign to what is signified "by convention"; in both the sign and the signified this is a relation of reason, whether such a sign is a sound, as a noun or verb, or a thing, as a sacrament. For since this imposition to signify posits nothing of reality in the sign except an extrinsic denomination, nor in the signified either, it cannot found a real relation, as all teach. Next, of the same sort are the relations of lord and servant among human beings; for these are founded only on a certain extrinsic denomination taken from the will. Many others are similar to this, as all those which arise from human contracts and wills:

as between husband and wife in the notion of spouses; between buyer and seller from the will to contract; and so with others.

7. Again, to the other member of this genus pertain all non-mutual relations, insofar as they are relations of reason in one extreme, such as the relation of "the seen" to the seer, or of "the visible" to the seen, or of "the knowable" to knowledge, and so forth, about which enough has been said in disputation XLVII[9]. To this are to be referred also all the relations of God to existing creatures. For these too could be said to be founded on an extrinsic denomination, because in God Himself there is, as such, no capacity and therefore no foundation for such relations.

8. Fourth and last, we can constitute another member of those relations in which many of the aforesaid defects of what is necessary for a real relation concur, together with some remote foundation on the part of the thing and a proximate one in some extrinsic denomination. Such seem to be the relations of reason which are called logical intentions, such as the relations of genus, species, predicate, subject, and the like. These relations are sometimes attributed to words, since predications and definitions are made by means of words; sometimes to things, because those are what are known objectively, are subjected and predicated; and these are properly called logical intentions. The former belong either to grammar or rhetoric or are secondarily attributed to words as instruments by which we manifest our concepts and speak about things. In these relations, therefore, although sometimes the extremes are real, there often is lacking a sufficient distinction, as between animal and rational insofar as they are compared as genus and difference. Sometimes also there is not sufficient unity and existence in the other extreme as so related, as is the case with the universal as such with respect to singulars; for insofar as it is universal it neither exists nor has such unity in reality. Finally, there is never in the things themselves a sufficient foundation for a relation of this kind, because

[9] Cf. sect. XIV–XV.

they are proximately founded on some extrinsic denomination arising from an act of the intellect.

Concerning Second Intentions

9. A threefold operation of the intellect is followed by a threefold relation of reason. Hence, in accordance with the three operations of the intellect, there is also a threefold order of such relations. From the first operation arise the relations of genus, species, definition, defined, etc. From the second operation, the relation of predicate, subject, copula, proposition. From the third, the relation of antecedent, consequent, middle, extremity, etc. These relations do not belong to things according to themselves, but as denominated from some operation of the intellect; and therefore they are always of reason and not real, even if they sometimes happen to be conversant among existing and distinct things. Yet these relations are not gratuitously fabricated; rather, some foundation is taken from the thing: such as real agreement, on which is founded the abstraction of the universal, which is also varied into genus, species, etc., insofar as the agreement is greater or lesser; or real identity or union of one with another, on which is founded the affirmation of one about another; or real emanation of one from another, or concomitance, or something similar, on which is founded an inference a priori or a posteriori.

10. Why the relations of genus, species, and the like have assumed the name "second intention." For this reason these last relations of reason are wont to be called in a special way "second intentions," as if they resulted from the second intention or attention or consideration of the intellect. By this name "second intention" is properly called reflexive intellection, because it presupposes another upon which it bears. Although, as we said above, all beings of reason can in some way be said to be founded on an operation of the intellect from which they arise—a operation which always presupposes another concept of a real being, after whose image or on whose

occasion the being of reason is conceived—nonetheless properly that operation is reflexive and, so to speak, per se "second," which falls upon another cognition, or upon the object as denominated by a prior cognition and thereby sharing certain properties. Because these logical relations are always founded on such reflexive cognition, therefore they are peculiarly called "second intentions," or second objective notions, because they are objected to the second or reflexive formal notion. Hence, by antonomasia, these relations of reason are wont to be called "things of second intention"—not because every thing known by reflexive intellection is a being of reason (for it is clear that real intellection itself can be known reflexively), but because their being is only objective in the second or reflexive cognition of the intellect.

11. From this there further arises that the intellect can reflect again upon the very second intentions themselves, and consider agreements or differences among them, define them, or reason from them, and thus found similar relations in them. Thus, from genus and species it abstracts the relation of the universal and denominates "genus" by that; and so with others. Then those relations are not only of reason on account of other defects, but because they are not conversant proximately among real or existing things. Therefore, when these relations are said to be founded in some way on things, it is to be understood of the first relations of this order. To say more about these relations pertains to the particular sciences, because these relations can be multiplied almost to infinity by fictions or reflections of the intellect; and therefore, concerning them and the whole of this doctrine, let what has been said suffice—things which may redound to the praise of the glorious God.

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